China turns inside: "Go West, Young Man..."

China's push to develop its west hasn't closed income gap with east, critics say
By Keith B. Richburg
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, June 29, 2010; A11

BEIJING -- Ten years ago, China's leadership launched its "Go West" campaign, an ambitious plan to develop and modernize the country's poor western hinterlands. The aim was simple: to close the region's yawning income gap with the more prosperous east and assuage restive minority populations, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet.

China's economic boom had largely left the west behind. Spreading the wealth was as important politically as economically -- it was a way of increasing domestic stability and cementing the government's control.

Chinese officials rattle off all the statistical measures of the program's success: Highways were constructed. Houses were built. Nomads were resettled in "model" villages. Millions of people have electricity and clean drinking water. A rail line links Beijing in the east to Lhasa on the Tibetan plateau. And annual economic growth in the west is about 12 percent, higher than the national average.

But beneath the barrage of official statistics lies another reality. China's west -- defined as the dozen provinces and "autonomous regions" stretching from Inner Mongolia to Xinjiang and Tibet -- remains the poorest, least-developed and least-educated part of the country.

The massive investment, critics say, has mainly benefited state-owned companies that build the roads and railways and mine the minerals. There is little indigenous industry and scant foreign investment. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced from their homes, and nomads have been resettled into villages where they have no livelihood. Locals complain that China is primarily interested in extracting minerals to keep the factories back east running.

The decade of development spending still has not bought the loyalty of China's ethnic minorities. Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang rioted last year, and Tibetans rose up in March 2008. Beijing has responded by severely tightening control in both places.

"The government has talked for years about this and that benefit they have brought to Tibetans," said Tsering Woeser, an outspoken Tibetan poet and blogger in Beijing. "But they never explained why, if the people are so happy, such a big riot happened."

Woeser added: "In recent years, there have been improvements in housing, electricity and water supplies. But these improvements cannot compare with the price Tibetans pay."

The sentiment is not confined to Tibet. Most agree that China's decade-long building spree has led to tangible improvements. "The economic development of the western region has made huge strides," Premier Wen Jiabao said late last year, announcing China's plans to continue the Go West campaign "unswervingly" for another decade.
Who actually benefits?

But the question is: At what cost to indigenous populations and the environment? "Nobody disputes that there are now many miles of roads and many airports and people coming in on planes," said Robert Barnett, a Tibet expert at Columbia University. "It's misleading to just ask if there's been economic progress. Who benefits from it? What is the cost locally, culturally and politically?"

Nicholas Bequelin, a China expert with the Asian division of Human Rights Watch, said: "It's not a people-centered modernization program. It's a top-down program that has mostly benefited state enterprises and the party-controlled institutions."

Xinjiang is China's largest region, making up one-sixth of its landmass, and Tibet is the second-largest, twice the size of Texas and accounting for one-eighth the area of the country.

The west, as China defines it, includes coal mining areas such as Shanxi; tiny, dirt-poor Ningxia; and relatively better-off provinces such as Sichuan. The west borders 14 countries, makes up 70 percent of China's landmass and is home to 27 percent of the population.

Timothy Oakes, a geography professor at the University of Colorado at Boulder, has worked regularly in Guizhou, in southwestern China, for more than 20 years. "The basic infrastructure improvements have actually been quite stunning," he said, adding that new highways have "changed the whole way of life in a whole lot of places."

But Oakes also said the development has been uneven and has failed to help Guizhou catch up with more prosperous areas: "The numbers mask the fact that you probably have the same degree of inequality in those regions as before, and probably worse. I still see large amounts of the countryside that are not being affected."
Small-scale business

Chinese officials mention handicrafts and pharmaceuticals as two growing local industries. But economists said those are extremely small-scale. "They can't be the local economy's backbone," said Yi Peng, a finance and economics commentator in Beijing.

The reasons include economics and geography. In China's export-driven economy, factories need to be close to the ports, and that means on the east coast or in the southeast. "Inland areas are bound to fall behind," Yi said.

The bulk of the economic activity in the western provinces is in mining. But local areas get little economic benefit. The biggest impacts, many critics say, are that people are relocated and that fragile ecosystems are threatened.

Tibet was recently discovered to be a treasure trove of mineral deposits -- iron ore, copper, lead and zinc that could reduce China's reliance on minerals from abroad. But activists, academics and others are worried that Tibet's delicate ecology will come under assault from an influx of Chinese mining concerns.

"Is it really necessary to develop the west?" Yi asked. "In my opinion, the living environment and the people's feeling are the most important."

Staff researcher Liu Liu contributed to this report.

382) Is there a Chinese model? - David Shambaugh

China's extraordinary growth in recent years has led many to wonder if a model can be erected based on this development. In China, though, scholars disagree whether a “Chinese model” of growth exists sufficient to export to other developing countries. According to David Shambaugh, director of George Washington University's China Policy Program, one must isolate four key elements of any supposed “model” for consideration: politics, economics, social welfare, and foreign policy. On each of these elements, China represents either too unique a circumstance for others to copy or the factors simply don’t apply. Indeed, China’s “Harmonious World” diplomatic strategy is specifically designed for its unique context, while China's economy is an amalgam of control and market systems that would be tough to replicate in other societies even if there were the desire. Moreover, Shambaugh writes, efforts to conceptualize a “coherent model” are futile. The most important and useful aspect of China's development is its ability to adapt in diverse ways to the changing demands of global affairs. – YaleGlobal

Is There a Chinese Model?
David Shambaugh
China Daily, 2 March 2010

During 2009 there was an upsurge in Chinese academic and journalistic writings concerning the question of a "Chinese model". Since last year Chinese intellectuals have been heatedly debating whether there is such a distinct Chinese model for development - and, if so, what are its contents and is it transferable for other countries?

This new interest inside of China seems to be heavily stimulated by the global financial crisis of 2008 -2010. Compared with the global fiasco brought on by this crisis and the questionable economic ideology underlying it, Chinese thinkers have found greater faith in China's own development policies. The recent Chinese debate concerning the "China model" follows earlier such debates in the West, Africa, and Latin America about the so-called "Beijing Consensus."

My reading of the Chinese discourse in recent months on this question reveals that there is no agreement among Chinese scholars. Some think there is a model, some not. Some think it's exportable, some not. Yet others argue that it is a waste of time to even discuss a "Chinese model" for others, as China has too much to do to continue its development at home.

From my perspective, in order to assess whether there is such a thing as a "China model" the concept must be broken down into several constituent parts of China's development experience. In evaluating each part, one must ask if this is unique to China - or is it simply common among other newly industrialized countries (NICs)? If the answer is yes, then China's experience may constitute a partial or full "model" and may therefore be transferable.

First, I think China's political system is unique-but not transferable. The Communist Party of China (CPC) has indeed evolved a political system out of a classic Leninist/Communist/Soviet style system into a hybrid political system today. This system still has many of the classic elements of Soviet Leninism, but allows for much more intra-party democracy, public participation at the local level, and puts great emphasis on meritocracy and competent governance. Only Leninist-style party-states (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Laos, Vietnam, Cuba) can learn from these Chinese political practices. It is different from Asian or African authoritarian systems.

Second, China's economic system is also a hybrid. It too still maintains many elements of the Soviet central planning and investment system. While the state sector of the economy has shrunk significantly (to approximately 30 percent of the national economy), this is deceiving-as the state remains the "invisible hand" dominating the economy - through state banks, state assets, state ownership, state manipulated prices, state cadres, and unpredictable state intervention in various economic sectors.

On the other hand, China's collective sector remains large (approximately 30 percent) and the private sector has boomed accounting for approximately 40 percent of GDP growth. Both the collective and private sectors have benefited from a close relationship to local governments (known as "local state corporatism"). Finally, the Chinese economic success has owed much to the introduction of free market mechanisms into the rural agricultural sector (with some state subsidies and price supports).

Are these elements of China's economic experience unique? Considered individually, no-considered collectively, yes. Are they transferable? Probably not-given the size of China, the continuing legacy of the "Soviet model," and the heavy hand of the central and local state in the economy.

Third, what about China's provision for social welfare as a component of its development model? Generally speaking, during the past 30 years, China has dismantled its social welfare state - leaving hundreds of millions of citizens without any or adequate provision of healthcare, unemployment insurance, cost of education, and a variety of other social services.

This is not a model to admire or transfer to other societies. What was good about the Chinese social welfare model before 1978 has been lost. Only by maintaining the world's highest household savings rate and drawing on hidden subsidies and family connections are Chinese citizens cushioned against these costs and unexpected personal catastrophes. This is a major challenge for China in the future: to rebuild its social welfare services.

Fourth, and finally, one can ask: does Chinese diplomacy offer a unique "model" in international affairs? Here, the answer is yes-at least rhetorically. China's concepts of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," "New Security Concept," "New International Order," "Strategic Partnerships," and "Harmonious World" are all unique and collectively do constitute something of a diplomatic model. Unfortunately, despite years - even decades -of promoting these concepts, they mainly fall on deaf ears abroad. Many countries do not wish to emulate and practice these concepts. The world is now more interested in what China does on the world stage, not what it says.

In sum, when considering these four factors, one must conclude that while there are some individual elements of China's development experience that are unique, they do not constitute a comprehensive and coherent "model"- nor are they easily transferred abroad. If anything, what is unique about China's model is that it flexibly adapts to elements imported from abroad and grafted on to domestic roots in all fields, producing a unique hybrid and eclectic system - this is China's real "model."

David Shambaugh is professor and director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University.

365) China's development model: book

China’s New Development Model
By Laurence Brahm
The Globalist, Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Globalist Bookshelf:
This is an excerpt from:
The Anti-Globalization Breakfast Club
By Laurence Brahm
John Wiley & Sons (2009)

Will this be China’s century — or the era of its collapse? Laurence Brahm describes how Beijing think tanks are working overtime to create a new kind of development model for China's overtaxed environment and social system. He explores the challenges in a conversation with Huang Ping, director-general of the American Studies Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Will this be China’s century — or the era of its collapse? Or will it be the era when China becomes a global threat?

Pessimists among certain Western think-tanks and academic institutions predict an imminent end to China’s mega-growth cycle.

Some Beijing think-tanks believe that the pressure is on to find a practical road forward — and not to get lost in the illusion that rapid GDP growth is sustainable.

These views may be extreme and represent protectionist fears expressed in wishful doomsday scenarios. Cold War thinking has resurfaced in theories and books.

The optimists, usually business analysts who point to another decade of sustained hyper-growth, counter these views.

China has always bent with the winds of change, they argue. So why should the future be any different? The truth and what transpires in the future may fall somewhere in between these two opposing views.

The “China threat” may not be in the form of military expansion or the flooding of world markets with cheap exports. It may instead take the form of environmental desecration, stimulating the acceleration of global warming that would indeed menace humanity. Or perhaps there will be a combination of all these factors in different degrees.

Another view emerging within some Beijing think-tanks is that the pressure is on to find a practical road forward and not to get lost in the illusion that the growth experienced in the past two decades is sustainable. But can China’s current leaders think outside the box and formulate new agendas to cope with the future?

Much of the work of coming up with new development blueprints and ideological platforms is being thrown to the Beijing think-tanks. They are talking about these issues openly — even in the local press — which has never before occurred.

Admittedly, even if a problem is not completely solvable, identifying and discussing it is a first step toward addressing it. At least it is better than smearing it over with dogma, as was done in the past.

The real problem probably lies in the excesses of privilege imbued with the Communist party, which has created an almost-surreal Orwellian- Dickensian system.

Huang Ping, director-general of the American Studies Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), noted that Beijing think-tanks are even going so far as to question “whether we have followed the Western model too closely without consciousness of its negative effects.”

Such think-tanks are challenging the consumption-driven, materialism-based model China has adopted and are instead calling for a new paradigm of development. But will they find them?

“China has enjoyed three decades of high economic growth by whatever indicator, and without domestic violence,” explained Huang Ping.

His argument glosses over the brutal crackdown against protests in 1989, and the fact that — despite the draconian police system — in recent years the number of violent demonstrations by farmers, factory workers and dissatisfied urbanites has been running as high as 80,000 incidents a year, often involving as many as 20,000 rioters.

Many of the protests have targeted government and police brutality, sometimes resulting in the burning of police cars and the destruction of government offices.

Huang Ping has an intimate knowledge of the Washington Consensus development models, since it has been his job to research them. Moreover, he is considered the nation’s leading specialist on social harmony. Unlike many other Chinese think-tank specialists, he dares to espouse new ideas that challenge head-on the past models that see GDP growth as a panacea.

"The Americanization of the world runs counter not only to China’s political and economic structure, but to its historic culture."

“Despite all of our problems, 200 million people have emerged into a new middle class, while another 300 million have been lifted out of poverty,” Huang noted. “What has happened is probably the world’s largest-scale development miracle since Britain’s Industrial Revolution.”

At the same time, Huang is aware of the problems that have accompanied that growth. “It has led to growing income gaps, social governance problems and environmental desecration as the costs of such development and transformation.”

Whether these costs are an acceptable tradeoff is currently the subject of intense debate among Chinese state officials and future planners.

“Globalization is a misnomer,” said Huang Ping. “All nations want globalization in technology trade. So, a better phrase would be ‘global integration of technology and science.’”

“But when this means the Americanization of the world, it runs counter not only to China’s political and economic structure, but to its historic culture and sociological structure as well.”

Huang noted that an “us-vs.-them, black-vs.-white” attitude was the main problem in Western thinking. In China, however, during the reform years of the 1990s, the curtain on ideology went down and a brief era of enormous flexibility prevailed. This happened under Deng’s notion that "it doesn’t matter if a cat is white or black as long as it catches mice” — in other words, whatever works economically is good.

Even if a problem is not completely solvable, identifying and discussing it is a first step. This is better than smearing it over with dogma, as was done in the past.

During this brief window of open thinking, an inherent flexibility in responding to changing conditions made it possible to fuse various approaches to economic development — capitalist and socialist, marker and planning — which has led to the country’s current economic boom and prosperity.

Now, despite this boom, China’s development model is being tested. For Beijing’s leaders during the 1990s, achieving a market economy was the overarching goal.

For its current leadership, the hypermarket economy poses new burdens: The country does not have the energy to support its own growth, the environment has been degraded and the social order has been frayed. As a consequence, Beijing’s economic think-tanks are asking if a better model can be developed.

Actually, the real problem probably lies in corruption and excesses of privilege imbued with the Communist party, which has created an almost-surreal Orwellian-Dickensian system. Culture and ethical values — the mainstays of Chinese society for two millennia — were bulldozed as infrastructure and property projects went ahead.

The antithesis of this can be seen in pockets of community rebuilding efforts among ethnic minorities and the rural poor, involving more than the usual infrastructure and road development.

Huang commented, “It involves trying to understand how people communicate and share values, cope with problems and identify issues of security and solidarity.”

China has always bent with the winds of change. So why should the future be any different?

Places such as Lijiang and Zhongdian, in Yunnan province, are going against the national development trend. Rather than emphasizing infrastructure and the growth of CDI, their long-term interest is the preservation of culture and the environment.

A new national ideology is necessary in order to plan for the next 20 years. Globalization, and models associated with it, is neither a goal nor a panacea where ideologies are concerned.

Neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism offer nothing of value to China or the developing world. At the same time, it isn’t practical to go back to Marxism, which China has already shed.

It is also unlikely that many other nations would embrace it. And Confucian thinking is one of the Chinese Communist Party’s biggest problems — the party is more a classical Confucian bureaucracy than an egalitarian body.

Read Part I here.