Chinese missile could shift Pacific power balance
By Eric Talmadge
Associated Press Writer, Thu Aug 5, 2010
ABOARD THE USS GEORGE WASHINGTON – Nothing projects U.S. global air and sea power more vividly than supercarriers. Bristling with fighter jets that can reach deep into even landlocked trouble zones, America's virtually invincible carrier fleet has long enforced its dominance of the high seas.
China may soon put an end to that.
U.S. naval planners are scrambling to deal with what analysts say is a game-changing weapon being developed by China — an unprecedented carrier-killing missile called the Dong Feng 21D that could be launched from land with enough accuracy to penetrate the defenses of even the most advanced moving aircraft carrier at a distance of more than 1,500 kilometers (900 miles).
___
EDITOR'S NOTE — The USS George Washington supercarrier recently deployed off North Korea in a high-profile show of U.S. sea power. AP Tokyo News Editor Eric Talmadge was aboard the carrier, and filed this report.
___
Analysts say final testing of the missile could come as soon as the end of this year, though questions remain about how fast China will be able to perfect its accuracy to the level needed to threaten a moving carrier at sea.
The weapon, a version of which was displayed last year in a Chinese military parade, could revolutionize China's role in the Pacific balance of power, seriously weakening Washington's ability to intervene in any potential conflict over Taiwan or North Korea. It could also deny U.S. ships safe access to international waters near China's 11,200-mile (18,000-kilometer) -long coastline.
While a nuclear bomb could theoretically sink a carrier, assuming its user was willing to raise the stakes to atomic levels, the conventionally-armed Dong Feng 21D's uniqueness is in its ability to hit a powerfully defended moving target with pin-point precision.
The Chinese Defense Ministry did not immediately respond to the AP's request for a comment.
Funded by annual double-digit increases in the defense budget for almost every year of the past two decades, the Chinese navy has become Asia's largest and has expanded beyond its traditional mission of retaking Taiwan to push its sphere of influence deeper into the Pacific and protect vital maritime trade routes.
"The Navy has long had to fear carrier-killing capabilities," said Patrick Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the nonpartisan, Washington-based Center for a New American Security. "The emerging Chinese antiship missile capability, and in particular the DF 21D, represents the first post-Cold War capability that is both potentially capable of stopping our naval power projection and deliberately designed for that purpose."
Setting the stage for a possible conflict, Beijing has grown increasingly vocal in its demands for the U.S. to stay away from the wide swaths of ocean — covering much of the Yellow, East and South China seas — where it claims exclusivity.
It strongly opposed plans to hold U.S.-South Korean war games in the Yellow Sea off the northeastern Chinese coast, saying the participation of the USS George Washington supercarrier, with its 1,092-foot (333-meter) flight deck and 6,250 personnel, would be a provocation because it put Beijing within striking range of U.S. F-18 warplanes.
The carrier instead took part in maneuvers held farther away in the Sea of Japan.
U.S. officials deny Chinese pressure kept it away, and say they will not be told by Beijing where they can operate.
"We reserve the right to exercise in international waters anywhere in the world," Rear Adm. Daniel Cloyd, who headed the U.S. side of the exercises, said aboard the carrier during the maneuvers, which ended last week.
But the new missile, if able to evade the defenses of a carrier and of the vessels sailing with it, could undermine that policy.
"China can reach out and hit the U.S. well before the U.S. can get close enough to the mainland to hit back," said Toshi Yoshihara, an associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College. He said U.S. ships have only twice been that vulnerable — against Japan in World War II and against Soviet bombers in the Cold War.
Carrier-killing missiles "could have an enduring psychological effect on U.S. policymakers," he e-mailed to The AP. "It underscores more broadly that the U.S. Navy no longer rules the waves as it has since the end of World War II. The stark reality is that sea control cannot be taken for granted anymore."
Yoshihara said the weapon is causing considerable consternation in Washington, though — with attention focused on land wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — its implications haven't been widely discussed in public.
Analysts note that while much has been made of China's efforts to ready a carrier fleet of its own, it would likely take decades to catch U.S. carrier crews' level of expertise, training and experience.
But Beijing does not need to match the U.S. carrier for carrier. The Dong Feng 21D, smarter, and vastly cheaper, could successfully attack a U.S. carrier, or at least deter it from getting too close.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned of the threat in a speech last September at the Air Force Association Convention.
"When considering the military-modernization programs of countries like China, we should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the U.S. symmetrically — fighter to fighter or ship to ship — and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options," he said.
Gates said China's investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, along with ballistic missiles, "could threaten America's primary way to project power" through its forward air bases and carrier strike groups.
The Pentagon has been worried for years about China getting an anti-ship ballistic missile. The Pentagon considers such a missile an "anti-access," weapon, meaning that it could deny others access to certain areas.
The Air Force's top surveillance and intelligence officer, Lt. Gen. David Deptula, told reporters this week that China's effort to increase anti-access capability is part of a worrisome trend.
He did not single out the DF 21D, but said: "While we might not fight the Chinese, we may end up in situations where we'll certainly be opposing the equipment that they build and sell around the world."
Questions remain over when — and if — China will perfect the technology; hitting a moving carrier is no mean feat, requiring state-of-the-art guidance systems, and some experts believe it will take China a decade or so to field a reliable threat. Others, however, say final tests of the missile could come in the next year or two.
Former Navy commander James Kraska, a professor of international law and sea power at the U.S. Naval War College, recently wrote a controversial article in the magazine Orbis outlining a hypothetical scenario set just five years from now in which a Deng Feng 21D missile with a penetrator warhead sinks the USS George Washington.
That would usher in a "new epoch of international order in which Beijing emerges to displace the United States."
While China's Defense Ministry never comments on new weapons before they become operational, the DF 21D — which would travel at 10 times the speed of sound and carry conventional payloads — has been much discussed by military buffs online.
A pseudonymous article posted on Xinhuanet, website of China's official news agency, imagines the U.S. dispatching the George Washington to aid Taiwan against a Chinese attack.
The Chinese would respond with three salvos of DF 21D, the first of which would pierce the hull, start fires and shut down flight operations, the article says. The second would knock out its engines and be accompanied by air attacks. The third wave, the article says, would "send the George Washington to the bottom of the ocean."
Comments on the article were mostly positive.
___
AP writer Christopher Bodeen in Beijing and National Security Writer Anne Gearan in Washington, D.C., contributed to this report.
Copyright © 2010 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.
Sunday, August 8, 2010
China and Africa: entrepreneurship and business
Some will find the same traits as the old European, or perhaps American, imperialism. Others consider that China is interested only in real business, trade, investments and commodities...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
CHINA AND AFRICA
Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa, land of a billion customers
Tessa Thorniley
Danwei, August 2, 2010
Multi-billion dollar resource and infrastructure deals between China and African countries make the business headlines ever more regularly, but there are very few reports on the growing numbers of Chinese entrepreneurs and small private companies seeking opportunities in Africa that they cannot find in China.
The trouble began in February when members of the Windhoek chamber of commerce complained that an invasion of Chinese corner shops, hairdressers, restaurants and traders was forcing out local businesses.
"There has been rapid growth in the number of small-scale retailing outlets throughout the country, offering low-quality products and replacing long-existing locally-owned businesses," the chamber announced, lobbying the government to protect Namibian businesses from such energetic Chinese competition.
Hage Geingob, Namibia's trade and industry minister and former prime minister, heard their plea. He banned all foreign investment in hair salons and public transport and introduced a permit system for new shopowners.
In defence of his protectionist new law, Mr Geingob suggested that members of the Chinese business community might have been operating illegally, without registering their businesses or declaring all of their earnings. "There have been concerns sparked by the activities of Chinese business people," he said.
Whatever the excuse, the strength of the backlash shows the extent to which Chinese firms have penetrated markets across Africa, and how worried the locals are. Armies of small entrepreneurs, marching in the wake of China's huge state-owned firms, have reached the very darkest parts of the continent.
"Across Africa today, everywhere, no matter how remote, you'll find a Chinese restaurant and a Chinese shop or local traders," says Martyn Davies, a South African consultant who is a director of the China Africa Network at the Gordon Institute of Business Science at the University of Pretoria. "And African consumers are buying Chinese products. More than two-thirds of the non-food products sold at Shoprite [a South African retail and fast-food group with stores across the continent] are from China," he adds.
Although multi-billion natural resource deals dominate the headlines, as many as 80 per cent of the Chinese companies that are currently operating in Africa are small or medium-sized enterprises, according to Dr Jing Gu, a research fellow at Sussex University's Institute of Development Studies.
They have come to get rich, she says: "Chinese private sector investment in Africa is not driven by Chinese government policy or Chinese political interests. They are more focused on the pursuit of profit."
Bilateral trade between China and Africa fell 15 per cent during the financial crisis. But in the first two months of this year it bounced back strongly, up 94 per cent year-on-year to $17.6 billion. The total trade for the year should top $100 billion and China is the biggest trading partner for many African states.
Estimates of the number of Chinese vary. Official figures from the Namibian Trade ministry show there are 500 small Chinese retailers in the country. But since the majority of small companies do not register themselves, the number could be far higher. "Senior Chinese officials estimate that there are a million Chinese on the continent but no-one truly knows because the borders are porous and there are no real records, such as bank accounts," says Mr Davies.
Many Chinese on the continent came over with the large SOEs but then spotted openings in the market that were too good to resist. "In terms of actual SMEs, companies with hundreds or thousands of employees, there are relatively few," says Adam Mahamat, a project advisor from Cameroon who now works at the China-Africa Business Council in Beijing. "What we have seen is that Chinese people who first went over to Africa to work for state-owned businesses are quitting these jobs and setting up on their own. Then they invite their friends and families over to help them when they begin to grow."
In the eyes of small Chinese companies, Africa is a land of opportunity. As one African official in Beijing put it: "The Chinese view Africa as an entity of one billion potential customers, much like the way the West views China."
* * *
At Oxford University, Alex Gadzala's doctoral work focuses on the effect of small Chinese businesses on the Kenyan economy. Her conclusions are dramatic. Africa may have received billions of dollars of aid money and infrastructure investment, but the arrival of large numbers of Chinese migrants will have an even more significant effect on transforming the continent's fortunes.
"Rather than large-scale investment and aid projects, it is the migratory influx [of Chinese] that carries the greatest ramifications for Africa's economic development," she says, arguing that Chinese competition is forcing stagnant local economies to adapt or die.
For decades, business in Kenya has been conducted on a short-term and informal basis known in Swahili as 'jua kali' or 'under the hot sun'. The Chinese, with their tight networks of guanxi, or relationships, have a strong competitive advantage. Kenyan businesses will be forced to evolve, argues Ms Gadzala, and to jettison the short-term thinking that is hampering their development.
Small, pragmatic and flexible, the Chinese companies are also prepared to tread where others have dared not to. Traders have been willing to enter the very lowest-margin sectors of the economy where supply chains are weak and which most other foreign businesses do not consider worthwhile.
The latest generation of mainland Chinese migrants have brought with them such a cheap and competitive array of products and services that they are even pushing out the first wave of ethnic Chinese migrants, the small groups of Taiwanese or Hong Kongers who arrived ten or 20 years ago.
"Chinese entrepreneurs often invest in places that many in the West would avoid," says Dr Gu. "They are more focused on new market opportunities and the pursuit of profit. They are not overly concerned about the investment climate, although they do have serious day-to-day issues relating to infrastructure."
The early challenges in adapting to the African environment are also being rapidly overcome. Until now, small Chinese companies have found it difficult to raise capital to expand because they distrusted the local banking system. Most also either stashed their profits or sent the money back to China. Earlier this year, however, Standard Chartered launched premium banking services in a number of African states, including Ghana and Nigeria, for Chinese SMEs who want to speak to bankers in their own language.
But despite bringing tangible benefits to African economies, small Chinese businesses are still viewed with suspicion and, in some cases, hostility. Some African countries, including Namibia, believe the arrival of the Chinese poses a threat to local jobs and industries and have imposed protectionist measures.
In South Africa, the effect of Chinese trade has been problematic. Chinese imports have decimated the local textile trade, forcing as many as 70,000 people out of work. In Nigeria, textile imports are banned and there are tariffs of up to 45 per cent on clothing imports.
And not all the Chinese businesses arriving are wholesome. Neon-lit karaoke parlours, where entertainment stretches beyond singing, and the occasional brothel lit by red lanterns have also sprung up, giving anti-Chinese groups fuel for their criticism.
Last year, a court in Ghana sentenced "King" James Xu Jin, his wife Chou Xiuying and his brother to a combined 41 years in prison for sex-trafficking. The trio had run the Peach Blossom Palace and had "enslaved" eight Chinese women, tricking them into believing that they were travelling to Africa to work in a restaurant before seizing their passports and forcing them into prostitution.
* * *
In Cameroon, David Xie, a 28-year-old business manager from Sichuan, has been in Africa for five years. He works as a liaison between a construction company building new water supply projects and the local government. But he readily admits he has spent little time outside the company walls. "Our company offered me a bed in a dormitory so most of the time I hang around there with my colleagues," he says. "I do not eat African food, except for fruit and beer." Although his company is a good mix of locals and Chinese, and despite the fact that he says communication is no problem ("most people here speak English or French"), the two sides remain clearly divided.
In Portuguese-speaking Angola, which pumps two million barrels of oil a day, the two communities are even further apart. Meng Mei, born in France to Chinese parents, has been working in Luanda since 2008. "In my experience there is almost no contact between the locals and Chinese workers. There is no integration. On the construction sites, the Chinese usually live on site. They live, work and sleep there. They don't go out. It's quite similar to the way migrant workers behave in China. They save money and send it home.
"For me, however, it is quite odd. I am Chinese but born and raised abroad. The Chinese workers do not go to movies or out to restaurants very much and they certainly don't do this with the locals. Some higher-ups may interact more, but only for business purposes," she says.
The lack of strong ties between the communities has created distrust and resentment. There are long-simmering tensions over the number of Chinese workers brought over by firms doing unskilled jobs that could have been given to local laborers. The Angolan government has tightened its immigration policies, and the cost of winning a long-term visa for a Chinese worker, together with travel costs and welfare payments, has risen to as much as USD20,000.
In response, Chinese companies have tried to take on more local staff, according to William Wang, an IT engineer who works with Meng Mei in Angola. “Back in 2008, maybe you would only see Chinese workers in Chinese companies but that has changed a lot in the last two years. I know a Chinese construction boss in Luanda, he hires 70 Chinese workers and 500 or 600 locals. It's not uncommon," he says. "I don't think the Angolans feel we are taking jobs. We have created employment also."
He adds: “In the past, I think there were problems because even the brightest Angolans had no real expertise – because of the war they didn't have much chance to develop. An IT engineer was qualified if he could switch on a computer and type. That's not the case anymore. Universities are training Angolans and they are increasingly skilled. Perhaps Chinese companies doing business here incentivised that?”
Mr Wang doesn't speak Portuguese but he says he occasionally socializes with African colleagues in Luanda, most of whom speak English. "I've been out with my African clients in Luanda. People in the telecoms sector. We eat dinner in a Chinese restaurant and once I invited them out for karaoke. I think they quite liked it. The bar had songs in Portuguese, Chinese and English so we could all sing," he says.
But clearly it will take more than a kizomba song from Ralph Anselmo, one of Angola's hottest singers, to bridge the chasm between Chinese and African culture, language and business practices. Just as foreigners operating in China find themselves baffled by Chinese culture, the Chinese in Africa often become exasperated with their inability to comprehend the attitudes of the locals.
“Chinese bosses complain to me that African workers, compared to Chinese workers, can be very slow. In Angola, the Africans used to say to me, you have to get used to Angola time. They told me that my timetables for projects were totally impossible. I told them they were not. There's a Chinese company which constructed a giant tower block in less than two years in the center of Luanda. It is beside a building for the Angolan Government that has already been under construction for ten years and which still isn't finished. In China that tall building would have been finished even quicker," says Mr Wang.
Meng Mei, meanwhile, has felt the frustration at first-hand. "It can be very hard to understand how Chinese run projects," she says. "In many cases I find it hard to understand why Chinese investors in Africa can ignore risks in the field of business in which they operate.
"For example, for two-and-a-half years I worked on a project for one major Chinese company in Africa. It was for a company's internal intranet. I regularly filed reports explaining what the project would need to succeed. In particular I repeatedly stressed the importance of a constant electricity supply. It's a basic but fundamental thing.
"Finally when the project was about to finish I said: 'So we are ready to go?' and only then did they say that they could not guarantee 24-hour electricity. I was told it was a local infrastructure problem and the boss of the company told me to just 'fix it'.
"I was very frustrated. I explained that I am IT professional not an engineer and that it would take major government co-operation to fix that kind of problem. They just hadn't factored it in at all,” she says.
Meanwhile, many small Chinese businesses, who are used to a focused, authoritarian and unchanging government at home, find the behavior of some African officials perplexing. "They always think that government officials can and will solve everything. It may be the case in China, but in Africa just because one official says yes, it does not stop another official from saying no. In this way projects and business deals get blocked and stalled. Our political systems are very very different," says Mr Mahamat.
“I think the biggest challenge for Chinese firms is their lack of experience and understanding of African business. Very, very few Chinese companies work with African partners because of this. Their approach to business is so different," he adds.
"In Africa, a businessman will say: 'I have some land, come and look at it and we can talk about what you want.' The Chinese want to know who owns what, the value, the cash flows and so on. It's not the same approach for Africans,” Mahamat explains.
Professor Gu, who interviewed more than a hundred companies and officials across Ghana, Nigeria and Madagascar to write a report on private Chinese businesses, identifies another stumbling block that is feeding tensions. "There are weak links between Chinese firms and local African firms," she says, arguing that this has had an impact on the extent of the technology and skills transfer between the two sides.
* * *
The question of whether Chinese firms are in Africa merely for their own profit, like their colonial predecessors, or whether they are also willing to be involved in the continent's development, will determine whether other countries follow Namibia's lead and close their doors too.
As a reflection of the anxiety felt by the Chinese side over its reputation, Beijing has ordered Chinese embassies and companies to forge greater links with local communities. At last year's Forum on Africa-China Cooperation, China committed billions of dollars of low-cost loans and support for African SMEs, as well as pledging funding for 30 hospitals, 30 malaria treatment centers and 50 China-Africa Friendship schools.
These gestures should ensure that Chinese SOEs can continue to snap up vast reserves of Africa's natural resources, and they should encourage African communities to look more fondly on the Chinese small businesses in their midst.
But whether the small businesses are doing enough to forge stronger links with African businesses and communities remains to be seen. There is little coordination or wider strategy among the SMEs to highlight the positive benefits they can bring. And there has been little recognition from African governments that the arrival of Chinese entrepreneurs could, with the right policies, and by encouraging investment in the right industries, revitalize their economies. "African governments, along with the African Union and civil society, needs to work to establish a constructive policy framework that help ensure that foreign investment makes a positive contribution to society," Professor Gu's research concludes.
While Chinese firms may be profiting handsomely from their presence in Africa, it is difficult to see much movement along this two-way street until they have laid deeper roots in the communities they serve.
Tessa Thorniley, a freelance business and travel writer based in Shanghai. She writes for newspapers, magazines and websites including The Daily Mail, the South China Morning Post, the Guardian, The Daily Telegraph and Wallpaper. Her previous articles for Danwei are Bankrupt schools and their fleeing foreign bosses and China's private healthcare racket.
Links and Sources
We make money not art: The Chinese Far West (photo source)
The Atlantic: The Next Empire by Howard French
The Guardian: China 'wants to set up factories in Africa' by Tania Branigan
The Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch
The Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria: The Asia Network and China Africa Network
Deborah Brautigam's blog China in Africa: The Real Story
China Talking Points: China Africa posts
MoneyWeb (South Africa): Taming Africa's Dragon column
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
CHINA AND AFRICA
Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa, land of a billion customers
Tessa Thorniley
Danwei, August 2, 2010
Multi-billion dollar resource and infrastructure deals between China and African countries make the business headlines ever more regularly, but there are very few reports on the growing numbers of Chinese entrepreneurs and small private companies seeking opportunities in Africa that they cannot find in China.
The trouble began in February when members of the Windhoek chamber of commerce complained that an invasion of Chinese corner shops, hairdressers, restaurants and traders was forcing out local businesses.
"There has been rapid growth in the number of small-scale retailing outlets throughout the country, offering low-quality products and replacing long-existing locally-owned businesses," the chamber announced, lobbying the government to protect Namibian businesses from such energetic Chinese competition.
Hage Geingob, Namibia's trade and industry minister and former prime minister, heard their plea. He banned all foreign investment in hair salons and public transport and introduced a permit system for new shopowners.
In defence of his protectionist new law, Mr Geingob suggested that members of the Chinese business community might have been operating illegally, without registering their businesses or declaring all of their earnings. "There have been concerns sparked by the activities of Chinese business people," he said.
Whatever the excuse, the strength of the backlash shows the extent to which Chinese firms have penetrated markets across Africa, and how worried the locals are. Armies of small entrepreneurs, marching in the wake of China's huge state-owned firms, have reached the very darkest parts of the continent.
"Across Africa today, everywhere, no matter how remote, you'll find a Chinese restaurant and a Chinese shop or local traders," says Martyn Davies, a South African consultant who is a director of the China Africa Network at the Gordon Institute of Business Science at the University of Pretoria. "And African consumers are buying Chinese products. More than two-thirds of the non-food products sold at Shoprite [a South African retail and fast-food group with stores across the continent] are from China," he adds.
Although multi-billion natural resource deals dominate the headlines, as many as 80 per cent of the Chinese companies that are currently operating in Africa are small or medium-sized enterprises, according to Dr Jing Gu, a research fellow at Sussex University's Institute of Development Studies.
They have come to get rich, she says: "Chinese private sector investment in Africa is not driven by Chinese government policy or Chinese political interests. They are more focused on the pursuit of profit."
Bilateral trade between China and Africa fell 15 per cent during the financial crisis. But in the first two months of this year it bounced back strongly, up 94 per cent year-on-year to $17.6 billion. The total trade for the year should top $100 billion and China is the biggest trading partner for many African states.
Estimates of the number of Chinese vary. Official figures from the Namibian Trade ministry show there are 500 small Chinese retailers in the country. But since the majority of small companies do not register themselves, the number could be far higher. "Senior Chinese officials estimate that there are a million Chinese on the continent but no-one truly knows because the borders are porous and there are no real records, such as bank accounts," says Mr Davies.
Many Chinese on the continent came over with the large SOEs but then spotted openings in the market that were too good to resist. "In terms of actual SMEs, companies with hundreds or thousands of employees, there are relatively few," says Adam Mahamat, a project advisor from Cameroon who now works at the China-Africa Business Council in Beijing. "What we have seen is that Chinese people who first went over to Africa to work for state-owned businesses are quitting these jobs and setting up on their own. Then they invite their friends and families over to help them when they begin to grow."
In the eyes of small Chinese companies, Africa is a land of opportunity. As one African official in Beijing put it: "The Chinese view Africa as an entity of one billion potential customers, much like the way the West views China."
* * *
At Oxford University, Alex Gadzala's doctoral work focuses on the effect of small Chinese businesses on the Kenyan economy. Her conclusions are dramatic. Africa may have received billions of dollars of aid money and infrastructure investment, but the arrival of large numbers of Chinese migrants will have an even more significant effect on transforming the continent's fortunes.
"Rather than large-scale investment and aid projects, it is the migratory influx [of Chinese] that carries the greatest ramifications for Africa's economic development," she says, arguing that Chinese competition is forcing stagnant local economies to adapt or die.
For decades, business in Kenya has been conducted on a short-term and informal basis known in Swahili as 'jua kali' or 'under the hot sun'. The Chinese, with their tight networks of guanxi, or relationships, have a strong competitive advantage. Kenyan businesses will be forced to evolve, argues Ms Gadzala, and to jettison the short-term thinking that is hampering their development.
Small, pragmatic and flexible, the Chinese companies are also prepared to tread where others have dared not to. Traders have been willing to enter the very lowest-margin sectors of the economy where supply chains are weak and which most other foreign businesses do not consider worthwhile.
The latest generation of mainland Chinese migrants have brought with them such a cheap and competitive array of products and services that they are even pushing out the first wave of ethnic Chinese migrants, the small groups of Taiwanese or Hong Kongers who arrived ten or 20 years ago.
"Chinese entrepreneurs often invest in places that many in the West would avoid," says Dr Gu. "They are more focused on new market opportunities and the pursuit of profit. They are not overly concerned about the investment climate, although they do have serious day-to-day issues relating to infrastructure."
The early challenges in adapting to the African environment are also being rapidly overcome. Until now, small Chinese companies have found it difficult to raise capital to expand because they distrusted the local banking system. Most also either stashed their profits or sent the money back to China. Earlier this year, however, Standard Chartered launched premium banking services in a number of African states, including Ghana and Nigeria, for Chinese SMEs who want to speak to bankers in their own language.
But despite bringing tangible benefits to African economies, small Chinese businesses are still viewed with suspicion and, in some cases, hostility. Some African countries, including Namibia, believe the arrival of the Chinese poses a threat to local jobs and industries and have imposed protectionist measures.
In South Africa, the effect of Chinese trade has been problematic. Chinese imports have decimated the local textile trade, forcing as many as 70,000 people out of work. In Nigeria, textile imports are banned and there are tariffs of up to 45 per cent on clothing imports.
And not all the Chinese businesses arriving are wholesome. Neon-lit karaoke parlours, where entertainment stretches beyond singing, and the occasional brothel lit by red lanterns have also sprung up, giving anti-Chinese groups fuel for their criticism.
Last year, a court in Ghana sentenced "King" James Xu Jin, his wife Chou Xiuying and his brother to a combined 41 years in prison for sex-trafficking. The trio had run the Peach Blossom Palace and had "enslaved" eight Chinese women, tricking them into believing that they were travelling to Africa to work in a restaurant before seizing their passports and forcing them into prostitution.
* * *
In Cameroon, David Xie, a 28-year-old business manager from Sichuan, has been in Africa for five years. He works as a liaison between a construction company building new water supply projects and the local government. But he readily admits he has spent little time outside the company walls. "Our company offered me a bed in a dormitory so most of the time I hang around there with my colleagues," he says. "I do not eat African food, except for fruit and beer." Although his company is a good mix of locals and Chinese, and despite the fact that he says communication is no problem ("most people here speak English or French"), the two sides remain clearly divided.
In Portuguese-speaking Angola, which pumps two million barrels of oil a day, the two communities are even further apart. Meng Mei, born in France to Chinese parents, has been working in Luanda since 2008. "In my experience there is almost no contact between the locals and Chinese workers. There is no integration. On the construction sites, the Chinese usually live on site. They live, work and sleep there. They don't go out. It's quite similar to the way migrant workers behave in China. They save money and send it home.
"For me, however, it is quite odd. I am Chinese but born and raised abroad. The Chinese workers do not go to movies or out to restaurants very much and they certainly don't do this with the locals. Some higher-ups may interact more, but only for business purposes," she says.
The lack of strong ties between the communities has created distrust and resentment. There are long-simmering tensions over the number of Chinese workers brought over by firms doing unskilled jobs that could have been given to local laborers. The Angolan government has tightened its immigration policies, and the cost of winning a long-term visa for a Chinese worker, together with travel costs and welfare payments, has risen to as much as USD20,000.
In response, Chinese companies have tried to take on more local staff, according to William Wang, an IT engineer who works with Meng Mei in Angola. “Back in 2008, maybe you would only see Chinese workers in Chinese companies but that has changed a lot in the last two years. I know a Chinese construction boss in Luanda, he hires 70 Chinese workers and 500 or 600 locals. It's not uncommon," he says. "I don't think the Angolans feel we are taking jobs. We have created employment also."
He adds: “In the past, I think there were problems because even the brightest Angolans had no real expertise – because of the war they didn't have much chance to develop. An IT engineer was qualified if he could switch on a computer and type. That's not the case anymore. Universities are training Angolans and they are increasingly skilled. Perhaps Chinese companies doing business here incentivised that?”
Mr Wang doesn't speak Portuguese but he says he occasionally socializes with African colleagues in Luanda, most of whom speak English. "I've been out with my African clients in Luanda. People in the telecoms sector. We eat dinner in a Chinese restaurant and once I invited them out for karaoke. I think they quite liked it. The bar had songs in Portuguese, Chinese and English so we could all sing," he says.
But clearly it will take more than a kizomba song from Ralph Anselmo, one of Angola's hottest singers, to bridge the chasm between Chinese and African culture, language and business practices. Just as foreigners operating in China find themselves baffled by Chinese culture, the Chinese in Africa often become exasperated with their inability to comprehend the attitudes of the locals.
“Chinese bosses complain to me that African workers, compared to Chinese workers, can be very slow. In Angola, the Africans used to say to me, you have to get used to Angola time. They told me that my timetables for projects were totally impossible. I told them they were not. There's a Chinese company which constructed a giant tower block in less than two years in the center of Luanda. It is beside a building for the Angolan Government that has already been under construction for ten years and which still isn't finished. In China that tall building would have been finished even quicker," says Mr Wang.
Meng Mei, meanwhile, has felt the frustration at first-hand. "It can be very hard to understand how Chinese run projects," she says. "In many cases I find it hard to understand why Chinese investors in Africa can ignore risks in the field of business in which they operate.
"For example, for two-and-a-half years I worked on a project for one major Chinese company in Africa. It was for a company's internal intranet. I regularly filed reports explaining what the project would need to succeed. In particular I repeatedly stressed the importance of a constant electricity supply. It's a basic but fundamental thing.
"Finally when the project was about to finish I said: 'So we are ready to go?' and only then did they say that they could not guarantee 24-hour electricity. I was told it was a local infrastructure problem and the boss of the company told me to just 'fix it'.
"I was very frustrated. I explained that I am IT professional not an engineer and that it would take major government co-operation to fix that kind of problem. They just hadn't factored it in at all,” she says.
Meanwhile, many small Chinese businesses, who are used to a focused, authoritarian and unchanging government at home, find the behavior of some African officials perplexing. "They always think that government officials can and will solve everything. It may be the case in China, but in Africa just because one official says yes, it does not stop another official from saying no. In this way projects and business deals get blocked and stalled. Our political systems are very very different," says Mr Mahamat.
“I think the biggest challenge for Chinese firms is their lack of experience and understanding of African business. Very, very few Chinese companies work with African partners because of this. Their approach to business is so different," he adds.
"In Africa, a businessman will say: 'I have some land, come and look at it and we can talk about what you want.' The Chinese want to know who owns what, the value, the cash flows and so on. It's not the same approach for Africans,” Mahamat explains.
Professor Gu, who interviewed more than a hundred companies and officials across Ghana, Nigeria and Madagascar to write a report on private Chinese businesses, identifies another stumbling block that is feeding tensions. "There are weak links between Chinese firms and local African firms," she says, arguing that this has had an impact on the extent of the technology and skills transfer between the two sides.
* * *
The question of whether Chinese firms are in Africa merely for their own profit, like their colonial predecessors, or whether they are also willing to be involved in the continent's development, will determine whether other countries follow Namibia's lead and close their doors too.
As a reflection of the anxiety felt by the Chinese side over its reputation, Beijing has ordered Chinese embassies and companies to forge greater links with local communities. At last year's Forum on Africa-China Cooperation, China committed billions of dollars of low-cost loans and support for African SMEs, as well as pledging funding for 30 hospitals, 30 malaria treatment centers and 50 China-Africa Friendship schools.
These gestures should ensure that Chinese SOEs can continue to snap up vast reserves of Africa's natural resources, and they should encourage African communities to look more fondly on the Chinese small businesses in their midst.
But whether the small businesses are doing enough to forge stronger links with African businesses and communities remains to be seen. There is little coordination or wider strategy among the SMEs to highlight the positive benefits they can bring. And there has been little recognition from African governments that the arrival of Chinese entrepreneurs could, with the right policies, and by encouraging investment in the right industries, revitalize their economies. "African governments, along with the African Union and civil society, needs to work to establish a constructive policy framework that help ensure that foreign investment makes a positive contribution to society," Professor Gu's research concludes.
While Chinese firms may be profiting handsomely from their presence in Africa, it is difficult to see much movement along this two-way street until they have laid deeper roots in the communities they serve.
Tessa Thorniley, a freelance business and travel writer based in Shanghai. She writes for newspapers, magazines and websites including The Daily Mail, the South China Morning Post, the Guardian, The Daily Telegraph and Wallpaper. Her previous articles for Danwei are Bankrupt schools and their fleeing foreign bosses and China's private healthcare racket.
Links and Sources
We make money not art: The Chinese Far West (photo source)
The Atlantic: The Next Empire by Howard French
The Guardian: China 'wants to set up factories in Africa' by Tania Branigan
The Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch
The Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria: The Asia Network and China Africa Network
Deborah Brautigam's blog China in Africa: The Real Story
China Talking Points: China Africa posts
MoneyWeb (South Africa): Taming Africa's Dragon column
Saturday, August 7, 2010
Transporte ferroviario na China: progressos fantasticos
China terá 13.000 km de trens rápidos até 2020
por Cláudia Trevisan
Blog Estadão, 29.julho.2010
Seção: Economia
Enquanto o Brasil pena para construir o trem rápido de 518 km que deve ligar Rio, São Paulo e Campinas, a China anuncia que vai adicionar 6.000 km de linhas do tipio à sua rede até 2012. Com isso, vai quase dobrar a malha de alta velocidade, para 13.000 km, cifra que vai superar a soma do que existirá em todos os demais países juntos.
Essa febre de construção vai exigir o equivalente a R$ 202 bilhões de investimentos nos próximos dois anos, cifra quase quatro vezes maior que os R$ 55,7 bilhões que o Brasil destinará a todo o setor ferroviário.
Em pouco tempo, a China se transformou em um dos líderes globais na construção de trens rápidos e começa a colocar em prática a estratégia de exportar tecnologia e equipamentos ferroviários para outros países. Entre eles, está o Brasil, onde os chineses devem disputar o contrato do Trem de Alta Velocidade (TAV) com japoneses, sul-coreanos, franceses, espanhois e alemães.
A ofensiva do país asiático para internacionalizar sua indústria ferroviária foi lançada no ano passado e levou as gigantescas estatais do setor a buscarem negócios em todas as regiões do planeta.
Por enquanto, um dos maiores acordos é com a Argentina, que receberá US$ 12,5 bilhões em financiamentos e investimentos para expandir sua rede e recuperar as linhas de Buenos Aires. A condição é que os recursos sejam utilizados na compra de tecnologia e equipamentos da China.
Pequim começou sua incursão no setor ferroviário latino-americano em 2009, com um acordo para a construção 470 km de linhas entre as cidades venezuelanas de Tinaco e Anaco.
Atualmente, os chineses também tentam obter contratos nos Estados Unidos, Rússia, Arábia Saudita, Mianmar, Polônia, Índia, Quirguistão e Uzbequistão, segundo o Ministério das Ferrovias.
A eventual vitória chinesa na disputa pelo TAV entre Rio, São Paulo e Campinas transformará o Brasil em uma espécie de vitrine para venda de produtos e serviços de um setor visto como estratégico pelo governo de Pequim, mas cujo crescimento não é isento de controvérsia.
Os interessados na obra, avaliada em R$ 33 bilhões, devem entregar suas propostas em novembro. A escolha do vencedor está prevista para o mês seguinte.
A China desenvolveu grande parte de sua tecnologia de trens rápidos com a ajuda de empresas estrangeiras, que aceitaram realizar joint-ventures com estatais controladas por Pequim na esperança de ter acesso ao imenso mercado local.
As autoridades chinesas refutam a acusação de que se apropriaram de know-how externo de maneira indevida, mas reconhecem que a experiência estrangeira teve papel relevante para o desenvolvimento do país no setor.
Em documento distribuído a jornalistas ontem, o Ministério das Ferrovias afirmou que a China desenvolveu inovações originais, mas também fez “re-inovações”, depois de “importar, digerir e absorver” a tecnologia estrangeira.
“A China aplicou os frutos da civilização de trens de alta velocidade”, declarou em entrevista coletiva o engenheiro-chefe do ministério, He Huawu. Segundo ele, o país está disposto a compartilhar suas “conquistas” com o restante do mundo.
O Banco Mundial avalia que a transferência de tecnologia, aliada à experiência chinesa na operação de milhares de quilômetros de linhas, transformará a indústria ferroviária local em uma das mais avançadas do mundo. “Isso deve posicionar o país para competir internacionalmente quando outros países adotarem trens de alta velocidade”, destaca estudo da entidade também divulgado ontem.
O Ministério das Ferrovias vai mais longe e sustenta que o desenvolvimento da China nesse setor pode levar ao “renascimento” e à “revitalização” das ferrovias em todo o mundo.
A entrada da China na disputa internacional nesse setor terá um marco simbólico em dezembro, quando o país sediará o 7º Congresso Mundial de Alta Velocidade (Highspeed 2010), na primeira vez em que o evento ocorrerá fora da Europa.
Os investimentos ferroviários tiveram uma das maiores fatias no pacote de estímulo de US$ 586 bilhões anunciado pela China em novembro de 2008 para combater os efeitos da crise econômica global.
De acordo com o governo, a construção de ferrovias recebeu investimentos de US$ 89 bilhões no ano passado, que levaram ao consumo de 20 milhões de toneladas de aço e de 120 milhões de toneladas de cimento, além de criar 6 milhões de empregos em toda a cadeia produtiva do setor.
por Cláudia Trevisan
Blog Estadão, 29.julho.2010
Seção: Economia
Enquanto o Brasil pena para construir o trem rápido de 518 km que deve ligar Rio, São Paulo e Campinas, a China anuncia que vai adicionar 6.000 km de linhas do tipio à sua rede até 2012. Com isso, vai quase dobrar a malha de alta velocidade, para 13.000 km, cifra que vai superar a soma do que existirá em todos os demais países juntos.
Essa febre de construção vai exigir o equivalente a R$ 202 bilhões de investimentos nos próximos dois anos, cifra quase quatro vezes maior que os R$ 55,7 bilhões que o Brasil destinará a todo o setor ferroviário.
Em pouco tempo, a China se transformou em um dos líderes globais na construção de trens rápidos e começa a colocar em prática a estratégia de exportar tecnologia e equipamentos ferroviários para outros países. Entre eles, está o Brasil, onde os chineses devem disputar o contrato do Trem de Alta Velocidade (TAV) com japoneses, sul-coreanos, franceses, espanhois e alemães.
A ofensiva do país asiático para internacionalizar sua indústria ferroviária foi lançada no ano passado e levou as gigantescas estatais do setor a buscarem negócios em todas as regiões do planeta.
Por enquanto, um dos maiores acordos é com a Argentina, que receberá US$ 12,5 bilhões em financiamentos e investimentos para expandir sua rede e recuperar as linhas de Buenos Aires. A condição é que os recursos sejam utilizados na compra de tecnologia e equipamentos da China.
Pequim começou sua incursão no setor ferroviário latino-americano em 2009, com um acordo para a construção 470 km de linhas entre as cidades venezuelanas de Tinaco e Anaco.
Atualmente, os chineses também tentam obter contratos nos Estados Unidos, Rússia, Arábia Saudita, Mianmar, Polônia, Índia, Quirguistão e Uzbequistão, segundo o Ministério das Ferrovias.
A eventual vitória chinesa na disputa pelo TAV entre Rio, São Paulo e Campinas transformará o Brasil em uma espécie de vitrine para venda de produtos e serviços de um setor visto como estratégico pelo governo de Pequim, mas cujo crescimento não é isento de controvérsia.
Os interessados na obra, avaliada em R$ 33 bilhões, devem entregar suas propostas em novembro. A escolha do vencedor está prevista para o mês seguinte.
A China desenvolveu grande parte de sua tecnologia de trens rápidos com a ajuda de empresas estrangeiras, que aceitaram realizar joint-ventures com estatais controladas por Pequim na esperança de ter acesso ao imenso mercado local.
As autoridades chinesas refutam a acusação de que se apropriaram de know-how externo de maneira indevida, mas reconhecem que a experiência estrangeira teve papel relevante para o desenvolvimento do país no setor.
Em documento distribuído a jornalistas ontem, o Ministério das Ferrovias afirmou que a China desenvolveu inovações originais, mas também fez “re-inovações”, depois de “importar, digerir e absorver” a tecnologia estrangeira.
“A China aplicou os frutos da civilização de trens de alta velocidade”, declarou em entrevista coletiva o engenheiro-chefe do ministério, He Huawu. Segundo ele, o país está disposto a compartilhar suas “conquistas” com o restante do mundo.
O Banco Mundial avalia que a transferência de tecnologia, aliada à experiência chinesa na operação de milhares de quilômetros de linhas, transformará a indústria ferroviária local em uma das mais avançadas do mundo. “Isso deve posicionar o país para competir internacionalmente quando outros países adotarem trens de alta velocidade”, destaca estudo da entidade também divulgado ontem.
O Ministério das Ferrovias vai mais longe e sustenta que o desenvolvimento da China nesse setor pode levar ao “renascimento” e à “revitalização” das ferrovias em todo o mundo.
A entrada da China na disputa internacional nesse setor terá um marco simbólico em dezembro, quando o país sediará o 7º Congresso Mundial de Alta Velocidade (Highspeed 2010), na primeira vez em que o evento ocorrerá fora da Europa.
Os investimentos ferroviários tiveram uma das maiores fatias no pacote de estímulo de US$ 586 bilhões anunciado pela China em novembro de 2008 para combater os efeitos da crise econômica global.
De acordo com o governo, a construção de ferrovias recebeu investimentos de US$ 89 bilhões no ano passado, que levaram ao consumo de 20 milhões de toneladas de aço e de 120 milhões de toneladas de cimento, além de criar 6 milhões de empregos em toda a cadeia produtiva do setor.
Hainan, China: capitalismo para bilionarios
Ilha chinesa cresce de forma rápida e vira paraíso de bilionários
Bruno Philip
UOL, 07/08/2010
Ilha de Hainan, na China, atrai redes internacionais de hotéis e muitos turistas
A ilha de Hainan exibe sua ambição sem complexos: tornar-se o destino dos mais ricos. Marinas, iates e palácios, vale tudo para atraí-los
Aqui, o tempo passa mais rápido que em outros lugares. Pergunte a um investidor da ilha de Hainan se esse futuro hotel “6 estrelas”, que ali adiante eleva suas torres em construção na direção do céu de monção, ou se, mais além, esse luxuoso complexo residencial são recentes, e ele lhe responderá: “Ah, não, ele deve ter uns três ou quatro anos...”. Em Hainan, anteontem já é passado distante.
Essa grande ilha situada no extremo sul da China, ao largo das costas vietnamitas, é uma espécie de caricatura do desenvolvimento acelerado do país, um precipitado assustador, desmedido, do famoso milagre econômico.
Em Sanya, principal destino turístico e segunda maior cidade de Hainan, não importa para onde se olhe, há um cenário de guindastes, andaimes e prédios recém-erguidos.
Acompanhando o mar e suas praias de areia reluzente, há novas cidades dedicadas ao prazer estival de turistas ricos ou ultrarricos, formando uma corola urbana às vezes ininterrupta.
Em 31 de dezembro de 2009, o Conselho de Estado (o governo chinês) apontou Hainan como modelo prioritário do desenvolvimento turístico do país. Objetivo: fazer da ilha um “destino internacional competitivo”.
Para isso, Hainan deve “se posicionar como uma ilha que se esforça para introduzir padrões internacionais”. A meta é, com o tempo, concorrer com os outros paraísos do resto da Ásia, como a Tailândia, o Vietnã e a Indonésia.
Sanya ainda precisa fazer muito para poder esperar competir com esses grandes, mas ela já recebe mais de 500 mil turistas estrangeiros e mais de 6 milhões de chineses por ano em seus 187 hotéis padronizados.
Neste ano, em Sanya e em Haikou, centro administrativo da ilha, os preços do setor imobiliário dispararam. Em fevereiro, o custo médio de um apartamento subiu 50% em relação a 2009, ou seja, cinco vezes a média nacional, anunciou a Agência de Estatísticas.
“Não temos terrenos o suficiente para vender, e as áreas à beira-mar que podem ser construídas são limitadas, então os preços disparam”, lamenta Tang Sixian, vice-diretor da Comissão do Desenvolvimento Turístico de Sanya. “E as pessoas vêm para investir. Muito. Elas pagam em dinheiro vivo!”, sorri.
Pagar em dinheiro vivo é bem o estilo de Wang Dafu, bilionário da região, presidente da empresa imobiliária Hangzhou e criador da recente marina para iates de bilionários.
Aos 44 anos, esse nativo da ilha já é por si só a história de um sucesso fenomenal: ainda que se recuse a dizer que é o mais rico dos habitantes, ele admite ser aquele que “mais paga impostos”.
Wang nos recebe em uma das salas do hotel de luxo que abriu em Sanya para os clientes de sua marina. De camisa polo verde, calça branca de listras pretas, óculos escuros, anel gravado e relógio de ouro, ele estende distraidamente uma mão a seu convidado, enquanto dá ordens por meio de um de seus dois celulares.
Seu diretor de marketing, “Stuart” Hu, revelou antes da chegada do chefe: “Ele veio do nada, conhece a dureza da vida”.
Ele teve a ideia dessa marina para bilionários em 2002. “Na época, comprei dois iates e pensei comigo mesmo que poderia abrir aqui um pequeno porto de recreação. Para mim, era mais prazer do que negócios. O principal é a paixão pelo mar e pelos barcos. Pessoas ricas que realmente adoram o mar. É esse meu critério de seleção!”, diz Wang, engolindo um ravióli que uma garçonete lhe serve apressadamente.
Para alguém que se preocupa mais com prazer do que com negócios, Wang Dafu não perdeu tempo: 400 loucos por iatismo já se inscreveram na marina, que abriu em agosto de 2009.
300 deles compraram imóveis vendidos por sua empresa. Esses podem se tornar membros do clube gratuitamente. Os outros cem pagaram pelo direito de atracar seus iates –que eles também podem alugar, pois o bom Wang também vende barcos– 630 mil yuans (R$ 168 mil).
As suítes do hotel, com vista para o pequeno porto onde já estão ancorados 40 iates, entre os quais o luxuoso Pershing de 3 milhões de euros de Wang Dafu, custam mais de 16 mil yuans (R$ 4.212) por noite.
A história do sucesso de Wang prefigurou a de sua ilha natal e, nesse sentido, é como sua representação primeira.
Em meados dos anos 1980, pouco tempo após o lançamento da política “de abertura e reforma”, o jovem Dafu, que enriqueceu aos poucos, começou fazendo viagens entre Hainan e Shenzen, cidade próxima de Cantão transformada em zona econômica especial pelo “pequeno timoneiro” Deng Xiaoping. Ele fazia pequenas vendas, de fertilizantes e produtos derivados do petróleo.
Foi nos anos 1990 que começou a galgar cada vez mais rápido a vertiginosa escada do sucesso social chinês. A receita era simples: “Investi no setor imobiliário em Shenzhen. Comprei quando os preços estavam baixos”.
E revendeu por preços muito altos. “Tsa! Tsa!”, ele diz, fazendo com os braços o gesto de engorda. “Quando eu estava em Shenzhen, nunca teria imaginado o que esses negócios poderiam vir a representar. Em minha juventude, o essencial era sobreviver”.
A pobreza é coisa do passado para Wang Dafu. O que ele fará para garantir o “reassentamento harmonioso” das centenas de pescadores cujas sampanas estão atracadas no pequeno porto, situado logo à frente da marina?
“Olhe ali”, diz, apontando um bloco de prédios em construção, do outro lado da marina: “São conjuntos de moradias que minha empresa mandou construir. O porto será deslocado para outro lugar”.
Em frente, as pessoas não gostam muito das ambições do ex-pobre de um tempo distante, um tempo em que ninguém era rico. Na família de Li (o nome foi mudado), que prefere guardar anonimato, a empresa do bilionário é vista como devoradora de vida passada.
Em torno da mesa, em uma noite de julho, na sala de jantar onde há somente uma geladeira, estão todos reunidos, desde o avô de regata que revira com os palitos sua tigela de arroz de porco, até a avô desdentada, passando pelo filho e sua esposa. “Eles são maus”, observa a nora, mostrando esse “outro lado” do porto, a marina.
“As compensações por nossa futura expulsão são insuficientes, ainda que os negociadores de Hongzhu tenham entendido que precisarão subir os preços. Por enquanto, a indenização proposta não nos permitirá nem mesmo que nos reinstalemos”. Quer dizer, nos imóveis construídos por aqueles que os estão expulsando.
Tradução: Lana Lim
Bruno Philip
UOL, 07/08/2010
Ilha de Hainan, na China, atrai redes internacionais de hotéis e muitos turistas
A ilha de Hainan exibe sua ambição sem complexos: tornar-se o destino dos mais ricos. Marinas, iates e palácios, vale tudo para atraí-los
Aqui, o tempo passa mais rápido que em outros lugares. Pergunte a um investidor da ilha de Hainan se esse futuro hotel “6 estrelas”, que ali adiante eleva suas torres em construção na direção do céu de monção, ou se, mais além, esse luxuoso complexo residencial são recentes, e ele lhe responderá: “Ah, não, ele deve ter uns três ou quatro anos...”. Em Hainan, anteontem já é passado distante.
Essa grande ilha situada no extremo sul da China, ao largo das costas vietnamitas, é uma espécie de caricatura do desenvolvimento acelerado do país, um precipitado assustador, desmedido, do famoso milagre econômico.
Em Sanya, principal destino turístico e segunda maior cidade de Hainan, não importa para onde se olhe, há um cenário de guindastes, andaimes e prédios recém-erguidos.
Acompanhando o mar e suas praias de areia reluzente, há novas cidades dedicadas ao prazer estival de turistas ricos ou ultrarricos, formando uma corola urbana às vezes ininterrupta.
Em 31 de dezembro de 2009, o Conselho de Estado (o governo chinês) apontou Hainan como modelo prioritário do desenvolvimento turístico do país. Objetivo: fazer da ilha um “destino internacional competitivo”.
Para isso, Hainan deve “se posicionar como uma ilha que se esforça para introduzir padrões internacionais”. A meta é, com o tempo, concorrer com os outros paraísos do resto da Ásia, como a Tailândia, o Vietnã e a Indonésia.
Sanya ainda precisa fazer muito para poder esperar competir com esses grandes, mas ela já recebe mais de 500 mil turistas estrangeiros e mais de 6 milhões de chineses por ano em seus 187 hotéis padronizados.
Neste ano, em Sanya e em Haikou, centro administrativo da ilha, os preços do setor imobiliário dispararam. Em fevereiro, o custo médio de um apartamento subiu 50% em relação a 2009, ou seja, cinco vezes a média nacional, anunciou a Agência de Estatísticas.
“Não temos terrenos o suficiente para vender, e as áreas à beira-mar que podem ser construídas são limitadas, então os preços disparam”, lamenta Tang Sixian, vice-diretor da Comissão do Desenvolvimento Turístico de Sanya. “E as pessoas vêm para investir. Muito. Elas pagam em dinheiro vivo!”, sorri.
Pagar em dinheiro vivo é bem o estilo de Wang Dafu, bilionário da região, presidente da empresa imobiliária Hangzhou e criador da recente marina para iates de bilionários.
Aos 44 anos, esse nativo da ilha já é por si só a história de um sucesso fenomenal: ainda que se recuse a dizer que é o mais rico dos habitantes, ele admite ser aquele que “mais paga impostos”.
Wang nos recebe em uma das salas do hotel de luxo que abriu em Sanya para os clientes de sua marina. De camisa polo verde, calça branca de listras pretas, óculos escuros, anel gravado e relógio de ouro, ele estende distraidamente uma mão a seu convidado, enquanto dá ordens por meio de um de seus dois celulares.
Seu diretor de marketing, “Stuart” Hu, revelou antes da chegada do chefe: “Ele veio do nada, conhece a dureza da vida”.
Ele teve a ideia dessa marina para bilionários em 2002. “Na época, comprei dois iates e pensei comigo mesmo que poderia abrir aqui um pequeno porto de recreação. Para mim, era mais prazer do que negócios. O principal é a paixão pelo mar e pelos barcos. Pessoas ricas que realmente adoram o mar. É esse meu critério de seleção!”, diz Wang, engolindo um ravióli que uma garçonete lhe serve apressadamente.
Para alguém que se preocupa mais com prazer do que com negócios, Wang Dafu não perdeu tempo: 400 loucos por iatismo já se inscreveram na marina, que abriu em agosto de 2009.
300 deles compraram imóveis vendidos por sua empresa. Esses podem se tornar membros do clube gratuitamente. Os outros cem pagaram pelo direito de atracar seus iates –que eles também podem alugar, pois o bom Wang também vende barcos– 630 mil yuans (R$ 168 mil).
As suítes do hotel, com vista para o pequeno porto onde já estão ancorados 40 iates, entre os quais o luxuoso Pershing de 3 milhões de euros de Wang Dafu, custam mais de 16 mil yuans (R$ 4.212) por noite.
A história do sucesso de Wang prefigurou a de sua ilha natal e, nesse sentido, é como sua representação primeira.
Em meados dos anos 1980, pouco tempo após o lançamento da política “de abertura e reforma”, o jovem Dafu, que enriqueceu aos poucos, começou fazendo viagens entre Hainan e Shenzen, cidade próxima de Cantão transformada em zona econômica especial pelo “pequeno timoneiro” Deng Xiaoping. Ele fazia pequenas vendas, de fertilizantes e produtos derivados do petróleo.
Foi nos anos 1990 que começou a galgar cada vez mais rápido a vertiginosa escada do sucesso social chinês. A receita era simples: “Investi no setor imobiliário em Shenzhen. Comprei quando os preços estavam baixos”.
E revendeu por preços muito altos. “Tsa! Tsa!”, ele diz, fazendo com os braços o gesto de engorda. “Quando eu estava em Shenzhen, nunca teria imaginado o que esses negócios poderiam vir a representar. Em minha juventude, o essencial era sobreviver”.
A pobreza é coisa do passado para Wang Dafu. O que ele fará para garantir o “reassentamento harmonioso” das centenas de pescadores cujas sampanas estão atracadas no pequeno porto, situado logo à frente da marina?
“Olhe ali”, diz, apontando um bloco de prédios em construção, do outro lado da marina: “São conjuntos de moradias que minha empresa mandou construir. O porto será deslocado para outro lugar”.
Em frente, as pessoas não gostam muito das ambições do ex-pobre de um tempo distante, um tempo em que ninguém era rico. Na família de Li (o nome foi mudado), que prefere guardar anonimato, a empresa do bilionário é vista como devoradora de vida passada.
Em torno da mesa, em uma noite de julho, na sala de jantar onde há somente uma geladeira, estão todos reunidos, desde o avô de regata que revira com os palitos sua tigela de arroz de porco, até a avô desdentada, passando pelo filho e sua esposa. “Eles são maus”, observa a nora, mostrando esse “outro lado” do porto, a marina.
“As compensações por nossa futura expulsão são insuficientes, ainda que os negociadores de Hongzhu tenham entendido que precisarão subir os preços. Por enquanto, a indenização proposta não nos permitirá nem mesmo que nos reinstalemos”. Quer dizer, nos imóveis construídos por aqueles que os estão expulsando.
Tradução: Lana Lim
Thursday, August 5, 2010
China's Strategy to Secure Natural Resources
Book:
China's Strategy to Secure Natural Resources: Risks, Dangers, and Opportunities
Theodore H. Moran
July 2010 • 66 pp.
ISBN paper 978-0-88132-512-6
$19.95 $15.96
The rapid emergence of China as a major industrial power poses a complex challenge for the world's natural resource markets. On the demand side, Chinese appetite for vast amounts of energy and minerals puts tremendous strain on the international supply system. On the supply side, Chinese efforts to procure raw materials can either exacerbate or help solve the problems of high demand. Backed by the Chinese government, Chinese companies have been acquiring equity stakes in natural resource companies, extending loans to mining and petroleum investors, and writing long-term procurement contracts for oil and minerals. These activities have aroused concern that China might be locking up natural resource supplies, gaining preferential access to available output, and expanding control over the world's extractive industries.
Do Chinese equity acquisitions, loans, and long-term procurement contracts help consolidate a tightly concentrated supply base by securing preferential access for Chinese buyers, or do they help multiply sources and diversify the supply base, making the provision of output more competitive for all buyers? Which outcome Chinese procurement arrangements generate depends upon whether those arrangements basically solidify a concentrated global supplier system (and enhance Chinese ownership/control within that concentrated supplier system) or expand, diversify, and make more competitive the global supply system (and use Chinese ownership/control as a lever for such expansion, diversification, and enhanced competition).
Theodore H. Moran investigates the impact of Chinese resource procurement on the structure of global energy and mineral supply. He notes that China's actions also have implications for rogue states, authoritarian leadership, civil wars, corruption, deterioration of governance standards, and the environment. Such effects may make patterns of Chinese resource procurement objectionable, on grounds quite apart from the debate about possible "lock up," "tie up," and "control" of access on the part of China and Chinese companies. He raises these important issues in the concluding chapter on the broader policy implications.
Business-school strategic management literature identifies four fundamental natural resource–procurement patterns for a large buyer. First, a buyer can take an equity stake with a major producer, on terms comparable with other co-owners, to create a special relationship with that producer. Second, a buyer can take an equity stake in an independent producer to procure an equity-share of production, again on terms comparable with other co-owners. Third, a buyer can make a loan to a pricemaking producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan. Fourth, a buyer can make a loan to a price-taking producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan.
These four procurement patterns allow an operational definition of tying up or gaining preferential access to supplies. If the buyer-seller arrangement solidifies a legal claim to a given structure of production (the first and third patterns), tying up or gaining preferential access to supplies has zero-sum implications for other consumers. However, if the buyer-seller arrangement expands and diversifies sources of output more rapidly than growth in world demand (the second and fourth patterns), the zero-sum implications vanish, as other consumers can more easily access a larger and more competitive global resource base.
Evidence from the 16 largest Chinese natural resource procurement arrangements (see table below) shows that Chinese efforts, like Japanese deployments of capital and purchase agreements in the late 1970s through the 1980s, predominantly help expand, diversify, and make the global energy-supply system more competitive. Moran's scorecard of China's procurement arrangements shows a few instances (3 of the largest 16) in which Chinese natural resource companies take an equity stake to create a "special relationship" with a major producer (first and third patterns). But the predominant pattern (13 of the largest 16) is to take equity stakes and/or write long-term procurement contracts with the competitive fringe (second and fourth patterns).
Strategic patterns of China's 16 largest natural-resource procurement cases
Pattern 1: Special relationship with major producer
Buyers and/or their home governments take an equity stake in a "major" producer to procure an equity share of production on terms comparable to other co-owners. 1. Sinopec and CNOOC, Angola, 2004
2. CNOOC and Akpo Oilfield, Nigeria, 2006
Pattern 2: Special relationship with competitive fringe
Buyers and/or their home governments take an equity stake in an "independent" producer so as to procure an equity share of production on terms comparable to other co-owners. 3. CNPC and GNPOC, Sudan, 1996
4. CNPC and Sinopec with Petrodar Operating Company, Sudan, 2001
5. CNOOC and North West Shelf Venture, Australia, 2002
6. CNOOC and Unocal, 2005 (aborted)
7. CNPC and PetroKazakhstan, 2005–09
8. Chalco and Aurukun Bauxite Project, Queensland, Australia, 2007
9. Sinopec and Yadavaran Oilfield, Iran, 2007
10. Socomin Joint Venture, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2008
11. Chinalco and Rio Tinto, 2008–09 (aborted)
12. Sinopec's acquisition of Addax Petroleum, 2009
13. CNPC's Development of South Pars Gasfield, Iran, 2009
14. CNPC's Development of South Azadegan Gasfield, Iran, 2009
Pattern 3: Loan capital to major producer to be repaid in output
Buyers and/or their home governments make a loan to a "price maker" producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan. 15. China Development Bank loan to Rosneft and Transneft, Russia, 2009
Pattern 4: Loan capital to competitive fringe to be repaid in output
Buyers and/or their home governments make a loan to a "price taker" producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan. 16. Sinopec and Petrobras, 2009
Key:
Chalco/Chinalco = Aluminum Corporation of China
CNOOC = China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC = China National Petroleum Corporation
GNPOC = Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
LNG = liquefied natural gas
Sinopec = China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation
Unocal = Union Oil Company of California
However, Chinese attempts to exercise control over mining of rare earth elements (REE)—metals used in a variety of technological applications, from lighter flints to high-temperature superconductivity—may constitute a significant exception. In August 2009 China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology set an annual quota for REE exports at 35,000 tons, potentially banned exports of at least five types of REEs, and took steps to control mining and improve environmental practices. These actions may have been to secure control over international markets; at the same time, they are being deployed to compel more foreign investment and more value added in associated industries in inland China. Concerned about access to supplies, mining companies and buyers have shown interest in developing new sites in Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Sweden, and Canada, as well as restarting production in the United States, which has stalled recently due to environmental concerns. China meanwhile has pursued an aggressive policy of acquiring equity stakes in new REE producers, particularly in Australia.
How should national authorities react to the prospect of Chinese investment in offshore REE companies? The foreign acquisition analytics in the rare earth sector fit well within the broader framework laid out in this policy analysis. Chinese investment in a small, independent producer that can do nothing except help expand supply and make the industry more competitive should be encouraged. But Chinese investment in a major producer, which perhaps puts the Chinese owners and government in a position to control or constrain production, should be viewed with circumspection.
More generally, the United States and other allies are rightly appalled at China's vigorous support for oil production in Sudan and Iran or for oil transportation, natural gas, and mineral production in Myanmar. They are right to be concerned about the consequences of China's natural resource procurement for regional conflict, support for terrorist groups, human rights violations, environmental degradation, and oppression, especially since providing equity capital and loans in return for natural resources is part of China's larger strategy toward Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and the South Pacific, as it seeks ever more natural resources to fuel its economic growth.
>> Preview book
>> Theodore H. Moran
>> View In Brief as pdf
China's Strategy to Secure Natural Resources: Risks, Dangers, and Opportunities
Theodore H. Moran
July 2010 • 66 pp.
ISBN paper 978-0-88132-512-6
$19.95 $15.96
The rapid emergence of China as a major industrial power poses a complex challenge for the world's natural resource markets. On the demand side, Chinese appetite for vast amounts of energy and minerals puts tremendous strain on the international supply system. On the supply side, Chinese efforts to procure raw materials can either exacerbate or help solve the problems of high demand. Backed by the Chinese government, Chinese companies have been acquiring equity stakes in natural resource companies, extending loans to mining and petroleum investors, and writing long-term procurement contracts for oil and minerals. These activities have aroused concern that China might be locking up natural resource supplies, gaining preferential access to available output, and expanding control over the world's extractive industries.
Do Chinese equity acquisitions, loans, and long-term procurement contracts help consolidate a tightly concentrated supply base by securing preferential access for Chinese buyers, or do they help multiply sources and diversify the supply base, making the provision of output more competitive for all buyers? Which outcome Chinese procurement arrangements generate depends upon whether those arrangements basically solidify a concentrated global supplier system (and enhance Chinese ownership/control within that concentrated supplier system) or expand, diversify, and make more competitive the global supply system (and use Chinese ownership/control as a lever for such expansion, diversification, and enhanced competition).
Theodore H. Moran investigates the impact of Chinese resource procurement on the structure of global energy and mineral supply. He notes that China's actions also have implications for rogue states, authoritarian leadership, civil wars, corruption, deterioration of governance standards, and the environment. Such effects may make patterns of Chinese resource procurement objectionable, on grounds quite apart from the debate about possible "lock up," "tie up," and "control" of access on the part of China and Chinese companies. He raises these important issues in the concluding chapter on the broader policy implications.
Business-school strategic management literature identifies four fundamental natural resource–procurement patterns for a large buyer. First, a buyer can take an equity stake with a major producer, on terms comparable with other co-owners, to create a special relationship with that producer. Second, a buyer can take an equity stake in an independent producer to procure an equity-share of production, again on terms comparable with other co-owners. Third, a buyer can make a loan to a pricemaking producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan. Fourth, a buyer can make a loan to a price-taking producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan.
These four procurement patterns allow an operational definition of tying up or gaining preferential access to supplies. If the buyer-seller arrangement solidifies a legal claim to a given structure of production (the first and third patterns), tying up or gaining preferential access to supplies has zero-sum implications for other consumers. However, if the buyer-seller arrangement expands and diversifies sources of output more rapidly than growth in world demand (the second and fourth patterns), the zero-sum implications vanish, as other consumers can more easily access a larger and more competitive global resource base.
Evidence from the 16 largest Chinese natural resource procurement arrangements (see table below) shows that Chinese efforts, like Japanese deployments of capital and purchase agreements in the late 1970s through the 1980s, predominantly help expand, diversify, and make the global energy-supply system more competitive. Moran's scorecard of China's procurement arrangements shows a few instances (3 of the largest 16) in which Chinese natural resource companies take an equity stake to create a "special relationship" with a major producer (first and third patterns). But the predominant pattern (13 of the largest 16) is to take equity stakes and/or write long-term procurement contracts with the competitive fringe (second and fourth patterns).
Strategic patterns of China's 16 largest natural-resource procurement cases
Pattern 1: Special relationship with major producer
Buyers and/or their home governments take an equity stake in a "major" producer to procure an equity share of production on terms comparable to other co-owners. 1. Sinopec and CNOOC, Angola, 2004
2. CNOOC and Akpo Oilfield, Nigeria, 2006
Pattern 2: Special relationship with competitive fringe
Buyers and/or their home governments take an equity stake in an "independent" producer so as to procure an equity share of production on terms comparable to other co-owners. 3. CNPC and GNPOC, Sudan, 1996
4. CNPC and Sinopec with Petrodar Operating Company, Sudan, 2001
5. CNOOC and North West Shelf Venture, Australia, 2002
6. CNOOC and Unocal, 2005 (aborted)
7. CNPC and PetroKazakhstan, 2005–09
8. Chalco and Aurukun Bauxite Project, Queensland, Australia, 2007
9. Sinopec and Yadavaran Oilfield, Iran, 2007
10. Socomin Joint Venture, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2008
11. Chinalco and Rio Tinto, 2008–09 (aborted)
12. Sinopec's acquisition of Addax Petroleum, 2009
13. CNPC's Development of South Pars Gasfield, Iran, 2009
14. CNPC's Development of South Azadegan Gasfield, Iran, 2009
Pattern 3: Loan capital to major producer to be repaid in output
Buyers and/or their home governments make a loan to a "price maker" producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan. 15. China Development Bank loan to Rosneft and Transneft, Russia, 2009
Pattern 4: Loan capital to competitive fringe to be repaid in output
Buyers and/or their home governments make a loan to a "price taker" producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan. 16. Sinopec and Petrobras, 2009
Key:
Chalco/Chinalco = Aluminum Corporation of China
CNOOC = China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC = China National Petroleum Corporation
GNPOC = Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
LNG = liquefied natural gas
Sinopec = China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation
Unocal = Union Oil Company of California
However, Chinese attempts to exercise control over mining of rare earth elements (REE)—metals used in a variety of technological applications, from lighter flints to high-temperature superconductivity—may constitute a significant exception. In August 2009 China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology set an annual quota for REE exports at 35,000 tons, potentially banned exports of at least five types of REEs, and took steps to control mining and improve environmental practices. These actions may have been to secure control over international markets; at the same time, they are being deployed to compel more foreign investment and more value added in associated industries in inland China. Concerned about access to supplies, mining companies and buyers have shown interest in developing new sites in Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Sweden, and Canada, as well as restarting production in the United States, which has stalled recently due to environmental concerns. China meanwhile has pursued an aggressive policy of acquiring equity stakes in new REE producers, particularly in Australia.
How should national authorities react to the prospect of Chinese investment in offshore REE companies? The foreign acquisition analytics in the rare earth sector fit well within the broader framework laid out in this policy analysis. Chinese investment in a small, independent producer that can do nothing except help expand supply and make the industry more competitive should be encouraged. But Chinese investment in a major producer, which perhaps puts the Chinese owners and government in a position to control or constrain production, should be viewed with circumspection.
More generally, the United States and other allies are rightly appalled at China's vigorous support for oil production in Sudan and Iran or for oil transportation, natural gas, and mineral production in Myanmar. They are right to be concerned about the consequences of China's natural resource procurement for regional conflict, support for terrorist groups, human rights violations, environmental degradation, and oppression, especially since providing equity capital and loans in return for natural resources is part of China's larger strategy toward Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and the South Pacific, as it seeks ever more natural resources to fuel its economic growth.
>> Preview book
>> Theodore H. Moran
>> View In Brief as pdf
Construction boom in China, land speculation
Risk to Global Economy
China's Real Estate Bubble Threatens to Burst
By Wieland Wagner
Der Spiegel, 08/03/2010
Two years after the US subprime crisis, China is seeing its own real estate bubble as a result of massive state stimulus programs. Many economists are warning it could burst soon, with unpredictable results for the global economy.
An interminable sawing, screeching, drilling and hammering rips through the oppressive summer heat and humidity in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin. Here, on the city's dusty outskirts, hundreds of new apartment buildings and houses in every imaginable style are springing up.
In an air-conditioned showroom, salespeople in yellow uniforms take potential buyers on tours of the facility. "In one year, we already sold 90 percent of North America, Asia and Europe," customer consultant Qi Yunbu says proudly. "Now we're preparing Africa, Oceania and South America for sale."
"Xingyao Wuzhou," loosely translated as "Shining Star over Five Continents," is the name of this Chinese blend of Dubai and Disneyland, a €2.3 billion ($3 billion) development designed to imitate the world map. The gigantic residential and leisure complex is being built around and within an artificial lake.
The developers apparently want to make sure that the residents of this aquatic paradise will lack for nothing. The plans include the world's largest indoor ski center, golf courses, a seven-star hotel, the world's largest musical fountain and miniature replicas of famous structures like the Tower Bridge in London and San Francisco's Golden Gate Bridge.
'The World Is Yours'
Megalomania is in full swing in China's booming economy. "The World Is Yours" is the slogan the developers are using to advertise the luxury project. Qi points to model villas in an exclusive waterfront location. These properties won't be sold until the end, he says, winking conspiratorially. Since sales began, square-meter prices have already risen by 4,000 to 5,000 yuan (€450-€570 or $590-$740). The investors expect their handsome profits to increase with each new construction phase.
Calculated optimism forms the fragile base on which similar projects are thriving all across China. Doubts are taboo, especially now that the mood is beginning to shift, at least outside the flashy showrooms. There is more and more talk of the bubble bursting soon, with some saying that the tipping point has already been reached -- with uncertain consequences for the rest of the global economy.
In June, real estate prices in 70 large Chinese cities declined over the previous month for the first time in almost one-and-a-half years -- by 0.4 percent for new construction and 0.1 percent for existing structures. The government statistics office also reported sobering figures for the overall economy.
Statistics also show that the economy grew by only 10.3 percent in the second quarter, compared with the same period last year. Growth in the first three months of the year was still at 11.9 percent. This decline in growth seems ridiculous when compared with economic conditions in Western industrialized countries. But for the People's Republic, whose development model needs record growth to keep the economy from quickly sliding downward, the recent data is unsettling.
'It's a Bubble'
Western exporting countries like Germany, which partly owe their gradual recovery from the global crisis to orders from China, are also reminded of the risks in East Asia. "You're starting to see that collapse in property and it's going to hit the banking system," Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard professor and former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, warned recently. "It's a bubble."
Even Xu Shaoshi, China's minister of land and resources, fears that the real estate market could undergo a "total correction" in the third quarter -- although, he adds, it will not look like the crisis the United States has experienced in recent years. There, the crisis began when banks started issuing more and more so-called subprime mortgages. People who could not in fact afford to buy a house were lured with low-interest loans and the promise that their property would more than likely increase in value and essentially pay for itself.
When real estate values first started going down, hundreds of thousands of people could no longer afford their mortgage payments. The real estate crisis turned into a banking crisis, and then into a debt crisis for the entire Western world. The consequences are still in evidence today, from the millions of unemployed and homeless people in the United States, to euro-zone nations like Greece, which threaten to collapse under the pressure of massive government debt.
China, which long seemed immune to the global crunch, now faces the threat of a homemade real estate crisis. This could spell trouble for many local governments, which in some cases have financed almost a third of their major infrastructure projects, like airports and train stations, by selling agricultural land to real estate sharks.
The Limits of Growth
Chinese municipalities sold 319,000 hectares (788,000 acres) of land in 2009 alone, an increase of 44 percent over the previous year. Local governments have borrowed heavily from banks, in the anticipation that land prices would continue to rise.
But now even China is running up against the limits of its growth, jeopardizing a central pillar of the Chinese economy. During the course of its economic stimulus programs, the government pumped 4 trillion yuan (about €450 billion or $590 billion) into the largest bailout package the People's Republic has ever seen. Initially, this triggered a massive building boom, sometimes with drastic consequences, including the frequent use of brutal methods to expropriate citizens.
Since last summer, Chinese banks have seen their inventories of real estate loans grow by more than 40 percent. This has led to bad planning, shady payments and, in many cases, exploding prices that directly affect the general population.
Saving money is hardly worthwhile in China. After a number of turbulent episodes in the markets, some of them dramatic, citizens are now shying away from investments in stocks. Under these circumstances, the Chinese long viewed buying a condominium or a house as the most sensible and profitable investment.
In some cities, the number of new residential units has already exceeded the number of new households. In major cities like Beijing and Shanghai, the Chinese pay about 20 times their annual salary to buy a condominium. By comparison, this factor is only about eight in expensive major world cities like Tokyo.
Part 2: Bubble Drives Up Commodity Prices
The imminent bubble is already affecting the rest of the world. The strong demand in China's voracious construction industry has also led to sharp rises in the prices of commodities like aluminum, iron and copper. Not surprisingly, a recent survey showed that more than two-thirds of all Chinese hope that the real estate bubble will burst soon. Many sense that China's brand of government-controlled capitalism is still a long way from being a market economy capable of self-regulation.
The political leadership reacted in April when it sought to curb speculative fever by instructing banks to approve fewer mortgage loans. At the same time, the required minimum down payment for the purchase of second homes was increased to 50 percent. The government is also thinking of taxing home ownership in the future.
But these measures are risky. In addition to curbing speculation, they could also stall the rest of the economy. The real estate sector is responsible for 20 percent of fixed investments, which could lead to an unwanted effect: If China starts building fewer apartment buildings and houses, sectors like the steel, glass and cement industries could end up with substantial excess capacity.
Crash or Soft Landing?
Notorious pessimists aren't the only ones painting these scenarios. Even Prime Minister Wen Jiabao recently admitted: "China, with its macroeconomic measures, faces an unexpectedly large dilemma." The fundamental risks are already reflected on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, where real estate and bank assets account for a quarter of market capitalization. The stock index fell by 27 percent in the first half of this year.
But is a real estate crash truly inevitable, or will China's economic planners manage to bring about a soft landing? Cao Jianhai of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing likens the Chinese economy to "a volcano before an eruption." Nevertheless, he doesn't believe that the government of Hu Jintao, the Communist Party leader and president, and Prime Minister Wen will allow a crash to occur before its term in office ends in 2012 -- local governments are too dependent on the real estate boom. According to Cao, Beijing will go to "any expense" to pump money into the financial system and spur a renewed surge of rapid economic growth.
But the bubble could burst in two years, says Cao, and then it will be up to Hu's and Wen's successors to correct the situation. In the worst case, Cao predicts, there could be a large-scale run on the banks. "Of the 4 trillion yuan in the Chinese economic stimulus package, 3 trillion are in fact coming from local governments -- and they borrowed the money from the banks."
Another Lost Decade?
There is an interesting historical parallel to the new Chinese bubble. With its excesses, such as luxury villas, amusement parks and golf courses, China's real estate bubble bears a striking similarity to the Japanese bubble of the 1980s. At the time, the property occupied by the emperor's palace in Tokyo was supposedly worth as much -- on paper -- as the entire state of California.
Admittedly, there are many differences between the aging island nation of Japan and the giant market that is China. In the People's Republic, more than 10 million people migrate from rural areas to major cities each year, an influx that does in fact create additional demand for apartments. But the current boom does not address this real demand, says Cao. "Migrant workers are poor and cannot afford the apartments, which are usually much too expensive."
After its bubble burst, Japan suffered the so-called "lost decade," which was followed by a second decade of crisis. Cao is convinced that China, too, will pay a heavy price for its dependence on the real estate boom: "Our industrial development will be delayed by 10 years as a result."
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
The Dark Side of the Boom
Chinese Fight Property Seizures by the State
By Wieland Wagner
DER SPIEGEL, 08/03/2010
Businessman Gu Kui is fighting to stop authorities from expropriating his property.
Local authorities in China are using brutal means to expropriate ordinary people in a bid to profit from the country's construction boom. Some desperate citizens have commited suicide, while others vow to defend their properties with their lives.
Businessman Gu Kui, 55, looks into the rearview mirror of his SUV. He is desperately trying to lose the blue car that's been following him for hours. Gu is so nervous that he almost rear-ends the car in front of him. He slams on the brakes and sharply turns the steering wheel. His vehicle makes a 180-degree turn and comes to a stop in the opposite direction on the highway.
Gu's near-accident in the western Chinese city of Chengdu ends without any injuries or damage to the vehicle. With his dangerous maneuver, Gu has managed to shake the people who have been tailing him -- for today, at least. The driver of the car that was following him, with its five thuggish passengers, has no choice but to remain in the flow of traffic and drive past Gu.
Gu has become accustomed to such chases and nerve-wracking encounters since he tangled with local officials in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province. A former owner of an auto parts market, Gu is part of a growing group of dissatisfied Chinese citizens. They are becoming increasingly bold in their opposition to the practices of Communist urban planners as they seek to effectively expropriate property and resell it to real estate sharks, in a bid to benefit from China's overheated construction boom.
'I Had to Look on as Bulldozers Demolished My Property'
Gu's former property is conveniently located near a highway access road. On the roughly five-hectare (12.3-acre) piece of land where he once operated a used-car and car parts business, construction cranes and crews are now hard at work erecting new apartment buildings. Red banners advertise the future apartments to potential buyers.
The district government had leased the property to him for 30 years. In the People's Republic, all land belongs to the state, which awards usage rights for fixed terms: up to 70 years for residential properties and 50 years for industrial operations. But other rules apply in rural areas, as in Gu's case. In any event, local officials decided that they could earn more money by driving Gu off the land and offering it to real estate developers instead.
Gu remembers the day they destroyed his livelihood. He says that hundreds of heavily armed police officers and thugs in civilian clothing appeared at the site, bringing along three ambulances as a precaution. "I had to look on as bulldozers demolished my property," he recalls.
As the pace of modernization in China's economy picks up, people are increasingly clinging to their property and standing up to the government's arbitrary practices. In the eastern Chinese city of Zhengzhou, a 45-year-old woman was killed in May when an excavator dragged her out of the upper floor of her restaurant, where she had barricaded herself in to protect her property.
Gu is now suing the Chengdu city government. The case -- which, bizarrely enough, is being funded by local functionaries, apparently in a bid to get rid of him -- has even attracted attention in faraway Beijing.
In the Public Interest
The reason Gu's case is garnering so much attention is because he isn't just suing for damages. In a petition to the central government and China's legislature, the National People's Congress, his attorney, Zhang Xinkui, is also fundamentally challenging the authority of local governments to heat up the real estate market through the arbitrary seizure and resale of properties.
The lawsuit calls the entire practice of Chinese state capitalism into question. For local governments and their often corrupt officials, buying and selling real estate has become a lucrative source of income to augment tight funds. Many of them, warns Liu Jiayi, the country's auditor general, face "heavy debt pressures."
But according to Zhang, China's municipalities are violating the national constitution with their real estate deals. Under the constitution, the authorities can only seize property if it is to be used in the public interest. Although "public interest" is an elastic term in Chinese communism, Zhang argues that the government, in its dual role as overseer and market player, is unnecessarily boosting speculation and exacerbating social injustices.
In 2007, China's National People's Congress enacted a law to protect private property -- with the exception of land. But in the course of rapid urbanization, planners, intent on promoting economic growth, often pay little attention to the rights of established residents and business owners. And contrary to the directives from Beijing, many local officials tend to promote the construction of luxury condominiums above everything else.
Suicides and Torture
Yang Youde, for example, comes from three generations of farmers. Until recently, he was growing melons and cotton, and raising fish, on the outskirts of Wuhan, a city of 9 million people. Today weeds run rampant on his fields, and almost all the fish in his large pond have starved to death. The 56-year-old spends almost all of his time defending his property against seizure by local authorities and speculators.
The facades of new luxury apartment buildings are getting closer to Yang's property, and most of his neighbors have already capitulated. Yang reports that one desperate man and his wife set themselves on fire, while others have drowned themselves in their ponds.
Yang's property, which consists of brick huts, looks like a fortress. He has built a perch above the shed where he keeps watch. He says that in August 2009, after he had submitted a petition against the planned seizure of his farm, the police came and dragged him away to one of China's notorious so-called "black jails," where he was held for 51 days. "They strung me up by my hands and put out cigarettes on my skin," he says.
Now he intends to defend his farm with the one thing he has left: his life.
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
China's Real Estate Bubble Threatens to Burst
By Wieland Wagner
Der Spiegel, 08/03/2010
Two years after the US subprime crisis, China is seeing its own real estate bubble as a result of massive state stimulus programs. Many economists are warning it could burst soon, with unpredictable results for the global economy.
An interminable sawing, screeching, drilling and hammering rips through the oppressive summer heat and humidity in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin. Here, on the city's dusty outskirts, hundreds of new apartment buildings and houses in every imaginable style are springing up.
In an air-conditioned showroom, salespeople in yellow uniforms take potential buyers on tours of the facility. "In one year, we already sold 90 percent of North America, Asia and Europe," customer consultant Qi Yunbu says proudly. "Now we're preparing Africa, Oceania and South America for sale."
"Xingyao Wuzhou," loosely translated as "Shining Star over Five Continents," is the name of this Chinese blend of Dubai and Disneyland, a €2.3 billion ($3 billion) development designed to imitate the world map. The gigantic residential and leisure complex is being built around and within an artificial lake.
The developers apparently want to make sure that the residents of this aquatic paradise will lack for nothing. The plans include the world's largest indoor ski center, golf courses, a seven-star hotel, the world's largest musical fountain and miniature replicas of famous structures like the Tower Bridge in London and San Francisco's Golden Gate Bridge.
'The World Is Yours'
Megalomania is in full swing in China's booming economy. "The World Is Yours" is the slogan the developers are using to advertise the luxury project. Qi points to model villas in an exclusive waterfront location. These properties won't be sold until the end, he says, winking conspiratorially. Since sales began, square-meter prices have already risen by 4,000 to 5,000 yuan (€450-€570 or $590-$740). The investors expect their handsome profits to increase with each new construction phase.
Calculated optimism forms the fragile base on which similar projects are thriving all across China. Doubts are taboo, especially now that the mood is beginning to shift, at least outside the flashy showrooms. There is more and more talk of the bubble bursting soon, with some saying that the tipping point has already been reached -- with uncertain consequences for the rest of the global economy.
In June, real estate prices in 70 large Chinese cities declined over the previous month for the first time in almost one-and-a-half years -- by 0.4 percent for new construction and 0.1 percent for existing structures. The government statistics office also reported sobering figures for the overall economy.
Statistics also show that the economy grew by only 10.3 percent in the second quarter, compared with the same period last year. Growth in the first three months of the year was still at 11.9 percent. This decline in growth seems ridiculous when compared with economic conditions in Western industrialized countries. But for the People's Republic, whose development model needs record growth to keep the economy from quickly sliding downward, the recent data is unsettling.
'It's a Bubble'
Western exporting countries like Germany, which partly owe their gradual recovery from the global crisis to orders from China, are also reminded of the risks in East Asia. "You're starting to see that collapse in property and it's going to hit the banking system," Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard professor and former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, warned recently. "It's a bubble."
Even Xu Shaoshi, China's minister of land and resources, fears that the real estate market could undergo a "total correction" in the third quarter -- although, he adds, it will not look like the crisis the United States has experienced in recent years. There, the crisis began when banks started issuing more and more so-called subprime mortgages. People who could not in fact afford to buy a house were lured with low-interest loans and the promise that their property would more than likely increase in value and essentially pay for itself.
When real estate values first started going down, hundreds of thousands of people could no longer afford their mortgage payments. The real estate crisis turned into a banking crisis, and then into a debt crisis for the entire Western world. The consequences are still in evidence today, from the millions of unemployed and homeless people in the United States, to euro-zone nations like Greece, which threaten to collapse under the pressure of massive government debt.
China, which long seemed immune to the global crunch, now faces the threat of a homemade real estate crisis. This could spell trouble for many local governments, which in some cases have financed almost a third of their major infrastructure projects, like airports and train stations, by selling agricultural land to real estate sharks.
The Limits of Growth
Chinese municipalities sold 319,000 hectares (788,000 acres) of land in 2009 alone, an increase of 44 percent over the previous year. Local governments have borrowed heavily from banks, in the anticipation that land prices would continue to rise.
But now even China is running up against the limits of its growth, jeopardizing a central pillar of the Chinese economy. During the course of its economic stimulus programs, the government pumped 4 trillion yuan (about €450 billion or $590 billion) into the largest bailout package the People's Republic has ever seen. Initially, this triggered a massive building boom, sometimes with drastic consequences, including the frequent use of brutal methods to expropriate citizens.
Since last summer, Chinese banks have seen their inventories of real estate loans grow by more than 40 percent. This has led to bad planning, shady payments and, in many cases, exploding prices that directly affect the general population.
Saving money is hardly worthwhile in China. After a number of turbulent episodes in the markets, some of them dramatic, citizens are now shying away from investments in stocks. Under these circumstances, the Chinese long viewed buying a condominium or a house as the most sensible and profitable investment.
In some cities, the number of new residential units has already exceeded the number of new households. In major cities like Beijing and Shanghai, the Chinese pay about 20 times their annual salary to buy a condominium. By comparison, this factor is only about eight in expensive major world cities like Tokyo.
Part 2: Bubble Drives Up Commodity Prices
The imminent bubble is already affecting the rest of the world. The strong demand in China's voracious construction industry has also led to sharp rises in the prices of commodities like aluminum, iron and copper. Not surprisingly, a recent survey showed that more than two-thirds of all Chinese hope that the real estate bubble will burst soon. Many sense that China's brand of government-controlled capitalism is still a long way from being a market economy capable of self-regulation.
The political leadership reacted in April when it sought to curb speculative fever by instructing banks to approve fewer mortgage loans. At the same time, the required minimum down payment for the purchase of second homes was increased to 50 percent. The government is also thinking of taxing home ownership in the future.
But these measures are risky. In addition to curbing speculation, they could also stall the rest of the economy. The real estate sector is responsible for 20 percent of fixed investments, which could lead to an unwanted effect: If China starts building fewer apartment buildings and houses, sectors like the steel, glass and cement industries could end up with substantial excess capacity.
Crash or Soft Landing?
Notorious pessimists aren't the only ones painting these scenarios. Even Prime Minister Wen Jiabao recently admitted: "China, with its macroeconomic measures, faces an unexpectedly large dilemma." The fundamental risks are already reflected on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, where real estate and bank assets account for a quarter of market capitalization. The stock index fell by 27 percent in the first half of this year.
But is a real estate crash truly inevitable, or will China's economic planners manage to bring about a soft landing? Cao Jianhai of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing likens the Chinese economy to "a volcano before an eruption." Nevertheless, he doesn't believe that the government of Hu Jintao, the Communist Party leader and president, and Prime Minister Wen will allow a crash to occur before its term in office ends in 2012 -- local governments are too dependent on the real estate boom. According to Cao, Beijing will go to "any expense" to pump money into the financial system and spur a renewed surge of rapid economic growth.
But the bubble could burst in two years, says Cao, and then it will be up to Hu's and Wen's successors to correct the situation. In the worst case, Cao predicts, there could be a large-scale run on the banks. "Of the 4 trillion yuan in the Chinese economic stimulus package, 3 trillion are in fact coming from local governments -- and they borrowed the money from the banks."
Another Lost Decade?
There is an interesting historical parallel to the new Chinese bubble. With its excesses, such as luxury villas, amusement parks and golf courses, China's real estate bubble bears a striking similarity to the Japanese bubble of the 1980s. At the time, the property occupied by the emperor's palace in Tokyo was supposedly worth as much -- on paper -- as the entire state of California.
Admittedly, there are many differences between the aging island nation of Japan and the giant market that is China. In the People's Republic, more than 10 million people migrate from rural areas to major cities each year, an influx that does in fact create additional demand for apartments. But the current boom does not address this real demand, says Cao. "Migrant workers are poor and cannot afford the apartments, which are usually much too expensive."
After its bubble burst, Japan suffered the so-called "lost decade," which was followed by a second decade of crisis. Cao is convinced that China, too, will pay a heavy price for its dependence on the real estate boom: "Our industrial development will be delayed by 10 years as a result."
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
The Dark Side of the Boom
Chinese Fight Property Seizures by the State
By Wieland Wagner
DER SPIEGEL, 08/03/2010
Businessman Gu Kui is fighting to stop authorities from expropriating his property.
Local authorities in China are using brutal means to expropriate ordinary people in a bid to profit from the country's construction boom. Some desperate citizens have commited suicide, while others vow to defend their properties with their lives.
Businessman Gu Kui, 55, looks into the rearview mirror of his SUV. He is desperately trying to lose the blue car that's been following him for hours. Gu is so nervous that he almost rear-ends the car in front of him. He slams on the brakes and sharply turns the steering wheel. His vehicle makes a 180-degree turn and comes to a stop in the opposite direction on the highway.
Gu's near-accident in the western Chinese city of Chengdu ends without any injuries or damage to the vehicle. With his dangerous maneuver, Gu has managed to shake the people who have been tailing him -- for today, at least. The driver of the car that was following him, with its five thuggish passengers, has no choice but to remain in the flow of traffic and drive past Gu.
Gu has become accustomed to such chases and nerve-wracking encounters since he tangled with local officials in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province. A former owner of an auto parts market, Gu is part of a growing group of dissatisfied Chinese citizens. They are becoming increasingly bold in their opposition to the practices of Communist urban planners as they seek to effectively expropriate property and resell it to real estate sharks, in a bid to benefit from China's overheated construction boom.
'I Had to Look on as Bulldozers Demolished My Property'
Gu's former property is conveniently located near a highway access road. On the roughly five-hectare (12.3-acre) piece of land where he once operated a used-car and car parts business, construction cranes and crews are now hard at work erecting new apartment buildings. Red banners advertise the future apartments to potential buyers.
The district government had leased the property to him for 30 years. In the People's Republic, all land belongs to the state, which awards usage rights for fixed terms: up to 70 years for residential properties and 50 years for industrial operations. But other rules apply in rural areas, as in Gu's case. In any event, local officials decided that they could earn more money by driving Gu off the land and offering it to real estate developers instead.
Gu remembers the day they destroyed his livelihood. He says that hundreds of heavily armed police officers and thugs in civilian clothing appeared at the site, bringing along three ambulances as a precaution. "I had to look on as bulldozers demolished my property," he recalls.
As the pace of modernization in China's economy picks up, people are increasingly clinging to their property and standing up to the government's arbitrary practices. In the eastern Chinese city of Zhengzhou, a 45-year-old woman was killed in May when an excavator dragged her out of the upper floor of her restaurant, where she had barricaded herself in to protect her property.
Gu is now suing the Chengdu city government. The case -- which, bizarrely enough, is being funded by local functionaries, apparently in a bid to get rid of him -- has even attracted attention in faraway Beijing.
In the Public Interest
The reason Gu's case is garnering so much attention is because he isn't just suing for damages. In a petition to the central government and China's legislature, the National People's Congress, his attorney, Zhang Xinkui, is also fundamentally challenging the authority of local governments to heat up the real estate market through the arbitrary seizure and resale of properties.
The lawsuit calls the entire practice of Chinese state capitalism into question. For local governments and their often corrupt officials, buying and selling real estate has become a lucrative source of income to augment tight funds. Many of them, warns Liu Jiayi, the country's auditor general, face "heavy debt pressures."
But according to Zhang, China's municipalities are violating the national constitution with their real estate deals. Under the constitution, the authorities can only seize property if it is to be used in the public interest. Although "public interest" is an elastic term in Chinese communism, Zhang argues that the government, in its dual role as overseer and market player, is unnecessarily boosting speculation and exacerbating social injustices.
In 2007, China's National People's Congress enacted a law to protect private property -- with the exception of land. But in the course of rapid urbanization, planners, intent on promoting economic growth, often pay little attention to the rights of established residents and business owners. And contrary to the directives from Beijing, many local officials tend to promote the construction of luxury condominiums above everything else.
Suicides and Torture
Yang Youde, for example, comes from three generations of farmers. Until recently, he was growing melons and cotton, and raising fish, on the outskirts of Wuhan, a city of 9 million people. Today weeds run rampant on his fields, and almost all the fish in his large pond have starved to death. The 56-year-old spends almost all of his time defending his property against seizure by local authorities and speculators.
The facades of new luxury apartment buildings are getting closer to Yang's property, and most of his neighbors have already capitulated. Yang reports that one desperate man and his wife set themselves on fire, while others have drowned themselves in their ponds.
Yang's property, which consists of brick huts, looks like a fortress. He has built a perch above the shed where he keeps watch. He says that in August 2009, after he had submitted a petition against the planned seizure of his farm, the police came and dragged him away to one of China's notorious so-called "black jails," where he was held for 51 days. "They strung me up by my hands and put out cigarettes on my skin," he says.
Now he intends to defend his farm with the one thing he has left: his life.
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
Confisco de propriedades na China: arbitrio e boom imobiliario
Chineses resistem aos confiscos de propriedade pelo Estado
Wieland Wagner
UOL, 5.08.2010
Segundo a constituição chinesa, as autoridades só podem confiscar propriedades para que estas sejam utilizadas em nome do interesse público
Autoridades municipais na China estão usando meios brutais para expropriar cidadãos comuns em uma tentativa de lucrarem com o boom do setor de construção no país. Alguns cidadãos desesperados se suicidaram, enquanto outros juraram defender as suas propriedades com a própria vida.
O empresário Gu Kui, 55, olha pelo espelho retrovisor do seu veículo utilitário esportivo. Ele está tentando desesperadamente despistar o carro azul que o está seguindo. Gu está tão nervoso que quase bate na traseira do automóvel à sua frente. Ele pisa forte no pedal de freio e gira abruptamente o volante. Derrapando, o seu veículo faz uma volta de 180 graus e para na direção oposta da rodovia.
O quase acidente sofrido por Gu na cidade de Chengdu, no oeste da China, termina sem ferimentos ou danos ao veículo. Com a sua manobra perigosa, Gu conseguiu se livrar das pessoas que o vinham seguindo – pelo menos por hoje. O motorista do carro que o seguia, acompanhado de cinco passageiros corpulentos, não tem escolha a não ser acompanhar o fluxo do tráfego e passar por Gu, no sentido oposto.
Gu acostumou-se a tais perseguições e encontros de arrebentar os nervos desde que desentendeu-se com as autoridades municipais de Chengdu, a capital da província de Sichuan. Ex-proprietário de um mercado de peças de automóveis, Gu faz parte de um grupo crescente de cidadãos chineses insatisfeitos. Eles estão se tornando cada vez mais ousados na sua oposição às práticas dos planejadores urbanos comunistas, que procuram confiscar propriedades e revendê-las para os tubarões do mercado imobiliário, em uma tentativa de lucrarem com o superaquecido boom do setor de construção na China.
“Eu tive que ficar olhando enquanto tratores demoliam a minha propriedade”
A ex-propriedade de Gu fica convenientemente localizada perto de uma estrada de acesso à rodovia principal. No terreno de aproximadamente cinco hectares, onde antigamente ele vendia carros e peças usadas, gruas e funcionários de construção agora trabalham arduamente para construir novos prédios de apartamentos. Faixas vermelhas fazem propaganda dos futuros apartamentos para potenciais compradores.
O governo municipal alugou a propriedade a ele por 30 anos. Na República Popular da China, todo terreno pertence ao Estado, que concede direitos de uso por períodos fixos: até 70 anos para as propriedades residenciais e 50 anos em se tratando de operações industriais. Mas outras regras se aplicam às áreas rurais, e este é o caso de Gu. De qualquer forma, as autoridades locais decidiram que poderiam ganhar mais dinheiro expulsando Gu do terreno e oferecendo-o a construtoras de prédios.
Gu se recorda do dia em que eles destruíram o seu meio de vida. Ele conta que centenas de policiais fortemente armados e capangas à paisana apareceram no local, trazendo três ambulâncias como medida de precaução. “Eu tive que ficar olhando enquanto os tratores demoliam a minha propriedade”, lembra-se Gu.
À medida que o ritmo da modernização da economia chinesa se acelera, as pessoas estão agarrando-se cada vez mais às suas propriedades e resistindo às prática arbitrárias do governo. Na cidade de Zhengzhou, no leste da China, uma mulher de 45 anos de idade foi morta em maio quando uma escavadeira a arrastou para fora do andar superior do seu restaurante, onde ela havia se entrincheirado para proteger a sua propriedade.
Agora Gu está processando o governo municipal de Chengdu. O processo – que, de forma bizarra, está sendo custeado por funcionários públicos locais, aparentemente em uma tentativa de livrarem-se dele – chegou a chamar atenção na distante Pequim.
Interesse público
O motivo pelo qual o processo de Gu está atraindo tanta atenção é o fato de ele não estar processando o governo apenas por danos. Em uma petição ao governo central e ao parlamento chinês, o Congresso Popular Nacional, o seu advogado, Zhang Xinkui, está também contestando fundamentalmente a suposta autoridade dos governos municipais para aquecerem o mercado imobiliário por meio do confisco e da venda arbitrários de propriedades.
O processo questiona toda a prática de capitalismo estatal chinês. Para os governos locais e seus funcionários frequentemente corruptos, comprar e vender terrenos transformou-se em uma fonte lucrativa de dinheiro para aumentar as verbas exíguas. Muitos deles, afirma Liu Jiayi, o auditor geral do país, enfrentam “fortes pressões de dívidas”.
Mas, segundo Zhang, os municípios da China estão violando a constituição nacional com os seus negócios no setor imobiliário. Segundo a constituição, as autoridades só podem confiscar propriedades para que estas sejam utilizadas em nome do interesse público. Embora “interesse público” seja um termo elástico no comunismo chinês, Zhang argumenta que o governo, com o seu papel duplo de fiscalizador e agente do mercado, está fomentando desnecessariamente a especulação e exacerbando as injustiças sociais.
Em 2007, o Congresso Popular Nacional da China baixou uma lei de proteção à propriedade privada – com a exceção de terrenos. Mas no decorrer da rápida urbanização, os planejadores, com o objetivo de promoverem crescimento econômico, muitas vezes dão pouca atenção aos direitos estabelecidos de moradores e donos de negócios. E, contrariando as diretrizes de Pequim, muitas autoridades locais tendem a promover, mais do que tudo, a construção de condomínios de luxo.
Suicídios e tortura
Yang Youde, por exemplo, traz no seu passado três gerações de fazendeiros. Até recentemente, ele plantava melões e algodão, e criava peixes, nos arredores de Wuhan, uma cidade de nove milhões de habitantes. Atualmente o mato toma conta dos seus campos de cultivo, e quase todos os peixes do seu grande lago morreram de fome. Este homem de 56 anos de idade passa a maior parte do tempo defendendo a sua propriedade do confisco por parte de autoridades municipais e especuladores.
As fachadas dos novos prédios de apartamentos de luxo estão se aproximando da propriedade de Yang, e a maioria dos seus vizinhos já capitulou. Yang conta que um homem desesperado e a sua mulher atearam fogo a si próprios, e outros se lançaram nos seus lagos e morreram afogados.
A propriedade de Yang, que consiste de casinhas de tijolos, parece uma fortaleza. Ele construiu uma plataforma sobre um depósito e está sempre de guarda. Yang conta que em agosto de 2009, após ter apresentado uma petição contra o planejado confisco da sua fazenda, a polícia veio e arrastou-o para uma das famosas “prisões negras” da China, onde ele ficou detido por 51 dias. “Eles me penduraram pelas mãos e me queimaram com cigarros”, diz Yang.
Agora ele pretende defender a sua propriedade com a única coisa que lhe restou: a sua vida.
Wieland Wagner
UOL, 5.08.2010
Segundo a constituição chinesa, as autoridades só podem confiscar propriedades para que estas sejam utilizadas em nome do interesse público
Autoridades municipais na China estão usando meios brutais para expropriar cidadãos comuns em uma tentativa de lucrarem com o boom do setor de construção no país. Alguns cidadãos desesperados se suicidaram, enquanto outros juraram defender as suas propriedades com a própria vida.
O empresário Gu Kui, 55, olha pelo espelho retrovisor do seu veículo utilitário esportivo. Ele está tentando desesperadamente despistar o carro azul que o está seguindo. Gu está tão nervoso que quase bate na traseira do automóvel à sua frente. Ele pisa forte no pedal de freio e gira abruptamente o volante. Derrapando, o seu veículo faz uma volta de 180 graus e para na direção oposta da rodovia.
O quase acidente sofrido por Gu na cidade de Chengdu, no oeste da China, termina sem ferimentos ou danos ao veículo. Com a sua manobra perigosa, Gu conseguiu se livrar das pessoas que o vinham seguindo – pelo menos por hoje. O motorista do carro que o seguia, acompanhado de cinco passageiros corpulentos, não tem escolha a não ser acompanhar o fluxo do tráfego e passar por Gu, no sentido oposto.
Gu acostumou-se a tais perseguições e encontros de arrebentar os nervos desde que desentendeu-se com as autoridades municipais de Chengdu, a capital da província de Sichuan. Ex-proprietário de um mercado de peças de automóveis, Gu faz parte de um grupo crescente de cidadãos chineses insatisfeitos. Eles estão se tornando cada vez mais ousados na sua oposição às práticas dos planejadores urbanos comunistas, que procuram confiscar propriedades e revendê-las para os tubarões do mercado imobiliário, em uma tentativa de lucrarem com o superaquecido boom do setor de construção na China.
“Eu tive que ficar olhando enquanto tratores demoliam a minha propriedade”
A ex-propriedade de Gu fica convenientemente localizada perto de uma estrada de acesso à rodovia principal. No terreno de aproximadamente cinco hectares, onde antigamente ele vendia carros e peças usadas, gruas e funcionários de construção agora trabalham arduamente para construir novos prédios de apartamentos. Faixas vermelhas fazem propaganda dos futuros apartamentos para potenciais compradores.
O governo municipal alugou a propriedade a ele por 30 anos. Na República Popular da China, todo terreno pertence ao Estado, que concede direitos de uso por períodos fixos: até 70 anos para as propriedades residenciais e 50 anos em se tratando de operações industriais. Mas outras regras se aplicam às áreas rurais, e este é o caso de Gu. De qualquer forma, as autoridades locais decidiram que poderiam ganhar mais dinheiro expulsando Gu do terreno e oferecendo-o a construtoras de prédios.
Gu se recorda do dia em que eles destruíram o seu meio de vida. Ele conta que centenas de policiais fortemente armados e capangas à paisana apareceram no local, trazendo três ambulâncias como medida de precaução. “Eu tive que ficar olhando enquanto os tratores demoliam a minha propriedade”, lembra-se Gu.
À medida que o ritmo da modernização da economia chinesa se acelera, as pessoas estão agarrando-se cada vez mais às suas propriedades e resistindo às prática arbitrárias do governo. Na cidade de Zhengzhou, no leste da China, uma mulher de 45 anos de idade foi morta em maio quando uma escavadeira a arrastou para fora do andar superior do seu restaurante, onde ela havia se entrincheirado para proteger a sua propriedade.
Agora Gu está processando o governo municipal de Chengdu. O processo – que, de forma bizarra, está sendo custeado por funcionários públicos locais, aparentemente em uma tentativa de livrarem-se dele – chegou a chamar atenção na distante Pequim.
Interesse público
O motivo pelo qual o processo de Gu está atraindo tanta atenção é o fato de ele não estar processando o governo apenas por danos. Em uma petição ao governo central e ao parlamento chinês, o Congresso Popular Nacional, o seu advogado, Zhang Xinkui, está também contestando fundamentalmente a suposta autoridade dos governos municipais para aquecerem o mercado imobiliário por meio do confisco e da venda arbitrários de propriedades.
O processo questiona toda a prática de capitalismo estatal chinês. Para os governos locais e seus funcionários frequentemente corruptos, comprar e vender terrenos transformou-se em uma fonte lucrativa de dinheiro para aumentar as verbas exíguas. Muitos deles, afirma Liu Jiayi, o auditor geral do país, enfrentam “fortes pressões de dívidas”.
Mas, segundo Zhang, os municípios da China estão violando a constituição nacional com os seus negócios no setor imobiliário. Segundo a constituição, as autoridades só podem confiscar propriedades para que estas sejam utilizadas em nome do interesse público. Embora “interesse público” seja um termo elástico no comunismo chinês, Zhang argumenta que o governo, com o seu papel duplo de fiscalizador e agente do mercado, está fomentando desnecessariamente a especulação e exacerbando as injustiças sociais.
Em 2007, o Congresso Popular Nacional da China baixou uma lei de proteção à propriedade privada – com a exceção de terrenos. Mas no decorrer da rápida urbanização, os planejadores, com o objetivo de promoverem crescimento econômico, muitas vezes dão pouca atenção aos direitos estabelecidos de moradores e donos de negócios. E, contrariando as diretrizes de Pequim, muitas autoridades locais tendem a promover, mais do que tudo, a construção de condomínios de luxo.
Suicídios e tortura
Yang Youde, por exemplo, traz no seu passado três gerações de fazendeiros. Até recentemente, ele plantava melões e algodão, e criava peixes, nos arredores de Wuhan, uma cidade de nove milhões de habitantes. Atualmente o mato toma conta dos seus campos de cultivo, e quase todos os peixes do seu grande lago morreram de fome. Este homem de 56 anos de idade passa a maior parte do tempo defendendo a sua propriedade do confisco por parte de autoridades municipais e especuladores.
As fachadas dos novos prédios de apartamentos de luxo estão se aproximando da propriedade de Yang, e a maioria dos seus vizinhos já capitulou. Yang conta que um homem desesperado e a sua mulher atearam fogo a si próprios, e outros se lançaram nos seus lagos e morreram afogados.
A propriedade de Yang, que consiste de casinhas de tijolos, parece uma fortaleza. Ele construiu uma plataforma sobre um depósito e está sempre de guarda. Yang conta que em agosto de 2009, após ter apresentado uma petição contra o planejado confisco da sua fazenda, a polícia veio e arrastou-o para uma das famosas “prisões negras” da China, onde ele ficou detido por 51 dias. “Eles me penduraram pelas mãos e me queimaram com cigarros”, diz Yang.
Agora ele pretende defender a sua propriedade com a única coisa que lhe restou: a sua vida.
Sunday, August 1, 2010
Thoughts on Economic Development, China and the West - Conference, Wuhan 11-12 )ctober 2010
SHOE: CFP--ESHET - SCHET - DEVECON conference, Wuhan 2010
Societies for the History of Economics
Call for Papers
The Centre of Economic Development Research (CEDR) at Wuhan University, China, in cooperation with the European Society for the History of Economic Thought (ESHET) and with the Society for the Chinese History of Economic Thought (SCHET) organizes a joint conference on
Thoughts on Economic Development, China and the West
11-12 October 2010, Wuhan
Chinese traditions of economic thinking are at least as old as their European counterparts, and in various periods Chinese ideas influenced economic thinking in the West, particularly in the age of physiocracy. Different strands of Western political and economic thought have, on the other hand, made a strong impact on the development of the Chinese society and economy during the 20th century, in the transition from empire to republic, in the emergence of the people's republic, and in the ongoing process of economic transformation. This conference will take stock of the development, cross-fertilization and contextual adaption of economic ideas in China and the West. The focus is set on theories about economic order and development in China. Other relevant contributions, in particular about the development of development economics and growth economics, are also welcome.
Paper proposals submitted for the conference should thus preferably address one or more of the following themes:
- Chinese Economic Thinking before the 20th Century
- Chinese Economic Thinking in the 20th Century
- Dissemination of Western Economic Ideas in China
- Dissemination of Chinese Economic Ideas in the West
- Economic Thinking in and about the Chinese Transformation Process(es)
- The Development of Development Economics and Growth Economics
Proposals of papers plus abstracts of no more than 800 words each should be submitted electronically before 31 March 2010 to Ma Ying (yingma9494@126.com ) and Hans-Michael Trautwein (michael.trautwein@uni-oldenburg.de ). Applicants will be informed about a decision concerning the acceptance of their proposals before 30 April 2010. First versions of the accepted papers will have to be submitted in full by 1 August 2010. Some travel grants will be made available by the organizers.
Scientific committee: Profs. Guo Xibao, Ma Ying (CSDE), Yan Qinghua (SCHET), Harald Hagemann, Cristina Marcuzzo, Hans-Michael Trautwein (ESHET)
Societies for the History of Economics
Call for Papers
The Centre of Economic Development Research (CEDR) at Wuhan University, China, in cooperation with the European Society for the History of Economic Thought (ESHET) and with the Society for the Chinese History of Economic Thought (SCHET) organizes a joint conference on
Thoughts on Economic Development, China and the West
11-12 October 2010, Wuhan
Chinese traditions of economic thinking are at least as old as their European counterparts, and in various periods Chinese ideas influenced economic thinking in the West, particularly in the age of physiocracy. Different strands of Western political and economic thought have, on the other hand, made a strong impact on the development of the Chinese society and economy during the 20th century, in the transition from empire to republic, in the emergence of the people's republic, and in the ongoing process of economic transformation. This conference will take stock of the development, cross-fertilization and contextual adaption of economic ideas in China and the West. The focus is set on theories about economic order and development in China. Other relevant contributions, in particular about the development of development economics and growth economics, are also welcome.
Paper proposals submitted for the conference should thus preferably address one or more of the following themes:
- Chinese Economic Thinking before the 20th Century
- Chinese Economic Thinking in the 20th Century
- Dissemination of Western Economic Ideas in China
- Dissemination of Chinese Economic Ideas in the West
- Economic Thinking in and about the Chinese Transformation Process(es)
- The Development of Development Economics and Growth Economics
Proposals of papers plus abstracts of no more than 800 words each should be submitted electronically before 31 March 2010 to Ma Ying (yingma9494@126.com ) and Hans-Michael Trautwein (michael.trautwein@uni-oldenburg.de ). Applicants will be informed about a decision concerning the acceptance of their proposals before 30 April 2010. First versions of the accepted papers will have to be submitted in full by 1 August 2010. Some travel grants will be made available by the organizers.
Scientific committee: Profs. Guo Xibao, Ma Ying (CSDE), Yan Qinghua (SCHET), Harald Hagemann, Cristina Marcuzzo, Hans-Michael Trautwein (ESHET)
Thursday, July 29, 2010
The rising power of the Chinese worker - The Economist
World economy
The rising power of the Chinese worker
The Economist, July 29th, 2010
In China’s factories, pay and protest are on the rise. That is good for China, and for the world economy
CHEAP labour has built China’s economic miracle. Its manufacturing workers toil for a small fraction of the cost of their American or German competitors. At the bottom of the heap, a “floating population” of about 130m migrants work in China’s boomtowns, taking home 1,348 yuan a month on average last year. That is a mere $197, little more than one-twentieth of the average monthly wage in America. But it is 17% more than the year before. As China’s economy has bounced back, wages have followed suit. On the coasts, where its exporting factories are clustered, bosses are short of workers, and workers short of patience. A spate of strikes has thrown a spanner into the workshop of the world.
The hands of China’s workers have been strengthened by a new labour law, introduced in 2008, and by the more fundamental laws of demand and supply (see article). Workers are becoming harder to find and to keep. The country’s villages still contain perhaps 70m potential migrants. Other rural folk might be willing to work closer to home in the growing number of factories moving inland. But the supply of strong backs and nimble fingers is not infinite, even in China. The number of 15- to 29-year-olds will fall sharply from next year. And although their wages are increasing, their aspirations are rising even faster. They seem less willing to “eat bitterness”, as the Chinese put it, without complaint.
Why the goons were called off
In truth, Chinese workers were never as docile as the popular caricature suggested. But the recent strikes have been unusual in their frequency (Guangdong province on China’s south coast suffered at least 36 strikes in the space of 48 days), their longevity and their targets: foreign multinationals.
China’s ruling Communist Party has swiftly quashed previous bouts of labour unrest. This one drew a more relaxed reaction. Goons from the government-controlled trade union roughed up some Honda strikers, but they were quickly called off. The strikes were widely, if briefly, covered in the state-supervised press. And the ringleaders have not so far heard any midnight knocks at the door.
This suggests three things. First, China is reluctant to get heavy-handed with workers in big-brand firms that attract global media attention. But, second, China is becoming more relaxed about spooking foreign investors. Indeed, if workers are upset, better that they blame foreign bosses than local ones. In the wake of the financial crisis, the party has concluded, correctly, that foreign investors need China more than it needs them. Third, and most important, the government may believe that the new bolshiness of its workers is in keeping with its professed aim of “rebalancing” the economy. And it would be right. China’s economy relies too much on investment and too little on consumer spending. That is mostly because workers get such a small slice of the national cake: 53% in 2007, down from 61% in 1990 (and compared with about two-thirds in America). Letting wages rise at the expense of profits would allow workers to enjoy more of the fruits of their labour.
Higher Chinese wages would also be good for the West. This may seem odd, given how much the rich world has come to rely on cheap Chinese labour: by one estimate, trade with China has added $1,000 a year to the pockets of every American household, thanks to cheaper goods in the country’s stores, cheaper inputs for its businesses and stiffer competition in its markets. Just as expanding the global labour force by a quarter through the addition of cheap Chinese workers helped to keep prices down in the West, so higher Chinese wages might start to export inflation. Furthermore, from the point of view of the global economy, labour is a resource, like land or oil. It would not normally benefit from the dwindling of China’s reserves of labour any more than from the drying up of Saudi wells.
Tomorrow’s global consumers
But in the wake of the financial crisis, things are different. Deflation is now a bigger threat than inflation. And with 47m workers unemployed in the OECD alone, labour is not holding back the global economy. What the world lacks is willing customers, not willing workers. Higher Chinese wages will have a similar effect to the stronger exchange rate that America has been calling for, shrinking China’s trade surplus and boosting its spending. This will help foreign companies and the workers they have idled. A 20% rise in Chinese consumption might well lead to an extra $25 billion of American exports. That could create over 200,000 American jobs.
Eventually, this extra spending will help the world economy return to full employment. At that point, foreign companies and consumers may miss China’s cheap coastal workers, who kept profits high and prices low. But there will still be cheap labour to be found inland and in places like India. And Chinese wages were anyway only half the story. The other half was Chinese productivity. Chinese labour costs tripled in the decade after 1995, but output per worker quintupled.
To repeat that feat, as it runs dry of crude labour, China will have to increase its supply of skilled workers. That will require a stable workforce, which stays with its employers long enough to be worth investing in. For that the government will need to relax further its system of internal passports, or hukou, which prevent migrant workers from settling formally in the city without losing their family plot back home. When labour was abundant, it suited the government to have a floating population that made few demands on urban authorities and drifted back to the family farm whenever hardship beckoned. But to maintain fast growth as the labour market tightens, China’s floating population will have to drop anchor.
As the late Joan Robinson, a Cambridge economist, once wrote, “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all”. Her quip, written in 1962, was inspired by underemployment in South-East Asia. Since then, capital has busily “exploited” workers in that region and its giant northern neighbour, much to their benefit. Now it is time for capital to invest in them.
Related items:
* China's labour market: The next China; Jul 29th 2010
The rising power of the Chinese worker
The Economist, July 29th, 2010
In China’s factories, pay and protest are on the rise. That is good for China, and for the world economy
CHEAP labour has built China’s economic miracle. Its manufacturing workers toil for a small fraction of the cost of their American or German competitors. At the bottom of the heap, a “floating population” of about 130m migrants work in China’s boomtowns, taking home 1,348 yuan a month on average last year. That is a mere $197, little more than one-twentieth of the average monthly wage in America. But it is 17% more than the year before. As China’s economy has bounced back, wages have followed suit. On the coasts, where its exporting factories are clustered, bosses are short of workers, and workers short of patience. A spate of strikes has thrown a spanner into the workshop of the world.
The hands of China’s workers have been strengthened by a new labour law, introduced in 2008, and by the more fundamental laws of demand and supply (see article). Workers are becoming harder to find and to keep. The country’s villages still contain perhaps 70m potential migrants. Other rural folk might be willing to work closer to home in the growing number of factories moving inland. But the supply of strong backs and nimble fingers is not infinite, even in China. The number of 15- to 29-year-olds will fall sharply from next year. And although their wages are increasing, their aspirations are rising even faster. They seem less willing to “eat bitterness”, as the Chinese put it, without complaint.
Why the goons were called off
In truth, Chinese workers were never as docile as the popular caricature suggested. But the recent strikes have been unusual in their frequency (Guangdong province on China’s south coast suffered at least 36 strikes in the space of 48 days), their longevity and their targets: foreign multinationals.
China’s ruling Communist Party has swiftly quashed previous bouts of labour unrest. This one drew a more relaxed reaction. Goons from the government-controlled trade union roughed up some Honda strikers, but they were quickly called off. The strikes were widely, if briefly, covered in the state-supervised press. And the ringleaders have not so far heard any midnight knocks at the door.
This suggests three things. First, China is reluctant to get heavy-handed with workers in big-brand firms that attract global media attention. But, second, China is becoming more relaxed about spooking foreign investors. Indeed, if workers are upset, better that they blame foreign bosses than local ones. In the wake of the financial crisis, the party has concluded, correctly, that foreign investors need China more than it needs them. Third, and most important, the government may believe that the new bolshiness of its workers is in keeping with its professed aim of “rebalancing” the economy. And it would be right. China’s economy relies too much on investment and too little on consumer spending. That is mostly because workers get such a small slice of the national cake: 53% in 2007, down from 61% in 1990 (and compared with about two-thirds in America). Letting wages rise at the expense of profits would allow workers to enjoy more of the fruits of their labour.
Higher Chinese wages would also be good for the West. This may seem odd, given how much the rich world has come to rely on cheap Chinese labour: by one estimate, trade with China has added $1,000 a year to the pockets of every American household, thanks to cheaper goods in the country’s stores, cheaper inputs for its businesses and stiffer competition in its markets. Just as expanding the global labour force by a quarter through the addition of cheap Chinese workers helped to keep prices down in the West, so higher Chinese wages might start to export inflation. Furthermore, from the point of view of the global economy, labour is a resource, like land or oil. It would not normally benefit from the dwindling of China’s reserves of labour any more than from the drying up of Saudi wells.
Tomorrow’s global consumers
But in the wake of the financial crisis, things are different. Deflation is now a bigger threat than inflation. And with 47m workers unemployed in the OECD alone, labour is not holding back the global economy. What the world lacks is willing customers, not willing workers. Higher Chinese wages will have a similar effect to the stronger exchange rate that America has been calling for, shrinking China’s trade surplus and boosting its spending. This will help foreign companies and the workers they have idled. A 20% rise in Chinese consumption might well lead to an extra $25 billion of American exports. That could create over 200,000 American jobs.
Eventually, this extra spending will help the world economy return to full employment. At that point, foreign companies and consumers may miss China’s cheap coastal workers, who kept profits high and prices low. But there will still be cheap labour to be found inland and in places like India. And Chinese wages were anyway only half the story. The other half was Chinese productivity. Chinese labour costs tripled in the decade after 1995, but output per worker quintupled.
To repeat that feat, as it runs dry of crude labour, China will have to increase its supply of skilled workers. That will require a stable workforce, which stays with its employers long enough to be worth investing in. For that the government will need to relax further its system of internal passports, or hukou, which prevent migrant workers from settling formally in the city without losing their family plot back home. When labour was abundant, it suited the government to have a floating population that made few demands on urban authorities and drifted back to the family farm whenever hardship beckoned. But to maintain fast growth as the labour market tightens, China’s floating population will have to drop anchor.
As the late Joan Robinson, a Cambridge economist, once wrote, “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all”. Her quip, written in 1962, was inspired by underemployment in South-East Asia. Since then, capital has busily “exploited” workers in that region and its giant northern neighbour, much to their benefit. Now it is time for capital to invest in them.
Related items:
* China's labour market: The next China; Jul 29th 2010
Relacoes economico-comerciais Brasil-China - Marcos Caramuru de Paiva
Ainda desconhecido por chineses, Brasil vira oportunidade além do comércio
Marcos Caramuru
Folha de S. Paulo, 28.07.2010
O Brasil passou a ser visto na China como um país de oportunidades para investimentos, não só comércio.
Há quatro explicações. A primeira é a percepção de que, no vácuo da crise, as economias maduras passarão por um longo período de incerteza. A China precisa abrir o leque de parceiros.
A segunda vem do acrônimo Bric. Sem conhecer bem a nossa realidade, os empresários chineses nos veem como membros de um grupo que terá peso crescente. Percepção é tudo em suas decisões.
Eles não costumam valer-se de consultoria, nem se fiam em análises complexas sobre o local onde atuarão.
Em geral, têm dificuldades de entender as peculiaridades de uma economia de renda média como a nossa. Mas, se antes desanimavam, agora querem vencer obstáculos. A terceira razão é estratégica. A China precisa garantir o suprimento de bens que o Brasil tem em abundância, e considera não só comprar fazendas e minas mas investir em logística e infraestrutura.
Por fim, num país onde a taxa de poupança é da ordem de 50% do PIB, há mais recursos que projetos -ainda que as obras sejam muitas.
Os bancos e os fundos de investimentos estão sempre à caça de opções. Muitos poupadores desencantados com a poupança e as Bolsas querem alternativas.
O negócio Brasil passou a ser tão bem avaliado que grandes bancos estrangeiros estão fazendo esforço para mostrar que conhecem a nossa realidade e são os intermediários para ela. Alguns abriram mesas de operações em Xangai apenas para o Brasil.
Como até hoje só dois bancos brasileiros estão na China continental, com presença discreta, instituições estrangeiras com filiais ou subsidiárias nos mercados chinês e brasileiro simultaneamente aproveitam a deixa.
Nas próximas duas décadas, a China será uma economia industrial cada vez mais sofisticada e competitiva devido, sobretudo, ao fácil acesso a financiamento, à boa infraestrutura e ao esforço empresarial em inovação.
Os salários, ainda baixos em muitos locais, estão aumentando, e o yuan, no médio prazo, deve apreciar. As empresas brasileiras que souberem montar parcerias interessantes para operar na China, no Brasil e em terceiros mercados vão ganhar.
O mercado chinês seguirá tendo liquidez abundante.
Um país como o Brasil, que precisa de recursos externos para crescer a taxas altas, vai se beneficiar disso. O primeiro passo está dado, com acordos de cooperação como os do BB, Itaú, BNDES e Petrobras. Mas há mais adiante.
Exceto por atores grandes e politicamente fortes, as instituições chinesas autorizadas a investir no exterior ainda estão amadurecendo.
Se soubermos mostrar as oportunidades que nossas empresas oferecem, estaremos no caminho certo.
MARCOS CARAMURU DE PAIVA é cônsul-geral do Brasil em Xangai.
Marcos Caramuru
Folha de S. Paulo, 28.07.2010
O Brasil passou a ser visto na China como um país de oportunidades para investimentos, não só comércio.
Há quatro explicações. A primeira é a percepção de que, no vácuo da crise, as economias maduras passarão por um longo período de incerteza. A China precisa abrir o leque de parceiros.
A segunda vem do acrônimo Bric. Sem conhecer bem a nossa realidade, os empresários chineses nos veem como membros de um grupo que terá peso crescente. Percepção é tudo em suas decisões.
Eles não costumam valer-se de consultoria, nem se fiam em análises complexas sobre o local onde atuarão.
Em geral, têm dificuldades de entender as peculiaridades de uma economia de renda média como a nossa. Mas, se antes desanimavam, agora querem vencer obstáculos. A terceira razão é estratégica. A China precisa garantir o suprimento de bens que o Brasil tem em abundância, e considera não só comprar fazendas e minas mas investir em logística e infraestrutura.
Por fim, num país onde a taxa de poupança é da ordem de 50% do PIB, há mais recursos que projetos -ainda que as obras sejam muitas.
Os bancos e os fundos de investimentos estão sempre à caça de opções. Muitos poupadores desencantados com a poupança e as Bolsas querem alternativas.
O negócio Brasil passou a ser tão bem avaliado que grandes bancos estrangeiros estão fazendo esforço para mostrar que conhecem a nossa realidade e são os intermediários para ela. Alguns abriram mesas de operações em Xangai apenas para o Brasil.
Como até hoje só dois bancos brasileiros estão na China continental, com presença discreta, instituições estrangeiras com filiais ou subsidiárias nos mercados chinês e brasileiro simultaneamente aproveitam a deixa.
Nas próximas duas décadas, a China será uma economia industrial cada vez mais sofisticada e competitiva devido, sobretudo, ao fácil acesso a financiamento, à boa infraestrutura e ao esforço empresarial em inovação.
Os salários, ainda baixos em muitos locais, estão aumentando, e o yuan, no médio prazo, deve apreciar. As empresas brasileiras que souberem montar parcerias interessantes para operar na China, no Brasil e em terceiros mercados vão ganhar.
O mercado chinês seguirá tendo liquidez abundante.
Um país como o Brasil, que precisa de recursos externos para crescer a taxas altas, vai se beneficiar disso. O primeiro passo está dado, com acordos de cooperação como os do BB, Itaú, BNDES e Petrobras. Mas há mais adiante.
Exceto por atores grandes e politicamente fortes, as instituições chinesas autorizadas a investir no exterior ainda estão amadurecendo.
Se soubermos mostrar as oportunidades que nossas empresas oferecem, estaremos no caminho certo.
MARCOS CARAMURU DE PAIVA é cônsul-geral do Brasil em Xangai.
Saturday, July 24, 2010
Droits de l'Homme en Chine: rapport de Human Rights Watch
La question tibétaine, "un défi politique majeur pour la Chine"
Entretien: Nicholas Bequelin, spécialiste de l'Asie à Human Rights Watch (HRW)
Le Monde, 24.07.2010
Nicholas Bequelin, basé à Hongkong et spécialiste de l'Asie à Human Rights Watch (HRW), s'exprime à la suite de la publication, jeudi 22 juillet, d'un rapport de l'organisation de défense des droits de l'homme basée à New York, sur les exactions policières chinoises au Tibet depuis 2008.
Qu'est-ce qui a guidé l'équipe de HRW dans la rédaction de ce rapport, présenté notamment comme indépendant des organisations liées au gouvernement tibétain en exil ?
Human Rights Watch a travaillé sans aucun a priori sur ce qui s'est passé au Tibet, mais avec le souci de répondre à un problème principal, à savoir, qu'est-ce que le gouvernement chinois cherchait à cacher en verrouillant complètement l'ensemble du plateau tibétain depuis les manifestations de mars 2008 jusqu'à aujourd'hui. On peut certes, depuis, s'y rendre, mais il y a des soldats partout, des policiers armés, etc.
Au moment des évènements au Tibet, quand il a fallu alerter la communauté diplomatique ou les Nations Unis, l'une de nos principales difficultés venait du fait que la majeure partie des informations fournies par le gouvernement tibétain en exil et les organisations pro-tibétaines étaient souvent de seconde main ou invérifiables. Il fallait donc faire une enquête qui s'affranchisse de ces sources et construise un rapport à neuf uniquement sur la base d'information de première main par des témoins oculaires directs.
Nous proposons un rapport difficilement réfutable, car complètement indépendant. Nous ne pouvons pas nous prononcer sur le nombre de tués mais seulement sur la nécessité absolue de faire une enquête sur cette question, maintenant qu'il est établi que les forces de sécurité ont ouvert le feu sur des manifestants à plusieurs reprises.
Quels éléments nouveaux le rapport apporte-t-il ?
Je crois qu'on établit de façon claire que les forces de l'ordre ont tiré à balles réelles, notamment à Lhassa, Ngaba, Tonghor et Gardze (province du Sichuan). Ce sont des informations qu'on a pu recouper : au total nous n'avons utilisé que 10 à 15 % des informations recueillies pour le rapport. La position du gouvernement chinois est que les troupes n'ont jamais tiré sur les manifestants, qu'il n'y a pas eu de morts par balle. Il n'a jamais admis que des manifestants sont morts à Lhassa le 14, ni le 15. Or, on a des témoignages. Officiellement, il y a bien eu à certains moments des communiqués sur des manifestants tués ou touchés par balles, mais ils ont été immédiatement retirés. On peut donc dire que les forces de l'ordre ont bien ouvert le feu, plusieurs fois, dans des régions différentes. Il faudrait maintenant répertorier tous les autres incidents sur lesquels nous n'avions pas assez de témoignages pouvant être recoupés.
Qu'est-ce qui est caractéristique dans la réaction chinoise au soulèvement tibétain de mars 2008, et la manière dont la " normalisation " de la région a été effectuée ?
Quand on voit tout l'appareil policier déployé, les abus, la férocité de la répression, les cas de ces moines ayant imprimé à la main une centaine de tracts et qui ont pris 6 ou 7 ans de prison, on constate que les forces de sécurité agissent comme s'il s'agissait d'une situation de conflit armé, de guérilla, ou de terrorisme, et non de manifestations populaires, pour la plupart spontanées, avec des manifestants non armés. Et qui n'ont pas causé de violences graves, avec l'exception de Lhassa, où il y a eu des morts il est la vrai, mais la plupart ont eu lieu au cours d'incendies de boutiques.
A l'époque Human Rights Watch a condamné sans ambiguité la violence par les manifestants. Les manifestations n'ont pas toujours été pacifiques, il y a eu des postes de police brulées, des jets de pierre, des representants des forces de l'ordre blessés et le rapport souligne que dans un certain nombre de cas il semble que les forces de sécurité aient exercé une retenue adequate… Mais dans de nombreux cas, on ne connaît jamais l'enchaînement qui a conduit à la confrontation. Le problème fondamental reste que le gouvernement chinois n'a jamais distingué entre les manifestants violents et non-violents, qui sont tous considérés comme des séparatistes.
Les procédures judiciaires ont été extrêmement sommaires, avec un appareil judiciaire très politisé. Les sources chinoises officielles ne s'en cachent même pas. Nous détaillons dans le rapport, sur la base de documents officiels chinois, de nombreux cas de Tibetains condamnés à de lourdes peines pour des actes de protestation absolument non-violents : par exemple a Kardze, deux moines d'un monastère sont sortis agiter un drapeau. Les gens prennent peur et ferment leurs boutiques. Les deux moines sont accusés d'incitation au séparatisme et ils écopent de longues années de prison.
Les informations données par la Chine sur le nombre de personnes arrêtées et condamnées sont-elles crédibles ?
La presse chinoise a par exemple titré sur le fait que " 8 % seulement des émeutiers ont été condamnés", ce qui reviendrait à 76 personnes. Mais si on commence à regarder hors de Lhassa, donc au Sichuan, au Gansu, dans les zones tibétaines, on trouve des dizaines de condamnations. Et cela a continué dans les mois qui ont suivi. Le nombre total de gens arrêtés et condamnés est beaucoup plus élevé que ce qu'ils ont donné. Tous les accusés sont qualifiés d'"incendiaires, des pilleurs et des casseurs ", mais de nombreuses personnes ont fait des actions qui ne sont absolument pas violentes. Des actions qui selon les comptes rendus chinois eux mêmes, ne sont même pas de l'ordre à troubler l'ordre public.
Les Tibétains qui tentent de témoigner et de passer des informations à l'étranger sont condamnés très lourdement…
Au cours des deux dernières années, comme l'ont d'ailleurs bien montré les organisations liées au gouvernement tibétain en exil, les gens qui passent des informations sont condamnés pour espionnage. Des gens qui téléphonent à leur cousin à Dharamsala peuvent se retrouver avec des condamnations extrêmement lourdes. Or, le gouvernement chinois sait bien que le comportement des forces de sécurité au Tibet est en contradiction avec les normes internationales, mais aussi ses propres lois.
Après le Tibet, c'est le Xinjiang qui s'est embrasé en juillet 2009, et a connu une répression également brutale. Il y a des parallèles entre les situations dans lesquelles se trouvent aujourd'hui ces deux zones de minorités ethniques...
C'est un défi politique majeur pour l'équipe de Hu Jintao : dans les quatre sixièmes du pays, des troupes armées ont dû être envoyées pour maintenir l'ordre et la liberté de circulation et de communication y sont restreints. Les évènements d'Urumqi ont été beaucoup plus contenus : ils ne se sont pas propagés ailleurs. Au Tibet, ça s'est davantage étendu. L'une des raisons, c'est qu'au Xinjiang, les Chinois Hans constituent près de 50 % de la population, bien plus qu'au Tibet. Le terrain est plus facile, ce sont des oasis. Il y a des routes, des aéroports, on peut facilement amener des troupes. Peu de temps après les évènements d'Urumqi, le gouvernement chinois a changé le premier secrétaire du parti de la Région autonome, et en a nommé un autre qui, en rupture avec la tradition, n'a pas fait sa carrière au Xinjiang même. Un plan massif de développement a été lancé, qui va complètement transformer le territoire. Les autorités ont aussi admis qu'à la base du problème, les Ouigours étaient exposés à des discriminations socio économiques. Et puis, il y a moins de sympathie international, il y a le problème du terrorisme islamique, le régime est donc dans une situation plus confortable.
Au Tibet, oui, on va construire des autoroutes, mais aucun mot sur les discriminations. La réalité est que la pouvoir est bien plus dans une impasse au Tibet : il y a une proportion de Chinois Hans plus faible, il n'y a pas d'agriculture qu'on peut étendre comme au Xinjiang en apportant l'irrigation. Il y a aussi une bureaucratie tibétaine qui a complètement accentué les rancoeurs, en captant les ressources et les richesses, comme l'a montré le rapport de l'ONG chinoise Gongmeng en 2008. Pékin peut difficilement faire face à deux régions de minorités ethniques en révolte : le Tibet tout seul, ça passe. Le Xinjiang, aussi. Mais les deux en même temps, non. Il fallait donc qu'ils règlent au moins un des problèmes : au Xinjiang, ils vont faire ce qu'ils savent faire, moderniser et transformer le terrain indigène en terrain chinois. Faire des villes qu'on puisse lire, administrativement et militairement. Renforcer les Bingtuan [Corps de production et de construction du Xinjiang]. Au Tibet, il n'y a pas de solution rapide, il n'y a pas de plan de 5 ans qui puisse faire progresser les choses.
Qu'est-ce que cela implique pour la question tibétaine ?
Sur le long terme, cela pose la question de la résolution politique. Le débat entre archaïsme et modernité, qui fait souvent surface quand on parle de la politique chinoise au Tibet, est relégué à l'arrière plan par un problème plus grave : quand les forces de sécurité agissent de cette façon, quand tout le monde est suspect, quand des gens sont emmenés, torturés et " disparus ", ça aliène population. Cela accentue le processus de polarisation dans la société. L'attitude des forces de l'ordre éloigne la possibilité d'une solution politique pour le Tibet. Les [autorités chinoises] auraient besoin de faire comme ce qu'elles ont fait dans le reste de la Chine, et de parvenir à un processus d'accommodation, de négociation avec la société.
Propos recueillis par Brice Pedroletti
Sur le même sujet
Des militaires chinois patrouillent à Lhassa, au Tibet, le 6 août 2008 à quelques semaines de l'ouverture des Jeux olympiques de Pékin.
Les faits"
Human Rights Watch dénonce la férocité de la répression au Tibet
Les faits"
Tiananmen : un ex-étudiant arrêté à Tokyo
Les faits:
Le dissident chinois Liu Xiaobo fait appel de sa condamnation
Entretien: Nicholas Bequelin, spécialiste de l'Asie à Human Rights Watch (HRW)
Le Monde, 24.07.2010
Nicholas Bequelin, basé à Hongkong et spécialiste de l'Asie à Human Rights Watch (HRW), s'exprime à la suite de la publication, jeudi 22 juillet, d'un rapport de l'organisation de défense des droits de l'homme basée à New York, sur les exactions policières chinoises au Tibet depuis 2008.
Qu'est-ce qui a guidé l'équipe de HRW dans la rédaction de ce rapport, présenté notamment comme indépendant des organisations liées au gouvernement tibétain en exil ?
Human Rights Watch a travaillé sans aucun a priori sur ce qui s'est passé au Tibet, mais avec le souci de répondre à un problème principal, à savoir, qu'est-ce que le gouvernement chinois cherchait à cacher en verrouillant complètement l'ensemble du plateau tibétain depuis les manifestations de mars 2008 jusqu'à aujourd'hui. On peut certes, depuis, s'y rendre, mais il y a des soldats partout, des policiers armés, etc.
Au moment des évènements au Tibet, quand il a fallu alerter la communauté diplomatique ou les Nations Unis, l'une de nos principales difficultés venait du fait que la majeure partie des informations fournies par le gouvernement tibétain en exil et les organisations pro-tibétaines étaient souvent de seconde main ou invérifiables. Il fallait donc faire une enquête qui s'affranchisse de ces sources et construise un rapport à neuf uniquement sur la base d'information de première main par des témoins oculaires directs.
Nous proposons un rapport difficilement réfutable, car complètement indépendant. Nous ne pouvons pas nous prononcer sur le nombre de tués mais seulement sur la nécessité absolue de faire une enquête sur cette question, maintenant qu'il est établi que les forces de sécurité ont ouvert le feu sur des manifestants à plusieurs reprises.
Quels éléments nouveaux le rapport apporte-t-il ?
Je crois qu'on établit de façon claire que les forces de l'ordre ont tiré à balles réelles, notamment à Lhassa, Ngaba, Tonghor et Gardze (province du Sichuan). Ce sont des informations qu'on a pu recouper : au total nous n'avons utilisé que 10 à 15 % des informations recueillies pour le rapport. La position du gouvernement chinois est que les troupes n'ont jamais tiré sur les manifestants, qu'il n'y a pas eu de morts par balle. Il n'a jamais admis que des manifestants sont morts à Lhassa le 14, ni le 15. Or, on a des témoignages. Officiellement, il y a bien eu à certains moments des communiqués sur des manifestants tués ou touchés par balles, mais ils ont été immédiatement retirés. On peut donc dire que les forces de l'ordre ont bien ouvert le feu, plusieurs fois, dans des régions différentes. Il faudrait maintenant répertorier tous les autres incidents sur lesquels nous n'avions pas assez de témoignages pouvant être recoupés.
Qu'est-ce qui est caractéristique dans la réaction chinoise au soulèvement tibétain de mars 2008, et la manière dont la " normalisation " de la région a été effectuée ?
Quand on voit tout l'appareil policier déployé, les abus, la férocité de la répression, les cas de ces moines ayant imprimé à la main une centaine de tracts et qui ont pris 6 ou 7 ans de prison, on constate que les forces de sécurité agissent comme s'il s'agissait d'une situation de conflit armé, de guérilla, ou de terrorisme, et non de manifestations populaires, pour la plupart spontanées, avec des manifestants non armés. Et qui n'ont pas causé de violences graves, avec l'exception de Lhassa, où il y a eu des morts il est la vrai, mais la plupart ont eu lieu au cours d'incendies de boutiques.
A l'époque Human Rights Watch a condamné sans ambiguité la violence par les manifestants. Les manifestations n'ont pas toujours été pacifiques, il y a eu des postes de police brulées, des jets de pierre, des representants des forces de l'ordre blessés et le rapport souligne que dans un certain nombre de cas il semble que les forces de sécurité aient exercé une retenue adequate… Mais dans de nombreux cas, on ne connaît jamais l'enchaînement qui a conduit à la confrontation. Le problème fondamental reste que le gouvernement chinois n'a jamais distingué entre les manifestants violents et non-violents, qui sont tous considérés comme des séparatistes.
Les procédures judiciaires ont été extrêmement sommaires, avec un appareil judiciaire très politisé. Les sources chinoises officielles ne s'en cachent même pas. Nous détaillons dans le rapport, sur la base de documents officiels chinois, de nombreux cas de Tibetains condamnés à de lourdes peines pour des actes de protestation absolument non-violents : par exemple a Kardze, deux moines d'un monastère sont sortis agiter un drapeau. Les gens prennent peur et ferment leurs boutiques. Les deux moines sont accusés d'incitation au séparatisme et ils écopent de longues années de prison.
Les informations données par la Chine sur le nombre de personnes arrêtées et condamnées sont-elles crédibles ?
La presse chinoise a par exemple titré sur le fait que " 8 % seulement des émeutiers ont été condamnés", ce qui reviendrait à 76 personnes. Mais si on commence à regarder hors de Lhassa, donc au Sichuan, au Gansu, dans les zones tibétaines, on trouve des dizaines de condamnations. Et cela a continué dans les mois qui ont suivi. Le nombre total de gens arrêtés et condamnés est beaucoup plus élevé que ce qu'ils ont donné. Tous les accusés sont qualifiés d'"incendiaires, des pilleurs et des casseurs ", mais de nombreuses personnes ont fait des actions qui ne sont absolument pas violentes. Des actions qui selon les comptes rendus chinois eux mêmes, ne sont même pas de l'ordre à troubler l'ordre public.
Les Tibétains qui tentent de témoigner et de passer des informations à l'étranger sont condamnés très lourdement…
Au cours des deux dernières années, comme l'ont d'ailleurs bien montré les organisations liées au gouvernement tibétain en exil, les gens qui passent des informations sont condamnés pour espionnage. Des gens qui téléphonent à leur cousin à Dharamsala peuvent se retrouver avec des condamnations extrêmement lourdes. Or, le gouvernement chinois sait bien que le comportement des forces de sécurité au Tibet est en contradiction avec les normes internationales, mais aussi ses propres lois.
Après le Tibet, c'est le Xinjiang qui s'est embrasé en juillet 2009, et a connu une répression également brutale. Il y a des parallèles entre les situations dans lesquelles se trouvent aujourd'hui ces deux zones de minorités ethniques...
C'est un défi politique majeur pour l'équipe de Hu Jintao : dans les quatre sixièmes du pays, des troupes armées ont dû être envoyées pour maintenir l'ordre et la liberté de circulation et de communication y sont restreints. Les évènements d'Urumqi ont été beaucoup plus contenus : ils ne se sont pas propagés ailleurs. Au Tibet, ça s'est davantage étendu. L'une des raisons, c'est qu'au Xinjiang, les Chinois Hans constituent près de 50 % de la population, bien plus qu'au Tibet. Le terrain est plus facile, ce sont des oasis. Il y a des routes, des aéroports, on peut facilement amener des troupes. Peu de temps après les évènements d'Urumqi, le gouvernement chinois a changé le premier secrétaire du parti de la Région autonome, et en a nommé un autre qui, en rupture avec la tradition, n'a pas fait sa carrière au Xinjiang même. Un plan massif de développement a été lancé, qui va complètement transformer le territoire. Les autorités ont aussi admis qu'à la base du problème, les Ouigours étaient exposés à des discriminations socio économiques. Et puis, il y a moins de sympathie international, il y a le problème du terrorisme islamique, le régime est donc dans une situation plus confortable.
Au Tibet, oui, on va construire des autoroutes, mais aucun mot sur les discriminations. La réalité est que la pouvoir est bien plus dans une impasse au Tibet : il y a une proportion de Chinois Hans plus faible, il n'y a pas d'agriculture qu'on peut étendre comme au Xinjiang en apportant l'irrigation. Il y a aussi une bureaucratie tibétaine qui a complètement accentué les rancoeurs, en captant les ressources et les richesses, comme l'a montré le rapport de l'ONG chinoise Gongmeng en 2008. Pékin peut difficilement faire face à deux régions de minorités ethniques en révolte : le Tibet tout seul, ça passe. Le Xinjiang, aussi. Mais les deux en même temps, non. Il fallait donc qu'ils règlent au moins un des problèmes : au Xinjiang, ils vont faire ce qu'ils savent faire, moderniser et transformer le terrain indigène en terrain chinois. Faire des villes qu'on puisse lire, administrativement et militairement. Renforcer les Bingtuan [Corps de production et de construction du Xinjiang]. Au Tibet, il n'y a pas de solution rapide, il n'y a pas de plan de 5 ans qui puisse faire progresser les choses.
Qu'est-ce que cela implique pour la question tibétaine ?
Sur le long terme, cela pose la question de la résolution politique. Le débat entre archaïsme et modernité, qui fait souvent surface quand on parle de la politique chinoise au Tibet, est relégué à l'arrière plan par un problème plus grave : quand les forces de sécurité agissent de cette façon, quand tout le monde est suspect, quand des gens sont emmenés, torturés et " disparus ", ça aliène population. Cela accentue le processus de polarisation dans la société. L'attitude des forces de l'ordre éloigne la possibilité d'une solution politique pour le Tibet. Les [autorités chinoises] auraient besoin de faire comme ce qu'elles ont fait dans le reste de la Chine, et de parvenir à un processus d'accommodation, de négociation avec la société.
Propos recueillis par Brice Pedroletti
Sur le même sujet
Des militaires chinois patrouillent à Lhassa, au Tibet, le 6 août 2008 à quelques semaines de l'ouverture des Jeux olympiques de Pékin.
Les faits"
Human Rights Watch dénonce la férocité de la répression au Tibet
Les faits"
Tiananmen : un ex-étudiant arrêté à Tokyo
Les faits:
Le dissident chinois Liu Xiaobo fait appel de sa condamnation
Thursday, July 15, 2010
Crescimento economico na China em 2010 - ultrapassando o Japao
Economia chinesa desacelera crescimento no 2º trimestre
BBC Brasil, 15 de julho, 2010
O ritmo da recuperação da economia chinesa desacelerou no segundo trimestre deste ano em comparação com a taxa de crescimento anual dos três meses anteriores.
Ritmo da economia chinesa afetará retomada econômica global
A economia cresceu 10,3% no segundo trimestre em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado. No primeiro trimestre, o crescimento anual da economia chinesa havia sido de 11,9%.
A desaceleração foi atribuída às medidas do governo chinês para conter uma bolha de crédito e segurar a rápida valorização dos imóveis no país.
Apesar da desaceleração, o país ainda está no caminho para se tornar a segunda maior economia do planeta até o fim do ano.
Restrições
As autoridades impuseram restrições no volume de empréstimos e investimentos para conter o aumento no preço das casas e o endividamento dos bancos públicos.
Ao divulgar os números da economia, o Escritório Nacional de Estatísticas chinês destacou o resultado até o meio do ano. Nos primeiros seis meses de 2010, o Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) do país chegou a US$ 2,55 trilhões, um crescimento de 11,1% em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado.
A meta do governo para o ano é de 8%, mas o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) estima que o crescimento chinês alcance 10,5% em 1010. Esse nível de crescimento levaria a China a ultrapassar o Japão, atualmente a segunda maior economia do planeta após os Estados Unidos.
Em dados divulgados nesta quinta-feira, o Banco Central japonês disse esperar um crescimento de 2,6% em 2010, após quedas de 5,2% em 2009 e 1,2% em 2008. Já a China, mesmo durante a crise, nunca cresceu menos de 9% durante esse período.
Ritmo de recuperação
Analistas acompanham a evolução da economia chinesa, cujo demanda por produtos de consumo, infraestrutura e commodities afetará as vendas de empresas em todo o mundo e, por consequência, o ritmo de recuperação da economia global.
Nos primeiros seis meses do ano, o levantamento do escritório de estatísticas da China mostrou que as vendas no varejo cresceram 18,2% no país em comparação com o mesmo período no ano anterior, com destaque para as vendas de veículos (aumento de 37%) e equipamentos domésticos (29%).
No início do ano passado, o governo chinês pôs em vigor uma série de medidas para fomentar a recuperação econômica, que incluiu subsídios para equipamentos domésticos e incentivos fiscais para a compra de carros.
O porta-voz do escritório de estatísticas, Sheng Laiyun, disse que a desaceleração econômica de agora "será benéfica para a economia, porque evitará um crescimento muito rápido e o superaquecimento (econômico)".
Nos primeiros seis meses do ano, a inflação chinesa ficou em 2,6%, abaixo do teto de 3% fixado pelo governo.
Já os números da renda também demonstraram crescimento nos primeiros seis meses do ano: 7,5% entre os moradores das cidades (cerca de 9,8 mil yuans ou US$ 1.450 per capita, descontada a inflação) e 9,5% entre os moradores das áreas rurais (cerca de 3 mil yuans ou US$ 455 per capita, descontada a inflação).
BBC Brasil, 15 de julho, 2010
O ritmo da recuperação da economia chinesa desacelerou no segundo trimestre deste ano em comparação com a taxa de crescimento anual dos três meses anteriores.
Ritmo da economia chinesa afetará retomada econômica global
A economia cresceu 10,3% no segundo trimestre em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado. No primeiro trimestre, o crescimento anual da economia chinesa havia sido de 11,9%.
A desaceleração foi atribuída às medidas do governo chinês para conter uma bolha de crédito e segurar a rápida valorização dos imóveis no país.
Apesar da desaceleração, o país ainda está no caminho para se tornar a segunda maior economia do planeta até o fim do ano.
Restrições
As autoridades impuseram restrições no volume de empréstimos e investimentos para conter o aumento no preço das casas e o endividamento dos bancos públicos.
Ao divulgar os números da economia, o Escritório Nacional de Estatísticas chinês destacou o resultado até o meio do ano. Nos primeiros seis meses de 2010, o Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) do país chegou a US$ 2,55 trilhões, um crescimento de 11,1% em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado.
A meta do governo para o ano é de 8%, mas o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) estima que o crescimento chinês alcance 10,5% em 1010. Esse nível de crescimento levaria a China a ultrapassar o Japão, atualmente a segunda maior economia do planeta após os Estados Unidos.
Em dados divulgados nesta quinta-feira, o Banco Central japonês disse esperar um crescimento de 2,6% em 2010, após quedas de 5,2% em 2009 e 1,2% em 2008. Já a China, mesmo durante a crise, nunca cresceu menos de 9% durante esse período.
Ritmo de recuperação
Analistas acompanham a evolução da economia chinesa, cujo demanda por produtos de consumo, infraestrutura e commodities afetará as vendas de empresas em todo o mundo e, por consequência, o ritmo de recuperação da economia global.
Nos primeiros seis meses do ano, o levantamento do escritório de estatísticas da China mostrou que as vendas no varejo cresceram 18,2% no país em comparação com o mesmo período no ano anterior, com destaque para as vendas de veículos (aumento de 37%) e equipamentos domésticos (29%).
No início do ano passado, o governo chinês pôs em vigor uma série de medidas para fomentar a recuperação econômica, que incluiu subsídios para equipamentos domésticos e incentivos fiscais para a compra de carros.
O porta-voz do escritório de estatísticas, Sheng Laiyun, disse que a desaceleração econômica de agora "será benéfica para a economia, porque evitará um crescimento muito rápido e o superaquecimento (econômico)".
Nos primeiros seis meses do ano, a inflação chinesa ficou em 2,6%, abaixo do teto de 3% fixado pelo governo.
Já os números da renda também demonstraram crescimento nos primeiros seis meses do ano: 7,5% entre os moradores das cidades (cerca de 9,8 mil yuans ou US$ 1.450 per capita, descontada a inflação) e 9,5% entre os moradores das áreas rurais (cerca de 3 mil yuans ou US$ 455 per capita, descontada a inflação).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
