A futura primeira-dama do Japão nasceu em Shangai, mas foi durante a ocupação japonesa dessa grande cidade chinesa (em 1943). Cabe conhecê-la, em todo caso, o que fazemos por esta matéria do Figaro.
Japon : la nouvelle première dame «mange le soleil»
Alain Barluet
Le Figaro, 15/09/2009
PORTRAIT - Le cyclone Miyuki déferle sur le Japon. Ce prénom féminin ne désigne pas le dernier tsunami, mais la femme du nouveau premier ministre, qui prendra ses fonctions mardi. Son caractère excentrique défraie la chronique nippone.
C'est peu dire que dans un pays où la plupart des épouses, a fortiori celles des politiciens, ont une fonction essentiellement décorative, Miyuki Hatoyama ne répond pas aux canons traditionnels.
Son mari, Yukio, va prendre les rênes du gouvernement, après la victoire de son mouvement, le Parti démocrate du Japon (PDJ), aux élections législatives du 30 août. Un scrutin historique puisqu'il a mis un terme à la longue suprématie des conservateurs qui tiennent le pouvoir depuis l'après-guerre.
À 66 ans, la future première dame n'a pas attendu cette échéance inédite pour se faire connaître. Les téléspectateurs japonais connaissaient déjà cette ancienne actrice passionnée par l'art de vivre, une notion dont le public nippon, soucieux de s'extraire de la gangue du conformisme, est désormais si friand. On la voyait fréquemment sur le petit écran donner des conseils culinaires, vestimentaires ou de décoration. Car Miyuki Hatoyama se dit «compositrice de sa vie». Il semble bien, en tout cas, que son sourire, son charme et son caractère extraverti soient des atouts maîtres pour son chef de gouvernement de mari, à l'allure plutôt conventionnelle.
Prêtresse «new age»
Les lecteurs la connaissaient aussi pour ses livres de cuisine macrobiotiques, notamment ses fameuses Recettes de nourriture spirituelle hawaïenne. C'est précisément son engouement immodéré pour la spiritualité qui lui vaut aujourd'hui une notoriété portée au zénith. Il faut dire qu'en matière de «spiritualité», Miyuki Hatoyama ne fait pas dans la demi-mesure. Lorsque les micros se tendent, elle se mue en effet instantanément en prêtresse «new age», parlant de ses «voyages interplanétaires» et évoquant ses «petits déjeuners solaires» !
«Je mange le soleil», a-t-elle ainsi raconté récemment en levant les bras au ciel comme si elle voulait s'emparer d'un astre imaginaire pour le déguster. «Je mange le soleil, j'aime cela, miam, miam, miam… Cela me donne énormément d'énergie. Mon mari en prend aussi.» On comprend aisément qu'avec de tels propos, la mirobolante Mme Hatoyama a aussitôt mis les médias en transes. Bien plus que ne l'a fait son terne mari, dont les experts en communication se frottent aujourd'hui les mains.
Mais la presse à grand tirage et la télévision ne sont pas au bout de leurs surprises. Dans un de ses livres, intitulé Les choses très étranges que j'ai rencontrées, Miyuki Hatoyama explique comment une nuit, il y a vingt ans, elle a été enlevée par des extraterrestres voyageant à bord d'un vaisseau spatial triangulaire… «Tandis que mon corps dormait, mon âme a été propulsée sur Vénus », écrit-elle dans cet ouvrage publié l'an dernier, mais que les élections ont placé sous les feux de l'actualité. «C'est un endroit très beau, et très vert», précise-t-elle encore.
Ex-actrice et «rechargeuse de batteries»
Née à Shanghaï en 1943, à l'époque où l'armée impériale occupait la Chine, Miyuki Hatoyama a grandi dans la ville portuaire de Kobe, au centre de l'Archipel. Dans les années 1960, elle joue pendant six ans sur la scène du célèbre Théâtre Takarazuka, une sorte de revue kitsch très populaire au Japon, où tous les rôles sont interprétés par des femmes. Elle s'installe ensuite aux États-Unis avec son premier mari, un restaurateur japonais. C'est là qu'elle rencontre Yukio Hatoyama, héritier d'une riche lignée de politiciens, alors étudiant à l'université de Stanford. Ils se marient en 1975. Leur fils unique, Kiichiro, 33 ans, est ingénieur. Il travaille à Moscou comme chercheur. Curieusement, les médias ont surnommé le futur premier ministre l'«alien» ou encore l'«extraterrestre», pour ses airs las et déphasés de Buster Keaton nippon.
Miyuki a entrepris de le «relooker». Elle avait déjà la réputation de confectionner elle-même ses vêtements, notamment une jupe réalisée avec de la toile de jute provenant d'un sac de café. Désormais, elle a également pris en charge la garde-robe de son mari et serait à l'origine de sa coiffure bouffante dont elle s'occupe, paraît-il, tous les matins. «Mon mari est un homme ordinaire dans la vie de tous les jours», confiait-elle récemment en dévoilant la passion de son conjoint pour les films animaliers et les biscuits salés à la crevette. Elle affirme aussi qu'ils ne parlent jamais politique entre eux et qu'elle lui fait souvent un massage des pieds, après une journée éreintante. Le traitement est de toute évidence apprécié par l'intéressé, ce dernier n'étant pas avare de compliments. «Je me sens soulagé en rentrant à la maison, elle recharge mes batteries, c'est mon soleil», se félicitait récemment Yukio Hatoyama.
Elle estime avoir pu concrétiser tous ses rêves jusqu'à présent. «Les rêves deviennent réalité si vous y croyez vraiment», disait-elle, il y a peu, après avoir vu en songe qu'elle réaliserait un film à Hollywood. L'acteur principal ? Tom Cruise, qu'elle déclare avoir rencontré dans ses pérégrinations intergalactiques. «D'ailleurs, il était japonais dans une vie antérieure», précisait-elle tout à fait sérieusement. L'histoire ne dit pas s'ils se sont croisés lors d'une réunion de l'Église de scientologie…
Thursday, September 17, 2009
Wednesday, September 16, 2009
36) A China ja viu o futuro, com a Alemanha...
em termos de energia solar, mas com tecnologia americana...
Have a Nice Day
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
The New York Times, September 16, 2009
Applied Materials is one of the most important U.S. companies you’ve probably never heard of. It makes the machines that make the microchips that go inside your computer. The chip business, though, is volatile, so in 2004 Mike Splinter, Applied Materials’s C.E.O., decided to add a new business line to take advantage of the company’s nanotechnology capabilities — making the machines that make solar panels. The other day, Splinter gave me a tour of the company’s Silicon Valley facility, culminating with a visit to its “war room,” where Applied maintains a real-time global interaction with all 14 solar panel factories it’s built around the world in the last two years. I could only laugh because crying would have been too embarrassing.
Not a single one is in America.
Let’s see: five are in Germany, four are in China, one is in Spain, one is in India, one is in Italy, one is in Taiwan and one is even in Abu Dhabi. I suggested a new company motto for Applied Materials’s solar business: “Invented here, sold there.”
The reason that all these other countries are building solar-panel industries today is because most of their governments have put in place the three perquisites for growing a renewable energy industry: 1) any business or homeowner can generate solar energy; 2) if they decide to do so, the power utility has to connect them to the grid; and 3) the utility has to buy the power for a predictable period at a price that is a no-brainer good deal for the family or business putting the solar panels on their rooftop.
Regulatory, price and connectivity certainty, that is what Germany put in place, and that explains why Germany now generates almost half the solar power in the world today and, as a byproduct, is making itself the world-center for solar research, engineering, manufacturing and installation. With more than 50,000 new jobs, the renewable energy industry in Germany is now second only to its auto industry. One thing that has never existed in America — with our fragmented, stop-start solar subsidies — is certainty of price, connectivity and regulation on a national basis.
That is why, although consumer demand for solar power has incrementally increased here, it has not been enough for anyone to have Applied Materials — the world’s biggest solar equipment manufacturer — build them a new factory in America yet. So, right now, our federal and state subsidies for installing solar systems are largely paying for the cost of importing solar panels made in China, by Chinese workers, using hi-tech manufacturing equipment invented in America.
Have a nice day.
“About 95 percent of our solar business is outside the U.S.,” said Splinter. “Our biggest U.S. customer is a German-owned company in Oregon. We sell them pieces of equipment.”
If you read some of the anti-green commentary today, you’ll often see sneering references to “green jobs.” The phrase is usually in quotation marks as if it is some kind of liberal fantasy or closet welfare program (and as if coal, oil and nuclear don’t get all kinds of subsidies). Nonsense. In 2008, more silicon was consumed globally making solar panels than microchips, said Splinter.
“We are seeing the industrialization of the solar business,” he added. “In the last 12 months, it has brought us $1.3 billion in revenues. It is hard to build a billion-dollar business.”
Applied sells its solar-panel factories for $200 million each. Solar panels can be made from many different semiconductors, including thin film coated onto glass with nanotechnology and from crystalline silicon. At Applied, making these complex machines requires America’s best, high-paid talent — people who can work at the intersection of chemistry, physics and nanotechnology.
If we want to launch a solar industry here, big-time, we need to offer the kind of long-term certainty that Germany does or impose the national requirement on our utilities to generate solar power as China does or have the government build giant solar farms, the way it built the Hoover Dam, and sell the electricity.
O.K., so you don’t believe global warming is real. I do, but let’s assume it’s not. Here is what is indisputable: The world is on track to add another 2.5 billion people by 2050, and many will be aspiring to live American-like, high-energy lifestyles. In such a world, renewable energy — where the variable cost of your fuel, sun or wind, is zero — will be in huge demand.
China now understands that. It no longer believes it can pollute its way to prosperity because it would choke to death. That is the most important shift in the world in the last 18 months. China has decided that clean-tech is going to be the next great global industry and is now creating a massive domestic market for solar and wind, which will give it a great export platform.
In October, Applied will be opening the world’s largest solar research center — in Xian, China. Gotta go where the customers are. So, if you like importing oil from Saudi Arabia, you’re going to love importing solar panels from China.
Have a Nice Day
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
The New York Times, September 16, 2009
Applied Materials is one of the most important U.S. companies you’ve probably never heard of. It makes the machines that make the microchips that go inside your computer. The chip business, though, is volatile, so in 2004 Mike Splinter, Applied Materials’s C.E.O., decided to add a new business line to take advantage of the company’s nanotechnology capabilities — making the machines that make solar panels. The other day, Splinter gave me a tour of the company’s Silicon Valley facility, culminating with a visit to its “war room,” where Applied maintains a real-time global interaction with all 14 solar panel factories it’s built around the world in the last two years. I could only laugh because crying would have been too embarrassing.
Not a single one is in America.
Let’s see: five are in Germany, four are in China, one is in Spain, one is in India, one is in Italy, one is in Taiwan and one is even in Abu Dhabi. I suggested a new company motto for Applied Materials’s solar business: “Invented here, sold there.”
The reason that all these other countries are building solar-panel industries today is because most of their governments have put in place the three perquisites for growing a renewable energy industry: 1) any business or homeowner can generate solar energy; 2) if they decide to do so, the power utility has to connect them to the grid; and 3) the utility has to buy the power for a predictable period at a price that is a no-brainer good deal for the family or business putting the solar panels on their rooftop.
Regulatory, price and connectivity certainty, that is what Germany put in place, and that explains why Germany now generates almost half the solar power in the world today and, as a byproduct, is making itself the world-center for solar research, engineering, manufacturing and installation. With more than 50,000 new jobs, the renewable energy industry in Germany is now second only to its auto industry. One thing that has never existed in America — with our fragmented, stop-start solar subsidies — is certainty of price, connectivity and regulation on a national basis.
That is why, although consumer demand for solar power has incrementally increased here, it has not been enough for anyone to have Applied Materials — the world’s biggest solar equipment manufacturer — build them a new factory in America yet. So, right now, our federal and state subsidies for installing solar systems are largely paying for the cost of importing solar panels made in China, by Chinese workers, using hi-tech manufacturing equipment invented in America.
Have a nice day.
“About 95 percent of our solar business is outside the U.S.,” said Splinter. “Our biggest U.S. customer is a German-owned company in Oregon. We sell them pieces of equipment.”
If you read some of the anti-green commentary today, you’ll often see sneering references to “green jobs.” The phrase is usually in quotation marks as if it is some kind of liberal fantasy or closet welfare program (and as if coal, oil and nuclear don’t get all kinds of subsidies). Nonsense. In 2008, more silicon was consumed globally making solar panels than microchips, said Splinter.
“We are seeing the industrialization of the solar business,” he added. “In the last 12 months, it has brought us $1.3 billion in revenues. It is hard to build a billion-dollar business.”
Applied sells its solar-panel factories for $200 million each. Solar panels can be made from many different semiconductors, including thin film coated onto glass with nanotechnology and from crystalline silicon. At Applied, making these complex machines requires America’s best, high-paid talent — people who can work at the intersection of chemistry, physics and nanotechnology.
If we want to launch a solar industry here, big-time, we need to offer the kind of long-term certainty that Germany does or impose the national requirement on our utilities to generate solar power as China does or have the government build giant solar farms, the way it built the Hoover Dam, and sell the electricity.
O.K., so you don’t believe global warming is real. I do, but let’s assume it’s not. Here is what is indisputable: The world is on track to add another 2.5 billion people by 2050, and many will be aspiring to live American-like, high-energy lifestyles. In such a world, renewable energy — where the variable cost of your fuel, sun or wind, is zero — will be in huge demand.
China now understands that. It no longer believes it can pollute its way to prosperity because it would choke to death. That is the most important shift in the world in the last 18 months. China has decided that clean-tech is going to be the next great global industry and is now creating a massive domestic market for solar and wind, which will give it a great export platform.
In October, Applied will be opening the world’s largest solar research center — in Xian, China. Gotta go where the customers are. So, if you like importing oil from Saudi Arabia, you’re going to love importing solar panels from China.
Monday, September 14, 2009
35) China: crescimento a 8% em 2009
Economia da China deve crescer 8% neste ano
Números relativos ao mês de agosto divulgados na sexta-feira pelo Departamento Nacional de Estatísticas da China sugerem que o pais vai conseguir atingir a meta de crescimento de 8% do PIB (Produto Interno Bruto) prevista para este ano.
O objetivo estabelecido pelo Partido Comunista é importante para que o nível de desemprego no país não atinja mais de 4,5% da população de 1,3 bilhão de pessoas. Em agosto o crescimento de 12,3% da produção industrial e o aumento no volume de investimento e consumo alimentaram as esperanças da China de conseguir atingir o número critico de 9 milhões de novos postos de trabalho criados neste ano. Um indicador de reaquecimento econômico, o nível de investimento em ativos subiu 33% entre janeiro e agosto, totalizando US$1,65 trilhões.
Números relativos ao mês de agosto divulgados na sexta-feira pelo Departamento Nacional de Estatísticas da China sugerem que o pais vai conseguir atingir a meta de crescimento de 8% do PIB (Produto Interno Bruto) prevista para este ano.
O objetivo estabelecido pelo Partido Comunista é importante para que o nível de desemprego no país não atinja mais de 4,5% da população de 1,3 bilhão de pessoas. Em agosto o crescimento de 12,3% da produção industrial e o aumento no volume de investimento e consumo alimentaram as esperanças da China de conseguir atingir o número critico de 9 milhões de novos postos de trabalho criados neste ano. Um indicador de reaquecimento econômico, o nível de investimento em ativos subiu 33% entre janeiro e agosto, totalizando US$1,65 trilhões.
34) China fights back, on the same token
In connection with my post 32, below...
China Moves to Retaliate Against U.S. Tire Tariff
By KEITH BRADSHER
The New York Times, September 13, 2009
HONG KONG — China unexpectedly increased pressure Sunday on the United States in a widening trade dispute, taking the first steps toward imposing tariffs on American exports of automotive products and chicken meat in retaliation for President Obama’s decision late Friday to levy tariffs on tires from China.
China may move against new U.S. tariffs on tires with duties on chickens and car parts.
The Chinese government’s strong countermove followed a weekend of nationalistic vitriol against the United States on Chinese Web sites in response to the tire tariff. “The U.S. is shameless!” said one posting, while another called on the Chinese government to sell all of its huge holdings of Treasury bonds.
The impact of the dispute extends well beyond tires, chickens and cars. Both governments are facing domestic pressure to take a tougher stand against the other on economic issues. But the trade battle increases political tensions between the two nations even as they try to work together to revive the global economy and combat mutual security threats, like the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea.
Mr. Obama’s decision to impose a tariff of up to 35 percent on Chinese tires is a signal that he plans to deliver on his promise to labor unions that he would more strictly enforce trade laws, especially against China, which has become the world’s factory while the United States has lost millions of manufacturing jobs. The trade deficit with China was a record $268 billion in 2008.
China had initially issued a fairly formulaic criticism of the tire dispute Saturday. But rising nationalism in China is making it harder for Chinese officials to gloss over American criticism.
“All kinds of policymaking, not just trade policy, is increasingly reactive to Internet opinion,” said Victor Shih, a Northwestern University specialist in economic policy formulation.
Eswar Prasad, a former China division chief at the International Monetary Fund, said that rising trade tensions between the United States and China could become hard to control. They could cloud the Group of 20 meeting of leaders of industrialized and fast-growing emerging nations in Pittsburgh on Sept. 24 and 25, and perhaps affect Mr. Obama’s visit to Beijing in November.
“This spat about tires and chickens could turn ugly very quickly,” Mr. Prasad said.
China exported $1.3 billion in tires to the United States in the first seven months of 2009, while the United States shipped about $800 million in automotive products and $376 million in chicken meat to China, according to data from Global Trade Information Services in Columbia, S.C.
For many years, American politicians have been able to take credit domestically for standing up to China by taking largely symbolic measures against Chinese exports in narrowly defined categories. In the last five years, the Commerce Department has restricted Chinese imports of goods as diverse as bras and oil well equipment.
For the most part, Chinese officials have grumbled but done little, preferring to preserve a trade relationship in which the United States buys $4.46 worth of Chinese goods for every $1 worth of American goods sold to China.
Now, the delicate equilibrium is being disturbed.
China’s commerce ministry announced Sunday that it would investigate “certain imported automotive products and certain imported chicken meat products originating from the United States” to determine if they were being subsidized or “dumped” below cost in the Chinese market. A finding of subsidies or dumping would allow China to impose tariffs on these imports.
The ministry did not mention the tire dispute in its announcement, portraying the investigations as “based on the laws of our country and on World Trade Organization rules.”
But the timing of the announcement — on a weekend and just after the tire decision in Washington — sent an unmistakable message of retaliation. The official Xinhua news agency Web site prominently linked its reports on the tire dispute and the Chinese investigations.
The commerce ministry statement, posted on its Web site, also hinted obliquely at the harm that a trade war could do while Western nations and Japan struggle to emerge from a severe economic downturn. “China is willing to continue efforts with various countries to make sure that the world economy recovers as quickly as possible,” the statement said.
The Chinese government sometimes organizes blog postings to defend its own policies. But some postings on the tire decision have been implicitly critical of the Chinese government, making it unlikely that they are part of an orchestrated effort.
“Why did our government purchase so much U.S. government debt?” said one posting signed by a “Group of Angry Youths.” It continued, “We should get rid of all such U.S. investments.”
China has accumulated $2 trillion in foreign reserves, mostly in Treasury bonds and other dollar-denominated assets, and held down the value of its currency, which has kept Chinese goods quite inexpensive in foreign markets. China’s exports have soared — China surpassed Germany in the first half of this year as the world’s largest exporter — while China’s imports have lagged, except for commodities like iron ore and oil that China lacks.
Worries that China might sell Treasury bonds — or even slow down its purchases of them — have been a concern for the Bush and Obama administrations as they have tried to figure out how to address China’s trade and currency policies.
At the same time, the Chinese economy relies heavily on exports to the United States, while the American economy is much less dependent on exports in the other direction. Exports to the United States, at 6 percent of China’s entire economic output, account for 13 times as large a share of the Chinese economy as exports to China represent for the United States economy.
Carol J. Guthrie, a spokeswoman for the Office of the United States trade representative, said that the United States wanted to avoid disputes with China and continue talks, but would look at any Chinese trade decisions for whether they comply with W.T.O. rules.
Products involved in trade disputes between the United States and China together make up only a minuscule sliver of the two countries’ trade relationship.
The bigger risk for China, economists and corporate executives have periodically warned, is that trade frictions could cause multinationals to rethink their heavy reliance on Chinese factories in their supply chains. The Chinese targeting of autos and chickens affects two industries that may have the political muscle in the United States to dissuade the Obama administration from aggressively challenging China’s policies.
General Motors sees much of its growth coming from its China subsidiary, the second-largest auto company in China after Volkswagen. And the farm lobby in the United States has long pressed for maximum access to a market of 1.3 billion mouths.
But spotlighting automotive trade may be risky for China. G.M. and Ford both rely mostly on local production to supply the Chinese market, while China is rapidly increasing auto parts shipments to the United States.
33) Ingresso da China no BID
Ingresso da China no BID anima países da AL
Cláudia Trevisan, DALIAN, CHINA
11.09.2009
Países da América Latina esperam que a entrada da China no Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento (BID) leve ao aumento dos investimentos do país em infraestrutura e atividades produtivas na região.
Além disso, pode facilitar a interação entre países latino-americanos e empresas chinesas e dar um caráter institucional aos projetos que contarem com sua chancela, avaliaram participantes do painel sobre as relações entre a América Latina e a China, ontem, no encontro do Fórum Econômico Mundial na cidade chinesa de Dalian.
"A China vê a América Latina como um grande mercado potencial e nós precisamos transformar nossa relação, hoje basicamente comercial, em uma relação mais profunda, que também envolva investimentos", disse o brasileiro Rodrigo Maciel, secretário executivo do Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China.
A China entrou no BID no início de 2009, depois de anos de negociação, e passou a ser o 48º integrante da instituição. O Banco de Desenvolvimento da China e o China Eximbank já fecharam acordos com o BID para participar do financiamento de projetos na região.
Bernardo Guillamon, diretor de Parcerias do BID, disse que a expectativa é que pelo menos dois projetos saiam do papel este ano, o que abriria o caminho para a mais rápida aprovação dos investimentos no futuro.
O ministro do Comércio, Indústria e Turismo da Colômbia, Luis Guillermo Plata, ressaltou ser difícil fazer um diagnóstico único para o relacionamento dos países latino-americanos com a China e preferiu dividi-los em dois grupos: os que têm superávit com o país asiático por exportarem commodities e os que têm déficit em razão da importação de produtos acabados, no qual está a Colômbia.
O único país da região que foge desse padrão é a Costa Rica, que conseguiu ter superávit no comércio com a China por meio da exportação de produtos de alto valor agregado, como chips e componentes eletrônicos.
A Costa Rica sente-se tão confortável em seu relacionamento com a China que negocia a assinatura de um acordo de livre comércio com o país, que deverá estar concluído no início de 2010. "Cerca de 80% de nossas exportações para a China são de bens de alta tecnologia", disse Marco Vinicio Ruiz, ministro de Comércio Exterior da Costa Rica.
Cláudia Trevisan, DALIAN, CHINA
11.09.2009
Países da América Latina esperam que a entrada da China no Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento (BID) leve ao aumento dos investimentos do país em infraestrutura e atividades produtivas na região.
Além disso, pode facilitar a interação entre países latino-americanos e empresas chinesas e dar um caráter institucional aos projetos que contarem com sua chancela, avaliaram participantes do painel sobre as relações entre a América Latina e a China, ontem, no encontro do Fórum Econômico Mundial na cidade chinesa de Dalian.
"A China vê a América Latina como um grande mercado potencial e nós precisamos transformar nossa relação, hoje basicamente comercial, em uma relação mais profunda, que também envolva investimentos", disse o brasileiro Rodrigo Maciel, secretário executivo do Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China.
A China entrou no BID no início de 2009, depois de anos de negociação, e passou a ser o 48º integrante da instituição. O Banco de Desenvolvimento da China e o China Eximbank já fecharam acordos com o BID para participar do financiamento de projetos na região.
Bernardo Guillamon, diretor de Parcerias do BID, disse que a expectativa é que pelo menos dois projetos saiam do papel este ano, o que abriria o caminho para a mais rápida aprovação dos investimentos no futuro.
O ministro do Comércio, Indústria e Turismo da Colômbia, Luis Guillermo Plata, ressaltou ser difícil fazer um diagnóstico único para o relacionamento dos países latino-americanos com a China e preferiu dividi-los em dois grupos: os que têm superávit com o país asiático por exportarem commodities e os que têm déficit em razão da importação de produtos acabados, no qual está a Colômbia.
O único país da região que foge desse padrão é a Costa Rica, que conseguiu ter superávit no comércio com a China por meio da exportação de produtos de alto valor agregado, como chips e componentes eletrônicos.
A Costa Rica sente-se tão confortável em seu relacionamento com a China que negocia a assinatura de um acordo de livre comércio com o país, que deverá estar concluído no início de 2010. "Cerca de 80% de nossas exportações para a China são de bens de alta tecnologia", disse Marco Vinicio Ruiz, ministro de Comércio Exterior da Costa Rica.
Sunday, September 13, 2009
32) China fights back: against US protectionism
Protectionism should be opposed, and in this case China is right...
Anyway, US should not be producing tires, anymore: its duty is to produce new ideas for tires, just that, and give the "right" to manufacturate tires to other countries, which cannot (yet) conceive new ways to make them, new forms to produce in a wise way...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
China May Appeal Tire Tariff to WTO
Bloomberg News
Sunday, September 13, 2009
China "strongly opposes" President Obama's decision to impose tariffs on tire imports from the country and may refer the case to the World Trade Organization, its Ministry of Commerce said.
The United States had violated rules of the WTO and the tariff is a breach of the commitments made by the nation at Group of 20 summits, the ministry said in a statement posted on its Web site, citing spokesman Yao Jian.
The move will harm both countries' interests and will produce a chain reaction of trade protectionism, slowing world economic recovery, the ministry said.
The decision is intended to bolster the faltering U.S. tire industry, in which more than 5,000 jobs have been lost over the past five years as the volume of Chinese tires in the market has tripled.
The U.S. government placed tariffs on tire imports from China, backing a United Steelworkers union complaint against the nation's second-largest trading partner, according to a White House statement. The tariffs will amount to 35 percent the first year, 30 percent the second and 25 percent the third.
The U.S. duties on Chinese tires are not expected to spark a trade war, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said to reporters in Minneapolis, where Obama is trying to drum up support for his health-care reform efforts.
"For trade to work for everybody, it has to be based on fairness and rules," Gibbs said. "We're simply enforcing those rules and would expect the Chinese to understand those rules."
The case brought by the United Steelworkers is the largest safeguard petition filed to protect U.S. producers from increasing imports from China.
"It is an abuse of the trade remedy measures and made an extremely bad start against the backdrop of global financial crisis," China's statement said. China will reserve "all legitimate rights, including referring the case to the WTO."
The decision is a blow to Chinese producers such as GITI Tire, the country's largest tiremaker, as well as U.S. retailers of low-cost imports.
"By taking this unprecedented action, the Obama administration is now at odds with its own public statements about refraining from increasing tariffs," said Vic DeIorio, executive vice president of GITI Tire in the United States. "This decision will cost many more American jobs than it will create."
Obama's decision signals a marked shift from the policy of the Bush administration, which had rejected taking action in four similar cases it reviewed.
Anyway, US should not be producing tires, anymore: its duty is to produce new ideas for tires, just that, and give the "right" to manufacturate tires to other countries, which cannot (yet) conceive new ways to make them, new forms to produce in a wise way...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
China May Appeal Tire Tariff to WTO
Bloomberg News
Sunday, September 13, 2009
China "strongly opposes" President Obama's decision to impose tariffs on tire imports from the country and may refer the case to the World Trade Organization, its Ministry of Commerce said.
The United States had violated rules of the WTO and the tariff is a breach of the commitments made by the nation at Group of 20 summits, the ministry said in a statement posted on its Web site, citing spokesman Yao Jian.
The move will harm both countries' interests and will produce a chain reaction of trade protectionism, slowing world economic recovery, the ministry said.
The decision is intended to bolster the faltering U.S. tire industry, in which more than 5,000 jobs have been lost over the past five years as the volume of Chinese tires in the market has tripled.
The U.S. government placed tariffs on tire imports from China, backing a United Steelworkers union complaint against the nation's second-largest trading partner, according to a White House statement. The tariffs will amount to 35 percent the first year, 30 percent the second and 25 percent the third.
The U.S. duties on Chinese tires are not expected to spark a trade war, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said to reporters in Minneapolis, where Obama is trying to drum up support for his health-care reform efforts.
"For trade to work for everybody, it has to be based on fairness and rules," Gibbs said. "We're simply enforcing those rules and would expect the Chinese to understand those rules."
The case brought by the United Steelworkers is the largest safeguard petition filed to protect U.S. producers from increasing imports from China.
"It is an abuse of the trade remedy measures and made an extremely bad start against the backdrop of global financial crisis," China's statement said. China will reserve "all legitimate rights, including referring the case to the WTO."
The decision is a blow to Chinese producers such as GITI Tire, the country's largest tiremaker, as well as U.S. retailers of low-cost imports.
"By taking this unprecedented action, the Obama administration is now at odds with its own public statements about refraining from increasing tariffs," said Vic DeIorio, executive vice president of GITI Tire in the United States. "This decision will cost many more American jobs than it will create."
Obama's decision signals a marked shift from the policy of the Bush administration, which had rejected taking action in four similar cases it reviewed.
Thursday, September 10, 2009
31) Strategic Dialogue China-USA: testimony Fred Bergsten
Testimony
The United States–China Economic Relationship and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue
C. Fred Bergsten
Institute for International Economics, September 10, 2009
C. Fred Bergsten testifies before the US House of Representatives that there is now substantial evidence that the initial Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), building on other United States–China contacts and its own predecessor forums, has made an important contribution toward progress on two international economic issues: the current economic crisis and global warming. The S&ED is also helping to create an informal G-2 joint leadership of the world economy that can supplement, not supplant, existing steering committees, including the G-7/8 and the G-20, and the major multilateral institutions (notably the IMF and WTO).
There is less indication that the two countries have been able to use the S&ED to date to address their concerns regarding other systemic issues such as the stability of the dollar, possible restrictions on China's future direct investments in the United States, and Chinese currency intervention. Other important opportunities for G-2 leadership include stronger IMF surveillance of national economic policies, reform of the governance of the international financial institutions, and preserving an open global trading system.
Hence the new S&ED has both a positive record of achievement and a rich agenda for future action at both the broad conceptual and practical policy levels. The two governments should continue, broaden and deepen the approach, and the Congress should continue to monitor the process to make sure that it realizes its full potential.
>> Read full testimony
Also, this link.
The United States–China Economic Relationship and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue
C. Fred Bergsten
Institute for International Economics, September 10, 2009
C. Fred Bergsten testifies before the US House of Representatives that there is now substantial evidence that the initial Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), building on other United States–China contacts and its own predecessor forums, has made an important contribution toward progress on two international economic issues: the current economic crisis and global warming. The S&ED is also helping to create an informal G-2 joint leadership of the world economy that can supplement, not supplant, existing steering committees, including the G-7/8 and the G-20, and the major multilateral institutions (notably the IMF and WTO).
There is less indication that the two countries have been able to use the S&ED to date to address their concerns regarding other systemic issues such as the stability of the dollar, possible restrictions on China's future direct investments in the United States, and Chinese currency intervention. Other important opportunities for G-2 leadership include stronger IMF surveillance of national economic policies, reform of the governance of the international financial institutions, and preserving an open global trading system.
Hence the new S&ED has both a positive record of achievement and a rich agenda for future action at both the broad conceptual and practical policy levels. The two governments should continue, broaden and deepen the approach, and the Congress should continue to monitor the process to make sure that it realizes its full potential.
>> Read full testimony
Also, this link.
30) China: WTO troubles about precious metals
Uma nota em conexão com o post anterior:
Reclamação dos EUA e da UE contra a China na OMC
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Professor de Economia Política, Diplomata de carreira
(Observações em caráter pessoal; 31.07.2009)
(A) Chamada informativa:
EUA e UE processaram a China na OMC, por restrições de exportação de matérias primas - em 23/junho/2009.
“Restrições a exportações impostas pela China a cerca de 20 matérias primas industriais, entre elas: terras raras, tungstênio, zinco, bauxita refratária, magnésio; sendo que em algumas delas responde por 80% da produção mundial.
Após 12 meses de negociação EUA e UE não conseguiram convencer a China a reduzir tarifas de exportação e ampliar as cotas para exportações.
Os EUA e UE, dizem que a China tem implementado cotas de exportações injustas e impostos sobre matérias primas que estão distorcendo o mercado mundial em especial do aço, semicondutores e para aeronaves, violando assim seus compromissos como membro da OMC.”
(B) Enquadramento formal:
No dia 23 de junho de 2009, EUA e UE, duas partes contratantes ao GATT e membros da OMC ingressaram (por meio dos documentos G/L/888; WT/DS394/1 e G/L/889; WT/DS395/1) demandas de consultas “contra” a China, ao abrigo do mecanismo de solução de controvérsias, que regula os procedimentos aplicáveis a toda e qualquer disputa comercial entre seus membros, cuja cobertura se faça por algum instrumento administrado pela OMC.
As petições, absolutamente idênticas (o que revela coordenação prévia) foram motivadas pelas restrições governamentais às exportações chinesas de uma série de produtos por ela produzidos e normalmente exportados (bauxita, carvão, magnésio, manganês, fósforo, zinco e outros).
Ambas enquadram as práticas chinesas nos seguintes dispositivos legais: Artigos VIII, X, e XI do GATT 1994 e parágrafos 5.1, 5.2, 8.2, e 11.3 da Parte I do Protocolo de Acesso da China ao GATT, datado de 2001.
(C) Explicações quanto ao caso:
Os fundamentos econômicos da iniciativa americano-européia são basicamente de ordem comercial, ao se sentirem empresas desses dois membros da OMC prejudicadas pelas medidas restritivas adotadas pelo governo chinês em defesa do seu mercado interno e de suas empresas nacionais. As medidas chinesas, ao restringirem (por limitações quantitativas) as exportações desses bens, ou ao cobrarem taxas discriminatórias contra a exportação, distorcem as condições de mercado (notadamente pelo encarecimento dos preços mundiais) e introduzem discriminação contra parceiros do GATT.
O enquadramento legal está configurada nos seguintes dispositivos:
1. Artigo VIII do GATT-1994: Taxas e formalidades aplicadas a importações e exportação.
Esse artigo basicamente diz que as partes contratantes ao GATT se eximirão de introduzir taxas e encargos de qualquer natureza (à exceção dos impostos alfandegários já previstos e cobertos pelo Artigo III) que não aqueles determinados por custos efetivos dos serviços e de nenhuma maneira podendo representar uma proteção indireta aos produtos nacionais ou uma imposição para fins fiscais apenas.
2. Artigo X: Publicação e Administração das regras comerciais.
Trata-se, essencialmente, da publicidade em torno de toda e qualquer medida afetando o comércio exterior, o que nem sempre parece ser o caso na China.
3. Artigo XI: Eliminação geral das restrições quantitativas.
O GATT proíbe quaisquer proibições ou restrições, a não ser as tarifas, seja que essas medidas sejam feitas por quotas, licenças de importação e de exportação, aplicadas aos produtos vendidos a ou comprados de qualquer outra parte contratante. Existem exceções para emergências temporárias, carência aguda de produtos essenciais, como produtos agrícolas, por exemplo. Medidas adotadas a esse efeito devem ser anunciadas, temporárias, com prazos determinados, e de toda forma, de maneira não discriminatória.
4. Parágrafos 5.1 e 5.2 do Protocolo de Acesso da China ao GATT.
Trata do compromisso da China de liberalizar gradativamente o seu comércio exterior (após 3 anos), concedendo-se às empresas chinesas total liberdade para transacionarem em todos os mercados (com algumas exceções claramente listadas). Deverá ser aplicado o tratamento nacional, ou seja, não pode haver discriminação entre empresas nacionais e estrangeiras.
5. Parágrafos 8.2 e 11.3 do Protocolo de Acesso da China ao GATT.
As licenças de importação e de exportação previstas e autorizadas não podem ser discriminatórias contra parceiros estrangeiros. A China tinha se comprometido a eliminar todas as taxas e licenças de exportação, de acordo com o Artigo VIII do GATT.
(D) Possível evolução do caso:
Se as consultas (as quais estão abertas a outras partes interessadas que se manifestaram explicitamente) não lograrem resultados satisfatórios, EUA e UE poderão, se assim julgarem necessário ou desejável, abrir uma reclamação formal contra a China, pelo chamado sistema de solução de controvérsias em sua modalidade arbitral (mas obrigatória). Vários meses poderão decorrer até uma solução final, que pode ir até o órgão de apelação.
-----------------------------------
Brasília, 31 de julho de 2009
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Reclamação dos EUA e da UE contra a China na OMC
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Professor de Economia Política, Diplomata de carreira
(Observações em caráter pessoal; 31.07.2009)
(A) Chamada informativa:
EUA e UE processaram a China na OMC, por restrições de exportação de matérias primas - em 23/junho/2009.
“Restrições a exportações impostas pela China a cerca de 20 matérias primas industriais, entre elas: terras raras, tungstênio, zinco, bauxita refratária, magnésio; sendo que em algumas delas responde por 80% da produção mundial.
Após 12 meses de negociação EUA e UE não conseguiram convencer a China a reduzir tarifas de exportação e ampliar as cotas para exportações.
Os EUA e UE, dizem que a China tem implementado cotas de exportações injustas e impostos sobre matérias primas que estão distorcendo o mercado mundial em especial do aço, semicondutores e para aeronaves, violando assim seus compromissos como membro da OMC.”
(B) Enquadramento formal:
No dia 23 de junho de 2009, EUA e UE, duas partes contratantes ao GATT e membros da OMC ingressaram (por meio dos documentos G/L/888; WT/DS394/1 e G/L/889; WT/DS395/1) demandas de consultas “contra” a China, ao abrigo do mecanismo de solução de controvérsias, que regula os procedimentos aplicáveis a toda e qualquer disputa comercial entre seus membros, cuja cobertura se faça por algum instrumento administrado pela OMC.
As petições, absolutamente idênticas (o que revela coordenação prévia) foram motivadas pelas restrições governamentais às exportações chinesas de uma série de produtos por ela produzidos e normalmente exportados (bauxita, carvão, magnésio, manganês, fósforo, zinco e outros).
Ambas enquadram as práticas chinesas nos seguintes dispositivos legais: Artigos VIII, X, e XI do GATT 1994 e parágrafos 5.1, 5.2, 8.2, e 11.3 da Parte I do Protocolo de Acesso da China ao GATT, datado de 2001.
(C) Explicações quanto ao caso:
Os fundamentos econômicos da iniciativa americano-européia são basicamente de ordem comercial, ao se sentirem empresas desses dois membros da OMC prejudicadas pelas medidas restritivas adotadas pelo governo chinês em defesa do seu mercado interno e de suas empresas nacionais. As medidas chinesas, ao restringirem (por limitações quantitativas) as exportações desses bens, ou ao cobrarem taxas discriminatórias contra a exportação, distorcem as condições de mercado (notadamente pelo encarecimento dos preços mundiais) e introduzem discriminação contra parceiros do GATT.
O enquadramento legal está configurada nos seguintes dispositivos:
1. Artigo VIII do GATT-1994: Taxas e formalidades aplicadas a importações e exportação.
Esse artigo basicamente diz que as partes contratantes ao GATT se eximirão de introduzir taxas e encargos de qualquer natureza (à exceção dos impostos alfandegários já previstos e cobertos pelo Artigo III) que não aqueles determinados por custos efetivos dos serviços e de nenhuma maneira podendo representar uma proteção indireta aos produtos nacionais ou uma imposição para fins fiscais apenas.
2. Artigo X: Publicação e Administração das regras comerciais.
Trata-se, essencialmente, da publicidade em torno de toda e qualquer medida afetando o comércio exterior, o que nem sempre parece ser o caso na China.
3. Artigo XI: Eliminação geral das restrições quantitativas.
O GATT proíbe quaisquer proibições ou restrições, a não ser as tarifas, seja que essas medidas sejam feitas por quotas, licenças de importação e de exportação, aplicadas aos produtos vendidos a ou comprados de qualquer outra parte contratante. Existem exceções para emergências temporárias, carência aguda de produtos essenciais, como produtos agrícolas, por exemplo. Medidas adotadas a esse efeito devem ser anunciadas, temporárias, com prazos determinados, e de toda forma, de maneira não discriminatória.
4. Parágrafos 5.1 e 5.2 do Protocolo de Acesso da China ao GATT.
Trata do compromisso da China de liberalizar gradativamente o seu comércio exterior (após 3 anos), concedendo-se às empresas chinesas total liberdade para transacionarem em todos os mercados (com algumas exceções claramente listadas). Deverá ser aplicado o tratamento nacional, ou seja, não pode haver discriminação entre empresas nacionais e estrangeiras.
5. Parágrafos 8.2 e 11.3 do Protocolo de Acesso da China ao GATT.
As licenças de importação e de exportação previstas e autorizadas não podem ser discriminatórias contra parceiros estrangeiros. A China tinha se comprometido a eliminar todas as taxas e licenças de exportação, de acordo com o Artigo VIII do GATT.
(D) Possível evolução do caso:
Se as consultas (as quais estão abertas a outras partes interessadas que se manifestaram explicitamente) não lograrem resultados satisfatórios, EUA e UE poderão, se assim julgarem necessário ou desejável, abrir uma reclamação formal contra a China, pelo chamado sistema de solução de controvérsias em sua modalidade arbitral (mas obrigatória). Vários meses poderão decorrer até uma solução final, que pode ir até o órgão de apelação.
-----------------------------------
Brasília, 31 de julho de 2009
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
29) China as a restrictive trading partner
China's Ring of Power
John Lee
Foreign Policy, September 9, 2009
While nobody was paying attention, Beijing was busy cornering the market on a little-known, but much coveted, strategic commodity.
What's green, greatly coveted, and offers extraordinary power to he who possesses it? For comic-book fans, the answer is the power ring wielded by the enigmatic Green Lantern, one of the most popular superheroes ever created by DC Comics. In the real world, the answer is not too dissimilar: It's "green" lanthanide, a blanket term for more than a dozen "rare earth metals" that are used in a range of increasingly important defense and technology applications.
There's just one thing: China caught on to green lanthanide's strategic value early and has been cornering the market ever since. The country now controls more than 95 percent of the world's supply. From the comic-book analogy, one might infer what this means.
These metals, today used in commercial products such as mobile phones and iPods, will increase in value over the coming years, as they are essential in a range of energy-efficient applications from hybrid cars to wind turbines. Lanthanide is essential to radar systems and lasers required in weapons such as America's awesome arsenal of "smart bombs" and other precision-guided explosives.
Although rare earth metals can be found in many countries, few governments or corporations had the foresight to invest and develop lanthanide mines. The United States, for example, has some reserves, but the U.S. government and private corporations depend heavily on existing stockpiles and on imports. Mining of rare earth metals in the United States is rare. Reviving defunct mines and developing sites for new ones will take considerable time -- up to a decade -- and even more money. Currently, the United States imports 87 percent of its lanthanide from China. The rest comes mostly from France, Japan, and Russia.
China's approach to lanthanide couldn't be more different. Fifteen years ago, it set out on a deliberate plan to capture the rare-earth-metals market. Beijing offered cheap loans to Chinese state-owned enterprises to develop lanthanide-rich sites and mine these metals. Thanks to cheap labor costs, poor environmental obligations, and shoddy cleanup standards, Chinese mines have been able to produce rare earth metals at much cheaper prices than foreign competitors -- in the process forcing many of these competitors out of the market. Yet even while squeezing its competitors' margins, Beijing has gradually cut export quotas of lanthanide to regional "strategic competitors" (such as Japan) by 6 percent each year over the past decade. In 2009, China will only sell 38,000 metric tons to Japan -- the same amount that Japanese giants Toyota and Honda consumed in all of 2008.
The stakes have been raised even higher recently. To further enhance its global dominance in this market and build further strategic leverage, China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released a white paper proposing to severely slash exports of the rare earth metals -- or even halt them altogether.
The white paper is not only bad news, but it's very bad timing. The news comes just as the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board is debating whether to allow a Chinese state-owned company, China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining, to buy a 51 percent stake in Lynas, one of the handful of Australian companies involved in rare-earth-metals mining. The deal conjures the recent memory of Chinalco's failed bid for an increased stake in British-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto, in which Rio Tinto walked away after the Chinese insisted on one or two seats on the company's board. Yet again, China's moves toward market control could not be more explicit.
Not surprisingly, the white paper -- together with ample evidence that China is not afraid to hoard its lanthanide -- has sparked a panicked rush to buy undeveloped and poorly developed rare-earth-metals mines in Russia, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Botswana, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Japan has already admitted that about one-fifth of its imported lanthanide enters the country as part of a sophisticated black market trade out of China -- a practice tolerated and even encouraged by the government in Tokyo.
These developments feed into fears that Beijing views economics as more about the building of Chinese state power and strategic leverage than it is about seeking profits. China has been trying to convince global markets and governments that they have nothing to fear from its state-owned enterprises -- that these are normal companies, behaving according to usual commercial incentives. They would never be used to acquire strategic leverage for the Chinese Communist Party, Beijing says. But those claims are looking less credible each day. By denying foreign companies access to rare earth metals, Chinese state-owned companies enjoy an unfair advantage, dominating the market for products that use the commodities. Foreign companies requiring the metals may be forced to relocate to China, where the worry of commercial and industrial theft, as well as the illegal acquisition of trade secrets, is very real.
As Ginya Adachi, from the Japanese Rare Earth Association argues, some markets are not really about money; they're about politics. For years Japan has been crying foul about sinister motives behind China's plan to dominate the market. The United States and the European Union are also finally catching on; they no longer view China as a reliable or trusted supplier of rare earth metals, or more generally as a trustworthy trading partner. Major commercial and military firms are already increasing stockpiles and seeking to source rare earth metals from other parts of the world. Japan and the European Union are seriously considering an appeal to the World Trade Organization. If Tokyo and Brussels were to go down that path, Washington would likely offer support, or even join in. Both measures of recourse -- WTO procedures and economic diluting of China's rare-earth-metals monopoly -- will take time. Meanwhile, Beijing will want to continue to restrict exports, even if it does not ban lanthanide sales altogether.
At the end of the day, it will be quiet pressure from Washington, Tokyo, and Brussels, backed by a credible threat of selective retaliatory trade restrictions, that forces China to reconsider the collateral costs of becoming the "OPEC of rare earth metals." Yet even this pressure must be applied carefully. Tensions with China should be shielded from the public realm because Beijing has a deserved reputation for unpredictability when it faces the prospect of "losing face." Turning China into a comic-book villain on this issue will probably only backfire.
John Lee
Foreign Policy, September 9, 2009
While nobody was paying attention, Beijing was busy cornering the market on a little-known, but much coveted, strategic commodity.
What's green, greatly coveted, and offers extraordinary power to he who possesses it? For comic-book fans, the answer is the power ring wielded by the enigmatic Green Lantern, one of the most popular superheroes ever created by DC Comics. In the real world, the answer is not too dissimilar: It's "green" lanthanide, a blanket term for more than a dozen "rare earth metals" that are used in a range of increasingly important defense and technology applications.
There's just one thing: China caught on to green lanthanide's strategic value early and has been cornering the market ever since. The country now controls more than 95 percent of the world's supply. From the comic-book analogy, one might infer what this means.
These metals, today used in commercial products such as mobile phones and iPods, will increase in value over the coming years, as they are essential in a range of energy-efficient applications from hybrid cars to wind turbines. Lanthanide is essential to radar systems and lasers required in weapons such as America's awesome arsenal of "smart bombs" and other precision-guided explosives.
Although rare earth metals can be found in many countries, few governments or corporations had the foresight to invest and develop lanthanide mines. The United States, for example, has some reserves, but the U.S. government and private corporations depend heavily on existing stockpiles and on imports. Mining of rare earth metals in the United States is rare. Reviving defunct mines and developing sites for new ones will take considerable time -- up to a decade -- and even more money. Currently, the United States imports 87 percent of its lanthanide from China. The rest comes mostly from France, Japan, and Russia.
China's approach to lanthanide couldn't be more different. Fifteen years ago, it set out on a deliberate plan to capture the rare-earth-metals market. Beijing offered cheap loans to Chinese state-owned enterprises to develop lanthanide-rich sites and mine these metals. Thanks to cheap labor costs, poor environmental obligations, and shoddy cleanup standards, Chinese mines have been able to produce rare earth metals at much cheaper prices than foreign competitors -- in the process forcing many of these competitors out of the market. Yet even while squeezing its competitors' margins, Beijing has gradually cut export quotas of lanthanide to regional "strategic competitors" (such as Japan) by 6 percent each year over the past decade. In 2009, China will only sell 38,000 metric tons to Japan -- the same amount that Japanese giants Toyota and Honda consumed in all of 2008.
The stakes have been raised even higher recently. To further enhance its global dominance in this market and build further strategic leverage, China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released a white paper proposing to severely slash exports of the rare earth metals -- or even halt them altogether.
The white paper is not only bad news, but it's very bad timing. The news comes just as the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board is debating whether to allow a Chinese state-owned company, China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining, to buy a 51 percent stake in Lynas, one of the handful of Australian companies involved in rare-earth-metals mining. The deal conjures the recent memory of Chinalco's failed bid for an increased stake in British-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto, in which Rio Tinto walked away after the Chinese insisted on one or two seats on the company's board. Yet again, China's moves toward market control could not be more explicit.
Not surprisingly, the white paper -- together with ample evidence that China is not afraid to hoard its lanthanide -- has sparked a panicked rush to buy undeveloped and poorly developed rare-earth-metals mines in Russia, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Botswana, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Japan has already admitted that about one-fifth of its imported lanthanide enters the country as part of a sophisticated black market trade out of China -- a practice tolerated and even encouraged by the government in Tokyo.
These developments feed into fears that Beijing views economics as more about the building of Chinese state power and strategic leverage than it is about seeking profits. China has been trying to convince global markets and governments that they have nothing to fear from its state-owned enterprises -- that these are normal companies, behaving according to usual commercial incentives. They would never be used to acquire strategic leverage for the Chinese Communist Party, Beijing says. But those claims are looking less credible each day. By denying foreign companies access to rare earth metals, Chinese state-owned companies enjoy an unfair advantage, dominating the market for products that use the commodities. Foreign companies requiring the metals may be forced to relocate to China, where the worry of commercial and industrial theft, as well as the illegal acquisition of trade secrets, is very real.
As Ginya Adachi, from the Japanese Rare Earth Association argues, some markets are not really about money; they're about politics. For years Japan has been crying foul about sinister motives behind China's plan to dominate the market. The United States and the European Union are also finally catching on; they no longer view China as a reliable or trusted supplier of rare earth metals, or more generally as a trustworthy trading partner. Major commercial and military firms are already increasing stockpiles and seeking to source rare earth metals from other parts of the world. Japan and the European Union are seriously considering an appeal to the World Trade Organization. If Tokyo and Brussels were to go down that path, Washington would likely offer support, or even join in. Both measures of recourse -- WTO procedures and economic diluting of China's rare-earth-metals monopoly -- will take time. Meanwhile, Beijing will want to continue to restrict exports, even if it does not ban lanthanide sales altogether.
At the end of the day, it will be quiet pressure from Washington, Tokyo, and Brussels, backed by a credible threat of selective retaliatory trade restrictions, that forces China to reconsider the collateral costs of becoming the "OPEC of rare earth metals." Yet even this pressure must be applied carefully. Tensions with China should be shielded from the public realm because Beijing has a deserved reputation for unpredictability when it faces the prospect of "losing face." Turning China into a comic-book villain on this issue will probably only backfire.
Monday, September 7, 2009
28) Direitos Humanos na China: editorial do Washington Post
Same Old China
An activist's imprisonment is a reminder that human rights are inseparable from 'big-picture issues.'
Washington Post editorial, Sunday, September 6, 2009
CHINA MAKES the news these days mostly as a rising power, entwined with U.S. interests on issues ranging from America's debt to Iran's nuclear ambitions. The recently arrived U.S. ambassador to Beijing, Jon Huntsman Jr., told reporters there last week that President Obama "told him to focus on a few big-picture issues: global economy, energy and climate change," the Wall Street Journal reported.
Every now and then, though, comes a news item so stark that it reminds us that China is something else as well: a one-party dictatorship determined to stomp on any shoots of political freedom. Such an item came, also last week, with the sentencing of Xie Changfa to 13 years in prison. Mr. Xie, who lives in Hunan province, was one of the many swept up by Chinese security forces ahead of the Beijing Olympics last summer; when the world moved on, he remained in jail. He had not committed, nor has he been accused of, any acts of violence. Rather, his "crime" was to help establish the Hunan Preparatory Committee of the Chinese Democracy Party. According to the nonprofit organization Human Rights in China, Mr. Xie's lawyer argued that China's constitution protects the right to organize a political party or assembly. Nonetheless, he was convicted of "illegally setting up a party in the long term" and "soliciting and inciting others to attack, denigrate, and overturn state power and the socialist system."
We cannot report Mr. Xie's reaction to the sentence. According to his brother -- who also was arrested last summer but who was subsequently released and permitted to attend the court proceeding -- Mr. Xie "was handcuffed for 30 minutes during the announcement of the decision. He did not have the opportunity to speak and looked haggard." No wonder: Mr. Xie is 57 years old and will be in prison until he is 70 if he serves his full sentence.
Mr. Huntsman said, thankfully, that human rights also will be on his agenda, and we hope that he raises the injustice of Mr. Xie's confinement. But human rights can't be treated simply as one item in a basket of issues. The nature of the Chinese regime -- its repressiveness and paranoia about threats from its own people -- inevitably affects how it behaves with regard to those issues cited by Mr. Obama and every other matter important to U.S.-China relations, including its attitude toward other dictatorships such as Burma and North Korea. You can't understand the regime in Beijing without understanding why it would lock away a peaceful, haggard and courageous 57-year-old in far-off Hunan province.
An activist's imprisonment is a reminder that human rights are inseparable from 'big-picture issues.'
Washington Post editorial, Sunday, September 6, 2009
CHINA MAKES the news these days mostly as a rising power, entwined with U.S. interests on issues ranging from America's debt to Iran's nuclear ambitions. The recently arrived U.S. ambassador to Beijing, Jon Huntsman Jr., told reporters there last week that President Obama "told him to focus on a few big-picture issues: global economy, energy and climate change," the Wall Street Journal reported.
Every now and then, though, comes a news item so stark that it reminds us that China is something else as well: a one-party dictatorship determined to stomp on any shoots of political freedom. Such an item came, also last week, with the sentencing of Xie Changfa to 13 years in prison. Mr. Xie, who lives in Hunan province, was one of the many swept up by Chinese security forces ahead of the Beijing Olympics last summer; when the world moved on, he remained in jail. He had not committed, nor has he been accused of, any acts of violence. Rather, his "crime" was to help establish the Hunan Preparatory Committee of the Chinese Democracy Party. According to the nonprofit organization Human Rights in China, Mr. Xie's lawyer argued that China's constitution protects the right to organize a political party or assembly. Nonetheless, he was convicted of "illegally setting up a party in the long term" and "soliciting and inciting others to attack, denigrate, and overturn state power and the socialist system."
We cannot report Mr. Xie's reaction to the sentence. According to his brother -- who also was arrested last summer but who was subsequently released and permitted to attend the court proceeding -- Mr. Xie "was handcuffed for 30 minutes during the announcement of the decision. He did not have the opportunity to speak and looked haggard." No wonder: Mr. Xie is 57 years old and will be in prison until he is 70 if he serves his full sentence.
Mr. Huntsman said, thankfully, that human rights also will be on his agenda, and we hope that he raises the injustice of Mr. Xie's confinement. But human rights can't be treated simply as one item in a basket of issues. The nature of the Chinese regime -- its repressiveness and paranoia about threats from its own people -- inevitably affects how it behaves with regard to those issues cited by Mr. Obama and every other matter important to U.S.-China relations, including its attitude toward other dictatorships such as Burma and North Korea. You can't understand the regime in Beijing without understanding why it would lock away a peaceful, haggard and courageous 57-year-old in far-off Hunan province.
27) China: comentarios anonimos, identificados...
China Web Sites Seeking Users’ Names
By JONATHAN ANSFIELD
The New York Times, September 6, 2009
BEIJING — News Web sites in China, complying with secret government orders, are requiring that new users log on under their true identities to post comments, a shift in policy that the country’s Internet users and media have fiercely opposed in the past.
Until recently, users could weigh in on news items on many of the affected sites more anonymously, often without registering at all, though the sites were obligated to screen all posts, and the posts could still be traced via Internet protocol addresses.
But in early August, without notification of a change, news portals like Sina, Netease, Sohu and scores of other sites began asking unregistered users to sign in under their real names and identification numbers, said top editors at two of the major portals affected. A Sina staff member also confirmed the change.
The editors said the sites were putting into effect a confidential directive issued in late July by the State Council Information Office, one of the main government bodies responsible for supervising the Internet in China.
The new step is not foolproof, the editors acknowledged. It was possible for a reporter to register successfully on several major sites under falsified names and ID and cellphone numbers.
But the requirement adds a critical new layer of surveillance to mainstream sites in China, which were already heavily policed. Further regulations of the same nature also appeared to be in the pipeline.
And while the authorities called the measure part of a drive to forge greater “social responsibility” and “civility” among users, they moved forward surreptitiously and suppressed reports about it, said the editors and others in the media industry familiar with the measure, who spoke on condition of anonymity to avoid putting their jobs at risk.
Asked why the policy was pushed through unannounced, the chief editor of one site said, “The influence of public opinion on the Net is still too big.”
Government Internet regulators have been trying to usher in real-name registration controls since 2003, when they ordered Internet cafes around China to demand that customers show identification, nominally to keep out minors. Last year, lawmakers and regulators began discussing legislation on a more extensive “real name system,” as it is known.
But such proposals have aroused heated debate over the purview of the state to restrict China’s online community, which is the largest in the world at about 340 million people and growing.
Proponents, led by officials and state-connected academics in the information security field, argue that mandatory controls are necessary to help subdue inflammatory attacks, misinformation and other illegal activity deemed to endanger social order. They often note registration requirements on large sites in South Korea to support their point.
Critics counter that government regulation represents an incursion on free speech, individual privacy and the watchdog role of the Web in China.
The critics say sites and users should retain the right to discipline themselves. Given the country’s huge population of Internet users and its failure to guarantee freedom of expression, they argue, the case of China is hardly analogous to that of South Korea.
In 2006, Internet users and the news media rebuffed one official proposal to require real-name registration on blog hosting sites. Star bloggers denounced the notion, while ordinary users overwhelmingly rejected it in surveys conducted on sites like Sina.
In another key test of the policy earlier this year, the legislature in Hangzhou, near Shanghai, passed a regulation that would have placed the requirement on users who comment, blog or play games on sites based there. Amid a popular outcry, however, the city shied away from enforcing the regulation.
Central authorities have gone to new lengths to tame online activity in 2009, a year peppered with politically delicate anniversaries.
Government censors have closed thousands of sites in a continuing war on “vulgarity,” closed liberal forums and blogs for spreading “harmful information,” blocked access to YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, and cut off Internet service where serious unrest has erupted, notably in the Xinjiang region of the west after deadly clashes between ethnic Uighurs and Han in July. Increasingly, officials have defended the Web shutdowns on the grounds of national security.
The government recently set off an international furor when it ordered that all computers sold in China come prepackaged with pornography filtering software that authorities could remotely control. Officials were forced to retreat from the order after international companies and trade bodies protested and Chinese hackers showed that the software was designed to block politically offensive content as well.
The authorities had aimed to avoid a similar showdown over the new real-name requirement. “We had no recourse to challenge it,” said the news editor of another portal.
Ta Kung Pao, a Hong Kong-based newspaper loyal to Beijing, first leaked news of the State Council edict in late July. But the report was scrubbed from the paper’s Web site within a few days.
Another state newspaper tried to follow up on the Ta Kung Pao report soon thereafter, the paper’s editors said, but they were forced to abort their article because they were warned that the order was a state secret.
The State Council Information Office had yet to respond to a list of submitted questions about the move.
The new mandate did not appear to affect formerly registered users of the portals. Nor did it affect blog hosts, forums or government news sites like People’s Daily or Xinhua.
Whether because it had an impact mainly on rookie users or because of the void of news about it, bloggers in China were unusually slow to recognize the measure. But those who did were critical.
One commentator on the popular forum Tianya wrote, “Not daring to write one’s real name, in truth, is a form of self-protection for the weak.”
There were signals in the state media in recent weeks that more name registration measures would follow.
An influential advocate of the policy, Fang Bingxing, the president of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, told a forum in August that the “time was ripe” to roll it out widely to bolster information security, newspapers reported.
A trail of comments on Sina thrashed the report.
Late last month, the Communist Party-run Guangming Daily ran a positive story about a city government portal in western China that imposed the requirement on new bloggers, calling it a “forerunner.”
Hu Yong, a new media specialist at Peking University, said government-enforced registration requirements carried long-term side effects.
“Netizens will have less trust in the government, and to a certain extent, the development of the industry will be impeded,” he said.
From a comparison of the most commented-on articles in July and August on a number of portals it was hard to determine whether the volume of posts had been affected so far.
But both editors at two of the major portals affected said their sites had shown marked drop-offs.
By JONATHAN ANSFIELD
The New York Times, September 6, 2009
BEIJING — News Web sites in China, complying with secret government orders, are requiring that new users log on under their true identities to post comments, a shift in policy that the country’s Internet users and media have fiercely opposed in the past.
Until recently, users could weigh in on news items on many of the affected sites more anonymously, often without registering at all, though the sites were obligated to screen all posts, and the posts could still be traced via Internet protocol addresses.
But in early August, without notification of a change, news portals like Sina, Netease, Sohu and scores of other sites began asking unregistered users to sign in under their real names and identification numbers, said top editors at two of the major portals affected. A Sina staff member also confirmed the change.
The editors said the sites were putting into effect a confidential directive issued in late July by the State Council Information Office, one of the main government bodies responsible for supervising the Internet in China.
The new step is not foolproof, the editors acknowledged. It was possible for a reporter to register successfully on several major sites under falsified names and ID and cellphone numbers.
But the requirement adds a critical new layer of surveillance to mainstream sites in China, which were already heavily policed. Further regulations of the same nature also appeared to be in the pipeline.
And while the authorities called the measure part of a drive to forge greater “social responsibility” and “civility” among users, they moved forward surreptitiously and suppressed reports about it, said the editors and others in the media industry familiar with the measure, who spoke on condition of anonymity to avoid putting their jobs at risk.
Asked why the policy was pushed through unannounced, the chief editor of one site said, “The influence of public opinion on the Net is still too big.”
Government Internet regulators have been trying to usher in real-name registration controls since 2003, when they ordered Internet cafes around China to demand that customers show identification, nominally to keep out minors. Last year, lawmakers and regulators began discussing legislation on a more extensive “real name system,” as it is known.
But such proposals have aroused heated debate over the purview of the state to restrict China’s online community, which is the largest in the world at about 340 million people and growing.
Proponents, led by officials and state-connected academics in the information security field, argue that mandatory controls are necessary to help subdue inflammatory attacks, misinformation and other illegal activity deemed to endanger social order. They often note registration requirements on large sites in South Korea to support their point.
Critics counter that government regulation represents an incursion on free speech, individual privacy and the watchdog role of the Web in China.
The critics say sites and users should retain the right to discipline themselves. Given the country’s huge population of Internet users and its failure to guarantee freedom of expression, they argue, the case of China is hardly analogous to that of South Korea.
In 2006, Internet users and the news media rebuffed one official proposal to require real-name registration on blog hosting sites. Star bloggers denounced the notion, while ordinary users overwhelmingly rejected it in surveys conducted on sites like Sina.
In another key test of the policy earlier this year, the legislature in Hangzhou, near Shanghai, passed a regulation that would have placed the requirement on users who comment, blog or play games on sites based there. Amid a popular outcry, however, the city shied away from enforcing the regulation.
Central authorities have gone to new lengths to tame online activity in 2009, a year peppered with politically delicate anniversaries.
Government censors have closed thousands of sites in a continuing war on “vulgarity,” closed liberal forums and blogs for spreading “harmful information,” blocked access to YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, and cut off Internet service where serious unrest has erupted, notably in the Xinjiang region of the west after deadly clashes between ethnic Uighurs and Han in July. Increasingly, officials have defended the Web shutdowns on the grounds of national security.
The government recently set off an international furor when it ordered that all computers sold in China come prepackaged with pornography filtering software that authorities could remotely control. Officials were forced to retreat from the order after international companies and trade bodies protested and Chinese hackers showed that the software was designed to block politically offensive content as well.
The authorities had aimed to avoid a similar showdown over the new real-name requirement. “We had no recourse to challenge it,” said the news editor of another portal.
Ta Kung Pao, a Hong Kong-based newspaper loyal to Beijing, first leaked news of the State Council edict in late July. But the report was scrubbed from the paper’s Web site within a few days.
Another state newspaper tried to follow up on the Ta Kung Pao report soon thereafter, the paper’s editors said, but they were forced to abort their article because they were warned that the order was a state secret.
The State Council Information Office had yet to respond to a list of submitted questions about the move.
The new mandate did not appear to affect formerly registered users of the portals. Nor did it affect blog hosts, forums or government news sites like People’s Daily or Xinhua.
Whether because it had an impact mainly on rookie users or because of the void of news about it, bloggers in China were unusually slow to recognize the measure. But those who did were critical.
One commentator on the popular forum Tianya wrote, “Not daring to write one’s real name, in truth, is a form of self-protection for the weak.”
There were signals in the state media in recent weeks that more name registration measures would follow.
An influential advocate of the policy, Fang Bingxing, the president of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, told a forum in August that the “time was ripe” to roll it out widely to bolster information security, newspapers reported.
A trail of comments on Sina thrashed the report.
Late last month, the Communist Party-run Guangming Daily ran a positive story about a city government portal in western China that imposed the requirement on new bloggers, calling it a “forerunner.”
Hu Yong, a new media specialist at Peking University, said government-enforced registration requirements carried long-term side effects.
“Netizens will have less trust in the government, and to a certain extent, the development of the industry will be impeded,” he said.
From a comparison of the most commented-on articles in July and August on a number of portals it was hard to determine whether the volume of posts had been affected so far.
But both editors at two of the major portals affected said their sites had shown marked drop-offs.
Sunday, September 6, 2009
26) Xinran Xue: uma escritora chinesa
Xinran Xue: Jornalista e escritora
Programa Roda Viva, da TV-Cultura de SP: 7.09.2009
Ela nasceu e foi criada na China comunista de Mao Tsé-Tung e viveu durante o período pelo qual o presidente da República Popular da China anunciava o Grande Salto para à Frente, com a política de industrialização do país e a Grande Revolução Cultural, uma ação política contra os revisionistas e a burguesia.
Depois da morte de Mao Tsé-Tung, em 1976, no começo da abertura econômica chinesa, Xinran foi para a Universidade estudar jornalismo e, nos anos 80, fez um programa de rádio onde recebia e lia cartas enviadas por ouvintes, em geral, mulheres contando seus dramas, dificuldades e tudo o que a repressão política e sexual impedia que fosse revelado a respeito do mundo feminino.
Esse trabalho permitiu que ela agrupasse conteúdo para uma série de livros sobre a realidade chinesa. Xinran Xue vive há 12 anos em Londres, na Inglaterra, onde se dedicou a escrever e a contar essas histórias.
Participam como convidados entrevistadores:
Demétrio Magnoli, sociólogo, especialista em relações internacionais e editor do Jornal Mundo, Geografia e Política Internacional; Leda, Balbino, chefe de reportagem da editoria de internacional do jornal O Estado de S.Paulo; Jacira Melo, diretora do Instituto Patrícia Galvão e Jayme Martins, jornalista, foi correspondente da mídia brasileira durante 20 anos em Pequim.
Apresentação: Heródoto Barbeiro
O Roda Viva é apresentado às segundas a partir das 22h10.
Você pode assistir on-line acessando o site no horário do programa.
http://www2.tvcultura.com.br/rodaviva
Programa Roda Viva, da TV-Cultura de SP: 7.09.2009
Ela nasceu e foi criada na China comunista de Mao Tsé-Tung e viveu durante o período pelo qual o presidente da República Popular da China anunciava o Grande Salto para à Frente, com a política de industrialização do país e a Grande Revolução Cultural, uma ação política contra os revisionistas e a burguesia.
Depois da morte de Mao Tsé-Tung, em 1976, no começo da abertura econômica chinesa, Xinran foi para a Universidade estudar jornalismo e, nos anos 80, fez um programa de rádio onde recebia e lia cartas enviadas por ouvintes, em geral, mulheres contando seus dramas, dificuldades e tudo o que a repressão política e sexual impedia que fosse revelado a respeito do mundo feminino.
Esse trabalho permitiu que ela agrupasse conteúdo para uma série de livros sobre a realidade chinesa. Xinran Xue vive há 12 anos em Londres, na Inglaterra, onde se dedicou a escrever e a contar essas histórias.
Participam como convidados entrevistadores:
Demétrio Magnoli, sociólogo, especialista em relações internacionais e editor do Jornal Mundo, Geografia e Política Internacional; Leda, Balbino, chefe de reportagem da editoria de internacional do jornal O Estado de S.Paulo; Jacira Melo, diretora do Instituto Patrícia Galvão e Jayme Martins, jornalista, foi correspondente da mídia brasileira durante 20 anos em Pequim.
Apresentação: Heródoto Barbeiro
O Roda Viva é apresentado às segundas a partir das 22h10.
Você pode assistir on-line acessando o site no horário do programa.
http://www2.tvcultura.com.br/rodaviva
Friday, September 4, 2009
25) Direitos humanos na China (talvez uma contradição nos termos)
Report from Global Issues:
China and Human Rights
This link.
Author: Anup Shah
(Updated Saturday, March 29, 2008)
To print all information e.g. expanded side notes, shows alternative links, use the print version.
This web page has the following sub-sections:
1. China’s lack of political freedoms
2. Opinion towards China brings mixed agendas
3. Tibet crackdown, 2008
(a) China’s poor attempt to deflect attention
(b) Resentment of Chinese economic policy not benefiting locals
(c) What is a Free Tibet?
(d) Lack of international unity, despite statements by media and world leaders
(e) China’s actions fuels the very thing it says it tries to fight
4. China and Africa; concerns over rights and exploitation
5. More information
China’s lack of political freedoms
Since the Communist Party gained power in China and established the People’s Republic of China in 1949, authoritarian rule has been the norm.
Around the late 1970s, as the first generation of Communist Party leaders were replaced by a second, some reforms provided a foundation of rapid economic development (it is now an economic superpower). The political reforms away from authoritarian rule has remained elusive.
For example, the government continues to exert its absolute control over politics, and is often looks to eradicate domestic “threats” to stability of the country through excessive use of force and authority.
Imprisonment of political opponents and journalists critical of the government has been common. The press is tightly regulated as is religion. Suppression of independence/secessionist movements is often heavy-handed, to say the least.
For example, months of campaigning by students and others for more democratic rights and freedom of speech culminated in the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, a violent crackdown by the Chinese military with 15 days of martial law. The after-effects also resulted in government crackdown of sympathizers. For example, foreign media were banned for a while, local media were strictly monitored and controlled, and Communist Party members who sympathized with the protesters were placed under house arrest.
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Opinion towards China brings mixed agendas
Interestingly, around the time of that massacre, Western opinion turned against China and has had an effect to this day when it comes to discussions of China’s human rights situation.
In summary, up to the end of the 1980s, China was seen as a reforming country moving towards market economics and an ally of the West to counter the then-Soviet Union, which China also feared despite being Communist as well.
The collapse of the Soviet Union around the same time, as well as this Tiananmen massacre, changed that view; China’s political value to the West lessened due to the demise of the Soviet Union and political critique of China could therefore become more pronounced.
There is tremendous commercial interest by outsiders with China, and some of that may explain the economic-friendly-but-politically-neutral-or-weak front that many Western countries and their businesses have with China.
To this day, many raise concerns in the political, commercial, social, and environmental concerns. Some are happy to point out problems in China, while overlooking problems in their own countries (or not realizing how large their own may be), for example.
Others may be afraid of the rise of China and see it as a threat to their jobs.
Leaders of some nations such as the US, UK and Australia, also hint that populous countries such as China and India may be more to blame for climate change than themselves, even though that is often spin or diverting attention from their own contributions that have gone on for much longer.
These things can all combine in various ways. In economic downturns, these factors can sometimes combine and result in racist attitudes towards Chinese (and other ethnic minorities).
This is certainly an oversimplification as there are issues ranging from the economic, to political to environmental and social that all attract differing views from outsiders towards China from China-bashing to China-supporting, and is not in the scope of this particular article here.
Back to top
Tibet crackdown, 2008
Tibet, which China considers part of its territory, has also seen problems.
Demonstrations marking the anniversary of the failed 1959 Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule resulted in the killing of numerous demonstrators. Chinese authorities claimed a low number of deaths, while Tibetans and international media, a higher number.
The Chinese government crackdown has included closing off the country to the outside world and shutting out or controlling most media, including Internet media and sites used to show video footage of what happened. The military and police presence has also swelled.
There have been protests in the past in Tibet, such as in 1987 and 1989, but these were only in the capital, Lhasa, and involved mostly monks, intellectuals, and students. In contrast, the 2008 riots have spread to other parts of Tibet and included peasants and workers.
China’s poor attempt to deflect attention
The Chinese government has been keen to show in their own video footage that Tibetans have turned against Chinese people living in Tibet. As with so many conflicts, while propaganda strategies try to highlight issues such as race and ethnicity, the root causes are often economic and political in nature and are typically less discussed.
The Chinese government, already under increasing scrutiny as the Beijing Olympics draws closer, has opted for strength and force, instead of dialog. The influential spiritual leader of Buddhists and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, exiled from Tibet since 1959, the Dalai Lama has been blamed by the Chinese government for being behind the recent riots, which the Dalai Lama has denied and suggested that there should be an international investigation of this claim.
Resentment of Chinese economic policy not benefiting locals
The Chinese government believes Tibet is backward and needs modernizing. China has therefore attempted a policy of rapid economic development in Tibet.
However, without any political reforms to accompany this process, the social tensions have increased as local Tibetans see little of the prosperity and growth, while ethnic Chinese, who have also been encouraged to emigrate there, have seen their wealth generally increase.
What may fundamentally be economic problems (of participation and benefits from the policies, etc), a political problem has manifested (issues of political freedoms, repression, and autonomy or independence—discussed further below). Certainly, Western mainstream media’s reporting typically concentrates on the harsh crackdown by the Chinese authorities.
Inter Press Service captures both the importance of the Dalai Lama in this, as well as the underlying economic causes:
Wang Lixiong, a Beijing-based writer whose research works on Tibet have been circulated within the communist party, says the current crisis should serve as a “wake up” call for Chinese leaders that their rapid economic development policy in Tibet is a failure.
… Wang reflected that Beijing’s politically-motivated investment in Tibet is fueling economic growth that widens social inequality and creates discontent.
Calling the visible signs of development in Tibet a “pretense of modernization”, Wang describes how the dramatic rise in living standards among the Tibetan elite is in a stark contrast with the impoverishment of the overwhelming majority of Tibetans who remain rural, illiterate and poor.
“If the current leadership doesn’t reconsider its Tibet policy, in ten or twenty years time, the Tibetan fight will become even uglier,” he reckons. “They must now recognize that imposed economic prosperity would not erase the significance of the Dalai Lama in Tibetan hearts. The Dalai Lama is the key to the Tibetan problem because he is their ultimate spiritual leader and also an international symbol of the Tibetan identity.”
— Antoaneta Bezlova, CHINA: Under Pressure to Rethink Tibet Policy, Inter Press Service, March 21, 2008
Pema Gyalpo, official representative of the Dalai Lama in Japan from 1975 to 1990, in an interview with Inter Press Service notes that “The Chinese are putting money into Tibet, but it’s … only being used to bring in more Chinese. Even the railroad was built to transport these settlers.… Bringing in more Chinese is a tool to exploit the Tibetan economy. Unless the Chinese change their past policies there will no solution to the Tibet problem.”
What is a “Free” Tibet?
To different people, a free Tibet means different things. Most assume that the majority of Tibetans are for independence away from China.
Even the Chinese government has accused the Dalai Lama of leading a separatist movement/agenda.
Yet, the Dalai Lama has long insisted that he is for autonomy, not independence, as noted in this excerpt from an interview by Amanda Bower in 2006:
1. Amanda Bower:
Two weeks ago, the Chinese government said it would allow you to visit your homeland, which you fled in 1959, if you abandoned your pursuit of independence for Tibet. But haven't you long said that you want autonomy, not independence, for Tibet?
2. Dalai Lama:
Oh yes. The world knows the Dalai Lama is not seeking independence. The world knows. Still the Chinese do not know. [Laughs]
3. Amanda Bower:
Do you have any heaviness of heart about giving up hope for Tibetan independence?
4. Dalai Lama:
No. It’s not necessary.… today, the common interest is more important than each individual nation’s sovereignty. Tibet is a landlocked country, a large area, small population, very, very backward. We Tibetans want modernization. Therefore, in order to develop Tibet materially as a modern nation, Tibet must remain within the People's Republic of China. Provided Chinese give us a full guarantee of preservation of Tibetan culture, Tibetan environment, Tibetan spirituality, then it is of mutual benefit. [Besides] foreign affairs [and] defense [are] all the things which Tibetans can manage by themselves. Tibetans should have the full autonomy.
— Dalai Lama: Tibet Wants Autonomy, Not Independence, Interview by By Amanda Bower, Time Magazine, 16 April 2006
(More recently, reflecting the March 2008 violence, the official web site for the Dalai Lama also notes the media has misquoted him a few times and clarifies that “On the issue of independence, [The Dalai Lama] reiterated that what he is seeking is meaningful autonomy for the Tibetan people.”)
Lack of international unity, despite statements by media and world leaders
On the surface, there is near-unanimous condemnation of the way the Chinese government has handled the situation. Yet, as Inter Press Service notes, in reality, the impasse at the United Nations Security Council shows that nations have their own interests that affect their judgment on whether or not to penalize China in some way for its heavy-handedness:
The killings and human rights transgressions in several of the world’s trouble spots — including Palestine, Burma (Myanmar), Sudan, Chechnya and now Tibet — have failed to trigger any punitive action or mandatory sanctions against any of the governments or miscreants.
The United States, Britain and France have continued to protect Israel (against the Palestinians) while Russia and China are currently protective of the beleaguered governments in Sudan and Burma.
All five countries continue to manipulate the 15-member Security Council to their advantage primarily because of their veto powers.
— Thalif Deen, Tibet Bypasses Security Council Scrutiny, Inter Press Service, March 18, 2008
Thalif Deen continues, noting that “Speaking on condition of anonymity, one Asian diplomat said that the Security Council is being run on a politically selfish principle: ‘You scratch my back, I will scratch yours.’”
Deen referred to the example of Palestine where Israel’s recent use of disproportionate force there killed many more civilians than that believed to have been killed here in Tibet, and yet, because the US backs Israel, China — usually a supporter of the Palestinian cause — did not want to antagonize Washington. Washington, for its part, Deen added, did not even mention China in the US State Department’s recent annual human rights report.
China’s actions fuels the very thing it says it tries to fight
The policies of China, of trying to modernize Tibet, but excluding Tibetans in the process, is undermining the situation. At the moment, it seems most people are angry and frustrated because they are not receiving the benefits of economic growth while their cultural, personal and religious freedoms are restricted, as the Dalai Lama feels:
Whether it was intended or not, I believe that a form of cultural genocide has taken place in Tibet.… Tibetans have been reduced to an insignificant minority … as a result of the huge transfer of non-Tibetans into Tibet. The distinctive Tibetan cultural heritage … is fading away.
… In reality, there is no religious freedom in Tibet. Even to call for a little more freedom is to risk being labeled a separatist. Nor is there any real autonomy in Tibet, even though these basic freedoms are guaranteed by the Chinese constitution.
I believe the demonstrations and protests taking place in Tibet are a spontaneous outburst of public resentment built up by years of repression in defiance of authorities that are oblivious to the sentiments of the local populace. They mistakenly believe that further repressive measures are the way to achieve their declared aim of long-term unity and stability.
— Dalai Lama, Press Release, March 18, 2008
There will also be all sorts of organizations around the world supporting the cause of the Tibetans. Some will be encouraging complete freedom/independence from China for whatever reason (anti-China reasons, legitimate belief in independence of Tibet from China, etc).
Some will want to exploit the current problems for a broader goal than that of the Dalai Lama. Researcher Michael Barker, for example, fears that some organizations supporting Tibetan’s have questionable pasts.
Whatever it may be, it is perhaps also ironic that China’s fears of separatist movements comes about because it might be fueling it.
Back to top
China and Africa; concerns over rights and exploitation
Criticism of China’s human rights is (predictably) increasing in the West, as China rises. Some of the concerns are genuine, while others hide political agenda. Common criticisms are over areas such as human rights, environment, and labor standards. As Chinese enterprises expand overseas, especially in Africa, criticisms of exploitation are increasing.
For example, China’s silence on the Sudanese government’s policy in Darfur suggests that China is not concerned about human rights; just about its own economic interests. In Angola for example, where there are lots of oil interest (not just from China), some Chinese companies have been accused of ignoring local issues, for example by importing many materials from China rather than sourcing it locally, and even hiring Chinese only, excluding local Angolans.
A BBC television report in early July 2007 even noted that at an African/Chinese conference, the West was not there, implying the West could perhaps have been able to tame Chinese attempts at exploitation. Nothing was mentioned about the decades of Western exploitation of Africa that continues today albeit more benignly.
A BBC web site forum even asked, Is China Africa’s new master?, perhaps not realizing that by saying “new”, it appeared to acknowledge a role that the West currently attempts to fill.
It seems that there may be some double standards here.
As detailed on this site’s section on Africa and trade, economics, and poverty issues, these western nations are the very ones that have exploited Africa for many decades. Some of these nations have even overthrown potential or fledgling democracies, favoring brutal dictators that have bled their countries.
For example, the economic policies of the IMF and World Bank, backed by Washington and Europe have been very detrimental to Africa. From Structural Adjustment Policies to economic dumping (often called food aid) to other aspects of unfair aid, debt and trade deals presented as historic positive deals for Africa, these issues seem to have been ignored when raising concerns about China’s involvement (or, as the previous link also notes, are ignored even when discussing Africa).
Firoze Manji, editor of the popular pan-African social issues web site, Pambazuka News, also raises the important point that in comparison to Europe and the US, China in Africa is still a small player.
It is worth quoting Manji at some length:
… in comparison to Europe and the US, China in Africa is still a small player. While keeping an eye out on China, Africans should not be distracted from paying attention to the West's continued exploitation of the continent including the use of military might to protect its economic interests.
…
Open any newspaper and you would get the impression that the African continent, and much of the rest of the world, is in the process of being ‘devoured’ by China. Phrases such as the ‘new scramble for Africa’, ‘voracious’, ‘ravenous’ or ‘insatiable’ ‘appetite for natural resources’ are typical descriptors used to characterise China’s engagement with Africa. In contrast, the operations of western capital for the same activities are described with anodyne phrases such as ‘development’, ‘investment’, ‘employment generation’.
…
China’s involvement in Africa has three main dimensions: foreign direct investment, aid and trade. In each of these dimensions China’s engagement is dwarfed by those of US and European countries, and often smaller than those of other Asian economies.
— Firoze Manji, China still a small player in Africa, Pambazuka News, March 27, 2008
After going into further detail (worth reading) Manji concludes that China offers potential for Africa which some Western countries finds threatening, but at the same time is taking advantage of the more open environment:
China has the advantage of never having enslaved or colonized the continent. China has also not made any false promises coated with neo-liberalism. While the West, the IMF and the World Bank put conditions that only aid in their fleecing of Africa, China has so far been willing to provide unconditional aid and invest in infrastructure. At the same time, however, it freely takes full advantage of the opening up of markets that neo-liberal economic policies over the last 25 years have offered, unencumbered.
And so far, unlike the US, China has not sought to establish military bases in Africa to protect its economic interests, which the US has sought to establish through AFRICOM.
— Firoze Manji, China still a small player in Africa, Pambazuka News, March 27, 2008
Many western news outlets and campaigners are quick to point out that China offers aid with no strings attached, whereas western nations offer aid with conditions tied to human rights. While there is some truth to this, it is often overlooked that a lot of conditions by western countries are not about human rights, but about opening up African economies and it is these conditions that are often criticized.
So, it seems that Africans should be cautious about China’s interests in Africa, but also be aware that criticism levied against China by others such as various Western countries may also have double standards and be part of a wider agenda whereby the rich countries are feeling threatened by the rise of a potential economic competitor.
Back to top
More information
Detailing the various human rights issues and violations in China is a gargantuan task, and not in the scope of this web site. Here are some organizations that have done just that:
* The Human Rights in China (HRIC) web site. With the 10 year anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, on June 4, 1999 the HRIC compiled a new list of evidence detailing the crimes committed in 1989.
* Amnesty International reports
* Human Rights Watch reports
Back to top
Where next?
This article is part of the following collection:
* Human Rights In Various Regions
1. The USA and Human Rights
2. Indonesia and Human Rights
3. Haiti and Human Rights
4. Kurds and Human Rights
5. Yugoslavia and Human Rights
6. China and Human Rights
7. Tunisia and Human Rights
8. Israel and Human Rights
9. Myanmar (formerly Burma) and Human Rights
10. Australia and Human Rights
11. Cuba and Human Rights
12. Europe and Human Rights
China and Human Rights
This link.
Author: Anup Shah
(Updated Saturday, March 29, 2008)
To print all information e.g. expanded side notes, shows alternative links, use the print version.
This web page has the following sub-sections:
1. China’s lack of political freedoms
2. Opinion towards China brings mixed agendas
3. Tibet crackdown, 2008
(a) China’s poor attempt to deflect attention
(b) Resentment of Chinese economic policy not benefiting locals
(c) What is a Free Tibet?
(d) Lack of international unity, despite statements by media and world leaders
(e) China’s actions fuels the very thing it says it tries to fight
4. China and Africa; concerns over rights and exploitation
5. More information
China’s lack of political freedoms
Since the Communist Party gained power in China and established the People’s Republic of China in 1949, authoritarian rule has been the norm.
Around the late 1970s, as the first generation of Communist Party leaders were replaced by a second, some reforms provided a foundation of rapid economic development (it is now an economic superpower). The political reforms away from authoritarian rule has remained elusive.
For example, the government continues to exert its absolute control over politics, and is often looks to eradicate domestic “threats” to stability of the country through excessive use of force and authority.
Imprisonment of political opponents and journalists critical of the government has been common. The press is tightly regulated as is religion. Suppression of independence/secessionist movements is often heavy-handed, to say the least.
For example, months of campaigning by students and others for more democratic rights and freedom of speech culminated in the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, a violent crackdown by the Chinese military with 15 days of martial law. The after-effects also resulted in government crackdown of sympathizers. For example, foreign media were banned for a while, local media were strictly monitored and controlled, and Communist Party members who sympathized with the protesters were placed under house arrest.
Back to top
Opinion towards China brings mixed agendas
Interestingly, around the time of that massacre, Western opinion turned against China and has had an effect to this day when it comes to discussions of China’s human rights situation.
In summary, up to the end of the 1980s, China was seen as a reforming country moving towards market economics and an ally of the West to counter the then-Soviet Union, which China also feared despite being Communist as well.
The collapse of the Soviet Union around the same time, as well as this Tiananmen massacre, changed that view; China’s political value to the West lessened due to the demise of the Soviet Union and political critique of China could therefore become more pronounced.
There is tremendous commercial interest by outsiders with China, and some of that may explain the economic-friendly-but-politically-neutral-or-weak front that many Western countries and their businesses have with China.
To this day, many raise concerns in the political, commercial, social, and environmental concerns. Some are happy to point out problems in China, while overlooking problems in their own countries (or not realizing how large their own may be), for example.
Others may be afraid of the rise of China and see it as a threat to their jobs.
Leaders of some nations such as the US, UK and Australia, also hint that populous countries such as China and India may be more to blame for climate change than themselves, even though that is often spin or diverting attention from their own contributions that have gone on for much longer.
These things can all combine in various ways. In economic downturns, these factors can sometimes combine and result in racist attitudes towards Chinese (and other ethnic minorities).
This is certainly an oversimplification as there are issues ranging from the economic, to political to environmental and social that all attract differing views from outsiders towards China from China-bashing to China-supporting, and is not in the scope of this particular article here.
Back to top
Tibet crackdown, 2008
Tibet, which China considers part of its territory, has also seen problems.
Demonstrations marking the anniversary of the failed 1959 Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule resulted in the killing of numerous demonstrators. Chinese authorities claimed a low number of deaths, while Tibetans and international media, a higher number.
The Chinese government crackdown has included closing off the country to the outside world and shutting out or controlling most media, including Internet media and sites used to show video footage of what happened. The military and police presence has also swelled.
There have been protests in the past in Tibet, such as in 1987 and 1989, but these were only in the capital, Lhasa, and involved mostly monks, intellectuals, and students. In contrast, the 2008 riots have spread to other parts of Tibet and included peasants and workers.
China’s poor attempt to deflect attention
The Chinese government has been keen to show in their own video footage that Tibetans have turned against Chinese people living in Tibet. As with so many conflicts, while propaganda strategies try to highlight issues such as race and ethnicity, the root causes are often economic and political in nature and are typically less discussed.
The Chinese government, already under increasing scrutiny as the Beijing Olympics draws closer, has opted for strength and force, instead of dialog. The influential spiritual leader of Buddhists and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, exiled from Tibet since 1959, the Dalai Lama has been blamed by the Chinese government for being behind the recent riots, which the Dalai Lama has denied and suggested that there should be an international investigation of this claim.
Resentment of Chinese economic policy not benefiting locals
The Chinese government believes Tibet is backward and needs modernizing. China has therefore attempted a policy of rapid economic development in Tibet.
However, without any political reforms to accompany this process, the social tensions have increased as local Tibetans see little of the prosperity and growth, while ethnic Chinese, who have also been encouraged to emigrate there, have seen their wealth generally increase.
What may fundamentally be economic problems (of participation and benefits from the policies, etc), a political problem has manifested (issues of political freedoms, repression, and autonomy or independence—discussed further below). Certainly, Western mainstream media’s reporting typically concentrates on the harsh crackdown by the Chinese authorities.
Inter Press Service captures both the importance of the Dalai Lama in this, as well as the underlying economic causes:
Wang Lixiong, a Beijing-based writer whose research works on Tibet have been circulated within the communist party, says the current crisis should serve as a “wake up” call for Chinese leaders that their rapid economic development policy in Tibet is a failure.
… Wang reflected that Beijing’s politically-motivated investment in Tibet is fueling economic growth that widens social inequality and creates discontent.
Calling the visible signs of development in Tibet a “pretense of modernization”, Wang describes how the dramatic rise in living standards among the Tibetan elite is in a stark contrast with the impoverishment of the overwhelming majority of Tibetans who remain rural, illiterate and poor.
“If the current leadership doesn’t reconsider its Tibet policy, in ten or twenty years time, the Tibetan fight will become even uglier,” he reckons. “They must now recognize that imposed economic prosperity would not erase the significance of the Dalai Lama in Tibetan hearts. The Dalai Lama is the key to the Tibetan problem because he is their ultimate spiritual leader and also an international symbol of the Tibetan identity.”
— Antoaneta Bezlova, CHINA: Under Pressure to Rethink Tibet Policy, Inter Press Service, March 21, 2008
Pema Gyalpo, official representative of the Dalai Lama in Japan from 1975 to 1990, in an interview with Inter Press Service notes that “The Chinese are putting money into Tibet, but it’s … only being used to bring in more Chinese. Even the railroad was built to transport these settlers.… Bringing in more Chinese is a tool to exploit the Tibetan economy. Unless the Chinese change their past policies there will no solution to the Tibet problem.”
What is a “Free” Tibet?
To different people, a free Tibet means different things. Most assume that the majority of Tibetans are for independence away from China.
Even the Chinese government has accused the Dalai Lama of leading a separatist movement/agenda.
Yet, the Dalai Lama has long insisted that he is for autonomy, not independence, as noted in this excerpt from an interview by Amanda Bower in 2006:
1. Amanda Bower:
Two weeks ago, the Chinese government said it would allow you to visit your homeland, which you fled in 1959, if you abandoned your pursuit of independence for Tibet. But haven't you long said that you want autonomy, not independence, for Tibet?
2. Dalai Lama:
Oh yes. The world knows the Dalai Lama is not seeking independence. The world knows. Still the Chinese do not know. [Laughs]
3. Amanda Bower:
Do you have any heaviness of heart about giving up hope for Tibetan independence?
4. Dalai Lama:
No. It’s not necessary.… today, the common interest is more important than each individual nation’s sovereignty. Tibet is a landlocked country, a large area, small population, very, very backward. We Tibetans want modernization. Therefore, in order to develop Tibet materially as a modern nation, Tibet must remain within the People's Republic of China. Provided Chinese give us a full guarantee of preservation of Tibetan culture, Tibetan environment, Tibetan spirituality, then it is of mutual benefit. [Besides] foreign affairs [and] defense [are] all the things which Tibetans can manage by themselves. Tibetans should have the full autonomy.
— Dalai Lama: Tibet Wants Autonomy, Not Independence, Interview by By Amanda Bower, Time Magazine, 16 April 2006
(More recently, reflecting the March 2008 violence, the official web site for the Dalai Lama also notes the media has misquoted him a few times and clarifies that “On the issue of independence, [The Dalai Lama] reiterated that what he is seeking is meaningful autonomy for the Tibetan people.”)
Lack of international unity, despite statements by media and world leaders
On the surface, there is near-unanimous condemnation of the way the Chinese government has handled the situation. Yet, as Inter Press Service notes, in reality, the impasse at the United Nations Security Council shows that nations have their own interests that affect their judgment on whether or not to penalize China in some way for its heavy-handedness:
The killings and human rights transgressions in several of the world’s trouble spots — including Palestine, Burma (Myanmar), Sudan, Chechnya and now Tibet — have failed to trigger any punitive action or mandatory sanctions against any of the governments or miscreants.
The United States, Britain and France have continued to protect Israel (against the Palestinians) while Russia and China are currently protective of the beleaguered governments in Sudan and Burma.
All five countries continue to manipulate the 15-member Security Council to their advantage primarily because of their veto powers.
— Thalif Deen, Tibet Bypasses Security Council Scrutiny, Inter Press Service, March 18, 2008
Thalif Deen continues, noting that “Speaking on condition of anonymity, one Asian diplomat said that the Security Council is being run on a politically selfish principle: ‘You scratch my back, I will scratch yours.’”
Deen referred to the example of Palestine where Israel’s recent use of disproportionate force there killed many more civilians than that believed to have been killed here in Tibet, and yet, because the US backs Israel, China — usually a supporter of the Palestinian cause — did not want to antagonize Washington. Washington, for its part, Deen added, did not even mention China in the US State Department’s recent annual human rights report.
China’s actions fuels the very thing it says it tries to fight
The policies of China, of trying to modernize Tibet, but excluding Tibetans in the process, is undermining the situation. At the moment, it seems most people are angry and frustrated because they are not receiving the benefits of economic growth while their cultural, personal and religious freedoms are restricted, as the Dalai Lama feels:
Whether it was intended or not, I believe that a form of cultural genocide has taken place in Tibet.… Tibetans have been reduced to an insignificant minority … as a result of the huge transfer of non-Tibetans into Tibet. The distinctive Tibetan cultural heritage … is fading away.
… In reality, there is no religious freedom in Tibet. Even to call for a little more freedom is to risk being labeled a separatist. Nor is there any real autonomy in Tibet, even though these basic freedoms are guaranteed by the Chinese constitution.
I believe the demonstrations and protests taking place in Tibet are a spontaneous outburst of public resentment built up by years of repression in defiance of authorities that are oblivious to the sentiments of the local populace. They mistakenly believe that further repressive measures are the way to achieve their declared aim of long-term unity and stability.
— Dalai Lama, Press Release, March 18, 2008
There will also be all sorts of organizations around the world supporting the cause of the Tibetans. Some will be encouraging complete freedom/independence from China for whatever reason (anti-China reasons, legitimate belief in independence of Tibet from China, etc).
Some will want to exploit the current problems for a broader goal than that of the Dalai Lama. Researcher Michael Barker, for example, fears that some organizations supporting Tibetan’s have questionable pasts.
Whatever it may be, it is perhaps also ironic that China’s fears of separatist movements comes about because it might be fueling it.
Back to top
China and Africa; concerns over rights and exploitation
Criticism of China’s human rights is (predictably) increasing in the West, as China rises. Some of the concerns are genuine, while others hide political agenda. Common criticisms are over areas such as human rights, environment, and labor standards. As Chinese enterprises expand overseas, especially in Africa, criticisms of exploitation are increasing.
For example, China’s silence on the Sudanese government’s policy in Darfur suggests that China is not concerned about human rights; just about its own economic interests. In Angola for example, where there are lots of oil interest (not just from China), some Chinese companies have been accused of ignoring local issues, for example by importing many materials from China rather than sourcing it locally, and even hiring Chinese only, excluding local Angolans.
A BBC television report in early July 2007 even noted that at an African/Chinese conference, the West was not there, implying the West could perhaps have been able to tame Chinese attempts at exploitation. Nothing was mentioned about the decades of Western exploitation of Africa that continues today albeit more benignly.
A BBC web site forum even asked, Is China Africa’s new master?, perhaps not realizing that by saying “new”, it appeared to acknowledge a role that the West currently attempts to fill.
It seems that there may be some double standards here.
As detailed on this site’s section on Africa and trade, economics, and poverty issues, these western nations are the very ones that have exploited Africa for many decades. Some of these nations have even overthrown potential or fledgling democracies, favoring brutal dictators that have bled their countries.
For example, the economic policies of the IMF and World Bank, backed by Washington and Europe have been very detrimental to Africa. From Structural Adjustment Policies to economic dumping (often called food aid) to other aspects of unfair aid, debt and trade deals presented as historic positive deals for Africa, these issues seem to have been ignored when raising concerns about China’s involvement (or, as the previous link also notes, are ignored even when discussing Africa).
Firoze Manji, editor of the popular pan-African social issues web site, Pambazuka News, also raises the important point that in comparison to Europe and the US, China in Africa is still a small player.
It is worth quoting Manji at some length:
… in comparison to Europe and the US, China in Africa is still a small player. While keeping an eye out on China, Africans should not be distracted from paying attention to the West's continued exploitation of the continent including the use of military might to protect its economic interests.
…
Open any newspaper and you would get the impression that the African continent, and much of the rest of the world, is in the process of being ‘devoured’ by China. Phrases such as the ‘new scramble for Africa’, ‘voracious’, ‘ravenous’ or ‘insatiable’ ‘appetite for natural resources’ are typical descriptors used to characterise China’s engagement with Africa. In contrast, the operations of western capital for the same activities are described with anodyne phrases such as ‘development’, ‘investment’, ‘employment generation’.
…
China’s involvement in Africa has three main dimensions: foreign direct investment, aid and trade. In each of these dimensions China’s engagement is dwarfed by those of US and European countries, and often smaller than those of other Asian economies.
— Firoze Manji, China still a small player in Africa, Pambazuka News, March 27, 2008
After going into further detail (worth reading) Manji concludes that China offers potential for Africa which some Western countries finds threatening, but at the same time is taking advantage of the more open environment:
China has the advantage of never having enslaved or colonized the continent. China has also not made any false promises coated with neo-liberalism. While the West, the IMF and the World Bank put conditions that only aid in their fleecing of Africa, China has so far been willing to provide unconditional aid and invest in infrastructure. At the same time, however, it freely takes full advantage of the opening up of markets that neo-liberal economic policies over the last 25 years have offered, unencumbered.
And so far, unlike the US, China has not sought to establish military bases in Africa to protect its economic interests, which the US has sought to establish through AFRICOM.
— Firoze Manji, China still a small player in Africa, Pambazuka News, March 27, 2008
Many western news outlets and campaigners are quick to point out that China offers aid with no strings attached, whereas western nations offer aid with conditions tied to human rights. While there is some truth to this, it is often overlooked that a lot of conditions by western countries are not about human rights, but about opening up African economies and it is these conditions that are often criticized.
So, it seems that Africans should be cautious about China’s interests in Africa, but also be aware that criticism levied against China by others such as various Western countries may also have double standards and be part of a wider agenda whereby the rich countries are feeling threatened by the rise of a potential economic competitor.
Back to top
More information
Detailing the various human rights issues and violations in China is a gargantuan task, and not in the scope of this web site. Here are some organizations that have done just that:
* The Human Rights in China (HRIC) web site. With the 10 year anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, on June 4, 1999 the HRIC compiled a new list of evidence detailing the crimes committed in 1989.
* Amnesty International reports
* Human Rights Watch reports
Back to top
Where next?
This article is part of the following collection:
* Human Rights In Various Regions
1. The USA and Human Rights
2. Indonesia and Human Rights
3. Haiti and Human Rights
4. Kurds and Human Rights
5. Yugoslavia and Human Rights
6. China and Human Rights
7. Tunisia and Human Rights
8. Israel and Human Rights
9. Myanmar (formerly Burma) and Human Rights
10. Australia and Human Rights
11. Cuba and Human Rights
12. Europe and Human Rights
Thursday, September 3, 2009
24) Crescimento da China
Do newsletter da União Geral dos Trabalhadores, em 31.08.2009
CHINA FAZ OBRAS PÚBLICAS:
A China faz o seu “New Deal” investindo bilhões de dólares em obras públicas. O pacote chinês é da ordem de mais de 500 bilhões e a última notícia refere-se à ampliação do Porto de Xangai, o maior terminal de cargas do mundo. Para se ter uma idéia do tamanho do porto chinês, basta compará-lo com Santos, o nosso maior porto, que ocupa o 41º lugar no ranking mundial. Os cinco maiores portos do mundo estão na Ásia, sendo três deles na China. São: Singapura, Xangai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen e Busan, este último na Coréia do Sul. O governo do Presidente Lula promove estudos para a ampliação do Porto de Santos e UGTpress já registrou esse esforço. Contudo, as providências são lentas.
OS PESSIMISTAS DA CHINA:
Com todo esse pacote monumental de obras, os pessimistas acham que a China não vai crescer mais do que 7% (isso mesmo, sete por cento) entre 2009 e 2010. Para eles, a China precisará se acomodar a um crescimento mais baixo, mas mesmo assim, impressionante para nós. Os jornais brasileiros são pródigos em apresentar, todos os dias, notícias sobre a economia da China, o que representa um sinal evidente de que essa economia se transformou na mais importante do mundo. Os Estados Unidos e a China formam hoje um par de economias que não podem se desgarrar, uma é dependente da outra e ambos, certamente, atuarão em conjunto nos fóruns internacionais na defesa dos interesses comuns.
CHINA FAZ OBRAS PÚBLICAS:
A China faz o seu “New Deal” investindo bilhões de dólares em obras públicas. O pacote chinês é da ordem de mais de 500 bilhões e a última notícia refere-se à ampliação do Porto de Xangai, o maior terminal de cargas do mundo. Para se ter uma idéia do tamanho do porto chinês, basta compará-lo com Santos, o nosso maior porto, que ocupa o 41º lugar no ranking mundial. Os cinco maiores portos do mundo estão na Ásia, sendo três deles na China. São: Singapura, Xangai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen e Busan, este último na Coréia do Sul. O governo do Presidente Lula promove estudos para a ampliação do Porto de Santos e UGTpress já registrou esse esforço. Contudo, as providências são lentas.
OS PESSIMISTAS DA CHINA:
Com todo esse pacote monumental de obras, os pessimistas acham que a China não vai crescer mais do que 7% (isso mesmo, sete por cento) entre 2009 e 2010. Para eles, a China precisará se acomodar a um crescimento mais baixo, mas mesmo assim, impressionante para nós. Os jornais brasileiros são pródigos em apresentar, todos os dias, notícias sobre a economia da China, o que representa um sinal evidente de que essa economia se transformou na mais importante do mundo. Os Estados Unidos e a China formam hoje um par de economias que não podem se desgarrar, uma é dependente da outra e ambos, certamente, atuarão em conjunto nos fóruns internacionais na defesa dos interesses comuns.
23) Is China’s Export-Oriented Growth Sustainable?
Is China’s Export-Oriented Growth Sustainable?
IMF Working Paper No. 09/172
KAI GUO, International Monetary Fund (IMF)
PAPA N’DIAYE, affiliation not provided to SSRN
This paper assesses the sustainability of China's export-oriented growth over the medium to longer term. It shows that maintaining the current export-oriented growth would require significant gains in market share through lower prices in a range of industries. This, in turn, could be achieved through a combination of increases in productivity, lower profits, and higher implicit or explicit subsidies to industry. However, the evidence suggest that it will prove difficult to accommodate such price reductions within existing profit margins or through productivity gains. Moving up the value-added chain, shifting the composition of exports, diversifying the export base, and increasing domestic value added of exports could give room to further export expansion. However, experiences from Asian economies that had similar export-oriented growth suggest there are limits to the global market share a country can occupy. Rebalancing growth toward private consumption would provide a large impetus to output growth and reduce the need for gaining further market share.
This link to pdf copy
IMF Working Paper No. 09/172
KAI GUO, International Monetary Fund (IMF)
PAPA N’DIAYE, affiliation not provided to SSRN
This paper assesses the sustainability of China's export-oriented growth over the medium to longer term. It shows that maintaining the current export-oriented growth would require significant gains in market share through lower prices in a range of industries. This, in turn, could be achieved through a combination of increases in productivity, lower profits, and higher implicit or explicit subsidies to industry. However, the evidence suggest that it will prove difficult to accommodate such price reductions within existing profit margins or through productivity gains. Moving up the value-added chain, shifting the composition of exports, diversifying the export base, and increasing domestic value added of exports could give room to further export expansion. However, experiences from Asian economies that had similar export-oriented growth suggest there are limits to the global market share a country can occupy. Rebalancing growth toward private consumption would provide a large impetus to output growth and reduce the need for gaining further market share.
This link to pdf copy
22) China: maior exportadora mundial...
China é a maior exportadora do mundo, diz OMC
O Estado de São Paulo, 2.09.2009
A China passou a ser a maior exportadora do mundo e superou Alemanha e Estados Unidos. Os dados são da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), que compilou o volume de exportações dos países de janeiro a junho de 2009 e aponta para o impacto da crise no mapa das potências comerciais.
Graças aos países asiáticos, a conclusão da OMC é de que o comércio mundial parou de cair e dá moderados sinais de recuperação. Os dados indicam que a queda nos primeiros meses do ano já se reverteu em um pequeno aumento em junho e julho. Mas a taxa ainda está distante dos níveis de 2008. Os dados ainda revelam que a retomada das exportações está sendo liderada pelos emergentes, em especial os da Ásia. Já o Brasil está estagnado em sua recuperação nos últimos dois meses.
A principal mudança provocada pela crise foi a transformação da China no maior exportador do mundo. Por uma margem mínima, Pequim superou a Alemanha, que era a líder desde 2003. A China exportou US$ 521,7 bilhões em seis meses, ante US$ 521,6 bilhões da Alemanha. Os americanos estão na terceira colocação.
Em 2002, a China era a quinta maior exportadora do mundo, com vendas anuais de US$ 325 bilhões, US$ 200 bilhões abaixo do que o país vendeu apenas nos últimos seis meses. Em 1997, era apenas a 16ª, com US$ 24,5 bilhões.
Parte da posição de número 1 da China resulta da crise. Nos últimos anos, a expansão das exportações alemãs tem sido o pilar da economia do país. Mas a recessão provocou uma reviravolta no modelo de crescimento defendido pela chanceler Angela Merkel. Ela e seu modelo enfrentam uma eleição em setembro. Com o alívio de já ter superado a recessão.
A OMC admite que não sabe se a China continuará líder até o fim do ano. Mas a realidade é que a China já é uma das líderes. No caso do Brasil, é o principal parceiro. Os chineses também já substituíram os americanos como o principal fornecedor de mercadorias à Europa. Nos últimos anos,dezenas de medidas foram adotadas contra os produtos chineses e Pequim é hoje o país mais afetado por medidas restritivas. Uma delas foiadotada pelo Brasil no início do ano, para barrar a entrada de produtos siderúrgicos chineses.
Apesar da retomada das exportações, a entidade máxima do comércio mantém a previsão de que o fluxo de importações e exportações cairá 10% em 2009, o maior recuo em décadas. Mas o que traz alívio aos analistas é que o tombo de mais de 40% em Cingapura, Japão e Coreia em janeiro e fevereiro já não está ocorrendo.
A principal força na recuperação do comércio é a Ásia. Na China, as exportações passaram de US$ 95 bilhões em junho para US$ 105 bilhões em julho. Ainda assim, a taxa é 23% abaixo de julho de 2008. As importações chinesas também cresceram entre junho e julho, de US$ 87 bilhões para US$ 94,7 bilhões. Ainda assim, a taxa é 14% inferior ao mesmo período de 2008.
Na China, a queda de exportações em janeiro foi a maior desde que o país decidiu romper com alguns dogmas do comunismo e abrir a economia,há 30 anos. Em janeiro, a redução das exportações foi de 29%, a maior desde 1979. Agora, grande parte do crescimento do comércio asiático é resultado da retomada industrial na região.
,
Os dados da OMC também mostram estagnação do Brasil. Entre junho e julho, as exportações chegaram a cair, de US$ 14,5 bilhões para US$ 14,1 bilhões. Mas ainda são superiores aos US$ 12 bilhões de maio.A corrente de comércio em julho foi de US$ 25,3 bilhões, com recuo de 32% em relação ao mesmo mês do ano passado. A queda só não foi maior nas exportações brasileiras graças às compras de empresas chinesas no setor primário.
O Estado de São Paulo, 2.09.2009
A China passou a ser a maior exportadora do mundo e superou Alemanha e Estados Unidos. Os dados são da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), que compilou o volume de exportações dos países de janeiro a junho de 2009 e aponta para o impacto da crise no mapa das potências comerciais.
Graças aos países asiáticos, a conclusão da OMC é de que o comércio mundial parou de cair e dá moderados sinais de recuperação. Os dados indicam que a queda nos primeiros meses do ano já se reverteu em um pequeno aumento em junho e julho. Mas a taxa ainda está distante dos níveis de 2008. Os dados ainda revelam que a retomada das exportações está sendo liderada pelos emergentes, em especial os da Ásia. Já o Brasil está estagnado em sua recuperação nos últimos dois meses.
A principal mudança provocada pela crise foi a transformação da China no maior exportador do mundo. Por uma margem mínima, Pequim superou a Alemanha, que era a líder desde 2003. A China exportou US$ 521,7 bilhões em seis meses, ante US$ 521,6 bilhões da Alemanha. Os americanos estão na terceira colocação.
Em 2002, a China era a quinta maior exportadora do mundo, com vendas anuais de US$ 325 bilhões, US$ 200 bilhões abaixo do que o país vendeu apenas nos últimos seis meses. Em 1997, era apenas a 16ª, com US$ 24,5 bilhões.
Parte da posição de número 1 da China resulta da crise. Nos últimos anos, a expansão das exportações alemãs tem sido o pilar da economia do país. Mas a recessão provocou uma reviravolta no modelo de crescimento defendido pela chanceler Angela Merkel. Ela e seu modelo enfrentam uma eleição em setembro. Com o alívio de já ter superado a recessão.
A OMC admite que não sabe se a China continuará líder até o fim do ano. Mas a realidade é que a China já é uma das líderes. No caso do Brasil, é o principal parceiro. Os chineses também já substituíram os americanos como o principal fornecedor de mercadorias à Europa. Nos últimos anos,dezenas de medidas foram adotadas contra os produtos chineses e Pequim é hoje o país mais afetado por medidas restritivas. Uma delas foiadotada pelo Brasil no início do ano, para barrar a entrada de produtos siderúrgicos chineses.
Apesar da retomada das exportações, a entidade máxima do comércio mantém a previsão de que o fluxo de importações e exportações cairá 10% em 2009, o maior recuo em décadas. Mas o que traz alívio aos analistas é que o tombo de mais de 40% em Cingapura, Japão e Coreia em janeiro e fevereiro já não está ocorrendo.
A principal força na recuperação do comércio é a Ásia. Na China, as exportações passaram de US$ 95 bilhões em junho para US$ 105 bilhões em julho. Ainda assim, a taxa é 23% abaixo de julho de 2008. As importações chinesas também cresceram entre junho e julho, de US$ 87 bilhões para US$ 94,7 bilhões. Ainda assim, a taxa é 14% inferior ao mesmo período de 2008.
Na China, a queda de exportações em janeiro foi a maior desde que o país decidiu romper com alguns dogmas do comunismo e abrir a economia,há 30 anos. Em janeiro, a redução das exportações foi de 29%, a maior desde 1979. Agora, grande parte do crescimento do comércio asiático é resultado da retomada industrial na região.
,
Os dados da OMC também mostram estagnação do Brasil. Entre junho e julho, as exportações chegaram a cair, de US$ 14,5 bilhões para US$ 14,1 bilhões. Mas ainda são superiores aos US$ 12 bilhões de maio.A corrente de comércio em julho foi de US$ 25,3 bilhões, com recuo de 32% em relação ao mesmo mês do ano passado. A queda só não foi maior nas exportações brasileiras graças às compras de empresas chinesas no setor primário.
Wednesday, September 2, 2009
21) China reforça a segurança para o aniversário da revolução de 1949
China reforça segurança para 60º aniversário da revolução
Valor Econômico, 30/09/2009
A China comemora o sexagésimo aniversário de sua revolução, quando os comunistas venceram a guerra civil contra os nacionalistas e implantaram o regime atual. Neste ano, as autoridades tomaram medidas de segurança excepcionais e usaram mais de 200 mil policiais e 1 milhão de voluntários para vigiar a Praça Tiananmen, em Pequim, onde haverá uma parada. Os hotéis que estão nas proximidades tiveram todos os seus quartos "requisitados pelo Estado" e permanecerão fechados. Os hotéis que estão distantes de Tiananmen, mas no caminho que será percorrido pela parada, terão que esvaziar todos os quartos que dão para a avenida principal de Pequim. Em 1º de outubro de 1949, o líder chinês Mao Tsé-tung fez um discurso em Tiananmen no qual declarou fundada a república comunista. Na foto, de ontem, policiais se perfilam na praça para uma cerimônia de troca de bandeiras.
Valor Econômico, 30/09/2009
A China comemora o sexagésimo aniversário de sua revolução, quando os comunistas venceram a guerra civil contra os nacionalistas e implantaram o regime atual. Neste ano, as autoridades tomaram medidas de segurança excepcionais e usaram mais de 200 mil policiais e 1 milhão de voluntários para vigiar a Praça Tiananmen, em Pequim, onde haverá uma parada. Os hotéis que estão nas proximidades tiveram todos os seus quartos "requisitados pelo Estado" e permanecerão fechados. Os hotéis que estão distantes de Tiananmen, mas no caminho que será percorrido pela parada, terão que esvaziar todos os quartos que dão para a avenida principal de Pequim. Em 1º de outubro de 1949, o líder chinês Mao Tsé-tung fez um discurso em Tiananmen no qual declarou fundada a república comunista. Na foto, de ontem, policiais se perfilam na praça para uma cerimônia de troca de bandeiras.
20) China mantém política econômica
China mantém política econômica
O primeiro-ministro chinês Wen Jiabao reiterou que o país vai continuar seguindo sua estratégia de estabilização econômica. Elas consistem em uma política fiscal ativa (aumento dos gastos) e uma política monetária flexível (ajuste do juro). Jiabao reafirmou o compromisso econômico do país ao presidente do Banco Mundial, Robert Zoellick, que visita a China e aproveita para ver projetos financiados pelo banco na região.
Nota PRA: Seria interessante conhecer o pensamento de certos economistas brasileiros sobre a política econômica da China...
O primeiro-ministro chinês Wen Jiabao reiterou que o país vai continuar seguindo sua estratégia de estabilização econômica. Elas consistem em uma política fiscal ativa (aumento dos gastos) e uma política monetária flexível (ajuste do juro). Jiabao reafirmou o compromisso econômico do país ao presidente do Banco Mundial, Robert Zoellick, que visita a China e aproveita para ver projetos financiados pelo banco na região.
Nota PRA: Seria interessante conhecer o pensamento de certos economistas brasileiros sobre a política econômica da China...
19) Retrocesso cambial com a China
Não considero uma idéia particularmente brilhante. O mundo demorou muitos anos para adotar um regime multilateral de pagamentos. Retroceder para moedas não conversíveis, num esquema puramente bilateral de comércio, não é um avanço, e sim um retrocesso...
Brasil e China devem substituir dólar no comércio bilateral
O presidente do Banco Central do Brasil, Henrique Meirelles, explicou em declarações ao The Wall Street Journal que o acordo com a China deverá beneficiar, essencialmente, os pequenos exportadores, ao permitir redução de custos, enquanto que os grandes exportadores deverão continuar a recorrer ao dólar americano.
As negociações começaram em junho, depois de o presidente Lula ter lançado a proposta durante a sua visita à China, em maio, com vista a incrementar o comércio bilateral e a reduzir a dependência face ao dólar nas trocas comerciais.
A China assinou recentemente acordo semelhante com a Argentina, o primeiro país da América do Sul a beneficiar-se das trocas comerciais na respectiva moeda com o gigante asiático.
O Brasil e a Argentina têm o mesmo acordo desde setembro de 2008 e, em julho, as exportações do Brasil para aquele país atingiram R$ 26 milhões em 109 transações efetuadas, o máximo atingido desde a entrada em vigor do acordo, o que representa ainda cerca de 2,1% do total de exportações do Brasil para a Argentina, segundo dados do banco central brasileiro.
Até agora, apenas as empresas de dez países da Associação das Nações do Sudeste Asiático estão autorizadas a realizar trocas comerciais em renmimbi com empresas de cinco cidades do continente chinês, Hong Kong e Macau, sob um programa piloto que teve início em julho e que envolve no total 400 empresas.
Brasil e China devem substituir dólar no comércio bilateral
O presidente do Banco Central do Brasil, Henrique Meirelles, explicou em declarações ao The Wall Street Journal que o acordo com a China deverá beneficiar, essencialmente, os pequenos exportadores, ao permitir redução de custos, enquanto que os grandes exportadores deverão continuar a recorrer ao dólar americano.
As negociações começaram em junho, depois de o presidente Lula ter lançado a proposta durante a sua visita à China, em maio, com vista a incrementar o comércio bilateral e a reduzir a dependência face ao dólar nas trocas comerciais.
A China assinou recentemente acordo semelhante com a Argentina, o primeiro país da América do Sul a beneficiar-se das trocas comerciais na respectiva moeda com o gigante asiático.
O Brasil e a Argentina têm o mesmo acordo desde setembro de 2008 e, em julho, as exportações do Brasil para aquele país atingiram R$ 26 milhões em 109 transações efetuadas, o máximo atingido desde a entrada em vigor do acordo, o que representa ainda cerca de 2,1% do total de exportações do Brasil para a Argentina, segundo dados do banco central brasileiro.
Até agora, apenas as empresas de dez países da Associação das Nações do Sudeste Asiático estão autorizadas a realizar trocas comerciais em renmimbi com empresas de cinco cidades do continente chinês, Hong Kong e Macau, sob um programa piloto que teve início em julho e que envolve no total 400 empresas.
18) China se torna mais dificil a investidores estrangeiros
Pelo menos é o que diz esta matéria do Daily Telegraph, da Grã-Bretanha, e esta é mesmo a minha impressão. Com seu crescimento econômico e desenvolvimento social, a China se torna mais assertiva e passa a exibir traços de nacionalismo antes inexistentes...
China Closes Doors to European Businesses
(Short)
Doing business in China is getting harder, not easier, according to European businesses, as they laid out almost 600 pages of complaints in a new report. The report paints a troubling picture of the Chinese business landscape, filled with discrimination against foreign companies, arbitrary laws and regulations, and abuses of China's World Trade Organization obligations. (telegraph.co.uk)
China closes doors to European businesses
Doing business in China is getting harder, not easier, according to European businesses, as they laid out almost 600 pages of complaints in a new report.
By Malcolm Moore in Shanghai
The Daily Telegraph, 02 Sep 2009
The report, from the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, covers the whole gamut of the Chinese economy, from industrial chemicals to mobile phones to banking.
It paints a troubling picture of the Chinese business landscape, filled with discrimination against foreign companies, arbitrary laws and regulations, and abuses of China's World Trade Organisation obligations.
Although China has repeatedly complained about protectionism in the United States and Europe, the report suggests that China is one of the most protectionist major economies.
Joerg Wuttke, the president of the European Chamber, warned that "China needs Europe more than Europe needs China", and pointed out that the EU is a bigger market than the US for China, and exports to European countries make up 7pc of Chinese GDP.
According to the World Bank, China ranks 83rd out of 181 countries in its annual assessment of how easy it is to do business. The emerging superpower scored lower than Kenya, Vanuatu and Colombia, but was judged better than Sierra Leone and Belarus.
Now, however, the business climate is getting worse. Mr Wuttke said in many sectors there had been "a slowdown, and in some cases partial reversal, of the reforms of recent years".
He noted that there have been a rising number of government interventions and that foreign investment restrictions have also increased. The EU report contains over 500 recommendations on how China could improve the situation, drawn from the 1,400 European companies working in the country.
In particular, the report criticises China's joint-venture requirements, which means that foreign companies in some sectors can only own up to 50pc of a company.
In the car sector, Chinese companies are able to buy European car makers, but foreign manufacturers in China have to do joint-ventures to operate and are allowed a maximum of two plants.
Meanwhile, foreign companies have been repeatedly barred for bidding from government contracts, even though China pledged that its Pounds400 billion of stimulus cash would be allocated to both local and foreign firms. "Bids by four foreign-invested wind energy companies in Shanghai, Shandong and Tianjin for a Eu5 billion project for 25 sets of wind turbine generators were rejected in the first round," the report notes.
The European Chamber says foreign companies are "excluded outright" from China's service sector, and uses Amadeus, a Spanish travel-booking company, as an example. More than seven years since China signed up to the WTO, it has still not granted Amadeus, a computer travel reservation system, the right to issue tickets and reservations to the growing Chinese market.
Meanwhile, China's host of technical regulations and certification procedures "blatantly discriminate" against foreign companies, said Dr Wuttke. The report cites an unnamed company that was the market leader in providing encryption services to Chinese banking, telecoms and public transport firms until the government "suddenly" required a new certification from the Office of Security Commercial Code Administration (OSCCA). "Not one foreign company or foreign-invested Chinese company has to date received OSCCA certification," the report points out.
More problems included a lack of transparency over regulations, little consultation, and an unfair enforcement of rules against foreign companies when Chinese firms are rarely picked up.
Dr Wuttke, who has complained in the past that China has not permitted a single major takeover by a foreign company of a domestic firm, also said government decisions were rarely explained. "There was no substantive analysis or evidence supporting the rejection of Coca Cola's merger with Huiyan, which doesn't help dispel suspicions of protectionism," he said.
China Closes Doors to European Businesses
(Short)
Doing business in China is getting harder, not easier, according to European businesses, as they laid out almost 600 pages of complaints in a new report. The report paints a troubling picture of the Chinese business landscape, filled with discrimination against foreign companies, arbitrary laws and regulations, and abuses of China's World Trade Organization obligations. (telegraph.co.uk)
China closes doors to European businesses
Doing business in China is getting harder, not easier, according to European businesses, as they laid out almost 600 pages of complaints in a new report.
By Malcolm Moore in Shanghai
The Daily Telegraph, 02 Sep 2009
The report, from the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, covers the whole gamut of the Chinese economy, from industrial chemicals to mobile phones to banking.
It paints a troubling picture of the Chinese business landscape, filled with discrimination against foreign companies, arbitrary laws and regulations, and abuses of China's World Trade Organisation obligations.
Although China has repeatedly complained about protectionism in the United States and Europe, the report suggests that China is one of the most protectionist major economies.
Joerg Wuttke, the president of the European Chamber, warned that "China needs Europe more than Europe needs China", and pointed out that the EU is a bigger market than the US for China, and exports to European countries make up 7pc of Chinese GDP.
According to the World Bank, China ranks 83rd out of 181 countries in its annual assessment of how easy it is to do business. The emerging superpower scored lower than Kenya, Vanuatu and Colombia, but was judged better than Sierra Leone and Belarus.
Now, however, the business climate is getting worse. Mr Wuttke said in many sectors there had been "a slowdown, and in some cases partial reversal, of the reforms of recent years".
He noted that there have been a rising number of government interventions and that foreign investment restrictions have also increased. The EU report contains over 500 recommendations on how China could improve the situation, drawn from the 1,400 European companies working in the country.
In particular, the report criticises China's joint-venture requirements, which means that foreign companies in some sectors can only own up to 50pc of a company.
In the car sector, Chinese companies are able to buy European car makers, but foreign manufacturers in China have to do joint-ventures to operate and are allowed a maximum of two plants.
Meanwhile, foreign companies have been repeatedly barred for bidding from government contracts, even though China pledged that its Pounds400 billion of stimulus cash would be allocated to both local and foreign firms. "Bids by four foreign-invested wind energy companies in Shanghai, Shandong and Tianjin for a Eu5 billion project for 25 sets of wind turbine generators were rejected in the first round," the report notes.
The European Chamber says foreign companies are "excluded outright" from China's service sector, and uses Amadeus, a Spanish travel-booking company, as an example. More than seven years since China signed up to the WTO, it has still not granted Amadeus, a computer travel reservation system, the right to issue tickets and reservations to the growing Chinese market.
Meanwhile, China's host of technical regulations and certification procedures "blatantly discriminate" against foreign companies, said Dr Wuttke. The report cites an unnamed company that was the market leader in providing encryption services to Chinese banking, telecoms and public transport firms until the government "suddenly" required a new certification from the Office of Security Commercial Code Administration (OSCCA). "Not one foreign company or foreign-invested Chinese company has to date received OSCCA certification," the report points out.
More problems included a lack of transparency over regulations, little consultation, and an unfair enforcement of rules against foreign companies when Chinese firms are rarely picked up.
Dr Wuttke, who has complained in the past that China has not permitted a single major takeover by a foreign company of a domestic firm, also said government decisions were rarely explained. "There was no substantive analysis or evidence supporting the rejection of Coca Cola's merger with Huiyan, which doesn't help dispel suspicions of protectionism," he said.
Tuesday, September 1, 2009
17) Relacoes EUA-China: sem ser o que poderia ser...
OPINION
The Yin and Yang of U.S.-China Relations
Don't expect a 'strategic alliance' anytime soon.
By BY IAN BREMMER AND NOURIEL ROUBINI
The Wall Street Journal, SEPTEMBER 1, 2009
American and Chinese officials said all the right things during this summer's inaugural round of their Strategic and Economic Dialogue. President Barack Obama pledged to "forge a path to the future that we seek for our children." Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo wondered aloud whether America and China can "build better relations despite very different social systems, cultures and histories." He answered his own question, in English, with a "Yes we can."
They can, but they probably won't. Yes, Mr. Obama will visit China in November. But when it comes to international burden-sharing, Washington is focused on geopolitical headaches while China confines its heavy-lifting to geoeconomic challenges. The two sides have good reason to cooperate, but there's a growing gap between what Washington expects from Beijing and what the Chinese can deliver.
Many of the issues that create conflict in U.S.-Chinese relations are well known: an enormous bilateral trade deficit, disputes over the value of China's currency, protections for U.S. intellectual property, the dollar's role as international reserve currency, conflicts over human rights, naval altercations, protectionist threats from both sides, and disagreements over how best to handle North Korea's Kim Jong Il. But there are other, less obvious obstacles to partnership.
First, both governments remain largely focused on formidable domestic challenges. Mr. Obama knows his political fortunes depend largely on the resilience of the U.S. economy and its ability to generate jobs. He's occupied for the moment with a high-stakes poker game with lawmakers in his own party over ambitious health-care and energy-reform plans.
China's leadership faces competing internal demands from those who want to stimulate the economy toward another round of export-driven growth and others who want to shift quickly toward greater dependence on domestic consumption. Given the trade deficit, Washington would like Beijing to focus on the latter, but China won't move as fast as the U.S. would like, in part because the leadership recognizes that the loss of millions of manufacturing and construction jobs in recent months could fuel further turmoil in a country that already sees tens of thousands of large-scale protests each year.
Second, there's the bureaucratic problem. For the past several years, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson chaired a strategic dialogue with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan. Washington and Beijing have now expanded the scope of talks to include the State Department and China's foreign ministry. Leaving aside the difficulties in building trust between U.S. and Chinese negotiators, State and Treasury don't coordinate well on strategy, and there's no guarantee that China's foreign and finance ministries will work seamlessly together either. The new formula for talks is bureaucratic infighting squared.
The third reason the U.S. and China won't build a durable strategic partnership is that Beijing has little appetite for the larger geopolitical role Washington would like it to play. Why should Beijing accept the risks that come with direct involvement in conflicts involving Iran and Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Israelis and Palestinians, Somalia and Sudan, and other sources of potential turmoil? It has more immediate problems at home.
On many issues where the U.S. wants China's support—on Iran's nuclear program, for example—Beijing's interests don't coincide with Washington's. Even in East Asia, China has good reason to avoid the heavy lifting on security, because the U.S. naval presence limits the risk that Japan, India, and other states will spend much more money on their militaries.
It's not as though Beijing is enjoying a free ride. China's more than $2 trillion in foreign currency reserves gives its leadership enormous clout as international lender of last resort. Its considerable contribution to global stability is mainly in financing Washington's spiraling debt. By righting its own economy, China can be the primary engine of near-term global growth. Isn't that service enough, Chinese officials ask, at a time when economic crises aggravate so many international problems?
The one tangible result of this summer's Strategic and Economic dialogue, a "memorandum of understanding" on climate change, reveals the larger problem. It's valuable to have an agreement in principle, but there were no hard choices on the primary bone of contention—carbon emissions. That's a problem that will generate friction in months to come.
Whenever U.S. and Chinese officials get together these days, they trigger a new round of speculation that the world's most important bilateral relationship might soon become its most valuable strategic alliance. It's wrong to entirely dismiss the value of effective speeches and positive political symbolism. But as U.S. and Chinese negotiators move from words to work, they're going to be pulling in different directions.
Mr. Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group, is co-author of "The Fat Tail: The Power of Political Knowledge for Strategic Investing" (Oxford University Press, 2009). Mr. Roubini is a professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of Business and chairman of RGE Monitor.
Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A15
The Yin and Yang of U.S.-China Relations
Don't expect a 'strategic alliance' anytime soon.
By BY IAN BREMMER AND NOURIEL ROUBINI
The Wall Street Journal, SEPTEMBER 1, 2009
American and Chinese officials said all the right things during this summer's inaugural round of their Strategic and Economic Dialogue. President Barack Obama pledged to "forge a path to the future that we seek for our children." Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo wondered aloud whether America and China can "build better relations despite very different social systems, cultures and histories." He answered his own question, in English, with a "Yes we can."
They can, but they probably won't. Yes, Mr. Obama will visit China in November. But when it comes to international burden-sharing, Washington is focused on geopolitical headaches while China confines its heavy-lifting to geoeconomic challenges. The two sides have good reason to cooperate, but there's a growing gap between what Washington expects from Beijing and what the Chinese can deliver.
Many of the issues that create conflict in U.S.-Chinese relations are well known: an enormous bilateral trade deficit, disputes over the value of China's currency, protections for U.S. intellectual property, the dollar's role as international reserve currency, conflicts over human rights, naval altercations, protectionist threats from both sides, and disagreements over how best to handle North Korea's Kim Jong Il. But there are other, less obvious obstacles to partnership.
First, both governments remain largely focused on formidable domestic challenges. Mr. Obama knows his political fortunes depend largely on the resilience of the U.S. economy and its ability to generate jobs. He's occupied for the moment with a high-stakes poker game with lawmakers in his own party over ambitious health-care and energy-reform plans.
China's leadership faces competing internal demands from those who want to stimulate the economy toward another round of export-driven growth and others who want to shift quickly toward greater dependence on domestic consumption. Given the trade deficit, Washington would like Beijing to focus on the latter, but China won't move as fast as the U.S. would like, in part because the leadership recognizes that the loss of millions of manufacturing and construction jobs in recent months could fuel further turmoil in a country that already sees tens of thousands of large-scale protests each year.
Second, there's the bureaucratic problem. For the past several years, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson chaired a strategic dialogue with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan. Washington and Beijing have now expanded the scope of talks to include the State Department and China's foreign ministry. Leaving aside the difficulties in building trust between U.S. and Chinese negotiators, State and Treasury don't coordinate well on strategy, and there's no guarantee that China's foreign and finance ministries will work seamlessly together either. The new formula for talks is bureaucratic infighting squared.
The third reason the U.S. and China won't build a durable strategic partnership is that Beijing has little appetite for the larger geopolitical role Washington would like it to play. Why should Beijing accept the risks that come with direct involvement in conflicts involving Iran and Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Israelis and Palestinians, Somalia and Sudan, and other sources of potential turmoil? It has more immediate problems at home.
On many issues where the U.S. wants China's support—on Iran's nuclear program, for example—Beijing's interests don't coincide with Washington's. Even in East Asia, China has good reason to avoid the heavy lifting on security, because the U.S. naval presence limits the risk that Japan, India, and other states will spend much more money on their militaries.
It's not as though Beijing is enjoying a free ride. China's more than $2 trillion in foreign currency reserves gives its leadership enormous clout as international lender of last resort. Its considerable contribution to global stability is mainly in financing Washington's spiraling debt. By righting its own economy, China can be the primary engine of near-term global growth. Isn't that service enough, Chinese officials ask, at a time when economic crises aggravate so many international problems?
The one tangible result of this summer's Strategic and Economic dialogue, a "memorandum of understanding" on climate change, reveals the larger problem. It's valuable to have an agreement in principle, but there were no hard choices on the primary bone of contention—carbon emissions. That's a problem that will generate friction in months to come.
Whenever U.S. and Chinese officials get together these days, they trigger a new round of speculation that the world's most important bilateral relationship might soon become its most valuable strategic alliance. It's wrong to entirely dismiss the value of effective speeches and positive political symbolism. But as U.S. and Chinese negotiators move from words to work, they're going to be pulling in different directions.
Mr. Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group, is co-author of "The Fat Tail: The Power of Political Knowledge for Strategic Investing" (Oxford University Press, 2009). Mr. Roubini is a professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of Business and chairman of RGE Monitor.
Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A15
Monday, August 31, 2009
16) A China continua fazendo o que ela faz, muito bem...
China copia marcas do Brasil e exporta para outros países
PEDRO SOARES
da Folha de S.Paulo, no Rio, 31/08/2009
Comum no comércio popular de rua das grandes cidades do país, a pirataria de artigos de grifes internacionais -como Nike, Adidas, Gucci, Versace, Montblanc e tantas outras- atinge também marcas brasileiras, copiadas especialmente na China e até exportadas para outros países. Existem casos de pirataria de tesouras, biquínis, cadeados, fechaduras, calçados e bebidas, entre outros artigos.
Em julho deste ano, a aduana do Peru apreendeu um carregamento de 13,5 mil tesouras com a marca brasileira Mundial, pirateadas na China, conforme comprovaram notas fiscais. Em 2005, outra carga com 17 mil unidades do produto também foi confiscada, diz Rafael Lima, sócio do escritório de advocacia Dannemann Siemsen, que cuida da marca Mundial e de outras empresas.
O escritório, diz, teve informações, pela filial da Mundial na China, de que havia a possibilidade de uma exportação irregular para o Peru. Contatou, então, a aduana e o órgão de marcas e patentes local (o Inpi de lá) e fez as apreensões.
Diferentemente do Brasil, não é necessária ação da polícia ou da Justiça para realizar as apreensões, ordenadas pelo órgão de marcas e patentes do Peru. O mesmo ocorre na China.
Por conta disso, diz, foi possível apreender um lote de 960 mil tesouras "clonadas" da Mundial numa fábrica chinesa em 2005. "Conseguimos infiltrar um funcionário na fábrica, que fez fotos e colheu provas", afirma Lima.
Ousadia maior foi a de uma empresa de bebidas da China que pirateou uma marca líder brasileira, cujo fabricante não permite a divulgação do nome. Os produtos eram vendidos com o rótulo da marca nacional em churrascarias em Xangai e Pequim. Foram apreendidos, na época, 600 mil vasilhames.
Em junho, a fabricante gaúcha de fechaduras e cadeados Soprano conseguiu reaver sua marca na China, que havia sido registrada irregularmente por uma empresa local. O início da disputa pela propriedade da marca ocorreu após o fim do contrato de licença entre a Soprano e a chinesa Gold God.
Gustavo Miotti, diretor da Soprano, diz que os produtos eram distribuídos no mercado chinês. "Achamos nossas fechaduras em lojas do Carrefour de lá. A situação está mudando, mas era muito comum ver produtos pirateados em saldões dos supermercados chineses."
Perda de tempo e dinheiro
A reportagem também ouviu o relato de uma marca famosa de sandálias de dedo e calçados pirateados na China e exportados para outros mercados. Procurada pela Folha, a empresa não se manifestou até a conclusão desta edição.
Uma das marcas mais famosas de moda praia do país, a carioca Salinas também foi alvo de pirataria. Biquínis, estampas e marca da empresa foram copiados em vários mercados, como EUA, México e Coreia.
No México, a Salinas, que vende seus produtos para 42 países, acionou uma firma local que produzia biquínis idênticos aos de suas coleções. A disputa levou três anos e só há pouco tempo a empresa conseguiu exportar para o México.
Recentemente, também conseguiu tirar do ar um site da Coreia que usava sua logomarca e vendia produtos similares aos seus.
"Manter uma marca é um custo muito alto. Gastamos US$ 35 mil em cada uma dessas disputas e mais de US$ 2.000 em cada país para registrar a marca. Muitas vezes nem vale a pena exportar", diz Antonio de Biasi, sócio da empresa.
Michael Ceitlin, presidente da Mundial, afirma que a marca já foi diversas vezes pirateada no Brasil e no exterior. "É uma prática muito mais comum do que se imagina. A pirataria de marcas brasileiras está crescendo porque as empresas do país estão se destacando em muitos mercados."
Mas a situação já foi pior. "A China já começa a dar decisões favoráveis às empresas internacionais. Desde que o país entrou para a OMC, ocorreram revisões de leis e regulamentações", diz Gustavo Rabello, do Noronha Advogados, que cuidou do caso da Soprano.
PEDRO SOARES
da Folha de S.Paulo, no Rio, 31/08/2009
Comum no comércio popular de rua das grandes cidades do país, a pirataria de artigos de grifes internacionais -como Nike, Adidas, Gucci, Versace, Montblanc e tantas outras- atinge também marcas brasileiras, copiadas especialmente na China e até exportadas para outros países. Existem casos de pirataria de tesouras, biquínis, cadeados, fechaduras, calçados e bebidas, entre outros artigos.
Em julho deste ano, a aduana do Peru apreendeu um carregamento de 13,5 mil tesouras com a marca brasileira Mundial, pirateadas na China, conforme comprovaram notas fiscais. Em 2005, outra carga com 17 mil unidades do produto também foi confiscada, diz Rafael Lima, sócio do escritório de advocacia Dannemann Siemsen, que cuida da marca Mundial e de outras empresas.
O escritório, diz, teve informações, pela filial da Mundial na China, de que havia a possibilidade de uma exportação irregular para o Peru. Contatou, então, a aduana e o órgão de marcas e patentes local (o Inpi de lá) e fez as apreensões.
Diferentemente do Brasil, não é necessária ação da polícia ou da Justiça para realizar as apreensões, ordenadas pelo órgão de marcas e patentes do Peru. O mesmo ocorre na China.
Por conta disso, diz, foi possível apreender um lote de 960 mil tesouras "clonadas" da Mundial numa fábrica chinesa em 2005. "Conseguimos infiltrar um funcionário na fábrica, que fez fotos e colheu provas", afirma Lima.
Ousadia maior foi a de uma empresa de bebidas da China que pirateou uma marca líder brasileira, cujo fabricante não permite a divulgação do nome. Os produtos eram vendidos com o rótulo da marca nacional em churrascarias em Xangai e Pequim. Foram apreendidos, na época, 600 mil vasilhames.
Em junho, a fabricante gaúcha de fechaduras e cadeados Soprano conseguiu reaver sua marca na China, que havia sido registrada irregularmente por uma empresa local. O início da disputa pela propriedade da marca ocorreu após o fim do contrato de licença entre a Soprano e a chinesa Gold God.
Gustavo Miotti, diretor da Soprano, diz que os produtos eram distribuídos no mercado chinês. "Achamos nossas fechaduras em lojas do Carrefour de lá. A situação está mudando, mas era muito comum ver produtos pirateados em saldões dos supermercados chineses."
Perda de tempo e dinheiro
A reportagem também ouviu o relato de uma marca famosa de sandálias de dedo e calçados pirateados na China e exportados para outros mercados. Procurada pela Folha, a empresa não se manifestou até a conclusão desta edição.
Uma das marcas mais famosas de moda praia do país, a carioca Salinas também foi alvo de pirataria. Biquínis, estampas e marca da empresa foram copiados em vários mercados, como EUA, México e Coreia.
No México, a Salinas, que vende seus produtos para 42 países, acionou uma firma local que produzia biquínis idênticos aos de suas coleções. A disputa levou três anos e só há pouco tempo a empresa conseguiu exportar para o México.
Recentemente, também conseguiu tirar do ar um site da Coreia que usava sua logomarca e vendia produtos similares aos seus.
"Manter uma marca é um custo muito alto. Gastamos US$ 35 mil em cada uma dessas disputas e mais de US$ 2.000 em cada país para registrar a marca. Muitas vezes nem vale a pena exportar", diz Antonio de Biasi, sócio da empresa.
Michael Ceitlin, presidente da Mundial, afirma que a marca já foi diversas vezes pirateada no Brasil e no exterior. "É uma prática muito mais comum do que se imagina. A pirataria de marcas brasileiras está crescendo porque as empresas do país estão se destacando em muitos mercados."
Mas a situação já foi pior. "A China já começa a dar decisões favoráveis às empresas internacionais. Desde que o país entrou para a OMC, ocorreram revisões de leis e regulamentações", diz Gustavo Rabello, do Noronha Advogados, que cuidou do caso da Soprano.
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