Tuesday, March 30, 2010

370) Matteo Ricci (2): uno gesuita alla corte dei Ming (exposizione)


"I segreti della Citta' Proibita. Matteo Ricci alla corte dei Ming"
a Ca’ dei Carraresi dal 24 ottobre al 9 maggio 2010

La Città Proibita svelata dalla tecnologia
Presentata la terza mostra sulla Cina a Ca’ dei Carraresi che si avvale di percorsi al computer

La terza mostra sulla Cina, che si apre intitolata "I segreti della Città Proibita. Matteo Ricci alla corte dei Ming", ha un partner importante in Fabrica, la costola più creativa e innovativa di Fondazione Benetton. Grazie all’accordo tra Sigillum, la società che orghanizza la mostra e Fabrica stessa, i visitatori non si limiteranno ad ammirare 350 preziosi reperti, fra cui gioielli, porcellane, dipinti, statue d’oro e mobili della Cina tra il 1368 e il 1644, ma potranno addentrarsi virtualmente in ogni più segreto recesso della Città Proibita. Tutto grazie al computer. Il percorso tecnologico non è stato ancora messo a punto, ma Alfio Pozzoni direttore di Fabrica, assicura che "tutti stanno lavorando a testa bassa per rendere la mostra più fruibile e facilmente "percorribile" anche da chi non ha familiarità con le diavolerie moderne".
Nella mostra, voluta da Fondazione Cassamarca e dal suo presidente Dino De Poli, una sezione è stata dedicata a Matteo Ricci, il gesuita italiano, matematico e astronomo, che all’inizio del XVII secolo introdusse a Corte le scienze occidentali. La figura di questo religioso sarà raccontata attraverso documenti, testi e i meccanismi di cui si serviva per lo studio dell’astronomia prestati alla mostra trevigiana dalle raccolte ricciane di Macerata, città natale del missionario, e dal Museo dell’Astronomia di Roma.
Un’altra figura di gesuita, quella di Giuseppe Castiglione, che partì nel 1715 come missionario in Cina e vi rimase per cinquant’anni diventando pittore di corte e assumendo il nome cinese di Lang Shi Ning, verrà raccontata nella quarta e ultima mostra dedicata alla Cina.
Prossime mostre - Nel corso della presentazione di ieri Adriano Madaro, responsabile di Sigillum, ha snocciolato le prossime mostre e date: nel 2011 "Manciù, l’ultimo Impero" che chiuderà la fase dedicata alla Cina. Nel 2012 "L’India dell’Himalaya", nel 2013 "L’India del Gange", nel 2014 "L’India dei Maharajà" e nel 2015 "Tibet il tetto del mondo". De Poli ha, però, voluto precisare che le mostre si faranno una alla volta e che del futuro non vi è certezza. «Sulla carta sì, è così. Vorremmo riuscire a fare tutto, ma la priorità è quella di finire le mostre sulla Cina. Poi vedremo. Il Tibet, invece, non si farà».

Articolo di Valeria Lipparini per www.gazzettino.it
articolo collegato: I Segreti della Citta' Proibita a Treviso
I Segreti della Citta’ Proibita - informazioni biglietti prenotazioni

369) Matteo Ricci (1): uno gesuita alla corte dei Ming (libro)

autore: Michela Fontana
titolo: Matteo Ricci. Un gesuita alla corte dei Ming
editore: Mondadori
collana: Le scie
anno: 2005
pp.: 347

Il gesuita Matteo Ricci arrivò a Macao nel 1582 e, dopo aver soggiornato in varie città, si trasferì a Pechino, dove visse dal 1601 al 1610 alla corte dell'imperatore Wanli della dinastia Ming. Fu Ricci a scoprire che la Cina coincideva con il Catai descritto da Marco Polo e a farne conoscere per primo, attraverso le sue lettere e i suoi scritti, la cultura e le tradizioni. La vita del gesuita è qui raccontata dalla giornalista Michela Fontana che a Pechino ha vissuto a lungo.
biografia

Michela Fontana si è laureata in matematica a Milano nel 1976; ha insegnato per otto anni nella scuola e poi si è dedicata al giornalismo scientifico, vincendo due volte il premio Glaxo e nel 1990 la Knight Science Jornalism Fellowships del MIT.
Il libro Percorsi calcolati le è valso l’International Pirelli Award per la divulgazione scientifica.
È stata anche Addetto scientifico all’Ambasciata d’Italia a Ottawa in Canada. Ha vissuto soprattutto all’estero (precisamente in Canada, in Cina dal 1999 al 2002 e in Svizzera).
Ha scritto per molti anni per «La Stampa » e «Panorama» con i quali continua a collaborare.

recensioni:
da Maecla [http://www.maecla.it/bibliotecaMatematica/af_file/FONTANA/FONTANA_RICCI.htm]

Il libro comprende:
- il Prologo,
- diciotto capitoli,
- la Cronologia degli avvenimenti narrati,
- la cronologia delle Dinastie cinesi,
- il Glossario,
- le Note e, infine,
- le Fonti e indicazioni bibliografiche.

L’autrice racconta, in modo avvincente, ma conservando obiettività e attenendosi a una rigorosa documentazione, la vita di Matteo Ricci, con una ricchezza di particolari davvero stupefacente.
La fonte principale di questa biografia è costituita dalla storia compilata da Ricci stesso e dalle lettere che scrisse dalla Cina ai suoi superiori e parenti.
IL lettore può, così, seguire la straordinaria e umana avventura di chi ha dedicato la propria vita alla diffusione della scienza europea in Cina, convinto che l’interesse per la cultura occidentale potesse agevolare l'evangelizzazione degli intellettuali.
Matteo Ricci, nato il 6 ottobre 1552 a Macerata, era il primogenito di una numerosa famiglia che contava, oltre a lui, quattro sorelle e otto fratelli. I Ricci appartenevano, da secoli, alla piccola nobiltà maceratese e Matteo fu avviato agli studi di giurisprudenza che decise di abbandonare, per entrare nell’ordine dei gesuiti e per seguire il piano di studi previsto per gli appartenenti a tale ordine: due anni di retorica, tre di filosofia e tre di teologia. La preparazione culturale dei gesuiti era vasta, anche se strumentale: per loro il sapere era un’arma da usare a difesa della Chiesa.
Il maceratese condivideva pienamente il punto di vista del gesuita tedesco Christoph Klau (1537-1612), noto con il nome umanistico di Christophorus Clavius, italianizzato in Cristoforo Clavio, astronomo e matematico di grande valore, professore al Collegio Romano dal 1563. Era stato proprio Cristoforo Clavio a convincere i colleghi a inserire aritmetica, algebra e geometria nei programmi di studio dell'Università gesuita, nella convinzione che la matematica rappresentasse un prerequisito fondamentale per apprendere le altre scienze e le discipline applicate.
Il 24 marzo 1578 Ricci partì, come missionario, per l'India e il 13 settembre 1578 giunse a Goa, dove ebbe modo di rendersi conto che la popolazione induista e musulmana veniva spinta alla conversione con la coercizione e la forza.
Come Cristoforo Clavio era stato la figura di riferimento per gli studi matematici a Roma, il gesuita coordinatore delle missioni in Asia, Alessandro Valignano, rappresentò il suo mentore per il lavoro missionario in Cina.
Per incrementare le conversioni, Alessandro Valignano aveva prefigurato la seguente strategia di lungo termine: i missionari dovevano imparare la lingua del paese in cui avrebbero svolto la loro opera, studiandone i costumi, adattandosi alle usanze locali e rispettando le tradizioni indigene, a meno che non fossero inaccettabili per la morale cristiana.
Arrivato in Cina, Ricci seppe attenersi scrupolosamente a tale politica missionaria, indicata con il termine "accomodamento", o "adattamento culturale".
Per ottenere i favori dei funzionari cinesi, egli aveva portato con sé, tra l'altro, orologi meccanici e "un vitrio triangular di Venezia", precisamente un prisma di vetro a base triangolare, che esposto ai raggi del sole sprigionava tutti i colori dell'arcobaleno.
Seppe dedicarsi con impegno allo studio del mandarino (la lingua parlata dalla classe colta) e, dopo quasi un anno di permanenza a Zhaoqiung, era già in grado di parlare il cinese senza interprete.
Dotato di un non comune talento per le relazioni sociali e di una memoria prodigiosa (riusciva a ricordare fino a cinquecento caratteri cinesi, dopo averli letti una sola volta), vantava anche un'approfondita conoscenza della matematica, dell'astronomia e della geografia. Studiò anche i Quattro Libri di Confucio, trovando notevoli analogie tra la morale confuciana e i principi dell'etica occidentale; definiva Confucio "un altro Seneca".
Iniziò l'evangelizzazione della Cina, intraprendendo un'ammirevole attività di divulgazione scientifica.
Poiché nelle carte geografiche cinesi non erano rappresentate l'Europa e l'America, Ricci trovò il modo di far accettare una più realistica rappresentazione della Terra, rinunciando, molto diplomaticamente, all'eurocentrismo dei mappamondi occidentali, per collocare al centro della sua carta l'Asia, con le Americhe a destra e l'Europa e l'Africa a sinistra. Agendo in tal modo, concedeva alla Cina una posizione privilegiata, pur rispettando le sue reali proporzioni rispetto agli altri paesi.
Siccome il suono della lettera "R" era sconosciuto in Cina, il cognome Ricci diventava "Li", mentre il nome "Matteo" si trasformava in "Madou" e tutti, anteponendo il cognome al nome secondo l'uso cinese, chiamavano il gesuita "Li Madou", appellativo con cui egli è, ancora oggi, ricordato in Cina e in Giappone.
Quando il cinese Qu Taisu si rivolse a Ricci per imparare i segreti dell'alchimia, sua grande passione, il gesuita gli dichiarò che non gli avrebbe insegnato i segreti della trasformazione degli elementi, bensì una disciplina che lo avrebbe aiutato a coltivare la propria mente: la matematica. Gli insegnò, così, il calcolo scritto, grazie al quale si potevano compiere operazioni aritmetiche più complesse di quelle consentite dall'abaco. Tale metodo occidentale venne presto chiamato dai cinesi "calcoli con il pennello".
In epoca Ming la matematica era considerata una forma di conoscenza di valore inferiore rispetto a quella letteraria e la scienza in generale attraversò una fase di declino rispetto al passato.
Ricci non sapeva che la ricerca matematica in Cina si era distinta in epoche passate, quando gli studiosi cinesi avevano anticipato, in più occasioni, i loro colleghi occidentali. (Uno dei tanti primati cinesi sull'Occidente era stato il calcolo del "pi greco", il numero decimale illimitato che fornisce il rapporto tra la circonferenza e il diametro di un cerchio. Un matematico cinese del VI secolo, insieme con il figlio, era riuscito a calcolarne un valore approssimato fino alla decima cifra decimale, con una precisione che, in Occidente, nessuno seppe superare per undici secoli.).
Il gesuita illustrò a Qu Taisu , che si era appassionato alla matematica occidentale, gli Elementi di Euclide nella traduzione latina di Clavio.
In seguito, Matteo Ricci arrivò a tradurre, insieme ad amici cinesi, le opere di Clavio, per spiegare agli intellettuali i concetti e i metodi della matematica europea. Nella scelta del primo testo da proporre al pubblico cinese non ebbe alcun dubbio: si sarebbe trattato degli Elementi di Euclide nell'edizione di Clavio. Era davvero un'impresa titanica preparare una versione cinese degli Elementi, in quanto dovevano essere tradotti dal latino al mandarino concetti e metodi di dimostrazione sviluppatisi nel contesto della cultura greca, lontanissima da quella cinese. Eppure Ricci seppe trovare le parole più adatte per descrivere il preciso significato di ogni concetto.
All'inizio del 1607 i primi sei libri dell'opera di Euclide erano interamente tradotti.
L'edizione cinese completa (che avrebbe conservato, senza alcuna variazione, la parte tradotta da Ricci insieme con il cinese Xu Guangqi) sarebbe stata pubblicata nel 1856 grazie alla traduzione degli altri nove libri, eseguita dal missionario inglese Alexander Wylie, con l'aiuto del cinese Li Shanlan.
Troverete le altre numerosissime opere di Ricci descritte, in modo particolareggiato, nelle pagine del libro. Sicuramente le osservazioni e le riflessioni di Ricci, anche se intrise dei pregiudizi del suo tempo, forniscono un'interessante chiave di lettura anche della Cina contemporanea.
Matteo Ricci, il pioniere del dialogo tra Cina e mondo occidentale, morì, dopo nove giorni di malattia, l'11 maggio 1610. Nella sua opera missionaria, egli aveva saputo affrontare con disinvoltura e competenza ogni difficoltà e con il suo impegno di divulgatore della cultura occidentale era riuscito a conquistare l'ammirazione dell'imperatore Wanli, che gli riservò il privilegio di essere sepolto in terra cinese.
Il cimitero, circondato da cipressi e da un muro di pietra chiuso da un cancello, è ancora oggi una piccola oasi di pace, isolato dalla vita convulsa di Pechino.

368) China's cruch time - Stratfor Intelligence Report

China: Crunch Time
By Peter Zeihan
Stratfor, March 30, 2010

The global system is undergoing profound change. Three powers — Germany, China and Iran — face challenges forcing them to refashion the way they interact with their regions and the world. We are exploring each of these three states in detail in three geopolitical weeklies, highlighting how STRATFOR’s assessments of these states are evolving. First we examined Germany. We now examine China.

U.S.-Chinese relations have become tenser in recent months, with the United States threatening to impose tariffs unless China agrees to revalue its currency and, ideally, allow it to become convertible like the yen or euro. China now follows Japan and Germany as one of the three major economies after the United States. Unlike the other two, it controls its currency’s value, allowing it to decrease the price of its exports and giving it an advantage not only over other exporters to the United States but also over domestic American manufacturers. The same is true in other regions that receive Chinese exports, such as Europe.

What Washington considered tolerable in a small developing economy is intolerable in one of the top five economies. The demand that Beijing raise the value of the yuan, however, poses dramatic challenges for the Chinese, as the ability to control their currency helps drive their exports. The issue is why China insists on controlling its currency, something embedded in the nature of the Chinese economy. A collision with the United States now seems inevitable. It is therefore important to understand the forces driving China, and it is time for STRATFOR to review its analysis of China.
An Inherently Unstable Economic System

China has had an extraordinary run since 1980. But like Japan and Southeast Asia before it, dramatic growth rates cannot maintain themselves in perpetuity. Japan and non-Chinese East Asia didn’t collapse and disappear, but the crises of the 1990s did change the way the region worked. The driving force behind both the 1990 Japanese Crisis and the 1997 East Asian Crisis was that the countries involved did not maintain free capital markets. Those states managed capital to keep costs artificially low, giving them tremendous advantages over countries where capital was rationally priced. Of course, one cannot maintain irrational capital prices in perpetuity (as the United States is learning after its financial crisis); doing so eventually catches up. And this is what is happening in China now.

STRATFOR thus sees the Chinese economic system as inherently unstable. The primary reason why China’s growth has been so impressive is that throughout the period of economic liberalization that has led to rising incomes, the Chinese government has maintained near-total savings capture of its households and businesses. It funnels these massive deposits via state-run banks to state-linked firms at below-market rates. It’s amazing the growth rate a country can achieve and the number of citizens it can employ with a vast supply of 0 percent, relatively consequence-free loans provided from the savings of nearly a billion workers.

It’s also amazing how unprofitable such a country can be. The Chinese system, like the Japanese system before it, works on bulk, churn, maximum employment and market share. The U.S. system of attempting to maximize return on investment through efficiency and profit stands in contrast. The American result is sufficient economic stability to be able to suffer through recessions and emerge stronger. The Chinese result is social stability that wobbles precipitously when exposed to economic hardship. The Chinese people rebel when work is not available and conditions reach extremes. It must be remembered that of China’s 1.3 billion people, more than 600 million urban citizens live on an average of about $7 a day, while 700 million rural people live on an average of $2 a day, and that is according to Beijing’s own well-scrubbed statistics.

Moreover, the Chinese system breeds a flock of other unintended side effects.

There is, of course, the issue of inefficient capital use: When you have an unlimited number of no-consequence loans, you tend to invest in a lot of no-consequence projects for political reasons or just to speculate. In addition to the overall inefficiency of the Chinese system, another result is a large number of property bubbles. Yes, China is a country with a massive need for housing for its citizens, but even so, local governments and property developers collude to build luxury dwellings instead of anything more affordable in urban areas. This puts China in the odd position of having both a glut and a shortage in housing, as well as an outright glut in commercial real estate, where vacancy rates are notoriously high.

There is also the issue of regional disparity. Most of this lending occurs in a handful of coastal regions, transforming them into global powerhouses, while most of the interior — and thereby most of the population — lives in abject poverty.

There is also the issue of consumption. Chinese statistics have always been dodgy, but according to Beijing’s own figures, China has a tiny consumer base. This base is not much larger than that of France, a country with roughly one twentieth China’s population and just over half its gross domestic product (GDP). China’s economic system is obviously geared toward exports, not expanding consumer credit.

Which brings us to the issue of dependence. Since China cannot absorb its own goods, it must export them to keep afloat. The strategy only works when there is endless demand for the goods it makes. For the most part, this demand comes from the United States. But the recent global recession cut Chinese exports by nearly one fifth, and there were no buyers elsewhere to pick up the slack. Meanwhile, to boost household consumption China provided subsidies to Chinese citizens who had little need for — and in some cases little ability to use — a number of big-ticket products. The Chinese now openly fear that exports will not make a sustainable return to previous levels until 2012. And that is a lot of production — and consumption — to subsidize in the meantime. Most countries have another word for this: waste.

This waste can be broken down into two main categories. First, the government roughly tripled the amount of cash it normally directs the state banks to lend to sustain economic activity during the recession. The new loans added up to roughly a third of GDP in a single year. Remember, with no-consequence loans, profitability or even selling goods is not an issue; one must merely continue employing people. Even if China boasted the best loan-quality programs in history, a dramatic increase in lending of that scale is sure to generate mountains of loans that will go bad. Second, not everyone taking out those loans even intends to invest prudently: Chinese estimates indicate that about one-fourth of this lending surge was used to play China’s stock and property markets.

It is not that the Chinese are foolish; that is hardly the case. Given their history and geographical constraints, we would be hard-pressed to come up with a better plan were we to be selected as Party general secretary for a day. Beijing is well aware of all these problems and more and is attempting to mitigate the damage and repair the system. For example, it is considering legalizing portions of what it calls the shadow-lending sector. Think of this as a sort of community bank or credit union that services small businesses. In the past, China wanted total savings capture and centralization to better direct economic efforts, but Beijing is realizing that these smaller entities are more efficient lenders — and that over time they may actually employ more people without subsidization.

But the bottom line is that this sort of repair work is experimental and at the margins, and it doesn’t address the core damage that the financial model continuously inflicts. The Chinese fear their economic strategy has taken them about as far as they can go. STRATFOR used to think that these sorts of internal weaknesses would eventually doom the Chinese system as it did the Japanese system (upon which it is modeled). Now, we’re not so sure.

Since its economic opening in 1978, China has taken advantage of a remarkably friendly economic and political environment. In the 1980s, Washington didn’t obsess overmuch about China, given its focus on the “Evil Empire.” In the 1990s, it was easy for China to pass inconspicuously in global markets, as China was still a relatively small player. Moreover, with all the commodities from the former Soviet Union hitting the global market, prices for everything from oil to copper neared historic lows. No one seemed to fight against China’s booming demand for commodities or rising exports. The 2000s looked like they would be more turbulent, and early in the administration of George W. Bush the EP-3 incident landed the Chinese in Washington’s crosshairs, but then the Sept. 11 attacks happened and U.S. efforts were redirected toward the Islamic world.

Believe it or not, the above are coincidental developments. In fact, there is a structural factor in the global economy that has protected the Chinese system for the past 30 years that is a core tenet of U.S. foreign policy: Bretton Woods.
Rethinking Bretton Woods

Bretton Woods is one of the most misunderstood landmarks in modern history. Most think of it as the formation of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and the beginning of the dominance of the U.S. dollar in the international system. It is that, but it is much, much more.

In the aftermath of World War II, Germany and Japan had been crushed, and nearly all of Western Europe lay destitute. Bretton Woods at its core was an agreement between the United States and the Western allies that the allies would be able to export at near-duty-free rates to the U.S. market in order to boost their economies. In exchange, the Americans would be granted wide latitude in determining the security and foreign policy stances of the rebuilding states. In essence, the Americans took what they saw as a minor economic hit in exchange for being able to rewrite first regional, and in time global, economic and military rules of engagement. For the Europeans, Bretton Woods provided the stability, financing and security backbone Europe used first to recover, and in time to thrive. For the Americans, it provided the ability to preserve much of the World War II alliance network into the next era in order to compete with the Soviet Union.

The strategy proved so successful with the Western allies that it was quickly extended to World War II foes Germany and Japan, and shortly thereafter to Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and others. Militarily and economically, it became the bedrock of the anti-Soviet containment strategy. The United States began with substantial trade surpluses with all of these states, simply because they had no productive capacity due to the devastation of war. After a generation of favorable trade practices, surpluses turned into deficits, but the net benefits were so favorable to the Americans that the policies were continued despite the increasing economic hits. The alliance continued to hold, and one result (of many) was the eventual economic destruction of the Soviet Union.

Applying this little history lesson to the question at hand, Bretton Woods is the ultimate reason why the Chinese have succeeded economically for the last generation. As part of Bretton Woods, the United States opens its markets, eschewing protectionist policies in general and mercantilist policies in particular. Eventually the United States extended this privilege to China to turn the tables on the Soviet Union. All China has to do is produce — it doesn’t matter how — and it will have a market to sell to.

But this may be changing. Under President Barack Obama, the United States is considering fundamental changes to the Bretton Woods arrangements. Ostensibly, this is to update the global financial system and reduce the chances of future financial crises. But out of what we have seen so far, the National Export Initiative (NEI) the White House is promulgating is much more mercantilist. It espouses doubling U.S. exports in five years, specifically by targeting additional sales to large developing states, with China at the top of the list.

STRATFOR finds that goal overoptimistic, and the NEI is maddeningly vague as to how it will achieve this goal. But this sort of rhetoric has not come out of the White House since pre-World War II days. Since then, international economic policy in Washington has served as a tool of political and military policy; it has not been a beast unto itself. In other words, the shift in tone in U.S. trade policy is itself enough to suggest big changes, beginning with the idea that the United States actually will compete with the rest of the world in exports.

If — and we must emphasize if — there will be force behind this policy shift, the Chinese are in serious trouble. As we noted before, the Chinese financial system is largely based on the Japanese model, and Japan is a wonderful case study for how this could go down. In the 1980s, the United States was unhappy with the level of Japanese imports. Washington found it quite easy to force the Japanese both to appreciate their currency and accept more exports. Opening the closed Japanese system to even limited foreign competition gutted Japanese banks’ international positions, starting a chain reaction that culminated in the 1990 collapse. Japan has not really recovered since, and as of 2010, total Japanese GDP is only marginally higher than it was 20 years ago.
China’s Limited Options

China, which unlike Japan is not a U.S. ally, would have an even harder time resisting should Washington pressure Beijing to buy more U.S. goods. Dependence upon a certain foreign market means that market can easily force changes in the exporter’s trade policies. Refusal to cooperate means losing access, shutting the exports down. To be sure, the U.S. export initiative does not explicitly call for creating more trade barriers to Chinese goods. But Washington is already brandishing this tool against China anyway, and it will certainly enter China’s calculations about whether to resist the U.S. export policy. Japan’s economy, in 1990 and now, only depended upon international trade for approximately 15 percent of its GDP. For China, that figure is 36 percent, and that is after suffering the hit to exports from the global recession. China’s only recourse would be to stop purchasing U.S. government debt (Beijing can’t simply dump the debt it already holds without taking a monumental loss, because for every seller there must be a buyer), but even this would be a hollow threat.

First, Chinese currency reserves exist because Beijing does not want to invest its income in China. Underdeveloped capital markets cannot absorb such an investment, and the reserves represent the government’s piggybank. Getting a 2 percent return on a rock-solid asset is good enough in China’s eyes. Second, those bond purchases largely fuel U.S. consumers’ ability to purchase Chinese goods. In the event the United States targets Chinese exports, the last thing China would want is to compound the damage. Third, a cold stop in bond purchases would encourage the U.S. administration — and the American economy overall — to balance its budgets. However painful such a transition may be, it would not be much as far as retaliation measures go: “forcing” a competitor to become economically efficient and financially responsible is not a winning strategy. Granted, interest rates would rise in the United States due to the reduction in available capital — the Chinese internal estimate is by 0.75 percentage points — and that could pinch a great many sectors, but that is nothing compared to the tsunami of pain that the Chinese would be feeling.

For Beijing, few alternatives exist to American consumption should Washington limit export access; the United States has more disposable income than all of China’s other markets combined. To dissuade the Americans, China could dangle the carrot of cooperation on sanctions against Iran before Washington, but the United States may already be moving beyond any use for that. Meanwhile, China would strengthen domestic security to protect against the ramifications of U.S. pressure. Beijing perceives the spat with Google and Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama as direct attacks by the United States, and it is already bracing for a rockier relationship. While such measures do not help the Chinese economy, they may be Beijing’s only options for preserving internal stability.

In China, fears of this coming storm are becoming palpable — and by no means limited to concerns over the proposed U.S. export strategy. With the Democratic Party in the United States (historically the more protectionist of the two mainstream U.S. political parties) both in charge and worried about major electoral losses, the Chinese fear that midterm U.S. elections will be all about targeting Chinese trade issues. Specifically, they are waiting for April 15, when the U.S. Treasury Department is expected to rule whether China is a currency manipulator — a ruling Beijing fears could unleash a torrent of protectionist moves by the U.S. Congress. Beijing already is deliberating on the extent to which it should seek to defuse American anger. But the Chinese probably are missing the point. If there has already been a decision in Washington to break with Bretton Woods, no number of token changes will make any difference. Such a shift in the U.S. trade posture will see the Americans going for China’s throat (no matter whether by design or unintentionally).

And the United States can do so with disturbing ease. The Americans don’t need a public works program or a job-training program or an export-boosting program. They don’t even have to make better — much less cheaper — goods. They just need to limit Chinese market access, something that can be done with the flick of a pen and manageable pain on the U.S. side.

STRATFOR sees a race on, but it isn’t a race between the Chinese and the Americans or even China and the world. It’s a race to see what will smash China first, its own internal imbalances or the U.S. decision to take a more mercantilist approach to international trade.

Saturday, March 27, 2010

367) Reevaluation of yuan: domestic demands...

Some economists, business leaders in China want yuan to appreciate
By John Pomfret
Washington Post, Saturday, March 27, 2010

BEIJING -- Chinese economists and business leaders have begun to call openly for their government to allow the yuan to appreciate against the dollar, in a sign that the issue is contentious here, too, and not just a problem between the United States and China.

President Obama has urged China to let the value of the yuan rise against the dollar as part of a plan to boost American exports and lower the trade deficit. U.S. economists have argued that the yuan is undervalued, and a group of senators led by Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) is threatening to push legislation that would place tariffs on Chinese goods if China does not allow its currency to float more freely.

China's loudest public reaction has been negative. On March 14, Premier Wen Jiabao told reporters that the yuan was not undervalued. A week later, Chen Deming, the minister of commerce, repeated the message to a meeting of foreign businessmen and in an interview with The Washington Post. Chen's deputy, Zhong Shan, has taken a similar line during the past two days while visiting the United States.

All three officials implied that only the United States was pushing for the change, with Wen advising Washington to stop "finger-pointing." But it is becoming increasingly apparent that China's government is by no means united around that view.

The People's Bank of China and a slew of economic research institutes advocate a more flexible yuan policy to control inflation and bolster domestic consumption by making imports cheaper. On the other side, the Commerce Ministry, which represents exporters, wants to keep the yuan cheap to help its constituents send more products abroad.

On Wednesday, the People's Bank invited economists to a discussion of the issue in the run-up to the bank's regular quarterly meeting, scheduled for next week. Several economists who attended endorsed allowing the yuan to appreciate, participants said, to the apparent dismay of the Commerce Ministry officials there.

Xu Xiaonian, a professor at the China Europe International Business School, was one of those who argued for raising the currency's value.

"In my opinion, the yuan should appreciate as soon as possible," he said in an interview after the meeting, arguing that a higher yuan would help flatten inflation and force Chinese exporters to either increase their productivity or transition from cheaper to more technologically advanced products.

"Appreciation will force China's export industry to upgrade," he said. "The low-end enterprises should have been closed earlier."

But protecting exporters is exactly what the Commerce Ministry has been advocating. China's exporters could be hurt if the yuan strengthens, because it would make Chinese products more expensive overseas. In his interview with The Post, Chen, the commerce minister, revealed a critical figure: The profit margin of the average Chinese exporter is a thin 1.7 percent, and revaluation would wipe that out.

"We also have our own employment and stability to think about," Chen said.

Chinese business leaders have also weighed in, contradicting the Commerce Ministry. During the recent annual session of the National People's Congress, several chief executives of large Chinese companies spoke in favor of a revaluation.

Yang Yuanqing, chief executive of computer giant Lenovo, told an open discussion group during the legislative session that an appreciation could "not only ease the trade frictions with developed countries but also improve people's consumption capacity -- because when money is appreciated, people have more money to buy more stuff."

Some Chinese officials and economists said that pressure from the United States has complicated the debate in China because it has allowed opponents of appreciation to appear more patriotic. The U.S. Treasury Department is expected to decide by April 15 whether to label China a currency manipulator, which would significantly escalate the conflict between the two countries over the issue. Another reason for China's publicly tough face is its fear that any hint of plans for a revaluation would prompt speculators to pour money into the country, enlarging its sizable asset bubble.

Zhang Bin, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said he and his colleagues are concerned that the Commerce Ministry's view is the only one getting a hearing.

"Consumers in China have no voice on this issue," said Zhang, who backs a one-time 10 percent appreciation. "The voice of one side is overwhelming."

It is clear that despite official denials, China's government agencies and industry groups are preparing for an appreciation of some sort. In February, the China International Chamber of Commerce and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade carried out "stress tests" to gauge the potential effect of such a move. Other ministries and industry groups have followed suit.

Friday, March 26, 2010

366) China's development model: book (2)


China’s New Value Dilemma
By Laurence Brahm - Bookshelf
The Globalist, Tuesday, January 19, 2010

This is an excerpt from:
The Anti-Globalization Breakfast Club
John Wiley & Sons (2009). Copyright Laurence Brahm

Despite years of breakneck GDP growth, China’s economic success has been unevenly distributed, and millions still do not have enough to eat. Laurence Brahm — an old China hand and former corporate lawyer turned social activist — describes the complicated relationship between material prosperity and spiritual and societal values.

During my years in Beijing, I participated as an outside advisor in China’s reform process — and had long been an advocate of its fresh approach to capitalism (“state capitalism,” as opposed to the IMF and World Bank’s market capitalism).

But I also had concerns about the direction in which China’s economy and social structure were headed.

By 2008, I saw overall deterioration expressed by corruption, crime, prostitution, gambling and alcoholism. It seemed that liquor had become China's new opium.

Having adopted a Western value standard of conspicuous consumption as a measure of human worth, China had become a country where human values were being smothered by greed.

So, while China’s economic model had seen the country succeed in material terms, it had left a gaping spiritual void. Quantity of life had displaced quality of life.

The Chinese model of macro-control development had worked very successfully in merging the tools of state planning with the market mechanism. But now, having adopted a Western — almost American — value standard of conspicuous consumption as a measure of human worth, it had become a country where human values were being smothered by greed and where corruption was perpetuated by the desire to accumulate brand-name goods.

How could China now serve as a future model to anyone else?

Part of the problem is that China’s leadership still adheres strictly to a philosophy of dialectical materialism. This is one reason why it has been so easy for Western multinationals to convert the population to consumer-brand fanaticism.

In turn, China has lost much of its own culture over the past decade. In this cultural free-fall state, its leaders are now groping for a way forward. Unfortunately, they have yet to look seriously to their own roots in trying to grow the tree to its next stage.

How sustainable is China’s economic model?

During the Tang dynasty, the poet Du Fu commented on the social inequities of the time, penning a poem on the debauchery prevalent among corrupt officials and the wealthy:
The Chinese model of macro-control development had worked very successfully in merging the tools of state planning with the market mechanism.

“Within vermilion gates wine and meat rot, while on the street outside people starve to death.”

Today, the finest seafood in the world and the most expensive imported wines are available in Beijing’s five-star restaurants. Outside, luxury cars disgorge officials and entrepreneurs with their wives or mistresses, who vie for the title of “most expensively dressed” or “most recently returned from an expensive overseas trip” (probably paid for from state coffers as a government “inspection” or “study tour”).

Meanwhile, at the end of 2007, official statistics put the number of impoverished people in rural China who simply do not have enough to eat at 24 million. In addition, 41 million income earners are searching for a way out of their desperate situation.

Crime, drug use, prostitution and even human slavery rackets have now become pillar industries of the Chinese economy. If one were to raise the problem with Beijing officials dining in the posh Maison Boulud à Pékin, Beijing’s first Michelin-rated restaurant, they would likely simply wave away these issues as problems of the waidi ren, “those rural outsiders.”

China’s new class system now appears to be more about caste than class.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is not unaware of the challenges. It has held a symposium of various interest groups, including the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, so-called democratic parties and a host of non-communist social representatives.

Crime, drug use, prostitution and even human slavery rackets have now become pillar industries of the Chinese economy.

The purpose of summoning so many groups from across the board was to discuss how to cope with the issue of “reforming and standardizing income.”

That might have been seen as a massive lobbying effort to keep a social pact between the CPC and the rest of society — given that it is mostly government officials and the managers of state-owned enterprises are spending lavishly on five-star lifestyles, while rural China struggles with survival.

The fact that the meeting was held within the secure Zhongnanhai compound underscored the importance and sensitivity of current CPC concerns over the problem.

Read Part II here.

365) China's development model: book


China’s New Development Model
By Laurence Brahm
The Globalist, Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Globalist Bookshelf:
This is an excerpt from:
The Anti-Globalization Breakfast Club
By Laurence Brahm
John Wiley & Sons (2009)

Will this be China’s century — or the era of its collapse? Laurence Brahm describes how Beijing think tanks are working overtime to create a new kind of development model for China's overtaxed environment and social system. He explores the challenges in a conversation with Huang Ping, director-general of the American Studies Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.


Will this be China’s century — or the era of its collapse? Or will it be the era when China becomes a global threat?

Pessimists among certain Western think-tanks and academic institutions predict an imminent end to China’s mega-growth cycle.

Some Beijing think-tanks believe that the pressure is on to find a practical road forward — and not to get lost in the illusion that rapid GDP growth is sustainable.

These views may be extreme and represent protectionist fears expressed in wishful doomsday scenarios. Cold War thinking has resurfaced in theories and books.

The optimists, usually business analysts who point to another decade of sustained hyper-growth, counter these views.

China has always bent with the winds of change, they argue. So why should the future be any different? The truth and what transpires in the future may fall somewhere in between these two opposing views.

The “China threat” may not be in the form of military expansion or the flooding of world markets with cheap exports. It may instead take the form of environmental desecration, stimulating the acceleration of global warming that would indeed menace humanity. Or perhaps there will be a combination of all these factors in different degrees.

Another view emerging within some Beijing think-tanks is that the pressure is on to find a practical road forward and not to get lost in the illusion that the growth experienced in the past two decades is sustainable. But can China’s current leaders think outside the box and formulate new agendas to cope with the future?

Much of the work of coming up with new development blueprints and ideological platforms is being thrown to the Beijing think-tanks. They are talking about these issues openly — even in the local press — which has never before occurred.

Admittedly, even if a problem is not completely solvable, identifying and discussing it is a first step toward addressing it. At least it is better than smearing it over with dogma, as was done in the past.

The real problem probably lies in the excesses of privilege imbued with the Communist party, which has created an almost-surreal Orwellian- Dickensian system.

Huang Ping, director-general of the American Studies Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), noted that Beijing think-tanks are even going so far as to question “whether we have followed the Western model too closely without consciousness of its negative effects.”

Such think-tanks are challenging the consumption-driven, materialism-based model China has adopted and are instead calling for a new paradigm of development. But will they find them?

“China has enjoyed three decades of high economic growth by whatever indicator, and without domestic violence,” explained Huang Ping.

His argument glosses over the brutal crackdown against protests in 1989, and the fact that — despite the draconian police system — in recent years the number of violent demonstrations by farmers, factory workers and dissatisfied urbanites has been running as high as 80,000 incidents a year, often involving as many as 20,000 rioters.

Many of the protests have targeted government and police brutality, sometimes resulting in the burning of police cars and the destruction of government offices.

Huang Ping has an intimate knowledge of the Washington Consensus development models, since it has been his job to research them. Moreover, he is considered the nation’s leading specialist on social harmony. Unlike many other Chinese think-tank specialists, he dares to espouse new ideas that challenge head-on the past models that see GDP growth as a panacea.

"The Americanization of the world runs counter not only to China’s political and economic structure, but to its historic culture."

“Despite all of our problems, 200 million people have emerged into a new middle class, while another 300 million have been lifted out of poverty,” Huang noted. “What has happened is probably the world’s largest-scale development miracle since Britain’s Industrial Revolution.”

At the same time, Huang is aware of the problems that have accompanied that growth. “It has led to growing income gaps, social governance problems and environmental desecration as the costs of such development and transformation.”

Whether these costs are an acceptable tradeoff is currently the subject of intense debate among Chinese state officials and future planners.

“Globalization is a misnomer,” said Huang Ping. “All nations want globalization in technology trade. So, a better phrase would be ‘global integration of technology and science.’”

“But when this means the Americanization of the world, it runs counter not only to China’s political and economic structure, but to its historic culture and sociological structure as well.”

Huang noted that an “us-vs.-them, black-vs.-white” attitude was the main problem in Western thinking. In China, however, during the reform years of the 1990s, the curtain on ideology went down and a brief era of enormous flexibility prevailed. This happened under Deng’s notion that "it doesn’t matter if a cat is white or black as long as it catches mice” — in other words, whatever works economically is good.

Even if a problem is not completely solvable, identifying and discussing it is a first step. This is better than smearing it over with dogma, as was done in the past.

During this brief window of open thinking, an inherent flexibility in responding to changing conditions made it possible to fuse various approaches to economic development — capitalist and socialist, marker and planning — which has led to the country’s current economic boom and prosperity.

Now, despite this boom, China’s development model is being tested. For Beijing’s leaders during the 1990s, achieving a market economy was the overarching goal.

For its current leadership, the hypermarket economy poses new burdens: The country does not have the energy to support its own growth, the environment has been degraded and the social order has been frayed. As a consequence, Beijing’s economic think-tanks are asking if a better model can be developed.

Actually, the real problem probably lies in corruption and excesses of privilege imbued with the Communist party, which has created an almost-surreal Orwellian-Dickensian system. Culture and ethical values — the mainstays of Chinese society for two millennia — were bulldozed as infrastructure and property projects went ahead.

The antithesis of this can be seen in pockets of community rebuilding efforts among ethnic minorities and the rural poor, involving more than the usual infrastructure and road development.

Huang commented, “It involves trying to understand how people communicate and share values, cope with problems and identify issues of security and solidarity.”

China has always bent with the winds of change. So why should the future be any different?

Places such as Lijiang and Zhongdian, in Yunnan province, are going against the national development trend. Rather than emphasizing infrastructure and the growth of CDI, their long-term interest is the preservation of culture and the environment.

A new national ideology is necessary in order to plan for the next 20 years. Globalization, and models associated with it, is neither a goal nor a panacea where ideologies are concerned.

Neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism offer nothing of value to China or the developing world. At the same time, it isn’t practical to go back to Marxism, which China has already shed.

It is also unlikely that many other nations would embrace it. And Confucian thinking is one of the Chinese Communist Party’s biggest problems — the party is more a classical Confucian bureaucracy than an egalitarian body.

Read Part I here.

364) Shanghai and Hong Kong: financial hubs of the 21st century

Shanghai and Hong Kong: China’s Emerging Global Financial Hubs
By Dan Steinbock
The Globalist, Tuesday, March 23, 2010

Since the early 2000s, Shanghai and Hong Kong have increasingly been seen as rivals for the economic center of the Greater China region. Dan Steinbock explores how the two cities have contributed profoundly to China's economic progress and financial development, albeit in different ways.

Until the 1990s, Hong Kong thrived and benefited from the postwar globalization. However, since the late 1990s, Shanghai has been booming, while Hong Kong, despite its historical wealth and capabilities, has been haunted by doubt over the future.

Since the early 2000s, Shanghai and Hong Kong have increasingly been seen as rivals for the economic center of the Greater China region.

Fluctuating fortunes
In the 1920s, Shanghai was the major center of international trade and finance in East Asia. The position of the “Pearl of the Orient” eroded with the turmoil of the 1930s, starting with the currency crisis and the Sino-Japanese War.

China needs an international financial platform to serve its growing needs and increasing voice in global financial markets.

After World War II and the Civil War, most foreign firms in 1949 moved their offices from Shanghai to Hong Kong, as part of an exodus of foreign investment.

As a British Crown Colony, Hong Kong was spared from the Civil War in the mainland and experienced an inflow of capital and labor, as well as Shanghai’s entrepreneurial elite. After the civil war, a new wave of migrants fled to Hong Kong, along with many corporations in Shanghai and Guangzhou.

As textile and manufacturing grew with low-cost labor and population growth, Hong Kong industrialized. The export-led growth model boosted living standards rapidly.

During the 1950s and 1960s, Shanghai was transformed into an industrial center. In comparison with other Chinese provinces and municipalities, it was the largest contributor of tax revenue to the central government, but at the cost of crippling its own infrastructure and capital development. As Shanghai fell into a historical oblivion, Hong Kong thrived.

At first, Shanghai was sidelined by economic liberalizations that were launched in China’s southern provinces in the mid-1980s. In 1992, when Deng Xiaoping declared that Shanghai would be "the head of the dragon" pulling the country into the future, the development of Pudong was designed to restore Shanghai’s historical role for the Yangtze River Delta and, more broadly, to China.

Shanghai’s economic reforms resulted in huge development and the birth of Lujiazui, the great financial and commercial hub in the Pudong New Area.

Shanghai’s economic reforms resulted in huge development and the birth of Lujiazui, the great financial and commercial hub in the Pudong New Area, across Shanghai’s historical Bund and the Huangpu River. Today, Shanghai’s position is rapidly rising as a major destination for corporate headquarters, fueling demand for a highly educated and modernized workforce.

"Shanghai has laid a solid foundation for making itself an international financial center. But it is still a big step away from the objective," China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) Chairman Liu Mingkang told the first Lujiazui Forum in May 2008. “Shanghai's financial sector only has about 100,000 professionals, compared with some 400,000 on Wall Street and more than 250,000 in London.”

Hong Kong and Shanghai compared
How do Hong Kong and Shanghai compare as financial hubs? First, Hong Kong has a deeper pool of financial services than Shanghai, with established insurance, law, accounting and other professional service firms.

With its market capitalization of $2.7 trillion, Shanghai's stock market is worth more than Hong Kong's, but it has fewer listed companies. For now, retail investors dominate trading in Shanghai, which translates to higher volatility.

In addition, Hong Kong is far more active in global bonds than Shanghai. It also has a mature and active financial futures market, but recently China’s State Council approved the launch of stock index futures in Shanghai.

Hong Kong has an independent legal system, and English continues to be the only medium in which the majority of overseas judgments are reported.

Domestic currency trading in Shanghai far surpasses that in Hong Kong, which is pegged to the U.S. dollar, but imposes no capital controls — whereas the renminbi is not fully convertible and exchange controls restrict foreign investment flows (for now).

While Hong Kong's financial markets regulator is an independent statutory body, Shanghai's regulator is part of the government's State Council. True to its British origins, Hong Kong has an independent legal system, and English continues to be the only medium in which the majority of overseas judgments are reported.

In Hong Kong, English is regularly spoken in the business environment, along with Cantonese. Mandarin is standard for business dealings in Shanghai.

Finally, financial professionals may be most attracted by Hong Kong’s income tax rate, which is a flat 15%, compared with some 45% in Shanghai. Compared with the rest of China, Shanghai has lower taxes for foreign-invested companies. Hong Kong tax rates are low by OECD standards, and there are no capital gains taxes. Taxes are also only levied on income made in Hong Kong.

Three scenarios
As the world’s factory, greatest commodity importer and largest holder of foreign exchange reserves, China needs an international financial platform to serve its growing needs and increasing voice in global financial markets. Due to the tarnished credibility of the dollar, the great global recession is accelerating these needs. In the future, China’s global financial hubs may evolve according to three generic scenarios:

# One financial center. Some observers expect China to have a single financial center. The scenario is based on the assumption that big is beautiful. Due to economies of scale and network effects, a nation can, or at least should, have only one major stock exchange.

The implication is that since there can be only one major financial center, it has to be Shanghai or Hong Kong. The UK has its City. The United States has its Wall Street. So China should also have its single global financial hub.

# Two or more financial centers. Other observers share the assumption that greater muscle means greater clout, but they also believe that, precisely due to its extraordinary size, China could develop two or perhaps even more financial centers. The assumption is that China's scale and level of development differs significantly from the United States' and the UK's.

In the short- and medium-term, the U.S. experiences may provide some benchmarks to assess the prospects of China’s financial centers, but in the long-term, China will set benchmarks of its own.

# Transitional stage. The third scenario is a variation of the second. In the short- to medium-term, China will be supported by two major financial hubs. In the long-term, one major financial hub may be supported by multiple smaller hubs that may be more focused regionally or in terms of markets.

Although financial centers compete with one another, the competition is not a "zero sum" game, and global centers can play many different roles (including domestic, niche, regional, international or global). In this scenario, the Pearl River Delta could evolve into China’s entrepreneurial innovation economy, with a Nasdaq-like market.

Currently, however, the basic assumption is that, in the long-term, Shanghai will become China’s international financial center.

363) Shanghai gets ready for the Expo...

Shanghai’s Coming Out Party
By Anna Greenspan
The Globalist - Analysis, Wednesday, March 24, 2010

Shanghai, China's biggest and most cosmopolitan metropolis, is currently putting the final touches on its preparations to host the World Expo 2010 from May to October. Anna Greenspan explores how the local authorities are changing the entire make-up of the city in preparation for this milestone event.

I have been living in the same apartment in downtown Shanghai for over two years, but in the last few weeks my neighborhood has been radically transformed.

Suddenly, across the street a new subway hub emerged. The street itself is constantly mutating. Teams of workers are busy planting full-grown trees that have just been shipped in.

Surprisingly, for a city as vain as Shanghai, there are no superstar architects involved in the World Expo plans. There is no "Birdsnest" or "Watercube" in the works.

Welcome to Shanghai circa 2010. Here, if you want to change your surroundings, it’s best simply to stay still.

Since 2002, when the city won the right to host the World Expo, it was clear that 2010 would be the year that Shanghai would stage its coming out party.

In the long rivalry between China’s two great cities, this is Shanghai’s time. While it has yet to make headlines elsewhere, preparations for the Expo, billed here as the "cultural Olympics," match — or even exceed — the build up to the Beijing Games.

Amazingly, almost every project announced in the city during the last few years had the same completion date. It almost became a joke.

Now as the big moment finally approaches — the official opening is set for May 1, 2010 — the countdown is relentless and inescapable.

Walk through an alleyway, wait to cross a main intersection, go to the library to check out a book — and somewhere, everywhere, a sign seems to be screaming out at you — 40, 39, 38 days left.

Without any doubt, the city has gone into a frenzy of construction that is unlike anything any city has ever seen.

Having lived here for most of the decade, I have certainly grown accustomed to expecting high-speed growth. I have seen entire neighborhoods vanish — and parks and skyscrapers magically appear.

Yet, nothing has prepared me for the mind-boggling change currently underway. The entire megalopolis is now being given a final push in the form of a major spruce-up.

In the long rivalry between China’s two great cities, this is Shanghai’s time.

Teams of migrant workers are everywhere — hanging from ladders, dangling from ropes. Brick by brick, they are replacing almost every sidewalk, painting almost every wall and fence, recovering every grid, retouching every facade.

Scaffolding is all around. Roads are dug up, piles of rubble block key passageways. Walking or cycling is often hazardous. Step out of a restaurant, gallery or club — however glamorous — and there they are, hard at work.

From the streets of Shanghai it is no surprise that China has been barely touched by the recession. Its biggest city is one gigantic stimulus machine.

Those zones that are truly impossible to "repair" are being covered up. For example, a huge block at Ulumuqi road and Wuyuan road — one that is filled with crumbling buildings and overgrown vegetation — is still up for rent. Recently a team of workers hid the entire block behind a massive billboard advertising — you guessed it — Expo 2010.

These "minor repairs" are overshadowed by the mega-projects that are currently underway. A few years ago I heard about a plan to bury some of the traffic lanes along the Bund, Shanghai’s iconic waterfront strip.

Accustomed to a Western sense of caution and the slow pace of deliberated change, I naively thought it was just a suggestion — something that might be nice some day. But about eight months ago, the barricades went up and the tunnel was dug. The newly renovated Bund is due to reopen this month.

True to Shanghai style, the 2010 World Expo's clear aim is to reanimate the Great Exhibitions of a previous age.

Every district, every major thoroughfare, is due for a similar makeover. Projects that have long seemed dead or stalled have been suddenly set into high-speed motion.

In Lujiazui, a pedestrian skyway is in the works, in Hongkou district a new waterfront, on Huaihai road, a string of new mega malls, on Nanjing road, a cluster of new super towers. All are due to open by May.

On Jumen road, which leads directly into the expo site, a once-seedy street of disused factories has been transformed into a vast "creative cluster" — one of more than 80 already in the city. It too will be ready for the Expo.

Long-term residents who have suffered from the seas of bulldozers, the near-constant sound of jackhammers and massive bouts of cough that inevitably arise when living in a film of dust, now have the pleasure of witnessing the city gradually unveil.

A major corner at Huaihai road and Changshu road — for months concealed by construction — was, just a few weeks ago, uncovered to reveal a subway stop with a small park on top.

At first, the trees were bare and there was nothing but mud. A few days later, however, everything was fully in bloom. At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, even the trees are made to keep up with Shanghai time.

Surprisingly, for a city that is otherwise as vain as Shanghai, there are no superstar architects involved in the World Expo plans. In sharp contrast to Beijing, there is no "Birdsnest" or "Watercube" in the works.

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, even the trees are made to keep up with Shanghai time.

Instead, the focus has been underground. In fact, the construction of the subway has been the most astonishing development of all. The network’s vast and high-speed expansion is rapidly making Shanghai’s subway system one of the most extensive in the world.

Subway stops are sprouting all over town, revolutionizing everyday life for millions of the city’s residents. In December, two new lines — No. 7 and No. 9 — opened across the street. In another few weeks, line No. 10 is set to open with a stop only blocks away. When I first arrived in Shanghai in 2002, there were only three lines — and by the time the expo begins, there will be 13.

All this says nothing of the Expo site itself, a vast area straddling both sides of the river that divides Shanghai. This long-neglected zone — with its factories, warehouses and giant shipyard — belonged, up until about a year ago, to the city’s industrial past.

Yet, it enjoys a surprisingly central location. Once developed, it has the potential to reorient the entire urban landscape of Shanghai.

Despite the fact that little is known about what will happen to the site once the Expo is over, the new high-rises that are being built nearby are rumored to be retailing at the exorbitant price of 80,000 RMB ($11,715/€8,122) per square meter.

Shanghai has gone into a frenzy of construction that is unlike anything any city has ever seen.

True to Shanghai style, the 2010 World Expo is set to dwarf all other World Fairs in every conceivable way. It has an unprecedented budget, the largest area, the most participants and the biggest projected audience (the government claims 70 million visitors over the course of six months). Its clear aim is to reanimate the Great Exhibitions of a previous age.

Where all this will ultimately lead is still unknown. How the surface spectacle of a future metropolis will mesh with the city’s complex reality is impossible to predict.

This much, however, is certain: If you want to know what to watch for in 2010, keep your eye on Shanghai.

Tuesday, March 23, 2010

362) Parceria EUA-China - Rubens Antonio Barbosa

Parceria Trans-Pacífico
Rubens Barbosa*
O Estado de S. Paulo, 23.03.2010
(Publicado como "O poder do Pacífico " no Globo)

Os EUA e a China entraram em período de crescentes atritos econômicos, políticos e diplomáticos, antecipando uma rivalidade que, mais para a frente, poderá trazer de volta a bipolaridade nas relações internacionais. A relação com a China passou a ser um dos maiores desafios da política externa norte-americana.

A tensão entre as duas maiores economias globais - neste ano a China vai ultrapassar o Japão - é resultado da percepção de que os dois países cada vez mais terão de tomar a dianteira no equacionamento das questões globais. Daí uma atitude mais crítica da China em relação aos EUA e, da parte destes, um visível endurecimento. A venda de armas a Taiwan, o encontro de Barack Obama com o Dalai Lama, o apoio dado à Google contra a censura na internet, as medidas restritivas contra produtos chineses de exportação (aço, pneus) são exemplos recentes de atitudes norte-americanas. A China criticou duramente os EUA pela crise econômica e tem-se colocado contra as sanções ao Irã no Conselho de Segurança da ONU, além de ter suspendido a cooperação no campo militar e ter feito ameaças de retaliação contra empresas norte-americanas. Adicionalmente poderiam ser lembradas as divergências nas negociações comerciais da Rodada Doha e nas questões relacionadas com a cúpula de Copenhague, a ameaça de venda de títulos do Tesouro americano e as pressões do Congresso americano para a China ser classificada como país que manipula o câmbio, abrindo a porta para sanções comerciais pelos EUA.

A mudança de atitude norte-americana para com a China pode estar relacionada à frustração quanto aos rumos políticos na sociedade chinesa. O governo de Washington saudou a emergência da China como potência econômica global na expectativa, alimentada nos governo Clinton e Bush, de que o desenvolvimento econômico levaria necessariamente a uma abertura política. Para surpresa dos formuladores da política externa norte-americana, não é isso que está ocorrendo. Ao contrário, o regime está hoje mais fechado e mais intolerante.

Até aqui tem prevalecido o interesse recíproco que permite à China ampliar anualmente suas exportações para o mercado americano, sem restrições às violações de direitos humanos e ambientais praticadas por Pequim, e, de outro lado, aos EUA colocar seus títulos do Tesouro nas reservas chineses em níveis perigosamente elevados (pouco menos de US$ 1 trilhão).

Essa situação gera um desequilíbrio pouco saudável para a economia mundial. Seria importante que os EUA poupassem mais, gastassem menos e reduzissem a dívida de longo prazo. A China, por outro lado, deveria fazer ajustes num amplo elenco de políticas para reequilibrar sua economia e estimular a demanda doméstica.

De maneira pouco sutil, a China já fez saber que, se as tensões persistirem, poderão prejudicar o equilíbrio econômico entre os dois países. Os EUA ensaiam atitudes muito mais firmes, em especial na área comercial.

Não parece, no entanto, que, no atual momento, a situação esteja fugindo do controle e desembocando numa crise de graves proporções. Os atritos mais sérios, envolvendo questões políticas, econômicas e mesmo militares, ficarão para as próximas décadas, quando diminuir ou desaparecer a distância que ainda separa hoje, sob qualquer aspecto, as duas principais potências globais.

Enquanto esse cenário de fricções se descortina, o governo norte-americano procura acompanhar as grandes mudanças econômicas que estão ocorrendo na Ásia. China e Japão alteraram suas respectivas políticas contrárias à negociação de acordos de livre-comércio e já estão em processo de negociação de uma série de acordos com seus vizinhos asiáticos, que discriminarão contra as exportações via preferências tarifárias de empresas norte-americanas.

Como reconheceram o presidente Obama e, mais recentemente, o USTR, Ron Kirk, a mudança do eixo dos temas econômicos e comerciais do Atlântico para o Pacífico é uma das transformações globais mais importantes nas relações comerciais e internacionais.

A China, que ultrapassou a Alemanha em 2009, tornou-se o segundo país em termos de trocas comerciais. Na nova divisão de trabalho internacional, a China está se transformando no grande produtor mundial de bens industriais e no grande consumidor de produtos agrícolas, minerais e de metais.

Na celebração dos 20 anos da organização, durante a reunião da Cooperação Econômica Ásia-Pacífico (Apec), o governo norte-americano, apesar das diferenças político-diplomáticas, anunciou que iniciará negociações para o estabelecimento da Parceria Trans-Pacífico (PTP). O presidente Obama, nessa oportunidade, deixou dito que os EUA são um poder do Pacífico e que ele é o primeiro presidente norte-americano do Pacífico.

O representante comercial norte-americano, em dezembro, lançou negociações para um acordo de livre-comércio que ampliaria os mecanismos já existentes entre Nova Zelândia, Chile, Cingapura e Brunei (o chamado P-5) para incluir EUA, Austrália, Peru e Vietnã. Esse acordo, modelado a partir do Nafta (acordo comercial mantido com o Canadá e México), poderia ser gradualmente ampliado para incluir outros países asiáticos, formando o PTP.

Levando em conta a tendência restritiva do Congresso norte-americano em relação ao livre-comércio, não será fácil para o governo Obama conseguir a autorização para negociar um acordo que potencialmente poderia incluir países como Japão, China e Coreia.

A visão estratégica de médio e de longo prazos dos formuladores da política comercial externa norte-americana transcende considerações políticas e diplomáticas conjunturais e é um bom exemplo da conveniência de despolitizar as decisões de natureza comercial na defesa do melhor interesse do país.

*PRESIDENTE DO CONSELHO DE COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR DA FIESP

361) Cambio chines - Antonio Delfim Neto

Câmbio chinês
Antonio Delfim Netto
Valor Econômico, 23.03.2010

A paciência do mundo com relação ao desarranjo produzido pela política cambial chinesa começa a dar sérios sinais de fadiga. É muito difícil saber qual é a taxa de câmbio de equilíbrio, a começar pela definição de equilíbrio do quê? Do balanço comercial de bens e serviços? Do balanço de bens e serviços mais o movimento de entrada de capitais para investimento físico e saída de sua remuneração? Do balanço em contas correntes, quando existe amplo movimento de capitais, não apenas de investimento físico, mas também de aplicações em papéis do governo e do setor privado e de movimentos de arbitragem dos portfólios dos investidores internacionais?

A relação de conversão da unidade de moeda nacional (o real, por exemplo) com relação à moeda de referência de poder liberatório internacional (o dólar) conserva o mesmo nome (taxa de câmbio), mas seu papel como preço relativo, que iguala o fluxo da oferta de divisas (exportação mais investimento direto) com o fluxo de demanda (importação mais remessa de lucro) e organiza a corrente de comércio, explorando as vantagens comparativas, foi se metamorfoseando.

À medida que se ampliou o movimento de capitais, ela transformou-se num outro animal: o preço de um ativo que tem muito mais a ver com as oportunidades de arbitragem financeira internacional do que com o nível de atividade da economia. Passou a servir às conveniências financeiras, muito mais do que às necessidades da economia real e do emprego.

A assimilação da liberdade do movimento de capitais às vantagens comparativas do movimento de bens e serviços nunca passou de puro contrabando ideológico, apoiado na afirmação apriorística que o capital, com sua extrema racionalidade, sempre procuraria aplicações físicas nos países com maiores taxas de retorno a longo prazo. O contrabando foi facilitado pelo truque semântico de chamar de capital duas coisas com efeitos econômicos potencialmente muito diferentes.

Qual, por exemplo, o aperfeiçoamento da alocação dos fatores internos (isto é, para o desenvolvimento econômico) obtido com a atividade de pura arbitragem dos operadores internacionais, que têm em seus portfólios o real e que podem valorizá-lo ou desvalorizá-lo com movimentos especulativos capazes de alterar as estruturas produtivas? Qual a vantagem de aceitar o financiamento externo para a dívida do governo, quando ela é dissipada em consumo e não em investimentos de infraestrutura?

Talvez houvesse alguma vantagem se essa arbitragem levasse, efetivamente, a taxa de juro real da economia a igualar-se à taxa de juro real do mundo. Nessa circunstância, a taxa de câmbio recuperaria seu papel alocativo e ajudaria as políticas monetária e fiscal que levam ao desenvolvimento. Mas alguém pode acreditar nisso com a política econômica que praticamos nas últimas duas décadas?

O problema da China é que ela também não acredita! Abriu pequenas frestas para o capital financeiro, mas radicalizou no controle da sua taxa de câmbio (como se vê no gráfico ao lado), que agora incomoda o mundo.

É difícil precisar os números, mas toda a evidência disponível sugere que o yuan deve estar desvalorizado entre 25% e 40% com relação ao dólar (o nosso real, ao contrário, está valorizado entre 15% e 20%!). Isso dá à China uma formidável vantagem competitiva, sem contar os múltiplos e disfarçados suportes adicionais do Estado chinês à exportação.

O incômodo ficou mais forte em fevereiro, quando as exportações chinesas revelaram um crescimento anual de 46% (com todo o mundo ainda encolhendo). Em janeiro, os Estados Unidos registraram um déficit comercial de US$ 37 bilhões: US$ 18 bilhões com a China, US$ 7 bilhões com petróleo e US$ 12 bilhões com o resto!

O presidente Obama começa a sofrer pressão dos sindicatos. E não pode ignorá-la com uma eleição em novembro. O Congresso, pela mesma razão, está exigindo que o próximo relatório do secretário do Tesouro afirme, com clareza, que a China manipula a sua moeda, o que abriria automaticamente um processo legislativo e obrigaria o presidente a agir. Com o nível de tensão emocional vigente, isso poderá degenerar em grave ameaça de irracional protecionismo. A sugestão que hoje encontra apoio no Congresso é uma tarifa geral de 25% sobre todos os produtos chineses.

A situação não é fácil nem para os EUA nem para a China. O gráfico anterior mostra que o último movimento chinês foi no primeiro semestre de 2005 e terminou no primeiro semestre de 2008. A política de lenta apreciação controlada provocou, naquela ocasião, uma especulação financeira que aumentou as reservas chinesas em quase US$ 500 bilhões e ajudou a acelerar a taxa de inflação de 1% para 8% ao ano no mesmo período. A China tem feito ouvidos moucos à reclamação do mundo. Agora, com a luz vermelha acesa, despachou às pressas seus negociadores para os EUA. Gato escaldado tem medo de água fria...

Antonio Delfim Netto é professor emérito da FEA-USP, ex-ministro da Fazenda, Agricultura e Planejamento. Escreve às terças-feiras
E-mail: contatodelfimnetto@terra.com.br

360) China vs Rio Tinto: um embate paradigmatico

Julgamento da Rio Tinto começa hoje em Xangai
Agência Estado, 21/03/2010

Um executivo australiano e outros três funcionários da gigante mineradora Rio Tinto, que enfrentam acusações de roubar segredos e oferecer subornos, serão julgados a partir desta segunda-feira, em Xangai. O julgamento é visto como um barômetro da conduta chinesa para lidar com negócios estrangeiros.

O australiano Stern Hu e outros três chineses foram presos nove meses atrás, quando a Rio Tinto agia como líder nas negociações de preço com siderúrgicas do país asiático. Hu era um executivo sênior da companhia na China, encarregado do minério de ferro. Poucos detalhes das alegações contra os suspeitos foram divulgados, e os quatro funcionários da mineradora não foram autorizados a fazer qualquer comentário público desde a prisão. Os advogados contatados neste final de semana se recusaram a comentar o assunto.

O Departamento Australiano de Comércio e Relações Exteriores emitiu um comunicado dizendo que estava desapontado com a decisão da corte chinesa de não permitir que autoridades consulares assistam às sessões que têm a ver com os segredos comerciais. "A decepção do governo com a decisão foi registrada junto às autoridades chinesas em Pequim e Canberra", informou, em um comunicado neste final de semana.

A Rio Tinto disse repetidamente que espera que o caso seja tratado de maneira rápida e transparente. Enquanto isso, a companhia segue em frente com seus negócios na China, maior polo de siderurgia do mundo e principal consumidor de minério de ferro. A mineradora recentemente apontou um novo executivo para a China e anunciou na sexta-feira um acordo com a estatal chinesa de alumínio Chinalco para desenvolver uma reserva de minério de ferro na Guiné. As informações são da Associated Press.

Monday, March 22, 2010

359) Google vs China: shifting search engines to Hong Kong

Breaking News Alert
The New York Times
Mon, March 22, 2010 -- 3:34 PM ET
-----

Google Shifting China Search Engine to Hong Kong

Google said it will shift its search engine for China off the
mainland. Visitors to Google.cn were now being redirected to
Google's Chinese-language service based in Hong Kong.

Read More:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/technology/23google.html?emc=na

Google Shuts China Site in Dispute Over Censorship
By MIGUEL HELFT and DAVID BARBOZA
The New York Times, March 22, 2010

SAN FRANCISCO — Just over two months after threatening to leave China because of censorship and intrusions by Chinese hackers, Google said Monday that it was closing its China-based Internet search service and instead directing Chinese users to a Hong Kong-based uncensored version of its search engine, which may get blocked in mainland China.

In a blog post, Google also said that it would retain much of its existing China operations, including its research and development team and its local sales force. The stunning move represents a powerful slap at Beijing regulators but also a risky ploy in which Google — one of the world’s technology powerhouses — will essentially turn its back on the world’s largest Internet market, with nearly 400 million Web users and growing quickly.

“Figuring out how to make good on our promise to stop censoring search on Google.cn has been hard,” David Drummond, Google’s chief legal officer, wrote in the blog post. “We want as many people in the world as possible to have access to our services, including users in mainland China, yet the Chinese government has been crystal clear throughout our discussions that self-censorship is a non-negotiable legal requirement.”

Mr. Drummond said that Google’s Hong Kong-based search engine would provide mainland China users results in simplified Chinese characters used on the mainland and was “entirely legal.”

“We very much hope that the Chinese government respects our decision,” Mr. Drummond said, “though we are well aware that it could at any time block access to our services.”

Google’s decision to scale back operations in China ends a nearly four-year bet by the company’s founders and top executives that Google’s search engine in China, even if censored, would help bring more information to Chinese citizens and loosen the government’s controls on the Internet.

Instead, specialists say, Chinese authorities have tightened their grip on the Internet in recent years. While other multinational companies are not expected to follow suit, some Western executives say Google’s decision is a symbol of a worsening business climate in China for foreign corporations and perhaps an indication that the Chinese government is favoring home-grown companies.

“It is certainly a historic moment,” said Xiao Qiang, director of the China Internet project at the University of California, Berkeley. “The Internet was seen as a catalyst for China being more integrated into the world. The fact that Google cannot exist in China, clearly indicates that China’s path as a rising power is going in a direction different from what the world expected and what many Chinese were hoping for.”

Despite its size and reputation for innovation, Google trails its main Chinese rival, Baidu.com, which was modeled on Google, with 33 percent market share to Baidu’s 63 percent.

The decision to shut down its China-based search engine will have a limited financial impact on Google, which is based in Mountain View, Calif. China accounted for a small fraction of Google’s $23.6 billion in global revenues last year. Still, abandoning a direct search engine presence in the largest Internet market in the world could have long-term repercussions and thwart Google’s ambitions to be a global superpower, analysts say.

Beijing has not yet responded to Google’s decision, which was announced around 3 a.m. Beijing time, but government officials have scolded Google in recent weeks insisting that the company must comply with the law.

Some Western analysts say Chinese regulators could retaliate against Google by blocking its Hong Kong or American search engines entirely, just as it blocks YouTube, Facebook and Twitter.

Supporters of Google have praised the company for taking a principled stand and effectively refusing to operate a censored Web site here, one that limits free speech and deletes information about democracy and human rights issues.

In a statement, Leslie Harris, chief executive of the Washington-based Center for Democracy and Technology, praised Google “for following through on its commitment to protect human rights and for its continued effort to enable China’s people with unfiltered access to robust sources of information from all over the world. Whether the Chinese people will be able to take advantage of Google search now rests squarely with the Chinese government.”

But other specialists said it was a foolish business decision that has unnecessarily embarrassed Beijing and one that could make it difficult for Google to continue operating other parts of its business in China.

In China, many students and professionals say they are extremely disappointed by Google’s decision to close its Chinese language Web site. They are about to lose access to the company’s vast resources, they say.

Last January, when Google initially threatened to leave China, many young people there placed wreaths at the company headquarters in Beijing as a sign of mourning.

At that time, Google said it had grown frustrated with complying with government censorship rules and that hackers based in China had stolen some of the company’s source code and even broken into the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights advocates.

The attacks were aimed at Google and more than 20 other American companies, the company said. While Google did not say the attacks were government sponsored, the company said it had enough information about the attacks to justify its threat to leave China.

People, inside and outside of Google, investigating the attacks have since put the number of companies that were targets at more than 30, and have traced the attacks to two universities in China: Shanghai Jiao Tong University and the Lanxiang Vocational School.

The universities and the Chinese government have denied any involvement in the attacks.

At the time of its announcement, Google said that its decision might well result in its having to shut down its China-based search engine, Google.cn, or leaving the country. In subsequent days, however, Google said that it hoped to preserve as much of its business in China as possible. In addition to its search engine, the company has a staff of about 600 that includes highly paid engineers and sales people, and a fledgling mobile phone business.

After serving Chinese users through its search engine based in the United States, Google decided to enter the Chinese market in 2006 with a local search engine under an arrangement with the government that required it to purge search results on banned topics.

But since then, Google has struggled to comply with Chinese censorship rules and failed to gain significant market share from Baidu.com, a Chinese site that was modeled on Google.

The decision to enter China, was also hotly debated in the company, and Google has come under criticism for cooperating with China’s censors. Not surprisingly, when the company said it would no longer abide by China’s censorship rules, human rights groups hailed the announcement, saying that Google’s stand should be a model for other American companies.

.

The decision to scale back its operations in China will have only a limited financial impact on Google in the short term. Google does not break down revenue by country, but people familiar with the company’s business in China said that its quarterly sales were in the vicinity of $150 million in the most recent quarter, which ended Dec. 31. Globally, it had $6.67 billion in revenue in the same period. Much of Google’s revenue in China comes from ads that Chinese companies place on Google’s sites in the United States and elsewhere. What’s more, ads that Google used to place on its China-based search engine will now be placed on the Hong Kong site, so as long as the site is unblocked in mainland China, Google will continue to earn revenue from them.

But the fallout from the decision could affect Google over the long term, as the Chinese Internet market continues to grow quickly.

Google is not the first American Internet company to stumble here. Nearly every major American brand has arrived with high hopes only to be stunted by government rules or fierce competition from Chinese rivals.

After struggling to compete in China, Yahoo sold its Chinese operations to Alibaba Group, a local company; Ebay and Amazon never got traction; and Microsoft’s MSN instant messaging service badly trails rival Tencent.

Google’s departure could present an opportunity for Baidu, whose stock has soared since the confrontation between Google and China began. It could also give a chance to Microsoft, a perennial underdog in Internet search, to make inroads into the Chinese market. Microsoft’s search engine, Bing, has a very small share of the market.

Many analysts say the government has favored and aided Chinese Internet start-ups, but that those businesses have also out maneuvered American companies.

Inside Google, the decision to pull out is widely believed to have been championed by Sergey Brin, a co-founder, who was born in the Soviet Union and is particularly sensitive to the issue of censorship. The decision by Google to enter China in 2006 was hotly debated internally, with Mr. Brin advising against it, while fellow co-founder, Larry Page, and chief executive, Eric E. Schmidt arguing for it.

Early this year, company executives acknowledged that their bet that Google could help open China had failed.

“We were looking at an environment that is more difficult than it was when we started,” David Drummond, Google’s chief legal officer said in January. “Far from our presence helping to open things up, it seems that things are getting tighter for open expression and freedom.”

David Barboza reported from Shanghai and Miguel Helft from San Francisco.

358) Cambio chines e o Brasil, segundo Henrique Meirelles

Câmbio chinês não afeta o Brasil, diz Meirelles
Ricardo Gozzi
O Estado de S. Paulo, 22.03.2010

O presidente do Banco Central, Henrique Meirelles, disse ontem que o Brasil está menos preocupado com a fraqueza da moeda chinesa do que outras grandes economias que reclamam do yuan. Segundo Meirelles, a economia brasileira está sendo puxada pela forte demanda interna, e o impacto das importações da China tem importância menor no Brasil do que em países como os Estados Unidos.



Meirelles também disse que ainda não decidiu se permanecerá no cargo até o fim do governo Lula ou se vai se desincompatibilizar da função a tempo de, eventualmente, concorrer a algum cargo eletivo. Ele comentou o assunto ao ser questionado por jornalistas ao término de uma palestra para banqueiros ocorrida, ontem, em Cancún, no México, durante a reunião anual do Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento (BID). O presidente do BC afirmou que tem tempo para se decidir. O prazo para desincompatibilização do cargo expira em 3 de abril.

A decisão que irei é tomar será, número um: se eu fico no Banco Central ou se eu saio do Banco Central. Se eu ficar, não poderei concorrer a nenhum cargo público e permanecerei no Banco Central até o fim do ano. Se eu decidir sair do Banco Central, então analisarei quais serão as opções disponíveis no momento, declarou Meirelles.

Ele se recusou a comentar rumores sobre a possibilidade de, no futuro próximo, ser chamado para vice numa possível chapa da pré-candidata do PT à Presidência, a ministra-chefe da Casa Civil, Dilma Rousseff.

Questionado por um jornalista estrangeiro sobre projetos para que o Banco Central do Brasil se torne uma instituição independente nos próximos anos, Meirelles disse: Não faz parte das atribuições de um presidente do Banco Central mudar as leis do País. Isso cabe ao Congresso Nacional. O que podemos fazer é emitir opiniões. Particularmente, minha experiência como membro do comitê de governadores do BIS (Banco de Compensações Internacionais) e todos os estudos e sondagens lá feitos mostram que, no longo prazo, um banco central legalmente independente provou ser um caminho eficiente e exitoso a ser seguido. Mais uma vez, porém, afirmo que a forma como funciona no Brasil tem dado muito certo.

Eleições. O deputado federal Antonio Palocci (PT-SP), ex-ministro da Fazendo, procurou afastar o risco político na economia brasileira, na noite de sábado, durante evento do BID em Cancún.

Acredito que esta será a primeira eleição (para presidente) na qual as pessoas irão às urnas sem medo de votar e sem que os partidos façam uso do medo para incentivar determinados comportamentos por parte do eleitor, opinou o deputado.
COM REUTERS

==================

Brasil não está preocupado com iuan, diz Meirelles
Da Redação
Jornal do Brasil, 22.03.2010

O Brasil está menos preocupado com a fraqueza da moeda chinesa do que outros países que reclamam da cotação do iuan, destacou ontem o presidente do Banco Central, Henrique Meirelles durante o encontro anual do Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento (BID) em Cancun, no México.

Meirelles afirmou que a economia nacional está sendo puxada pela robusta demanda interna.

Segundo ele, o impacto de importações da China é menos preocupante para o Brasil do que para outros países.

As nações exportadoras querem que Pequim abandone sua taxa de 6,83 iuans por dólar imposta em 2008 para ajudar exportadores chineses a lidar com a crise mundial.

As bolhas de capital especulativo não representam risco para a economia real do Brasil, garantiu Meirelles. O risco de bolhas de capital especulativo existe, mas o problema é quando afeta a economia real, e o Brasil tem evitado as bolhas de crédito, diz Meirelles.

O presidente da Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico (OCDE), José Angel Gurría, alertou em fevereiro passado para o risco de bolhas de crédito em países como Brasil e Índia.
Com agências

Saturday, March 20, 2010

357) Vale vs China: aumento de 100pc no preco do minerio

Vale negociaria reajuste de até 100%
Da Redação
O Globo, 20.03.2010

O presidente da Vale, Roger Agnelli, afirmou ontem que o preço do minério vai subir no mercado internacional devido a um crescimento na demanda que não está sendo acompanhado pela produção.

Ele disse que a companhia está negociando com os clientes e, sem revelar detalhes ou valores, deu a entender que o preço da commodity pode subir até 100%, mas ressaltou que as discussões estão sendo individuais. Segundo o vicepresidente da Associação Chinesa de Ferro e Aço (Cisa), Luo Bingsheng, a Vale pediu um aumento de 90% a 100% no preço do minério de ferro às siderúrgicas daquele país.

— Não dá para ter essa situação, uma disparidade tão grande entre o mercado à vista e o contrato de longo prazo. É uma briga para ter o contrato de longo prazo, e isso gera problemas de desvio, uma vez que o preço no mercado spot está 100% acima do preço de longo prazo — disse Agnelli.

Luo, no entanto, ressaltou que as siderúrgicas chinesas ainda estão com excesso de capacidade e produzindo muito aço. Ele traçou um panorama obscuro para as siderúrgicas chinesas em 2010. Elas precisam fixar os preços do minério de ferro com Vale, Rio Tinto e BHP Billiton, depois de terem falhado em conseguir o corte de preço acentuado que queriam no ano passado.

— Eu ainda não vi a declaração da Cisa. Mas há uma série de fatores que levam a um reajuste importante no preço do minério. Primeiro é a questão das moedas, segundo é a questão de fretes, terceiro é a questão da demanda do mercado à vista. Não faz sentido vender com desconto algo que se possa vender no mercado à vista com preço bem superior — afirmou Agnelli.

Ele afirmou que a proposta da Vale é que haja uma flutuação “trimestral ou semestral” nos preços para que os clientes tenham estabilidade para negociar com seus respectivos consumidores.

Segundo Agnelli, o aumento no preço acompanha o aumento na demanda, que, na avaliação da companhia, deve ficar alta pelo menos nos próximos três ou quatro anos.

— O aumento de produção não está acompanhando, de forma alguma, o anúncio da demanda para o minério. Então, vamos ter aumento de preço sim, assim como teve aumento de preço do carvão, assim como o preço do aço também já tem subido no mundo inteiro — afirmou o presidente da Vale.