Investimento chinês exclui o Brasil
Paula Puliti
O Estado de S. Paulo, 27.11.2009
A China tem surpreendido o mundo com o salto de seus investimentos produtivos no exterior. Mas o Brasil parece fora desse movimento. A relação bilateral tem de fato se intensificado, só que, basicamente, no âmbito comercial. Enquanto os chineses absorvem cerca de 10% das exportações brasileiras, puxadas por soja e minério de ferro, o investimento direto em solo nacional é exíguo, apesar dos esforços de aproximação.
Hoje, chega ao Brasil uma missão de 350 empresas chinesas de diversos setores, das quais 125 são potenciais investidoras tanto no setor produtivo quanto no financeiro, segundo a Apex, a agência oficial de promoção de exportações e investimentos. Entre elas estão a Beiqi Foton Motor (automóveis), Datang Capital (tecnologia da informação), Sinochem Group (petróleo) e o Agricultural Bank of China e Bank of Communications of Shanghai.
Segundo dados do Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior, as vendas para a Ásia (leia-se China) aumentaram 4,2% de janeiro a setembro deste ano, colocando a região na primeira posição de mercado comprador, superando a União Europeia (UE). Em 2008, a China comprou US$ 16,4 bilhões do Brasil.
Já em investimento direto, os últimos dados disponíveis do Banco Central mostram que a posição de estoque da China no Brasil não passava de US$ 238,7 milhões até abril, segundo levantamento do economista Luís Afonso Lima, presidente da Sociedade Brasileira de Estudos de Empresas Transnacionais e da Globalização Econômica.
O valor real, na verdade, é uma incógnita, já que muitos dos recursos chineses que ingressam no Brasil podem vir por meio de terceiros países. Mas, mesmo que seja o dobro do que registra o BC, o valor é irrisório, para o secretário executivo do Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China, Rodrigo Maciel. Apesar de ser relativamente nova no cenário, a China já tem perfil de investidor mundial.
Em 2008, a China respondeu por 2,8% dos fluxos globais de investimentos diretos produtivos, que corresponde a US$ 52 bilhões, mais que o dobro do de 2007, segundo a Conferência das Nações Unidas sobre Comércio e Desenvolvimento (Unctad). O Brasil recebeu menos de US$ 38 milhões.
Segundo Lima, o IED chinês ainda se concentra na Coreia do Sul, no Japão e Vietnã. Fora da Ásia, o foco é a África. A China quer matérias primas para sustentar seu crescimento.
O dado exato é difícil de obter, concorda Márcia Nejaim, gerente-geral de Investimentos da Apex. O que sabemos é que os investimentos no Brasil são pequenos, quando se compara com outros países.
O presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva visitou a China mais de uma vez, assim como o presidente Hu Jintao veio ao Brasil. Mas quase nada se reverteu em investimento produtivo.
Uma exceção foi a Petrobrás, que em outubro obteve um empréstimo de US$ 10 bilhões do China Development Bank. Também fez acordo com a Sinopec, gigante chinesa do petróleo, para cooperação nas áreas de exploração, refino, petroquímica e suprimento de bens e serviços para a indústria do petróleo.
O empresário Eike Batista também está prestes a acertar sociedade entre a Wuhan Iron & Steel e a MMX Mineração e Metálicos.
Friday, November 27, 2009
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
110) A poupança dos chineses
A poupança dos chineses
Revista Época, 25/11/09
A China vem se tornando uma potência econômica mundial. De fato, nos últimos 25 anos, o crescimento da sua economia tem sido impressionante, na casa dos 7% ao ano (por habitante). A China já é provavelmente o segundo PIB mundial e tem aumentado constantemente sua participação no comércio internacional. Mas apesar disso, viver na China, pelo menos no presente, não deve ser lá muito agradável. Não apenas pela falta de liberdades, mas também pelo fato de que os chineses, ainda muito pobres (a renda por habitante ainda é cerca de metade da brasileira), poupam mais de metade de sua renda! Qual a graça de consumir tão pouco?
Essa tremenda poupança, é fato, facilita o crescimento via acumulação de capital. E quando a economia ainda se encontra em estágios prematuros de desenvolvimento, essa é a via mais natural de expansão do PIB. Mas o investimento, em estonteantes 40% do PIB, ainda consegue ser menor que a poupança doméstica total. Com as sobras, os chineses vão financiando o consumo dos outros — principalmente dos norte-americanos (essa é a lógica do tal Bretton Woods II).
Pergunta que não quer calar: por que os chineses poupam tanto, e por que sua taxa de poupança vem crescendo na última década?
Boa parte da explicação vem do comportamento da poupança das empresas. Essa, segundo o especialista em China do UBS, Jonhatan Andersen, cresceu de 16% para algo como 26% do PIB nos últimos cinco anos. O motivo por trás dessa expressiva variação foi a arrancada da rentabilidade das empresas chinesas, que vêm ganhando espaço no mercado internacional de bens e serviços.
Completando o quadro, as famílias na China poupam violentamente, mais ou menos 30% do PIB (no Brasil, a poupança das famílias é próxima a 5%). Motivos culturais podem sempre estar por trás da explicação dos altos níveis de poupança, mas não são boa fonte de explicação para variação da taxa de poupança. Afinal de contas, aspectos culturais não mudam tão rapidamente. E a variação tem sido grande: em 1980 a poupança era de 15% do PIB, no ano 2000, 25% e em 2007, 30%.
A tese de que a poupança das famílias chinesas é alta por conta da falta de uma rede de proteção social ampla também esbarra na dificuldade de explicar o motivo da variação ao longo do tempo. A dificuldade se deve ao fato de os sistemas de pensões e assitência médica terem melhorado bem ao longo dos últimos 10 anos – a poupança das famílias, portanto, deveria ter retrocedido um pouco, e não aumentado.
No artigo “The Competitive Saving Motive: Evidence from Rising Sex Ratios and Savings in China“, Shang-Jin Wei e Xiabo Zhang apresentam uma explicação alternativa interessante. Segundo eles, a poupança das famílias tem aumentado por conta de um crescente desequilíbrio no que se denomina ”sex ratio” – a razão entre o nascimento de meninos e meninas. Essa razão saltou, principalmente devido à política de filho único, de 106 meninos para 100 meninas em 1980, para 124 meninos para 100 meninas em 2007 (como é possível? efeito colateral do ultrassom). Ok, mas o que isso tem a ver com poupança?
Ora, por conta desse desequilíbrio crescente, o mercado de casamentos para as gerações mais novas tornou-se muito mais competitivo para os meninos (homens adultos no futuro próximo). E para incrementar as chances dos filhos, nada mais natural que dotá-los com recursos mais gordos, cortando consumo presente e aumentando a poupança. Em linha com esse raciocínio, os autores apresentam evidências econométricas mostrando que a poupança individual das famílias é mais alta justamente nos locais onde o sex ratio é mais desproporcional — isso já isolando o efeito de outras variáveis que supostamente afetam a taxa de poupança, como renda, estabilidade do emprego, etc.
Mas o aumento da poupança das famílias com mais meninos (ou um só menino) não seria compensado por uma queda da poupança das famílias com mais meninas (ou uma só menina)? Isso não se verifica nos dados, como mostram os pesquisadores. A explicação por eles aventada é que, como essa maior poupança dos pais com filhos homens é fortemente canalizada para compra de imóveis, os preços desses se elevam, forçando as famílias com meninas a, tudo o mais constante, pouparem mais para adquirirem suas moradias. Liquidamente, por conta do incentivo a despoupar devido à vantagem das meninas no mercado matrimonial, o que acontece é que a poupança das famílias com meninas quase não se altera.
Viver na China não deve ser nada fácil, principalmente para os rapazes que brevemente enfrentarão belas dificuldades no mercado matrimonial.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
109) China's Nuclear Program (1964-1972) - National Security Archive Electronic Book (2000)
The Chinese Nuclear Weapons Program: Problems of Intelligence Collection and Analysis, 1964-1972
Edited By William Burr
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 26: March 31, 2000
During late 1998 and 1999, the Wen Ho Lee espionage controversy and debate over U.S. corporate technology transfers to China made the Chinese nuclear weapons program the subject of heated debate in the U.S. media and in American politics. Besides creating irresponsible attacks on White House declassification policy, the debate generated panicky analysis of Chinese nuclear policy, with some analysts arguing that "China might pose a more dangerous threat to the United States" than did the Cold War Soviet Union, not least because Beijing "is bent on acquiring the strategic nuclear capability to hold American cities at risk."1 Yet, publicly available information suggests the risk of making categorical statements about China's nuclear posture. For example, there are tremendous disparities, not only between Chinese and U.S. strategic forces, but also between the forces mobilized by the Soviet Union at the Cold War's height and the strategic forces currently under Chinese control. Thus, while Beijing now has some 20 ICBMs, the United States has nearly 600 (and the Soviet Union in 1976 had over 1400). If Beijing is "bent" on acquiring nuclear forces that will bring it to parity with Washington or with Soviet Cold War force, it has a tremendous distance to go.2
While Beijing's policymaking process is truly opaque, the amount of publicly available information on Chinese nuclear forces is significant. For example, Robert S. Norris and a team of researchers at the Natural Resources Defense Council, Ming Zhang with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and John L. Lewis and Hua Di (now tragically imprisoned in China) of Stanford University have produced important studies on the Chinese nuclear program, with detailed information on nuclear weapons developments, deployments, and nuclear policy nuclear tests from the 1960s to the 1990s.3
Release of U.S. intelligence reporting and analysis, however, has lagged behind the open source material; the U.S. intelligence establishment has released comparatively little material on its substantial collection effort aimed at China's nuclear weapons effort. The no doubt large stack of reports and analyses generated over the years by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency, Air Force intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office, among others, remains largely classified.4 So far, CIA intransigently refuses to declassify National Intelligence Estimates on Chinese nuclear forces (as well as nuclear nonproliferation issues) from as far back as the mid-1960s.5
Fortunately, before Congress checked White House declassification programs some intelligence reporting and analysis on the earlier phases of the Chinese nuclear program became available through FOIA and at the National Archives. Reproduced below is a selection of Air Force, State Department, DIA, and CIA documentation that, in the aggregate, provides some evidence on the means that the intelligence establishment used to track the Chinese nuclear program, how intelligence analysts assessed the progress of Beijing's nuclear weapons and missile program, as well as how they interpreted Chinese nuclear strategy.
The documents suggest considerable competence in tracking Chinese nuclear and missile tests, as well as missile training activities, but what also comes across is a very limited, as well as rather inaccurate, knowledge of Chinese missile deployments during the late 1960s. For example, even though Beijing had begun to deploy the Dong Feng-2 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) in the fall of 1966, U.S. intelligence failed to detect the deployment although it would discover related activities, e.g., troop training, later in the decade. Further, initial estimates of Chinese progress in deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were erroneous; an operational capability by 1971 was predicted, although actual progress was far slower.6
Most of the discussion in these documents is limited to nuclear tests and missile deployments, although a CIA report (document 9) speculated at some length about the conceptual basis of Chinese nuclear strategy. In interesting contrast to the images of an aggressive nuclear China propounded by some analysts today, in the early 1970s CIA experts saw political and defensive goals as more important; citing China's embrace of a no-first-use nuclear use policy, they argued that Beijing's nuclear weapons program "had two functions: prestige and deterrence."7 They believed that China was unlikely to use its weapons for first-strike, offensive purposes: "Initiating a nuclear attack on the US or the USSR would invite the elimination of China as an industrial or military power, while an attack elsewhere still runs the risk of superpower response."
What role prestige may play in Chinese calculations today is unclear, but thirty years later analysts still hold that deterrence remains basic to Chinese strategy, although others propagate hard-line interpretations of Chinese policy.8 Experts in the intelligence establishment and nonpartisan think-tanks hold that Beijing's nuclear policy is still based on no-first-use and a "limited deterrence" or "second strike capability." Moreover, in contrast to Russian and U.S. practice, the Chinese keep their nuclear forces at "de-alerted" levels, thus avoiding the risks of accidental launch.9 Citing these policies and practices, Federation of American Scientists president Jeremy Stone has strongly argued that "No major nuclear power has been more responsible, in its nuclear doctrine and force posture, than ... China."10
Whether China's leaders will hold to a low alert-minimum deterrence posture remains to be seen. Beijing's militance on Taiwan and strains in Sino-American relations could lead to changes in China's nuclear posture. Moreover, U.S. missile defenses could have a destabilizing impact. Even though U.S. missile defense programs are supposedly aimed at Iraq and North Korea, if the systems are ever deployed, they could encourage major Chinese investments in ICBM and SLBM deployments and a new arms race.11 Informed public debate about U.S.-Chinese relations and Beijing's nuclear posture would be advanced if the intelligence establishment released older studies of China's nuclear policies and posture. Unfortunately, that may not happen soon. Congressional panic over espionage and the Chinese nuclear program has led to a more hostile climate for declassification along with legislation undermining President Clinton's executive order, e.g., forcing executive branch re-review of millions of pages of documents that had been slated for archival release. Besides delaying the release of older documents, the backlash in Congress has undoubtedly bolstered anti-declassification recidivism in the intelligence agencies.12
Documents
Document 1: Excerpts, "History of the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) 1 July-31 December 1964," Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in excerpted, sanitized form
For many years, the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) has been one of the most significant U.S. government collectors of nuclear weapons production and testing data.13 With remote sensors deployed around the world, AFTAC is poised to detect signals and traces, such as acoustic, radiochemical, seismic, or electromagnetic, from nuclear weapons tests in a various environments (atmospheric, underground, underwater, and in space). After the 1963 limited test ban treaty, the U.S. government expanded AFTAC's network of sensors under "Project Clear Sky" so that it could better detect treaty violations.
This document shows how AFTAC's sensors detected China's first nuclear test on 16 October 1964 at Lop Nor. The Chinese announced the test the same day, but U.S. government officials wanted to learn all that they could about the physical properties of the device that Beijing tested. While acoustic and seismic/ signals could help measure yield, or explosive force, only radiochemical analysis of windblown fallout could tell U.S. atomic scientists what radioactive elements fueled the device. As it turned out, U.S. intelligence analysts and scientists were startled to learn that the Chinese had not tested a conventional plutonium implosion device as had been predicted for several years. Instead, Chinese atomic scientists showed their great skills by testing a uranium implosion device that Atomic Energy Chairman Glenn Seaborg later described as "more sophisticated in design" than the U-235 weapon exploded over Hiroshima. Perhaps to avoid official confirmation of AFTAC's capabilities, sanitizers have removed references to the time of the detonation and the presence of U-235 particles, among other details, from the document.14
Document 2: "Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/3, Priority National Intelligence Objectives (Revised 1 July 1966)"
[Location of original: National Archives, Record Group 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Records Relating to the CIA History Staff History Source Collection, 1946-78, box 11, file "HS/HC Notebook Vol. II Original Version of Revisions of DCIDs"]
Issued periodically, the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI's) "Priority National Intelligence Objectives" identified the "most critical substantive problems" that would guide intelligence production, research, and collection activities during the coming months. It shows the high priority that the DCI gave to tracking the Chinese nuclear weapons program, although it was apparent that the Soviet target had somewhat higher importance.
Document 3: "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, excerpt from "Weekly Summary," 4 November 1966, FOIA release in excerpted and sanitized form
This is how CIA presented current information on Chinese nuclear developments to policymakers and middle-level officials at the State Department, Pentagon, and elsewhere in the national security establishment. The report suggested that the Chinese were making some progress in weaponizing nuclear devices by testing a nuclear-tipped medium range missile, although it was unclear how far Beijing had to go in producing a "deployable weapons system." In truth, the Chinese had done so. The delivery system tested--the Dong Feng-2--had reached an "Initial Operational Capability" (IOC) and was beginning to be deployed in small numbers in northeast Asia with Japanese cities and U.S. bases in Japan as the targets.15 To make the report relevant both to diplomats and military officials, the report combined technical intelligence--some of which has been excised--and analysis of the test's political implications. It would be interesting to see how CIA presented the same event in the President's Daily Brief or in the daily Central Intelligence Bulletin, but those remain secret even today, 34 years later.
Document 4: U.S. State Department Airgram to Embassy in India et al. CA-1148, "Communist China's ICBM Flight Test Program," 10 August 1967
[Location of original: National Archives, Record Group 59 (hereinafter cited as RG 59), Records of the State Department, Subject-Numeric Files, 1967-69 (hereinafter cited as SN 67-69)]
The State Department's and Foreign Service's roles in intelligence collection is evident in these instructions to embassies. The Department's concern about a Chinese ICBM program led it to enlist U.S. embassies in the region and elsewhere in a comprehensive effort to collect intelligence on anticipated Chinese missile testing activities. Because missile tests require instrumentation and tracking facilities, the Department wanted embassy and consular officials to look for any sign that Beijing was negotiating agreements with countries adjoining the Indian ocean that would facilitate a missile testing program. For example, already suspicious of France, not least because of that country's recognition of China in 1964 and its departure from the NATO military structure, the Department alerted the Paris embassy to find out if the Chinese might have spoken with the French about placing missile tracking technology on the Comoro Islands. The greater probability that the Chinese would track their tests from missile range instrumentation ships prompted the Department to task U.S. diplomats in Tanzania and Pakistan with responsibility for detecting possible Chinese efforts to acquire access to port facilities on the Indian Ocean. Whether the Chinese made such arrangements remains to be seen.
Document 5: U.S. State Department Director of Intelligence and Research to the Secretary, "Chinese Nuclear Test May Have Been Failure," Intelligence Note 1030, 29 December 1967
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, SN 67-69]
No government likes to admit failures and as this document suggests, Beijing was not about to announce that an expensive nuclear test had gone awry.16 The document also shows that AFTAC collected air samples very quickly, but how the detonation was first detected remains to be seen; probably Air Force sensors picked up the detonation's acoustic or seismic signals. What State Department analysts did not yet know --or perhaps did not mention--was that the device was airdropped from a Huang-6 bomber.17
Document 6: U.S. State Department Director of Intelligence and Research to the Secretary, "Chinese MRBM Deployment Delayed," Intelligence Note 323, 3 May 1968
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, SN 67-69]
This stimulating document shows State Department intelligence trying to explain why a 1966 estimate that Beijing would deploy a few medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in 1967 may have been proven wrong. As already noted, however, Beijing had deployed the Dong Feng-2 (or, in the parlance of U.S. intelligence, CCS-1) MRBM in 1966. That this was a mobile, although rather clumsy, weapons system undoubtedly interfered with detection by satellite systems. Nevertheless, State Department analysts correctly noted that Beijing's progress in developing and producing advanced delivery systems was slow and that the Cultural Revolution had seriously interfered with scientific R&D work.18
Document 7: U.S. State Department Telegram 208578 to U.S. Embassy in South Korea, "Information on Chinese Nuclear Capabilities," 25 July 1968
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, SN 67-69]
Briefing allies on possible threats was a significant part of intelligence work and this telegram to the U.S. embassy in Seoul shows what State Department officials wanted to tell South Korean dictator Park Chung Hee
about China's nuclear weapons program. An important point that analysts wanted to get across was the lack of accurate information about Beijing's progress, much less the impact of political developments on the weapons program. Thus, while the analysts were certain that the Chinese had an MRBM, they simply did not know if it had been deployed. Although the estimators suggested that China would have ICBMs by the early 1970s, this was highly inaccurate because an IOC was not reached until 1981. What the State Department did not want to disclose, however, was the existence of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on such subjects as the Chinese nuclear program. Presumably, no one wanted to provide South Korea's CIA with a target for its intelligence operations in the United States (operations which a decade later scandalized Congressional committees).
Document 8: U.S. State Department Director of Intelligence and Research to the Secretary, "Current Developments in Chinese Nuclear Capabilities," Intelligence Note 621, 6 August 1968
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, SN 67-69]
This intelligence note provides a fuller account of the Chinese nuclear program than that authorized for President Park, although the uncertainty about Beijing's missile progress is evident. In contrast to the information developed a few weeks earlier for Park, this document includes more discussion of the implications of Beijing's tiny nuclear force for its politico-military strategy, e.g., the "possibility," not mentioned to Park, that once the Chinese had a few ICBMs, they could use MRBMs to "threaten Asian nations or US forces in Asia." Analysts also expressed concern that possession of "sophisticated weapons systems" could "embolden" the Chinese to increase their support for "revolutionary groups" in the region. But a picture of Beijing explicitly brandishing nuclear weapons for threat purposes was not the main point that the analysts wanted to make. More significantly, they put across the image of a cautious Beijing, deterred by the U.S.'s massive nuclear forces and committed to a non-nuclear "people's war" strategy, and whose nuclear program was largely motivated by prestige and "deterrence" considerations.
Document 9: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, excerpt from draft report on Chinese military strategy, date unknown but circa 1970-71
[Location of original: National Archives, Office of International Security Policy and Planning, Subject Files 1968-71, box 2, file Pol 1-4 NSSM 69 Nuclear Policy in Asia, Comments on Knull Draft]
Lacking any particulars directly showing its origins, this document has the format, type-face in particular, typical of CIA products of this period. It is clearly an excerpt from a longer report whose title and date is unknown (but which is the subject of an Archive FOIA request to CIA). Significantly, this report shows how little progress the intelligence agencies had made in their knowledge of the Chinese missile program in the two or three years since 1968. During the late 1960s, satellite photography had helped intelligence analysts identify CCS-1 (Dong Feng-2) training facilities, but they remained unable to identify an "operationally deployed [MRBM] site"; as the text notes, road-transportable MRBMs are "adaptable to concealment."
This report also provides an analysis of Chinese strategy that is somewhat more confident and straightforward than INR's from a few years earlier. Discounting the possibility that Beijing would make "crude, direct use of nuclear blackmail," CIA analysts suggested that Beijing's nuclear strategy paralleled its "defensive" conventional forces doctrine. The Chinese wanted nuclear weapons for national prestige but also for deterrence.19 According to CIA analysts, Beijing's avowed commitment to a "no first use" policy and the enormous destructive potential of nuclear weapons made an offensive, first-strike posture unlikely. Thirty years later, some analysts posit a threatening Chinese nuclear posture, while others argue that China's nuclear posture is still based on no-first use and "limited deterrence," although that could change if the United States adopted "a Cold War-style containment policy."20
Document 10: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Soviet and Peoples Republic of China Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy and Strategy," March 1972 (excerpt), FOIA release
This excerpt provides a useful overview of what Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysts believed they knew about Chinese nuclear weapons deployments as of the early 1970s. The document shows that even with the most sophisticated technology, it was exceedingly difficult for U.S. intelligence to detect MRBM deployments with any assurance. Only days after Richard Nixon's historic trip to China, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysts summarized what the intelligence establishment had learned about Chinese MRBMs: that CCS-1 (Dong Feng-2) troop training activities had been detected, that the CCS-2 (Dong Feng-3) was likely to be deployed soon, and that some MRBM sites "may have been detected", with perhaps 15 missiles deployed to "undetected areas." Nevertheless, the analysts inaccurately opined that "it appears that the Chinese had no intentions [in 1966] of deploying the CSS-1, although it was within their capability."
Document 11: U.S. Embassy Moscow cable 2676 to Department of State, "Sino-Soviet Military Balance," 25 March 1972
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1970-73 (hereinafter cited as SN 70-73)]
Document 12: U.S. State Department Airgram 4285 to Embassy Moscow, "Sino-Soviet Military Balance (C-SR-2056545)," 28 April 1972
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, SN 70-73]
Document 13: U.S. Embassy Moscow airgram 454 to Department of State, "Sino-Soviet Military Balance (C-SR-2056545)," 21 June 1972
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, SN 70-73]
These documents convey the alacrity with which U.S. intelligence received the smallest morsels about Chinese nuclear missile deployments during the early 1970s. What the U.S. Embassy learned through a Swiss source was that the Chinese had deployed MRBMs that could strike targets in Eastern or Central Russia (as well as U.S. bases in the Philippines). Those in fact were the capabilities of the Dong Feng-3 mobile missile, which had been deployed in 1971. The Chinese official who had mentioned the deployment was, however, overoptimistic about the rate of progress for an MRBM that could strike Moscow. Beijing would not have a missile that could strike targets in European Russia, including Moscow, until 1981 when the Dong Feng-4 was deployed.21
How U.S. intelligence agencies assessed the scraps of information reported in the 25 March cable remains to be seen. Even though the Moscow Embassy failed to garner more information from its Swiss informant, what it had learned was generally accurate, but there was no way to confirm it. Although the U.S. intelligence establishment was able to detect Chinese missile tests with considerable confidence, when or whether it detected Chinese mobile missile deployments with any exactitude remains obscure at least from the declassified record. Indeed, as shown by a document leaked to the Washington Times, the problem of Chinese mobile missiles continues to baffle U.S. intelligence.22
Appendix A
Table 3, "Chinese Strategic Nuclear Forces, 2005-2010," from Ming Zhang, China's Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), p. 37. The Archive thanks the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for permission to use this table. (not inserted, see URL)
(...)
Note: Nuclear warhead yields are expressed in kilotons (KT) and megatons (MT), indicating an explosive force equivalent to that amount of TNT.
Sources: Estimates are based on data in Jones and McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998, p. 63; William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Joshua Handler, Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: National Resources Defense Council); Patrick J. Garrity, “Nuclear Weapons and Asia-Pacific Security: Issues, Trends, and Uncertainties,” National Security Studies Quarterly, vol. IV, issue 1, Winter 1998, p. 46; Bill Gertz, “China Adds 6 ICBMs to Arsenal,” Washington Times, July 21, 1998 (Internet edition); “New Declassified 1998 Report on the Ballistic Missile Threat,” Proliferation Brief, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), vol. 1, no. 13, September 28, 1998.
Appendix B
Table 7-1, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 1964-1993, from Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1994, p. 359. The Archive thanks Robert S. Norris, Natural Resources Defense Council, for permission to use this table. Note: TU-4, H[ong]-6 and H[ong]-5 are bombers; Q[ian]-5 is a supersonic attack aircraft. The DF [Dong Feng] missiles are described in detail in Norris et al., cited above.
Return to Index of Electronic Briefing Books
Return to National Security Archive Main Page
Notes
1. Kenneth deGraffenreid, ed., The Cox Report (Washington, D.C., Regnery, 1999); quotations from editor's introduction, n.p.
2. For statistics on Chinese strategic forces, see Ming Zhang, China's Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 37, reproduced in appendix A, and Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1994, 359, reproduced in appendix B below. For statistics on U.S. and Soviet strategic forces over the years, see Robert S. Norris and Thomas B. Cochran, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Working Papers, US-USSR Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces 1945-1996 (Washington, D.C., Natural Resources Defense Council, 1997).
3. See Robert S. Norris et al. French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons; Ming Zhang, China's Changing Nuclear Posture; and John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security 17 (Fall 1992): 5-40.
4. In recent years, however, well-placed officials in the intelligence bureaucracy and the Pentagon have selectively leaked intelligence reports on Chinese nuclear deployments and weapons policy to Washington Times reporter Bill Gertz. Some of the documents were reprinted in Gertz's book, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security (Washington, D.C., Regnery Publishing Co., 1999). Several leaked documents on Chinese missiles are reproduced on pages 245-54. For critical commentary on Gertz's book and his methods, see Federation of American Scientists, Secrecy and Government Bulletin, Issue No. 78, May 1999, and Stephen Schwartz, "Lots of Leaks," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January-February 2000.
5. Some of the National Security Archive's requests, however, are under appeal. Some of the documents at issues were published in excerpted form only in the State Department's Foreign Relations series. See various Central Intelligence Agency estimates in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, volume 22 (Washington, D.C. 1996) and Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-68, volume 30 (Washington, D.C., 1998).
6. Again, see Norris et al., Chinese Nuclear Weapons, and Wilson Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals."
7. Prestige played a role in Chinese decisionmaking at an early date; key officials considered nuclear weapons to be essential to world power, progress, and development. As Foreign Minister Chen Yi put it to Japanese journalists with Kyodo News Service in late October 1963: "A-bombs, missiles, supersonic aircraft--all these are reflective of the technical level of a nation's industry. China will have to resolve this issue within the next several years; otherwise, it will degenerate into a second-class or third-class nation."
8. For the nerve center of hawkish thinking about China, see "'Blue Team' Draws a Hard Line on Beijing", Washington Post, 22 February 2000.
9. For analyses stressing a deterrent posture, see "DCI Statement on Damage Assessment", 21 April 2000,; Ming Zhang, "What Threat?", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September-October 1999, 52-57, and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Proliferation Roundtable: China's Changing Nuclear Posture, April 30, 1999," at . For China's alert procedures, see Harold A. Feivson, ed., The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1999), 119. For background on China's deterrence policy over the years, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1994), 231-37.
10. Jeremy Stone, "Missile Encirclement: China's Interest in Missile Controls," FAS Public Interest Report, September-October1998, at.
11. For discussion of the possible impact of U.S. missile defense on Chinese policy, see Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, "The China Puzzle; Goal: Build a Missile Defense, Problem: How to Handle Beijing," The Washington Post, 5 March 2000, and John Isaacs, "A Political Decision," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000, 22-25.
12. See recent issues of Federation of American Scientists, Secrecy & Government Bulletin, prepared by Steven Aftergood, for incisive analysis of recent developments in declassification policy.
13. For a first rate history of AFTAC's early years, when it was known as AFOAT/One, (Air Force Office of Atomic Energy/One) see Charles A. Ziegler and David Jacobson, Spying Without Spies: Origins of America's Secret Nuclear Surveillance System (Westport, CT, Praeger, 1995).
14. Glenn T. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1987), 116.
15. Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 362. For an account of the test from Chinese sources, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press), 202-03.
16. It has since become part of the scholarly consensus that the test was a dud. See Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 420. This study suggests that the initial estimate of a yield of 10 kilotons was later revised upwards to 15-25 kilotons. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, 202-03, 214.
19. For a significant historical study confirming the importance of deterrence in Chinese nuclear policy, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1994), 231-37.
20. See Ming Zhang, "What Threat?", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September-October 2000, 52-57.
21. Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 380-83.
22. Gertz, Betrayal, 254.
Edited By William Burr
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 26: March 31, 2000
During late 1998 and 1999, the Wen Ho Lee espionage controversy and debate over U.S. corporate technology transfers to China made the Chinese nuclear weapons program the subject of heated debate in the U.S. media and in American politics. Besides creating irresponsible attacks on White House declassification policy, the debate generated panicky analysis of Chinese nuclear policy, with some analysts arguing that "China might pose a more dangerous threat to the United States" than did the Cold War Soviet Union, not least because Beijing "is bent on acquiring the strategic nuclear capability to hold American cities at risk."1 Yet, publicly available information suggests the risk of making categorical statements about China's nuclear posture. For example, there are tremendous disparities, not only between Chinese and U.S. strategic forces, but also between the forces mobilized by the Soviet Union at the Cold War's height and the strategic forces currently under Chinese control. Thus, while Beijing now has some 20 ICBMs, the United States has nearly 600 (and the Soviet Union in 1976 had over 1400). If Beijing is "bent" on acquiring nuclear forces that will bring it to parity with Washington or with Soviet Cold War force, it has a tremendous distance to go.2
While Beijing's policymaking process is truly opaque, the amount of publicly available information on Chinese nuclear forces is significant. For example, Robert S. Norris and a team of researchers at the Natural Resources Defense Council, Ming Zhang with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and John L. Lewis and Hua Di (now tragically imprisoned in China) of Stanford University have produced important studies on the Chinese nuclear program, with detailed information on nuclear weapons developments, deployments, and nuclear policy nuclear tests from the 1960s to the 1990s.3
Release of U.S. intelligence reporting and analysis, however, has lagged behind the open source material; the U.S. intelligence establishment has released comparatively little material on its substantial collection effort aimed at China's nuclear weapons effort. The no doubt large stack of reports and analyses generated over the years by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency, Air Force intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office, among others, remains largely classified.4 So far, CIA intransigently refuses to declassify National Intelligence Estimates on Chinese nuclear forces (as well as nuclear nonproliferation issues) from as far back as the mid-1960s.5
Fortunately, before Congress checked White House declassification programs some intelligence reporting and analysis on the earlier phases of the Chinese nuclear program became available through FOIA and at the National Archives. Reproduced below is a selection of Air Force, State Department, DIA, and CIA documentation that, in the aggregate, provides some evidence on the means that the intelligence establishment used to track the Chinese nuclear program, how intelligence analysts assessed the progress of Beijing's nuclear weapons and missile program, as well as how they interpreted Chinese nuclear strategy.
The documents suggest considerable competence in tracking Chinese nuclear and missile tests, as well as missile training activities, but what also comes across is a very limited, as well as rather inaccurate, knowledge of Chinese missile deployments during the late 1960s. For example, even though Beijing had begun to deploy the Dong Feng-2 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) in the fall of 1966, U.S. intelligence failed to detect the deployment although it would discover related activities, e.g., troop training, later in the decade. Further, initial estimates of Chinese progress in deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were erroneous; an operational capability by 1971 was predicted, although actual progress was far slower.6
Most of the discussion in these documents is limited to nuclear tests and missile deployments, although a CIA report (document 9) speculated at some length about the conceptual basis of Chinese nuclear strategy. In interesting contrast to the images of an aggressive nuclear China propounded by some analysts today, in the early 1970s CIA experts saw political and defensive goals as more important; citing China's embrace of a no-first-use nuclear use policy, they argued that Beijing's nuclear weapons program "had two functions: prestige and deterrence."7 They believed that China was unlikely to use its weapons for first-strike, offensive purposes: "Initiating a nuclear attack on the US or the USSR would invite the elimination of China as an industrial or military power, while an attack elsewhere still runs the risk of superpower response."
What role prestige may play in Chinese calculations today is unclear, but thirty years later analysts still hold that deterrence remains basic to Chinese strategy, although others propagate hard-line interpretations of Chinese policy.8 Experts in the intelligence establishment and nonpartisan think-tanks hold that Beijing's nuclear policy is still based on no-first-use and a "limited deterrence" or "second strike capability." Moreover, in contrast to Russian and U.S. practice, the Chinese keep their nuclear forces at "de-alerted" levels, thus avoiding the risks of accidental launch.9 Citing these policies and practices, Federation of American Scientists president Jeremy Stone has strongly argued that "No major nuclear power has been more responsible, in its nuclear doctrine and force posture, than ... China."10
Whether China's leaders will hold to a low alert-minimum deterrence posture remains to be seen. Beijing's militance on Taiwan and strains in Sino-American relations could lead to changes in China's nuclear posture. Moreover, U.S. missile defenses could have a destabilizing impact. Even though U.S. missile defense programs are supposedly aimed at Iraq and North Korea, if the systems are ever deployed, they could encourage major Chinese investments in ICBM and SLBM deployments and a new arms race.11 Informed public debate about U.S.-Chinese relations and Beijing's nuclear posture would be advanced if the intelligence establishment released older studies of China's nuclear policies and posture. Unfortunately, that may not happen soon. Congressional panic over espionage and the Chinese nuclear program has led to a more hostile climate for declassification along with legislation undermining President Clinton's executive order, e.g., forcing executive branch re-review of millions of pages of documents that had been slated for archival release. Besides delaying the release of older documents, the backlash in Congress has undoubtedly bolstered anti-declassification recidivism in the intelligence agencies.12
Documents
Document 1: Excerpts, "History of the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) 1 July-31 December 1964," Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in excerpted, sanitized form
For many years, the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) has been one of the most significant U.S. government collectors of nuclear weapons production and testing data.13 With remote sensors deployed around the world, AFTAC is poised to detect signals and traces, such as acoustic, radiochemical, seismic, or electromagnetic, from nuclear weapons tests in a various environments (atmospheric, underground, underwater, and in space). After the 1963 limited test ban treaty, the U.S. government expanded AFTAC's network of sensors under "Project Clear Sky" so that it could better detect treaty violations.
This document shows how AFTAC's sensors detected China's first nuclear test on 16 October 1964 at Lop Nor. The Chinese announced the test the same day, but U.S. government officials wanted to learn all that they could about the physical properties of the device that Beijing tested. While acoustic and seismic/ signals could help measure yield, or explosive force, only radiochemical analysis of windblown fallout could tell U.S. atomic scientists what radioactive elements fueled the device. As it turned out, U.S. intelligence analysts and scientists were startled to learn that the Chinese had not tested a conventional plutonium implosion device as had been predicted for several years. Instead, Chinese atomic scientists showed their great skills by testing a uranium implosion device that Atomic Energy Chairman Glenn Seaborg later described as "more sophisticated in design" than the U-235 weapon exploded over Hiroshima. Perhaps to avoid official confirmation of AFTAC's capabilities, sanitizers have removed references to the time of the detonation and the presence of U-235 particles, among other details, from the document.14
Document 2: "Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/3, Priority National Intelligence Objectives (Revised 1 July 1966)"
[Location of original: National Archives, Record Group 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Records Relating to the CIA History Staff History Source Collection, 1946-78, box 11, file "HS/HC Notebook Vol. II Original Version of Revisions of DCIDs"]
Issued periodically, the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI's) "Priority National Intelligence Objectives" identified the "most critical substantive problems" that would guide intelligence production, research, and collection activities during the coming months. It shows the high priority that the DCI gave to tracking the Chinese nuclear weapons program, although it was apparent that the Soviet target had somewhat higher importance.
Document 3: "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, excerpt from "Weekly Summary," 4 November 1966, FOIA release in excerpted and sanitized form
This is how CIA presented current information on Chinese nuclear developments to policymakers and middle-level officials at the State Department, Pentagon, and elsewhere in the national security establishment. The report suggested that the Chinese were making some progress in weaponizing nuclear devices by testing a nuclear-tipped medium range missile, although it was unclear how far Beijing had to go in producing a "deployable weapons system." In truth, the Chinese had done so. The delivery system tested--the Dong Feng-2--had reached an "Initial Operational Capability" (IOC) and was beginning to be deployed in small numbers in northeast Asia with Japanese cities and U.S. bases in Japan as the targets.15 To make the report relevant both to diplomats and military officials, the report combined technical intelligence--some of which has been excised--and analysis of the test's political implications. It would be interesting to see how CIA presented the same event in the President's Daily Brief or in the daily Central Intelligence Bulletin, but those remain secret even today, 34 years later.
Document 4: U.S. State Department Airgram to Embassy in India et al. CA-1148, "Communist China's ICBM Flight Test Program," 10 August 1967
[Location of original: National Archives, Record Group 59 (hereinafter cited as RG 59), Records of the State Department, Subject-Numeric Files, 1967-69 (hereinafter cited as SN 67-69)]
The State Department's and Foreign Service's roles in intelligence collection is evident in these instructions to embassies. The Department's concern about a Chinese ICBM program led it to enlist U.S. embassies in the region and elsewhere in a comprehensive effort to collect intelligence on anticipated Chinese missile testing activities. Because missile tests require instrumentation and tracking facilities, the Department wanted embassy and consular officials to look for any sign that Beijing was negotiating agreements with countries adjoining the Indian ocean that would facilitate a missile testing program. For example, already suspicious of France, not least because of that country's recognition of China in 1964 and its departure from the NATO military structure, the Department alerted the Paris embassy to find out if the Chinese might have spoken with the French about placing missile tracking technology on the Comoro Islands. The greater probability that the Chinese would track their tests from missile range instrumentation ships prompted the Department to task U.S. diplomats in Tanzania and Pakistan with responsibility for detecting possible Chinese efforts to acquire access to port facilities on the Indian Ocean. Whether the Chinese made such arrangements remains to be seen.
Document 5: U.S. State Department Director of Intelligence and Research to the Secretary, "Chinese Nuclear Test May Have Been Failure," Intelligence Note 1030, 29 December 1967
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, SN 67-69]
No government likes to admit failures and as this document suggests, Beijing was not about to announce that an expensive nuclear test had gone awry.16 The document also shows that AFTAC collected air samples very quickly, but how the detonation was first detected remains to be seen; probably Air Force sensors picked up the detonation's acoustic or seismic signals. What State Department analysts did not yet know --or perhaps did not mention--was that the device was airdropped from a Huang-6 bomber.17
Document 6: U.S. State Department Director of Intelligence and Research to the Secretary, "Chinese MRBM Deployment Delayed," Intelligence Note 323, 3 May 1968
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, SN 67-69]
This stimulating document shows State Department intelligence trying to explain why a 1966 estimate that Beijing would deploy a few medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in 1967 may have been proven wrong. As already noted, however, Beijing had deployed the Dong Feng-2 (or, in the parlance of U.S. intelligence, CCS-1) MRBM in 1966. That this was a mobile, although rather clumsy, weapons system undoubtedly interfered with detection by satellite systems. Nevertheless, State Department analysts correctly noted that Beijing's progress in developing and producing advanced delivery systems was slow and that the Cultural Revolution had seriously interfered with scientific R&D work.18
Document 7: U.S. State Department Telegram 208578 to U.S. Embassy in South Korea, "Information on Chinese Nuclear Capabilities," 25 July 1968
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, SN 67-69]
Briefing allies on possible threats was a significant part of intelligence work and this telegram to the U.S. embassy in Seoul shows what State Department officials wanted to tell South Korean dictator Park Chung Hee
about China's nuclear weapons program. An important point that analysts wanted to get across was the lack of accurate information about Beijing's progress, much less the impact of political developments on the weapons program. Thus, while the analysts were certain that the Chinese had an MRBM, they simply did not know if it had been deployed. Although the estimators suggested that China would have ICBMs by the early 1970s, this was highly inaccurate because an IOC was not reached until 1981. What the State Department did not want to disclose, however, was the existence of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on such subjects as the Chinese nuclear program. Presumably, no one wanted to provide South Korea's CIA with a target for its intelligence operations in the United States (operations which a decade later scandalized Congressional committees).
Document 8: U.S. State Department Director of Intelligence and Research to the Secretary, "Current Developments in Chinese Nuclear Capabilities," Intelligence Note 621, 6 August 1968
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, SN 67-69]
This intelligence note provides a fuller account of the Chinese nuclear program than that authorized for President Park, although the uncertainty about Beijing's missile progress is evident. In contrast to the information developed a few weeks earlier for Park, this document includes more discussion of the implications of Beijing's tiny nuclear force for its politico-military strategy, e.g., the "possibility," not mentioned to Park, that once the Chinese had a few ICBMs, they could use MRBMs to "threaten Asian nations or US forces in Asia." Analysts also expressed concern that possession of "sophisticated weapons systems" could "embolden" the Chinese to increase their support for "revolutionary groups" in the region. But a picture of Beijing explicitly brandishing nuclear weapons for threat purposes was not the main point that the analysts wanted to make. More significantly, they put across the image of a cautious Beijing, deterred by the U.S.'s massive nuclear forces and committed to a non-nuclear "people's war" strategy, and whose nuclear program was largely motivated by prestige and "deterrence" considerations.
Document 9: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, excerpt from draft report on Chinese military strategy, date unknown but circa 1970-71
[Location of original: National Archives, Office of International Security Policy and Planning, Subject Files 1968-71, box 2, file Pol 1-4 NSSM 69 Nuclear Policy in Asia, Comments on Knull Draft]
Lacking any particulars directly showing its origins, this document has the format, type-face in particular, typical of CIA products of this period. It is clearly an excerpt from a longer report whose title and date is unknown (but which is the subject of an Archive FOIA request to CIA). Significantly, this report shows how little progress the intelligence agencies had made in their knowledge of the Chinese missile program in the two or three years since 1968. During the late 1960s, satellite photography had helped intelligence analysts identify CCS-1 (Dong Feng-2) training facilities, but they remained unable to identify an "operationally deployed [MRBM] site"; as the text notes, road-transportable MRBMs are "adaptable to concealment."
This report also provides an analysis of Chinese strategy that is somewhat more confident and straightforward than INR's from a few years earlier. Discounting the possibility that Beijing would make "crude, direct use of nuclear blackmail," CIA analysts suggested that Beijing's nuclear strategy paralleled its "defensive" conventional forces doctrine. The Chinese wanted nuclear weapons for national prestige but also for deterrence.19 According to CIA analysts, Beijing's avowed commitment to a "no first use" policy and the enormous destructive potential of nuclear weapons made an offensive, first-strike posture unlikely. Thirty years later, some analysts posit a threatening Chinese nuclear posture, while others argue that China's nuclear posture is still based on no-first use and "limited deterrence," although that could change if the United States adopted "a Cold War-style containment policy."20
Document 10: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Soviet and Peoples Republic of China Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy and Strategy," March 1972 (excerpt), FOIA release
This excerpt provides a useful overview of what Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysts believed they knew about Chinese nuclear weapons deployments as of the early 1970s. The document shows that even with the most sophisticated technology, it was exceedingly difficult for U.S. intelligence to detect MRBM deployments with any assurance. Only days after Richard Nixon's historic trip to China, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysts summarized what the intelligence establishment had learned about Chinese MRBMs: that CCS-1 (Dong Feng-2) troop training activities had been detected, that the CCS-2 (Dong Feng-3) was likely to be deployed soon, and that some MRBM sites "may have been detected", with perhaps 15 missiles deployed to "undetected areas." Nevertheless, the analysts inaccurately opined that "it appears that the Chinese had no intentions [in 1966] of deploying the CSS-1, although it was within their capability."
Document 11: U.S. Embassy Moscow cable 2676 to Department of State, "Sino-Soviet Military Balance," 25 March 1972
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1970-73 (hereinafter cited as SN 70-73)]
Document 12: U.S. State Department Airgram 4285 to Embassy Moscow, "Sino-Soviet Military Balance (C-SR-2056545)," 28 April 1972
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, SN 70-73]
Document 13: U.S. Embassy Moscow airgram 454 to Department of State, "Sino-Soviet Military Balance (C-SR-2056545)," 21 June 1972
[Location of original: National Archives, RG 59, SN 70-73]
These documents convey the alacrity with which U.S. intelligence received the smallest morsels about Chinese nuclear missile deployments during the early 1970s. What the U.S. Embassy learned through a Swiss source was that the Chinese had deployed MRBMs that could strike targets in Eastern or Central Russia (as well as U.S. bases in the Philippines). Those in fact were the capabilities of the Dong Feng-3 mobile missile, which had been deployed in 1971. The Chinese official who had mentioned the deployment was, however, overoptimistic about the rate of progress for an MRBM that could strike Moscow. Beijing would not have a missile that could strike targets in European Russia, including Moscow, until 1981 when the Dong Feng-4 was deployed.21
How U.S. intelligence agencies assessed the scraps of information reported in the 25 March cable remains to be seen. Even though the Moscow Embassy failed to garner more information from its Swiss informant, what it had learned was generally accurate, but there was no way to confirm it. Although the U.S. intelligence establishment was able to detect Chinese missile tests with considerable confidence, when or whether it detected Chinese mobile missile deployments with any exactitude remains obscure at least from the declassified record. Indeed, as shown by a document leaked to the Washington Times, the problem of Chinese mobile missiles continues to baffle U.S. intelligence.22
Appendix A
Table 3, "Chinese Strategic Nuclear Forces, 2005-2010," from Ming Zhang, China's Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), p. 37. The Archive thanks the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for permission to use this table. (not inserted, see URL)
(...)
Note: Nuclear warhead yields are expressed in kilotons (KT) and megatons (MT), indicating an explosive force equivalent to that amount of TNT.
Sources: Estimates are based on data in Jones and McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998, p. 63; William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Joshua Handler, Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: National Resources Defense Council); Patrick J. Garrity, “Nuclear Weapons and Asia-Pacific Security: Issues, Trends, and Uncertainties,” National Security Studies Quarterly, vol. IV, issue 1, Winter 1998, p. 46; Bill Gertz, “China Adds 6 ICBMs to Arsenal,” Washington Times, July 21, 1998 (Internet edition); “New Declassified 1998 Report on the Ballistic Missile Threat,” Proliferation Brief, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), vol. 1, no. 13, September 28, 1998.
Appendix B
Table 7-1, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 1964-1993, from Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1994, p. 359. The Archive thanks Robert S. Norris, Natural Resources Defense Council, for permission to use this table. Note: TU-4, H[ong]-6 and H[ong]-5 are bombers; Q[ian]-5 is a supersonic attack aircraft. The DF [Dong Feng] missiles are described in detail in Norris et al., cited above.
Return to Index of Electronic Briefing Books
Return to National Security Archive Main Page
Notes
1. Kenneth deGraffenreid, ed., The Cox Report (Washington, D.C., Regnery, 1999); quotations from editor's introduction, n.p.
2. For statistics on Chinese strategic forces, see Ming Zhang, China's Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 37, reproduced in appendix A, and Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1994, 359, reproduced in appendix B below. For statistics on U.S. and Soviet strategic forces over the years, see Robert S. Norris and Thomas B. Cochran, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Working Papers, US-USSR Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces 1945-1996 (Washington, D.C., Natural Resources Defense Council, 1997).
3. See Robert S. Norris et al. French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons; Ming Zhang, China's Changing Nuclear Posture; and John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security 17 (Fall 1992): 5-40.
4. In recent years, however, well-placed officials in the intelligence bureaucracy and the Pentagon have selectively leaked intelligence reports on Chinese nuclear deployments and weapons policy to Washington Times reporter Bill Gertz. Some of the documents were reprinted in Gertz's book, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security (Washington, D.C., Regnery Publishing Co., 1999). Several leaked documents on Chinese missiles are reproduced on pages 245-54. For critical commentary on Gertz's book and his methods, see Federation of American Scientists, Secrecy and Government Bulletin, Issue No. 78, May 1999
5. Some of the National Security Archive's requests, however, are under appeal. Some of the documents at issues were published in excerpted form only in the State Department's Foreign Relations series. See various Central Intelligence Agency estimates in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, volume 22 (Washington, D.C. 1996) and Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-68, volume 30 (Washington, D.C., 1998).
6. Again, see Norris et al., Chinese Nuclear Weapons, and Wilson Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals."
7. Prestige played a role in Chinese decisionmaking at an early date; key officials considered nuclear weapons to be essential to world power, progress, and development. As Foreign Minister Chen Yi put it to Japanese journalists with Kyodo News Service in late October 1963: "A-bombs, missiles, supersonic aircraft--all these are reflective of the technical level of a nation's industry. China will have to resolve this issue within the next several years; otherwise, it will degenerate into a second-class or third-class nation."
8. For the nerve center of hawkish thinking about China, see "'Blue Team' Draws a Hard Line on Beijing", Washington Post, 22 February 2000.
9. For analyses stressing a deterrent posture, see "DCI Statement on Damage Assessment", 21 April 2000,
10. Jeremy Stone, "Missile Encirclement: China's Interest in Missile Controls," FAS Public Interest Report, September-October1998, at
11. For discussion of the possible impact of U.S. missile defense on Chinese policy, see Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, "The China Puzzle; Goal: Build a Missile Defense, Problem: How to Handle Beijing," The Washington Post, 5 March 2000, and John Isaacs, "A Political Decision," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000, 22-25.
12. See recent issues of Federation of American Scientists, Secrecy & Government Bulletin, prepared by Steven Aftergood, for incisive analysis of recent developments in declassification policy.
13. For a first rate history of AFTAC's early years, when it was known as AFOAT/One, (Air Force Office of Atomic Energy/One) see Charles A. Ziegler and David Jacobson, Spying Without Spies: Origins of America's Secret Nuclear Surveillance System (Westport, CT, Praeger, 1995).
14. Glenn T. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1987), 116.
15. Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 362. For an account of the test from Chinese sources, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press), 202-03.
16. It has since become part of the scholarly consensus that the test was a dud. See Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 420. This study suggests that the initial estimate of a yield of 10 kilotons was later revised upwards to 15-25 kilotons. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, 202-03, 214.
19. For a significant historical study confirming the importance of deterrence in Chinese nuclear policy, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1994), 231-37.
20. See Ming Zhang, "What Threat?", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September-October 2000, 52-57.
21. Norris et al., British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 380-83.
22. Gertz, Betrayal, 254.
108) Chinese Exchange Rate - Institute for International EConomics
The Chinese Exchange Rate
Peterson Institute for International Economics (link)
The Issue
China announced several changes to its foreign exchange regime on July 21, 2005, including abandoning the renminbi-dollar peg and pegging to a basket of currencies instead. Despite the policy change, China's currency strengthened very little for two years after reforms were announced and the current account surplus soared to an astonishing 11 percent in 2007. From November 2007 through the end of 2008, however, the pace of appreciation increased substantially. Reinforcing this appreciation were two steps the government took through mid-2008: reducing value-added tax (VAT) rebate rates for a large number of export products and imposing restrictions on the export processing regime. Some of this appreciation is also attributable to the dollar's appreciation against other currencies resulting from the global economic turmoil and the "flight to safety" of investors seeking dollar-denominated securities, with the renminbi "riding the dollar up" during this period.
Despite the more rapid pace of currency appreciation in 2008, PIIE Senior Fellows Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy conclude that the renminbi is still undervalued on a real trade-weighted (effective) basis and that a further appreciation—say, on the order of 15 to 25 percent—would be desirable. However, the Chinese authorities—assuming that they don't allow the sizable real appreciation of the renminbi in 2008 to be undone—are not as far "behind the curve" as they were in October 2007 and should continue their currency reforms even in the face of a global economic slowdown. Like most of the rest of the world struggling with the global financial crisis and economic slowdown, economic growth in China has slowed markedly—from 14 percent (at an annual rate) in the second quarter of 2007 to only 6.1 percent in the first quarter of 2009 before recovering to 7.9 percent in the quarter ending in June. China faces a considerably less buoyant outlook for external demand than before the crisis, as seen in the sharp decline in China's exports beginning in November 2008. To mitigate the effects of slowing external demand and promote exports, the authorities have since July 2008 backtracked and raised VAT rebates paid to producers of exported goods.
If China allows little currency appreciation over the coming quarters, continues raising VAT rebates, and global growth converges back toward long-term potential, China's current account surplus would risk expanding once again, perhaps at the rapid pace observed in 2005–07. China's external imbalance is much bigger than it was five or six years ago: Its current account surplus in 2008 was $426 billion compared with $68.7 billion in 2004. China's foreign exchange reserves have also skyrocketed, reaching $2.1 trillion at the end of June 2009.
Essential Reading from the Institute
Book: Future of China's Exchange Rate Policy
The Policy Analyses in International Economics No. 87
by Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy
July 2009
Book: Debating China's Exchange Rate Policy
edited by Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy
April 2008
Book: China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (hardcover)
by C. Fred Bergsten , Charles Freeman , Nicholas R. Lardy and Derek J. Mitchell
September 2008
Speech: Is China a Currency “Manipulator”? [pdf]
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Transcript from Peterson Perspectives: Interviews on Current Issues
January 28, 2009
Op-ed: China's Currency Needs to Rise Further
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
and Nicholas R. Lardy, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Op-ed in the Financial Times
July 22, 2008
Testimony: The Dollar and the Renminbi
by C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Statement before the Hearing on US Economic Relations with China: Strategies and Options on Exchange Rates and Market Access, Subcommittee on Security and International Trade and Finance, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate
May 23, 2007
Policy Brief 07-4: Global Imbalances: Time for Action [pdf]
March 2007
Working Paper 07-5: A (Lack of) Progress Report on China's Exchange Rate Policies [pdf]
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
June 2007
Op-ed: Is China Having It Both Ways?
by Arvind Subramanian, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Post on the Wall Street Journal's Real Time Economics
March 25, 2009
Op-ed: The Yen Beckons China’s Dollars
by C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Op-ed in the Financial Times
March 12, 2007
Testimony: The Chinese Exchange Rate and the US Economy
by C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Testimony before the Hearing on the Treasury Department's Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policy and the Strategic Economic Dialogue Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
January 31, 2007
Testimony: Assessing Progress on China’s Exchange Rate Policies
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Testimony before the Hearing on
"Risks and Reform: The Role of Currency in the US–China Relationship"
Committee on Finance, US Senate
Washington, DC
March 28, 2007
Article: Clash of the Titans
by C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Article in Newsweek, International Edition
April 24, 2006
Op-ed: China's Revaluation Shows Size Really Matters
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
and Nicholas R. Lardy, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Op-ed in the Financial Times
July 22, 2005
Policy Brief 06-6: China: Toward a Consumption-Driven Growth Path [pdf]
by Nicholas R. Lardy, Peterson Institute for International Economics
October 2006
Working Paper 04-1: Adjusting China's Exchange Rate Policies [pdf]
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
June 2004
Policy Brief 05-1: A Currency Basket for East Asia, Not Just China [pdf]
by John Williamson, Peterson Institute for International Economics
August 2005
Policy Brief 04-7: What Kind of Landing for the Chinese Economy? [pdf]
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
and Nicholas R. Lardy, Peterson Institute for International Economics
November 2004
Peterson Institute for International Economics (link)
The Issue
China announced several changes to its foreign exchange regime on July 21, 2005, including abandoning the renminbi-dollar peg and pegging to a basket of currencies instead. Despite the policy change, China's currency strengthened very little for two years after reforms were announced and the current account surplus soared to an astonishing 11 percent in 2007. From November 2007 through the end of 2008, however, the pace of appreciation increased substantially. Reinforcing this appreciation were two steps the government took through mid-2008: reducing value-added tax (VAT) rebate rates for a large number of export products and imposing restrictions on the export processing regime. Some of this appreciation is also attributable to the dollar's appreciation against other currencies resulting from the global economic turmoil and the "flight to safety" of investors seeking dollar-denominated securities, with the renminbi "riding the dollar up" during this period.
Despite the more rapid pace of currency appreciation in 2008, PIIE Senior Fellows Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy conclude that the renminbi is still undervalued on a real trade-weighted (effective) basis and that a further appreciation—say, on the order of 15 to 25 percent—would be desirable. However, the Chinese authorities—assuming that they don't allow the sizable real appreciation of the renminbi in 2008 to be undone—are not as far "behind the curve" as they were in October 2007 and should continue their currency reforms even in the face of a global economic slowdown. Like most of the rest of the world struggling with the global financial crisis and economic slowdown, economic growth in China has slowed markedly—from 14 percent (at an annual rate) in the second quarter of 2007 to only 6.1 percent in the first quarter of 2009 before recovering to 7.9 percent in the quarter ending in June. China faces a considerably less buoyant outlook for external demand than before the crisis, as seen in the sharp decline in China's exports beginning in November 2008. To mitigate the effects of slowing external demand and promote exports, the authorities have since July 2008 backtracked and raised VAT rebates paid to producers of exported goods.
If China allows little currency appreciation over the coming quarters, continues raising VAT rebates, and global growth converges back toward long-term potential, China's current account surplus would risk expanding once again, perhaps at the rapid pace observed in 2005–07. China's external imbalance is much bigger than it was five or six years ago: Its current account surplus in 2008 was $426 billion compared with $68.7 billion in 2004. China's foreign exchange reserves have also skyrocketed, reaching $2.1 trillion at the end of June 2009.
Essential Reading from the Institute
Book: Future of China's Exchange Rate Policy
The Policy Analyses in International Economics No. 87
by Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy
July 2009
Book: Debating China's Exchange Rate Policy
edited by Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy
April 2008
Book: China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (hardcover)
by C. Fred Bergsten , Charles Freeman , Nicholas R. Lardy and Derek J. Mitchell
September 2008
Speech: Is China a Currency “Manipulator”? [pdf]
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Transcript from Peterson Perspectives: Interviews on Current Issues
January 28, 2009
Op-ed: China's Currency Needs to Rise Further
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
and Nicholas R. Lardy, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Op-ed in the Financial Times
July 22, 2008
Testimony: The Dollar and the Renminbi
by C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Statement before the Hearing on US Economic Relations with China: Strategies and Options on Exchange Rates and Market Access, Subcommittee on Security and International Trade and Finance, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate
May 23, 2007
Policy Brief 07-4: Global Imbalances: Time for Action [pdf]
March 2007
Working Paper 07-5: A (Lack of) Progress Report on China's Exchange Rate Policies [pdf]
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
June 2007
Op-ed: Is China Having It Both Ways?
by Arvind Subramanian, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Post on the Wall Street Journal's Real Time Economics
March 25, 2009
Op-ed: The Yen Beckons China’s Dollars
by C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Op-ed in the Financial Times
March 12, 2007
Testimony: The Chinese Exchange Rate and the US Economy
by C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Testimony before the Hearing on the Treasury Department's Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policy and the Strategic Economic Dialogue Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
January 31, 2007
Testimony: Assessing Progress on China’s Exchange Rate Policies
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Testimony before the Hearing on
"Risks and Reform: The Role of Currency in the US–China Relationship"
Committee on Finance, US Senate
Washington, DC
March 28, 2007
Article: Clash of the Titans
by C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Article in Newsweek, International Edition
April 24, 2006
Op-ed: China's Revaluation Shows Size Really Matters
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
and Nicholas R. Lardy, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Op-ed in the Financial Times
July 22, 2005
Policy Brief 06-6: China: Toward a Consumption-Driven Growth Path [pdf]
by Nicholas R. Lardy, Peterson Institute for International Economics
October 2006
Working Paper 04-1: Adjusting China's Exchange Rate Policies [pdf]
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
June 2004
Policy Brief 05-1: A Currency Basket for East Asia, Not Just China [pdf]
by John Williamson, Peterson Institute for International Economics
August 2005
Policy Brief 04-7: What Kind of Landing for the Chinese Economy? [pdf]
by Morris Goldstein, Peterson Institute for International Economics
and Nicholas R. Lardy, Peterson Institute for International Economics
November 2004
107) Manifestacoes estudantis de Tiananmen - 20 anos depois
Reprodução a partir do blog pessoal, post de 3 de junho de 2009
Tiananmen: 20 anos da revolta estudantil na China
Uma matéria do jornal francês Le Figaro sobre os 20 anos da revolta estudantil que terminou no massacre da Praça da Paz Celestial (que nome tão irônico, em retrospecto),apenas uma etapa, mas provavelmente não a mais decisiva, do longo caminho da China em direção à democracia, um sistema político (ou um regime de governança) que ela jamais conheceu em toda a sua história milenar.
Talvez os filhos desta geração sacrificada conheçam a democracia, mas terão primeiro de romper o monopólio político do Partido Comunista.
Tiananmen, la révolte qui a ébranlé la Chine
De notre correspondant à Pékin, Arnaud de La Grange
Le Figaro, 03/06/2009
Quand le mouvement de grève de la faim se déclenche le 13 mai et que l'occupation de la place Tiananmen devient effective, la population pékinoise s'est largement rangée aux côtés des étudiants.
Quand le mouvement de grève de la faim se déclenche le 13 mai et que l'occupation de la place Tiananmen devient effective, la population pékinoise s'est largement rangée aux côtés des étudiants.
Dans la nuit du 3 au 4 juin 1989, l'Armée populaire de libération ouvre le feu sur les jeunes contestataires qui manifestent depuis plusieurs semaines dans la capitale. C'est la fin du «printemps de Pékin».
Il y aura vingt ans exactement cette nuit, le sang coulait au cœur de la capitale d'un pays que, durant une décennie pourtant, le monde avait regardé s'adonner avec frénésie aux réformes. La Chine venait de connaître six semaines où le cours de l'histoire avait débordé, dépassant tout le monde, le pouvoir comme le camp prodémocratique.
Tout a commencé le 15 avril 1989, avec l'annonce de la mort du réformateur Hu Yaobang, dont la popularité n'a cessé de grandir depuis qu'il avait été limogé deux ans auparavant. Des étudiants se rendent alors en grappes pour lui rendre hommage devant le monument aux héros place Tiananmen. Ils ne veulent pas renverser le régime, juste obtenir une réaffirmation de la réforme politique. Le 20 avril, ils sont des milliers à se rendre devant l'entrée de Zhongnanhai, la «nouvelle cité interdite» des barons communistes, pour demander la «réévaluation du rôle de Hu Yaobang», plus de liberté d'expression et moins de corruption. Devant l'absence de réponse, hormis quelques coups de matraque, le mouvement va se structurer. Dans les universités, les étudiants créent des associations autonomes pour remplacer les unions officielles liées au Parti.
Un «immense gâchis»
Quand le mouvement de grève de la faim se déclenche le 13 mai et que l'occupation de la place Tiananmen devient effective, la population pékinoise s'est largement rangée aux côtés des étudiants. C'est l'occasion de protester contre l'augmentation du coût de la vie, de demander plus de justice, plus de liberté de la presse pour lutter contre la corruption et l'arbitraire des cadres du Parti. Mais les ouvriers, longtemps tenus à distance par les étudiants d'ailleurs, ont à peine le temps de commencer à s'organiser. Il n'y aura pas de «Solidarnosc chinois».
L'histoire bascule en deux journées. Le 17 mai, lors d'une réunion chez Deng Xiaoping, le patron du PC, Zhao Ziyang, et son bras droit Bao Tong sont accusés d'avoir favorisé l'essor du mouvement étudiant. Deng Xiaoping dresse le tableau d'une anarchie croissante, du risque de perte de contrôle total de la situation et suggère l'instauration de la loi martiale. Le 18 au matin, la décision est prise. Zhao Ziyang décide de jeter l'éponge. «Je me suis dit que quoi qu'il arrive, je refuserai d'être le secrétaire général du Parti qui aura mobilisé la troupe pour tirer sur les étudiants», raconte-t-il dans ses mémoires posthumes qui viennent d'être publiés aux États-Unis et à Hongkong. Le soir du 19 mai, on voit ces images terribles de Zhao Ziyang - accompagné de l'actuel premier ministre Wen Jiabao - descendre au-devant des étudiants sur la place Tiananmen. Il les exhorte à rentrer chez eux, fait ses excuses. «Nous sommes venus trop tard», finit-il par lâcher, les larmes aux yeux.
Trop tard, en effet. La loi martiale est promulguée le 20 mai et l'armée reçoit l'ordre de faire mouvement. Partout, des barricades sont dressées, des murs humains se forment pour freiner l'avancée des soldats. Parfois, la violence éclate. Entre le 20 mai et le 3 juin, l'armée se trouve paralysée dans une ville en ébullition. Les soldats avaient l'ordre de ne pas menacer la foule, de ne pas tirer et beaucoup n'auront longtemps pas de munitions dans leurs chargeurs. Dean Peng, alors assistant de recherche à l'Institut de l'énergie atomique de l'université de Pékin, était sur la place Tiananmen la nuit du 3 au 4 juin. Il se souvient qu'à ce moment-là, il y avait de moins en moins d'étudiants et de plus en plus de chômeurs dans les rues. Le mouvement étudiant donnait des signaux contradictoires d'essoufflement et de radicalisation. «Rétrospectivement, je me rends compte de l'immense gâchis que tout cela a été, raconte-t-il, même chez les durs du pouvoir, personne ne voulait de ce bain de sang, d'où ce sentiment de honte qui perdure jusqu'à aujourd'hui chez nos dirigeants.»
Nettoyer la place
Pour Dean, le drame est venu d'une montée aux extrêmes presque mécanique. Pourtant peu suspect de sympathie pour le Parti, qui pour lui n'est plus aujourd'hui le PCC mais «la FCC, fraction communiste de Chine», cet homme de 41 ans estime qu'«il y a eu des erreurs tactiques des deux côtés». «Les étudiants ont poussé trop loin à un moment, laissant croire à Deng que son pouvoir était menacé sur le fond. Le pouvoir a fait lui une erreur énorme en décrétant la loi martiale, qui a irrité les gens, alors que tout aurait pu se gérer sans violence, les revendications étant très vagues et pas structurées politiquement». Le problème, selon lui, c'est qu'aucun des deux camps n'avait l'expérience de ce type de confrontation. «Et c'est devenu un problème de “face”, poursuit-il. Les étudiants, s'ils se retiraient, montraient qu'ils avaient peur. Deng, s'il ne parvenait pas à rétablir l'ordre alors qu'il avait poussé à la loi martiale, perdait la face.»
L'ordre est donné le 3 juin de nettoyer la place à tout prix. Mais les consignes stipulent que le sang ne coule pas sur Tiananmen. De fait, la plupart des morts seront à déplorer dans les avenues adjacentes ou dans différents quartiers de la capitale. Lynchages de soldats, tirs contre des barrages humains de civils, la violence court avec la nuit qui avance. «Avec mon mari, nous avons cherché notre fils Wu Xiangdong toute la nuit, raconte Xu Jue, une adorable femme de 70 ans, qui était géographe chercheur à l'époque. On a vu une foule se déchaîner contre un soldat. Je n'ai pas compris. Et puis j'ai vu ces mêmes soldats abattre un rang entier de manifestants qui barraient la rue. Je ne comprenais plus rien. C'était terrible.» Après avoir couru tous les hôpitaux, le couple ne retrouvera son fils qu'au petit matin. Mort, son cadavre aligné auprès d'autres dans le garage à vélos de l'hôpital. Il avait 21 ans.
Aujourd'hui, avec bien d'autres «mères de Tiananmen», Xu Jue a écrit son histoire, archivée sur un site américain «pour que la mémoire ne meure pas». Elle montre la chemise que portait son fils à Tiananmen, bardée des signatures de ses amis. Son testament, aussi, écrit le 20 mai, quand la loi martiale a été instaurée. «Mes chers parents, pardonnez-moi si je ne suis pas très obéissant, a écrit le jeune homme, mais ce que je fais est digne de mon nom chinois». Officiellement, la «tempête politique» de mai 1989 a fait 241 morts. Xu Jue ne demande aujourd'hui que trois choses : que la vérité sur les faits et le bilan des victimes soient rétablis, que l'on dise officiellement qui a donné l'ordre de tirer et qu'une indemnité soit donnée aux familles, «pas pour l'argent, mais pour le principe». Et que l'État de droit et la liberté d'expression ne soient pas aussi en retard sur le développement économique. «L'année dernière, j'ai voulu aller me recueillir sur la tombe de Zhao Ziyang, dit-elle, six policiers m'ont arrêtée et emmenée dans une voiture. Un grand pays peut-il traiter comme cela une femme âgée, dont le seul crime est d'avoir perdu son fils il y a vingt ans ?»
» Pékin sur la défensive avant l'anniversaire de Tiananmen
» BLOG - L'espérance indéfectible de Bao Tong
Tiananmen: 20 anos da revolta estudantil na China
Uma matéria do jornal francês Le Figaro sobre os 20 anos da revolta estudantil que terminou no massacre da Praça da Paz Celestial (que nome tão irônico, em retrospecto),apenas uma etapa, mas provavelmente não a mais decisiva, do longo caminho da China em direção à democracia, um sistema político (ou um regime de governança) que ela jamais conheceu em toda a sua história milenar.
Talvez os filhos desta geração sacrificada conheçam a democracia, mas terão primeiro de romper o monopólio político do Partido Comunista.
Tiananmen, la révolte qui a ébranlé la Chine
De notre correspondant à Pékin, Arnaud de La Grange
Le Figaro, 03/06/2009
Quand le mouvement de grève de la faim se déclenche le 13 mai et que l'occupation de la place Tiananmen devient effective, la population pékinoise s'est largement rangée aux côtés des étudiants.
Quand le mouvement de grève de la faim se déclenche le 13 mai et que l'occupation de la place Tiananmen devient effective, la population pékinoise s'est largement rangée aux côtés des étudiants.
Dans la nuit du 3 au 4 juin 1989, l'Armée populaire de libération ouvre le feu sur les jeunes contestataires qui manifestent depuis plusieurs semaines dans la capitale. C'est la fin du «printemps de Pékin».
Il y aura vingt ans exactement cette nuit, le sang coulait au cœur de la capitale d'un pays que, durant une décennie pourtant, le monde avait regardé s'adonner avec frénésie aux réformes. La Chine venait de connaître six semaines où le cours de l'histoire avait débordé, dépassant tout le monde, le pouvoir comme le camp prodémocratique.
Tout a commencé le 15 avril 1989, avec l'annonce de la mort du réformateur Hu Yaobang, dont la popularité n'a cessé de grandir depuis qu'il avait été limogé deux ans auparavant. Des étudiants se rendent alors en grappes pour lui rendre hommage devant le monument aux héros place Tiananmen. Ils ne veulent pas renverser le régime, juste obtenir une réaffirmation de la réforme politique. Le 20 avril, ils sont des milliers à se rendre devant l'entrée de Zhongnanhai, la «nouvelle cité interdite» des barons communistes, pour demander la «réévaluation du rôle de Hu Yaobang», plus de liberté d'expression et moins de corruption. Devant l'absence de réponse, hormis quelques coups de matraque, le mouvement va se structurer. Dans les universités, les étudiants créent des associations autonomes pour remplacer les unions officielles liées au Parti.
Un «immense gâchis»
Quand le mouvement de grève de la faim se déclenche le 13 mai et que l'occupation de la place Tiananmen devient effective, la population pékinoise s'est largement rangée aux côtés des étudiants. C'est l'occasion de protester contre l'augmentation du coût de la vie, de demander plus de justice, plus de liberté de la presse pour lutter contre la corruption et l'arbitraire des cadres du Parti. Mais les ouvriers, longtemps tenus à distance par les étudiants d'ailleurs, ont à peine le temps de commencer à s'organiser. Il n'y aura pas de «Solidarnosc chinois».
L'histoire bascule en deux journées. Le 17 mai, lors d'une réunion chez Deng Xiaoping, le patron du PC, Zhao Ziyang, et son bras droit Bao Tong sont accusés d'avoir favorisé l'essor du mouvement étudiant. Deng Xiaoping dresse le tableau d'une anarchie croissante, du risque de perte de contrôle total de la situation et suggère l'instauration de la loi martiale. Le 18 au matin, la décision est prise. Zhao Ziyang décide de jeter l'éponge. «Je me suis dit que quoi qu'il arrive, je refuserai d'être le secrétaire général du Parti qui aura mobilisé la troupe pour tirer sur les étudiants», raconte-t-il dans ses mémoires posthumes qui viennent d'être publiés aux États-Unis et à Hongkong. Le soir du 19 mai, on voit ces images terribles de Zhao Ziyang - accompagné de l'actuel premier ministre Wen Jiabao - descendre au-devant des étudiants sur la place Tiananmen. Il les exhorte à rentrer chez eux, fait ses excuses. «Nous sommes venus trop tard», finit-il par lâcher, les larmes aux yeux.
Trop tard, en effet. La loi martiale est promulguée le 20 mai et l'armée reçoit l'ordre de faire mouvement. Partout, des barricades sont dressées, des murs humains se forment pour freiner l'avancée des soldats. Parfois, la violence éclate. Entre le 20 mai et le 3 juin, l'armée se trouve paralysée dans une ville en ébullition. Les soldats avaient l'ordre de ne pas menacer la foule, de ne pas tirer et beaucoup n'auront longtemps pas de munitions dans leurs chargeurs. Dean Peng, alors assistant de recherche à l'Institut de l'énergie atomique de l'université de Pékin, était sur la place Tiananmen la nuit du 3 au 4 juin. Il se souvient qu'à ce moment-là, il y avait de moins en moins d'étudiants et de plus en plus de chômeurs dans les rues. Le mouvement étudiant donnait des signaux contradictoires d'essoufflement et de radicalisation. «Rétrospectivement, je me rends compte de l'immense gâchis que tout cela a été, raconte-t-il, même chez les durs du pouvoir, personne ne voulait de ce bain de sang, d'où ce sentiment de honte qui perdure jusqu'à aujourd'hui chez nos dirigeants.»
Nettoyer la place
Pour Dean, le drame est venu d'une montée aux extrêmes presque mécanique. Pourtant peu suspect de sympathie pour le Parti, qui pour lui n'est plus aujourd'hui le PCC mais «la FCC, fraction communiste de Chine», cet homme de 41 ans estime qu'«il y a eu des erreurs tactiques des deux côtés». «Les étudiants ont poussé trop loin à un moment, laissant croire à Deng que son pouvoir était menacé sur le fond. Le pouvoir a fait lui une erreur énorme en décrétant la loi martiale, qui a irrité les gens, alors que tout aurait pu se gérer sans violence, les revendications étant très vagues et pas structurées politiquement». Le problème, selon lui, c'est qu'aucun des deux camps n'avait l'expérience de ce type de confrontation. «Et c'est devenu un problème de “face”, poursuit-il. Les étudiants, s'ils se retiraient, montraient qu'ils avaient peur. Deng, s'il ne parvenait pas à rétablir l'ordre alors qu'il avait poussé à la loi martiale, perdait la face.»
L'ordre est donné le 3 juin de nettoyer la place à tout prix. Mais les consignes stipulent que le sang ne coule pas sur Tiananmen. De fait, la plupart des morts seront à déplorer dans les avenues adjacentes ou dans différents quartiers de la capitale. Lynchages de soldats, tirs contre des barrages humains de civils, la violence court avec la nuit qui avance. «Avec mon mari, nous avons cherché notre fils Wu Xiangdong toute la nuit, raconte Xu Jue, une adorable femme de 70 ans, qui était géographe chercheur à l'époque. On a vu une foule se déchaîner contre un soldat. Je n'ai pas compris. Et puis j'ai vu ces mêmes soldats abattre un rang entier de manifestants qui barraient la rue. Je ne comprenais plus rien. C'était terrible.» Après avoir couru tous les hôpitaux, le couple ne retrouvera son fils qu'au petit matin. Mort, son cadavre aligné auprès d'autres dans le garage à vélos de l'hôpital. Il avait 21 ans.
Aujourd'hui, avec bien d'autres «mères de Tiananmen», Xu Jue a écrit son histoire, archivée sur un site américain «pour que la mémoire ne meure pas». Elle montre la chemise que portait son fils à Tiananmen, bardée des signatures de ses amis. Son testament, aussi, écrit le 20 mai, quand la loi martiale a été instaurée. «Mes chers parents, pardonnez-moi si je ne suis pas très obéissant, a écrit le jeune homme, mais ce que je fais est digne de mon nom chinois». Officiellement, la «tempête politique» de mai 1989 a fait 241 morts. Xu Jue ne demande aujourd'hui que trois choses : que la vérité sur les faits et le bilan des victimes soient rétablis, que l'on dise officiellement qui a donné l'ordre de tirer et qu'une indemnité soit donnée aux familles, «pas pour l'argent, mais pour le principe». Et que l'État de droit et la liberté d'expression ne soient pas aussi en retard sur le développement économique. «L'année dernière, j'ai voulu aller me recueillir sur la tombe de Zhao Ziyang, dit-elle, six policiers m'ont arrêtée et emmenée dans une voiture. Un grand pays peut-il traiter comme cela une femme âgée, dont le seul crime est d'avoir perdu son fils il y a vingt ans ?»
» Pékin sur la défensive avant l'anniversaire de Tiananmen
» BLOG - L'espérance indéfectible de Bao Tong
106) Relacoes comerciais America Latina - Asia Pacifico
El reciente dinamismo de la relación comercial entre América Latina y el Caribe y Asia-Pacífico
Durante las últimas tres décadas, los países de Asia-Pacífico se han ubicado entre las economías más dinámicas del mundo: casi duplicaron su participación en el PIB global entre 1980 y 2009 pasando de 16,4% a 30,6%, respectivamente.
Boletim do INTAL-BID: Carta Mensual n. 159, octubre 2009
Paper sobre AL-Asia Pacifico
Durante las últimas tres décadas, los países de Asia-Pacífico se han ubicado entre las economías más dinámicas del mundo: casi duplicaron su participación en el PIB global entre 1980 y 2009 pasando de 16,4% a 30,6%, respectivamente.
Boletim do INTAL-BID: Carta Mensual n. 159, octubre 2009
Paper sobre AL-Asia Pacifico
105) American economic relations with Asia - Marcus Nolland
American Economic Relations with Asia
Marcus Noland - Peterson Institute for International Economics
Asian Economic Policy Review, (2009) 4, 181–199
Abstract:
The USA and Asia have an enormous stake in each others’ continuing prosperity. This outcome is linked to the preservation of the open international economic order, which in turn faces challenges at both the interstate diplomatic level and at the domestic political level. The global financial crisis is probably the worst since the Great Depression and the domestic politics makes it increasingly difficult to formulate a constructive trade policy. In the absence of adequate reform at the global level, the alternative could be further fragmentation into competing regional blocs. Asia holds
the key, combining both dissatisfaction with existing global arrangements with the resources to reconstitute, at least at the regional level, an alternative set of institutions and practices. How Asia responds, acting to strengthen reformed global institutions or undermine them in favor of regional alternatives, will partly depend on the policies of the dominant global power, the USA.
Key words: Asia, financial crisis, globalization, regionalism, USA
Avaliable at: http://news.piie.com/t/533477/5991645/13729/0/
Marcus Noland - Peterson Institute for International Economics
Asian Economic Policy Review, (2009) 4, 181–199
Abstract:
The USA and Asia have an enormous stake in each others’ continuing prosperity. This outcome is linked to the preservation of the open international economic order, which in turn faces challenges at both the interstate diplomatic level and at the domestic political level. The global financial crisis is probably the worst since the Great Depression and the domestic politics makes it increasingly difficult to formulate a constructive trade policy. In the absence of adequate reform at the global level, the alternative could be further fragmentation into competing regional blocs. Asia holds
the key, combining both dissatisfaction with existing global arrangements with the resources to reconstitute, at least at the regional level, an alternative set of institutions and practices. How Asia responds, acting to strengthen reformed global institutions or undermine them in favor of regional alternatives, will partly depend on the policies of the dominant global power, the USA.
Key words: Asia, financial crisis, globalization, regionalism, USA
Avaliable at: http://news.piie.com/t/533477/5991645/13729/0/
Sunday, November 22, 2009
104) Cartas de Shanghai: esquema redacional
Cartas de Shanghai, Planejamento Editorial
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
(o que eu poderei, ou não, escrever nos meses à frente)
1. A China: o território, o país, características básicas no plano geográfico
2. A China: sociedade, povos, cultura, diversidade e unidade das civilizações locais
3. Desenvolvimento histórico da sociedade chinesa: império e cultura milenares
4. Desenvolvimento histórico da sociedade e da economia chinesa: grandes tendências
5. Ordem política e instituições: uma longa história de centralização e despotismo
6. Economia: da maior economia mundial à decadência e à recuperação atual
7. Economia: desenvolvimentos desde as reformas da era Deng Xiaoping
8. Economia: perspectivas da China na economia mundial
9. Equilíbrios geopolíticos e questões de defesa e de segurança
10. Desenvolvimentos nos campos científico e tecnológico
11. Aspectos de sua literatura e cultura: breve síntese contemporânea
12. A China no mundo: do centro do universo à interdependência soberana
13. Relações com os Estados Unidos: osmose necessária e contraditória
14. Relações com o Brasil: considerações no plano econômico e diplomático
15. O que o Brasil pode aprender com a China; o que a China espera do Brasil
Esquema tentativo: 30.10.2009
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
(o que eu poderei, ou não, escrever nos meses à frente)
1. A China: o território, o país, características básicas no plano geográfico
2. A China: sociedade, povos, cultura, diversidade e unidade das civilizações locais
3. Desenvolvimento histórico da sociedade chinesa: império e cultura milenares
4. Desenvolvimento histórico da sociedade e da economia chinesa: grandes tendências
5. Ordem política e instituições: uma longa história de centralização e despotismo
6. Economia: da maior economia mundial à decadência e à recuperação atual
7. Economia: desenvolvimentos desde as reformas da era Deng Xiaoping
8. Economia: perspectivas da China na economia mundial
9. Equilíbrios geopolíticos e questões de defesa e de segurança
10. Desenvolvimentos nos campos científico e tecnológico
11. Aspectos de sua literatura e cultura: breve síntese contemporânea
12. A China no mundo: do centro do universo à interdependência soberana
13. Relações com os Estados Unidos: osmose necessária e contraditória
14. Relações com o Brasil: considerações no plano econômico e diplomático
15. O que o Brasil pode aprender com a China; o que a China espera do Brasil
Esquema tentativo: 30.10.2009
103) Asia Miracle - Robert Fogel
The Impact of the Asian Miracle on the Theory of Economic Growth
Robert W. Fogel
NBER Working Paper No. 14967 - May 2009
ABSTRACT
This paper, divided into seven sections, considers the development of economic growth theory in light of the spectacular advances of the economies of China, India, and Southeast Asia. Section 1 reviews the debate over the sources of technological change and the measurement of total factor productivity that emerged during the second half of the 1950s. Section 2, “Convergence and Divergence,” deals with the closing of the economic gap between the U.S. and other OECD nations that existed after World War II and the increasing economic gap between OECD and Third World nations. Section 3, “The Asian Miracle,” describes the new recognition among Western economists that the sustained, very rapid growth in China and Southeast Asia was changing the global economic balance. Section 4, “Endogenous Economic Growth,” deals with the work of a group of mainly verbal theorists, including Simon Kuznets and T.W. Schultz, who sought to define social, political, demographic, religious, and ideological conditions that preceded the epoch of modern economic growth, which began in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries. That line of thought was extended by more mathematical economists who studied the invention and modeled the diffusion of new technologies in agriculture (Zvi Griliches) and industry (Edwin Mansfield). Section 5, “Bridges between Two Cohorts of Theorists on Technological Change,” compares the work of Griliches, Richard Nelson, and Dale W. Jorgenson, whose quantitative analysis of endogenous technological change spanned the period from the mid-1950s to the new cohort of growth theorists that emerged during the mid- to late-1980s. Section 6, “The Economic Historians,” focuses on their investigations of the nterrelationships of the evolution of social, economic, and political institutions and on findings about the impact of institutional changes on invention, innovation, the process of technological change, and economic growth. Section 7, “The Impact of the Asian Economic Miracle on Growth Theory,” focuses on the theorizing about the likely impact of the rapidly expanding Asian economies on the shaping of the global economy over the next several decades.
Robert W. Fogel
Director, Center for Population Economics
University of Chicago, Booth School of Business
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue, Suite 367
Chicago, IL 60637 and NBER
Robert W. Fogel
NBER Working Paper No. 14967 - May 2009
ABSTRACT
This paper, divided into seven sections, considers the development of economic growth theory in light of the spectacular advances of the economies of China, India, and Southeast Asia. Section 1 reviews the debate over the sources of technological change and the measurement of total factor productivity that emerged during the second half of the 1950s. Section 2, “Convergence and Divergence,” deals with the closing of the economic gap between the U.S. and other OECD nations that existed after World War II and the increasing economic gap between OECD and Third World nations. Section 3, “The Asian Miracle,” describes the new recognition among Western economists that the sustained, very rapid growth in China and Southeast Asia was changing the global economic balance. Section 4, “Endogenous Economic Growth,” deals with the work of a group of mainly verbal theorists, including Simon Kuznets and T.W. Schultz, who sought to define social, political, demographic, religious, and ideological conditions that preceded the epoch of modern economic growth, which began in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries. That line of thought was extended by more mathematical economists who studied the invention and modeled the diffusion of new technologies in agriculture (Zvi Griliches) and industry (Edwin Mansfield). Section 5, “Bridges between Two Cohorts of Theorists on Technological Change,” compares the work of Griliches, Richard Nelson, and Dale W. Jorgenson, whose quantitative analysis of endogenous technological change spanned the period from the mid-1950s to the new cohort of growth theorists that emerged during the mid- to late-1980s. Section 6, “The Economic Historians,” focuses on their investigations of the nterrelationships of the evolution of social, economic, and political institutions and on findings about the impact of institutional changes on invention, innovation, the process of technological change, and economic growth. Section 7, “The Impact of the Asian Economic Miracle on Growth Theory,” focuses on the theorizing about the likely impact of the rapidly expanding Asian economies on the shaping of the global economy over the next several decades.
Robert W. Fogel
Director, Center for Population Economics
University of Chicago, Booth School of Business
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue, Suite 367
Chicago, IL 60637 and NBER
102) The Globalist on China
Searching for China in The Globalist resulted in 612 links containing "China"
Here are the first 10. Look for the other 602 in:
http://www.theglobalist.com/Search.aspx?txtSearch=China
1 Global History
The Two Chinas
Friday, January 11, 2008
Will Taiwan prove to be the Alsace-Lorraine of the 21st century?
2 Global Companies
Meet the New China: China's Top Brands
Wednesday, September 28, 2005
Which companies from China are becoming household names around the world?
3 Global Culture
China in My Life: Exploring China's Future
Saturday, February 16, 2008
When it comes to economic and geopolitical influence, how does China compare to the United States?
4 Global History
China in My Life: China in the 21st Century
Friday, February 15, 2008
Are the Beijing Olympics a pinnacle of China's rise — or a pitfall?
5 China in Transformation
China in 2040 — Leading the World?
Saturday, November 03, 2001
Will China take over the number one spot in the league of global leaders 40 years from now?
6 Global Culture
Pictures at a Chinese Exhibition
Monday, September 17, 2001
How does China's capital Beijing compare to Asian mega-cities?
7 Open Markets > China
A Piece of the Rock
Friday, March 17, 2000
The Chinese just celebrated the 50th anniversary of Mao’s revolution — with a dose of capitalism?
8 Global Economy
Canada's Response to the China Challenge
Tuesday, June 05, 2007
How should Canada address the growing threat that China poses to its economy?
9 Global Economy
China's Real Three Challenges to the United States
Friday, August 29, 2008
What are the global dimensions of the challenges China poses to the United States?
10 Global Economy
Living in China’s Shadow
Tuesday, September 30, 2003
China poses many new challenges. But what about new opportunities?
Here are the first 10. Look for the other 602 in:
http://www.theglobalist.com/Search.aspx?txtSearch=China
1 Global History
The Two Chinas
Friday, January 11, 2008
Will Taiwan prove to be the Alsace-Lorraine of the 21st century?
2 Global Companies
Meet the New China: China's Top Brands
Wednesday, September 28, 2005
Which companies from China are becoming household names around the world?
3 Global Culture
China in My Life: Exploring China's Future
Saturday, February 16, 2008
When it comes to economic and geopolitical influence, how does China compare to the United States?
4 Global History
China in My Life: China in the 21st Century
Friday, February 15, 2008
Are the Beijing Olympics a pinnacle of China's rise — or a pitfall?
5 China in Transformation
China in 2040 — Leading the World?
Saturday, November 03, 2001
Will China take over the number one spot in the league of global leaders 40 years from now?
6 Global Culture
Pictures at a Chinese Exhibition
Monday, September 17, 2001
How does China's capital Beijing compare to Asian mega-cities?
7 Open Markets > China
A Piece of the Rock
Friday, March 17, 2000
The Chinese just celebrated the 50th anniversary of Mao’s revolution — with a dose of capitalism?
8 Global Economy
Canada's Response to the China Challenge
Tuesday, June 05, 2007
How should Canada address the growing threat that China poses to its economy?
9 Global Economy
China's Real Three Challenges to the United States
Friday, August 29, 2008
What are the global dimensions of the challenges China poses to the United States?
10 Global Economy
Living in China’s Shadow
Tuesday, September 30, 2003
China poses many new challenges. But what about new opportunities?
101) China's Challenge — Beyond the Economy
China's Challenge — Beyond the Economy
By Elizabeth C. Economy
Globalist Bookshelf, Tuesday, June 01, 2004
China’s rapid economic development has raised the country’s standard of living considerably. But it has also come at a steep cost to China’s environment. In this excerpt from “The River Runs Black,” Elizabeth Economy outlines the urgent challenge Chinese leaders face in averting the looming crisis.
China’s leaders face a daunting task. With one-quarter of the world’s population, centuries of grand-scale campaigns to transform the natural environment for man’s benefit, intensive and unfettered economic development, and – most recently – its entry into the global economy, China has laid waste to its resources.
A looming environmental disaster: one-quarter of China’s land is now desert.
The results are evident everywhere. Water scarcity is an increasingly prevalent problem. Over China’s leaders struggle to move beyond traditional notions of security that contribute to large-scale development programs.
China has lost twice as much forested land over the centuries as it now possesses. And air quality in many major cities ranks among the worst in the world.
China’s leaders must also now contend with growing public health problems. Rising rates of cancer, birth defects and other pollution-related illnesses have been documented throughout the country.
Pollution – straining China’s economic boom
The economic costs of China’s environmental degradation are rising sharply. Most immediately, poor air and water quality have direct costs in terms of crop loss, missed days of work from respiratory disease and factory shutdowns from lack of water.
Even greater challenges are on the horizon. Several of China’s major river systems are running dry in places, necessitating huge and costly river diversion schemes.
Mass migration
Much of China’s north is under increasing threat of
China has lost twice as much forested land over the centuries as it now possesses. And air quality in many major cities ranks among the worst in the world.
desertification, prompting vast afforestation schemes, with only mixed results.
These depleted land and water resources, coupled with the river diversions, will contribute to migration on the scale of tens of millions over the next decades.
While this will relieve population pressure on some of China’s most overgrazed and intensively farmed land, it will increase the strain on many urban areas.
Urban challenges
Already cities such as Shanghai are experiencing significant stress to their sanitation and waste systems, as well as difficulty in gaining access to natural resources, such as water.
At the same time, as the reforms have exacerbated old (as well as introduced new) environmental challenges, they have not managed to break free of other aspects of China’s environmental legacy.
Good intentions, disastrous consequences
Particularly damaging has been Beijing’s continued reliance on campaigns to address vast, often complex environmental problems.
History has demonstrated repeatedly that the
The Chinese government is wary of the potential for NGOs and the media to criticize government policy — or serve as a force for broader social change.
challenges of deforestation, pollution and scarcity of natural resources are poorly addressed by grand-scale campaigns that attend little to the complex social, economic and environmental/scientific issues that underpin these challenges.
Moreover, even as China assumes a leadership position in the global economy and the international community, its leaders struggle to move beyond traditional notions of security that contribute to large-scale development programs with potentially highly deleterious environmental consequences, such as the grain self-reliance and “Go West” campaigns.
Signs of hope
China’s post-Mao leaders have developed a far more institutional system of governance, with a codified system of laws. This is a critical step forward for environmental protection.
Still, by most measures, the central environmental protection bureaucracy in China remains weak.
Not a priority: environmental protection bureaucracy only one-twentieth as large.
With roughly five times the population of the United States, China possesses a central
Local officials and enterprise managers prefer not to use pollution control technologies in order to decrease the costs of operating the plants.
Central government funding for environmental protection – while increasing steadily over the course of the reform period – is still well under the level that Chinese experts claim is necessary to prevent further deterioration.
China’s weak enforcement of its own environmental protection laws also undermines the potential environmental advantages of foreign direct investment.
Pressure to cut costs
Many multinationals complain that despite their best efforts, local officials and enterprise managers prefer not to use the pollution control technologies they provide in order to decrease the costs of operating the plants.
Or, in other instances, foreign firms simply cannot compete against domestic firms that do not abide by the country’s environmental regulations.
Fearing broad social change
China’s leaders have also placed the future of environmental protection in the hands of the Chinese people, opening the door to grassroots activities, NGOs and the media.
With roughly five times the population of the United States, China possesses a central environmental protection bureaucracy only one-twentieth as large.
The Chinese government is wary of the potential for NGOs and the media to move beyond issues of local enforcement to criticize central government policy or potentially serve as a force for broader social change.
The environment may serve as a locus for broader political discontent and calls for political reform, as it has in other countries.
Given the dynamic nature of both China’s economy and its evolving political system, assessing China’s environmental future and its broader implications for the country and the world is no easy task.
Reproduced from Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future. Copyright © 2004 by Cornell University. Used by permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press.
By Elizabeth C. Economy
Globalist Bookshelf, Tuesday, June 01, 2004
China’s rapid economic development has raised the country’s standard of living considerably. But it has also come at a steep cost to China’s environment. In this excerpt from “The River Runs Black,” Elizabeth Economy outlines the urgent challenge Chinese leaders face in averting the looming crisis.
China’s leaders face a daunting task. With one-quarter of the world’s population, centuries of grand-scale campaigns to transform the natural environment for man’s benefit, intensive and unfettered economic development, and – most recently – its entry into the global economy, China has laid waste to its resources.
A looming environmental disaster: one-quarter of China’s land is now desert.
The results are evident everywhere. Water scarcity is an increasingly prevalent problem. Over China’s leaders struggle to move beyond traditional notions of security that contribute to large-scale development programs.
China has lost twice as much forested land over the centuries as it now possesses. And air quality in many major cities ranks among the worst in the world.
China’s leaders must also now contend with growing public health problems. Rising rates of cancer, birth defects and other pollution-related illnesses have been documented throughout the country.
Pollution – straining China’s economic boom
The economic costs of China’s environmental degradation are rising sharply. Most immediately, poor air and water quality have direct costs in terms of crop loss, missed days of work from respiratory disease and factory shutdowns from lack of water.
Even greater challenges are on the horizon. Several of China’s major river systems are running dry in places, necessitating huge and costly river diversion schemes.
Mass migration
Much of China’s north is under increasing threat of
China has lost twice as much forested land over the centuries as it now possesses. And air quality in many major cities ranks among the worst in the world.
desertification, prompting vast afforestation schemes, with only mixed results.
These depleted land and water resources, coupled with the river diversions, will contribute to migration on the scale of tens of millions over the next decades.
While this will relieve population pressure on some of China’s most overgrazed and intensively farmed land, it will increase the strain on many urban areas.
Urban challenges
Already cities such as Shanghai are experiencing significant stress to their sanitation and waste systems, as well as difficulty in gaining access to natural resources, such as water.
At the same time, as the reforms have exacerbated old (as well as introduced new) environmental challenges, they have not managed to break free of other aspects of China’s environmental legacy.
Good intentions, disastrous consequences
Particularly damaging has been Beijing’s continued reliance on campaigns to address vast, often complex environmental problems.
History has demonstrated repeatedly that the
The Chinese government is wary of the potential for NGOs and the media to criticize government policy — or serve as a force for broader social change.
challenges of deforestation, pollution and scarcity of natural resources are poorly addressed by grand-scale campaigns that attend little to the complex social, economic and environmental/scientific issues that underpin these challenges.
Moreover, even as China assumes a leadership position in the global economy and the international community, its leaders struggle to move beyond traditional notions of security that contribute to large-scale development programs with potentially highly deleterious environmental consequences, such as the grain self-reliance and “Go West” campaigns.
Signs of hope
China’s post-Mao leaders have developed a far more institutional system of governance, with a codified system of laws. This is a critical step forward for environmental protection.
Still, by most measures, the central environmental protection bureaucracy in China remains weak.
Not a priority: environmental protection bureaucracy only one-twentieth as large.
With roughly five times the population of the United States, China possesses a central
Local officials and enterprise managers prefer not to use pollution control technologies in order to decrease the costs of operating the plants.
Central government funding for environmental protection – while increasing steadily over the course of the reform period – is still well under the level that Chinese experts claim is necessary to prevent further deterioration.
China’s weak enforcement of its own environmental protection laws also undermines the potential environmental advantages of foreign direct investment.
Pressure to cut costs
Many multinationals complain that despite their best efforts, local officials and enterprise managers prefer not to use the pollution control technologies they provide in order to decrease the costs of operating the plants.
Or, in other instances, foreign firms simply cannot compete against domestic firms that do not abide by the country’s environmental regulations.
Fearing broad social change
China’s leaders have also placed the future of environmental protection in the hands of the Chinese people, opening the door to grassroots activities, NGOs and the media.
With roughly five times the population of the United States, China possesses a central environmental protection bureaucracy only one-twentieth as large.
The Chinese government is wary of the potential for NGOs and the media to move beyond issues of local enforcement to criticize central government policy or potentially serve as a force for broader social change.
The environment may serve as a locus for broader political discontent and calls for political reform, as it has in other countries.
Given the dynamic nature of both China’s economy and its evolving political system, assessing China’s environmental future and its broader implications for the country and the world is no easy task.
Reproduced from Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future. Copyright © 2004 by Cornell University. Used by permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press.
100) Will China Face an Environmental Meltdown?
Will China Face an Environmental Meltdown?
By Elizabeth C. Economy
Globalist Bookshelf, Tuesday, June 15, 2004
China today is still far from having a comprehensive policy to deal with its massive environmental problems. Elizabeth Economy — the author of "The River Runs Black" — outtines a somber scenario. Could a slowdown in economic growth and resulting social unrest lead to even worse environmental consequences in the future?
Let's assume that well below the 7% that some analysts predict necessary to maintain social stability, China's economy slows or even experiences a significant downturn.
Environmental disaster strikes
Local officials are likely to continue to favor economic development at the expense of the environment in an effort to preserve social stability.
International business stops investing and withdraws from the interior, which is now viewed as politically unstable.
As a result, China's air quality does not improve, as the country continues to rely on older, more inefficient polluting technologies and automobiles.
Water pollution increases throughout the major river systems. And, most important, investment in waste treatment or new conservation efforts diminish as a short-term outlook prevails.
Out of work — China's citizens suffer
Especially in the already economically hard-hit areas of northeast China and the interior provinces, massive layoffs in the state-owned enterprise sector and growing problems with environmentally and economically induced migration would also challenge the ability of local governments to provide work for the people.
The social welfare system is overwhelmed as continued corruption drains local coffers and impairs the development of a functioning pension system.
Wide-spread violence and protests
There are frequent demonstrations, which often turn violent. The outlook for improved quality of life is bleak.
Corruption continues to erode economic institutions and leadership credibility as Chinese citizens believe they have no recourse for justice.
Positive environmental trends in forestry and agricultural practices are reversed as logging bans are ignored and farmers attempt to eke out a living on increasingly degraded land.
In the "Go West" effort, environmental and economic exploitation prompt not only growing political disaffection, but also increased violence and protests against domestic and international businesses perceived to support such policies.
Facing isolation
International business stops investing and withdraws from the interior, which is now viewed as politically unstable.
The West-East pipeline becomes a target of sabotage. Weaknesses in the banking infrastructure and law enforcement deepen as Chinese officials seek any means to keep local industry afloat.
Corruption hits China's judicial system
After making small gains in the rule of law, courts are increasingly reluctant to press enterprises to adhere to environmental protection laws for fear of promoting further social unrest.
Peasant and worker unrest would be managed through repression and, perhaps, through the projection of an external threat or a manufactured crisis.
Corruption continues to erode economic institutions and leadership credibility as Chinese citizens believe they have no recourse for justice.
Unwilling to risk massive layoffs, Chinese officials backtrack on WTO commitments in an effort to preserve Chinese industries.
Bureaucracies are given greater latitude to develop regulations that impede the access of foreign companies to China's market.
Foreign investors respond by denouncing Chinese practices, further contributing to international friction and trade disruptions.
Resisting the WTO
Fewer environmental benefits are also felt due to a slowdown in the influx of foreign technology and increasing acceptance of poorer environmental practices.
Gains for China's industry come largely in the highly polluting textile, toy and tin mining industries.
A lack of attention
Few benefits are reaped in the expected area of agriculture, as China resists opening its market to large-scale grain imports promised in its WTO accession agreement.
Local officials are likely to favor economic development at the expense of the environment in an effort to preserve social stability.
In such a time of domestic stress and leadership vulnerability, the environment is not likely to receive much positive attention.
More likely, the public security apparatus would increasingly scrutinize the work of NGOs and independent lawyers for the political content of their work.
Uprisings undermine unity
Peasant and worker unrest would be managed through repression and, perhaps, through the projection of an external threat or a manufactured crisis in the Taiwan Straits to rally nationalist sentiment and deflect attention from the country’s economic woes.
Despite all these actions, China might still collapse or be driven by wide-scale civil strife.
Environmental disaster triggers activism
Regime-threatening protests emanating from China's minorities – especially the Uighurs in Xinjiang and Tibetan independence advocates or from a combination of striking laborers, peasants and urban intellectuals – are all within the realm of possibility, especially as China's leaders struggle to enforce WTO strictures.
In this scenario the environment could be one of many causes espoused by the protesters. An environmental disaster of significant magnitude, like a collapse of the Three Gorges Dam, could easily serve as the trigger for such protests — a giant symbol of the corruption, lack of transparency and limited political participation of China's current system.
Reproduced from Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future. Copyright © 2004 by Cornell University. Used by permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press.
By Elizabeth C. Economy
Globalist Bookshelf, Tuesday, June 15, 2004
China today is still far from having a comprehensive policy to deal with its massive environmental problems. Elizabeth Economy — the author of "The River Runs Black" — outtines a somber scenario. Could a slowdown in economic growth and resulting social unrest lead to even worse environmental consequences in the future?
Let's assume that well below the 7% that some analysts predict necessary to maintain social stability, China's economy slows or even experiences a significant downturn.
Environmental disaster strikes
Local officials are likely to continue to favor economic development at the expense of the environment in an effort to preserve social stability.
International business stops investing and withdraws from the interior, which is now viewed as politically unstable.
As a result, China's air quality does not improve, as the country continues to rely on older, more inefficient polluting technologies and automobiles.
Water pollution increases throughout the major river systems. And, most important, investment in waste treatment or new conservation efforts diminish as a short-term outlook prevails.
Out of work — China's citizens suffer
Especially in the already economically hard-hit areas of northeast China and the interior provinces, massive layoffs in the state-owned enterprise sector and growing problems with environmentally and economically induced migration would also challenge the ability of local governments to provide work for the people.
The social welfare system is overwhelmed as continued corruption drains local coffers and impairs the development of a functioning pension system.
Wide-spread violence and protests
There are frequent demonstrations, which often turn violent. The outlook for improved quality of life is bleak.
Corruption continues to erode economic institutions and leadership credibility as Chinese citizens believe they have no recourse for justice.
Positive environmental trends in forestry and agricultural practices are reversed as logging bans are ignored and farmers attempt to eke out a living on increasingly degraded land.
In the "Go West" effort, environmental and economic exploitation prompt not only growing political disaffection, but also increased violence and protests against domestic and international businesses perceived to support such policies.
Facing isolation
International business stops investing and withdraws from the interior, which is now viewed as politically unstable.
The West-East pipeline becomes a target of sabotage. Weaknesses in the banking infrastructure and law enforcement deepen as Chinese officials seek any means to keep local industry afloat.
Corruption hits China's judicial system
After making small gains in the rule of law, courts are increasingly reluctant to press enterprises to adhere to environmental protection laws for fear of promoting further social unrest.
Peasant and worker unrest would be managed through repression and, perhaps, through the projection of an external threat or a manufactured crisis.
Corruption continues to erode economic institutions and leadership credibility as Chinese citizens believe they have no recourse for justice.
Unwilling to risk massive layoffs, Chinese officials backtrack on WTO commitments in an effort to preserve Chinese industries.
Bureaucracies are given greater latitude to develop regulations that impede the access of foreign companies to China's market.
Foreign investors respond by denouncing Chinese practices, further contributing to international friction and trade disruptions.
Resisting the WTO
Fewer environmental benefits are also felt due to a slowdown in the influx of foreign technology and increasing acceptance of poorer environmental practices.
Gains for China's industry come largely in the highly polluting textile, toy and tin mining industries.
A lack of attention
Few benefits are reaped in the expected area of agriculture, as China resists opening its market to large-scale grain imports promised in its WTO accession agreement.
Local officials are likely to favor economic development at the expense of the environment in an effort to preserve social stability.
In such a time of domestic stress and leadership vulnerability, the environment is not likely to receive much positive attention.
More likely, the public security apparatus would increasingly scrutinize the work of NGOs and independent lawyers for the political content of their work.
Uprisings undermine unity
Peasant and worker unrest would be managed through repression and, perhaps, through the projection of an external threat or a manufactured crisis in the Taiwan Straits to rally nationalist sentiment and deflect attention from the country’s economic woes.
Despite all these actions, China might still collapse or be driven by wide-scale civil strife.
Environmental disaster triggers activism
Regime-threatening protests emanating from China's minorities – especially the Uighurs in Xinjiang and Tibetan independence advocates or from a combination of striking laborers, peasants and urban intellectuals – are all within the realm of possibility, especially as China's leaders struggle to enforce WTO strictures.
In this scenario the environment could be one of many causes espoused by the protesters. An environmental disaster of significant magnitude, like a collapse of the Three Gorges Dam, could easily serve as the trigger for such protests — a giant symbol of the corruption, lack of transparency and limited political participation of China's current system.
Reproduced from Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future. Copyright © 2004 by Cornell University. Used by permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press.
99) Book: When China Rules the World, Martin Jacques
China is in crisis, not in the ascendant
Will Hutton
The Observer, Sunday 21 June 2009
Martin Jacques makes some bold claims for the future strength of the would-be superpower, but he fails to justify them, argues Will Hutton
Review of:
When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World
by Martin Jacques
(London: Allen Lane, 2009, pp550, £30)
The first problem with this book is its title. There is no prospect of China ruling the world. This is a country whose uncertainties of identity and economic frailties prevent it from ever projecting hegemonic hard and soft power. Its authoritarian institutions, far from being a source of strength, are a source of weakness. China is simultaneously big but poor, powerful but weak. And there, until wholesale political change occurs, it will stay, notwithstanding its considerable growth rates and economic achievement. Indeed, its current economic model, dependent on high exports and mountainous savings, is disintegrating, as both insiders and close observers recognise.
Martin Jacques partially acknowledges that economic problems exist even as he breathlessly rehearses the economically impossible extrapolations of China's recent growth far into the future. His intellectual difficulty is that he needs to make the grandiose claim that China will rule the world to drive home his interesting thesis that western-defined modernity - the belief in the marriage of democracy, Enlightenment values, capitalism and progress - is about to be contested seriously for the first time by a non-western power.
China is not a nation state, he writes, but a civilisation state. As such, it cannot make accommodations with others as it rises. It will be condemned to be true to its past; rather than submit to multilateral law and institutions, it will "feel free to be what it thinks it is and act accordingly to its history and instincts which are those of a civilisation state".
Historically, China has regarded itself as being at the centre of the world and has sought tribute from others as acknowledgement of its inherent superiority, a racism that is embedded in the Chinese psyche, Jacques argues provocatively. Its instincts remain essentially Confucian: a strong central state seeking benevolently and collectively to improve the condition of the people. Communism is a contemporary expression of Confucianism.
This is the most eyecatching part of what is in essence another of the Beware China is coming, Asian values are superior books. However, the affinity between Confucianism and communism is hardly a new insight. Liu Shaoqi, one of the party's five leaders in the 1940s, drew a parallel between the self-discipline and self-cultivation needed to be a Confucian scholar and becoming an effective communist. Where Jacques scores is in arguing that it is Chinese civilisation, rather than the Communist party, that will drive China.
Yet the more I reflect on the idea of a civilisation state standing in tension with a conventional nation state, the less am I persuaded the distinction holds. Britain, France, Germany and the US are also civilisation states, defined as much by their different cultures and histories as their jurisdictional boundaries, languages and national assemblies. All in varying ways are creatures of the European Enlightenment; all can trace core values to republican Rome and the philosophers of Greece.
Western states frequently do not meet their own standards any more than China does. But I agree with Rousseau, Kant and Paine that all human beings have a sense of self and are thus worthy of equal respect as individuals, as I agree with Aristotle and Plato about the importance of due desert underpinning justice. There is a universal hunger for these values which does not stop at China's borders because of some mystical adherence to Asian values. We all want to live lives we have reason to value - whether we are Chinese or British.
Indeed, the processes thrown up by the western tradition - the rule of law, the drive to experiment and innovate, the prevalence of free argument and exchange of ideas - also drive successful, long-term economic performance. China can approach the frontier of technological knowledge developed by others, but it has a limited capacity to get beyond it. It is deeply corrupt, deeply uninnovative, deeply environmentally wasteful and these deformations can be traced back to its lack of institutions rooted in Enlightenment values. China has no checks and balances; it needs them.
The great reforming revolutionary Sun Yat-Sen wanted them for China; the Tiananmen protesters in Beijing and other cities across China risked their lives for them; Charter 08, instigated by more than 300 Chinese intellectuals last December, campaigns for them; and the Chinese in Taiwan have succeeded partially in implanting them. Jacques's argument implies that Chinese workers don't want representation at work, nor Chinese shareholders any influence on company managements, nor Chinese citizens to hold their government to account. It is profoundly mistaken. The majority do want these things and the fact they don't have them holds China back.
China cannot build its economy for ever on a savings rate of 40 per cent of GDP, or exports growing at such a rate that by 2020 they will constitute half of the world's merchandise exports. The model is cracking because it must. China must save less and consume more, as Jacques acknowledges.
But it will not make the transition without political change. The Chinese save because they do not trust the future. They know the Communist party's grip is unsustainable. The real story of the next generation will be of the west drawing ahead of a China facing political turmoil and increasing economic difficulties. The problem we will have to manage is not China ruling the world. It will be of bridging the already high and growing gap between the west and the rest. Martin Jacques's extensive research is marred by the book's central thesis. He is too suspicious of the west to offer real insight into the future.
• Will Hutton is the author of The Writing on the Wall: China and the West in the 21st Century (Abacus)
Saturday, November 21, 2009
98) China: books and articles
Bibliografia retirada da tese apresentada por:
Mauricio Carvalho Lyrio
A ascensão da China como potência: fundamentos políticos internos
(Brasília, DF: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Instituto Rio Branco, LIV Curso de Altos Estudos, Fevereiro de 2009)
Sumário da tese:
Introdução (1)
1. A caracterização da China como potência em ascensão (7)
1.1. O enigma do declínio chinês (7)
1.2. Civilização e poder internacional (15)
1.3. Definição e fatores de ascensão de uma "gramde potência" (19)
2. Fundamentos materiais para a ascensão da China (24)
2.1. O crescimento da econiomia (24)
2.2. O desenvolvimento científico e tecnológico (38)
2.3. O acesso à energia (45)
2.4. A questão ambiental (51)
2.5. Balanço das condições materiais para a ascensão da China como potência (57)
3. Fundamentos políticos internos para a ascensão da China: autocracia e reformas (61)
3.1. Longevidade e instabilidade na China (62)
3.2. A relativa estabilidade pós-Mao (71)
3.3. O processo de reformas políticas (79)
3.4. Tradiçnao autocrática e democracia (86)
3.5. Forças rivais ao PCC (102)
4. Fundamentos políticos internos para a ascensão da China: o PCC e a legitimação ideológica (112)
4.1. O PCC e a ordem estabelecida (112)
4.2. O PCC pós-comunista e a legitimação ideológica: o socialismo (119)
4.3. O PCC pós-comunista e a legitimação ideológica: o nacionalismo (134)
4.4. O PCC pós-comunista e a legitimação ideológica: o Confucianismo (149)
4.5. Balanço das condições políticas para a ascensão da China como potência (156)
5. Algumas reflexões sobre a visnao do Estado chinês acerca da ascensão da China (159)
5.1. China: visão histórica do entorno e do mundo (160)
5.2. Auto-suficiência, universalismo (166)
5.3. Pacifismo, militarismo (168)
5.4. Diplomacia e circunstância geográfica (181)
Conclusão (195)
Bibliografia (201)
Bibliografia selecionada por Paulo Roberto de Almeida:
Brodgaard, Joan. The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (NY Routledge, 2005)
Chen, Jie. Popular political support in urban China (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004)
Confucius. The Analects (London: Penguin, 1979)
CSIS & IIE. China: The Balance Sheet (NY: BBS Publications, 2006)
Deng, Yong & Wang, Fei-Ling. China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005)
Ding, X. L. The decline of communism in China: legitimacy crisis, 1977-1989 (NY: cambridge UP, 1994)
Economy, Elizabeth. The River Runs Black: the environmental challenge to China's future (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004)
Fairbank, John King. China: A New History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2006)
Feuerwerker, Albert. "Chinese Economic History in Comparactive Perspective". In: Ropp, Paul (ed.). Heritage of China: contemporary perspectives on Chinese Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)
Gilley, Bruce. China's Democratic Future: How it will happen and where it will lead (NY: Columbia UP, 2005)
Goldman, Merle. "Epilogue: China ata the start ot the twenty-first century" and "The Post-Mao Reform Era". In: Fairbank, John King. China: A New History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2006)
Hutchings, Graham. Modern China: a guide to a century of change (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2001)
Hutton, Will. The Writing on the Wall: China and the West in the 21st Century (London: Little, Brown, 2007)
Lao Tzu. Tao Te Ching (London: Penguin, 1963)
Li, Cheng. China's Leaders: The New Generation (Lawman: Rowman, 2001)
Naughton, Barry. The Chinese Economy: Transition and Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007)
Needham, Joseph. Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridsge UP, 1954)
Perry, Elizabeth and Goldman, Merle (eds.). Grassroots Political reform in Contemporary China (Cambridge: Harvard Contemporary China Series, 2007)
Schram, Stuart (ed.) Foundations and Limits of State Power in China (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1987)
Shirk, Susan L. China: The Fragile Superpower (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007)
Zhang, Xudong. Intellectual Politics in Post-Tienanmen China (Durham: Duke UP, 1998)
Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian (eds.). China's Post-Jiang Leadership succession: problems and perspectives (River Edge, NJ: World Scientific, 2002)
Xiaoping, Deng. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982) (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994)
Mauricio Carvalho Lyrio
A ascensão da China como potência: fundamentos políticos internos
(Brasília, DF: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Instituto Rio Branco, LIV Curso de Altos Estudos, Fevereiro de 2009)
Sumário da tese:
Introdução (1)
1. A caracterização da China como potência em ascensão (7)
1.1. O enigma do declínio chinês (7)
1.2. Civilização e poder internacional (15)
1.3. Definição e fatores de ascensão de uma "gramde potência" (19)
2. Fundamentos materiais para a ascensão da China (24)
2.1. O crescimento da econiomia (24)
2.2. O desenvolvimento científico e tecnológico (38)
2.3. O acesso à energia (45)
2.4. A questão ambiental (51)
2.5. Balanço das condições materiais para a ascensão da China como potência (57)
3. Fundamentos políticos internos para a ascensão da China: autocracia e reformas (61)
3.1. Longevidade e instabilidade na China (62)
3.2. A relativa estabilidade pós-Mao (71)
3.3. O processo de reformas políticas (79)
3.4. Tradiçnao autocrática e democracia (86)
3.5. Forças rivais ao PCC (102)
4. Fundamentos políticos internos para a ascensão da China: o PCC e a legitimação ideológica (112)
4.1. O PCC e a ordem estabelecida (112)
4.2. O PCC pós-comunista e a legitimação ideológica: o socialismo (119)
4.3. O PCC pós-comunista e a legitimação ideológica: o nacionalismo (134)
4.4. O PCC pós-comunista e a legitimação ideológica: o Confucianismo (149)
4.5. Balanço das condições políticas para a ascensão da China como potência (156)
5. Algumas reflexões sobre a visnao do Estado chinês acerca da ascensão da China (159)
5.1. China: visão histórica do entorno e do mundo (160)
5.2. Auto-suficiência, universalismo (166)
5.3. Pacifismo, militarismo (168)
5.4. Diplomacia e circunstância geográfica (181)
Conclusão (195)
Bibliografia (201)
Bibliografia selecionada por Paulo Roberto de Almeida:
Brodgaard, Joan. The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (NY Routledge, 2005)
Chen, Jie. Popular political support in urban China (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004)
Confucius. The Analects (London: Penguin, 1979)
CSIS & IIE. China: The Balance Sheet (NY: BBS Publications, 2006)
Deng, Yong & Wang, Fei-Ling. China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005)
Ding, X. L. The decline of communism in China: legitimacy crisis, 1977-1989 (NY: cambridge UP, 1994)
Economy, Elizabeth. The River Runs Black: the environmental challenge to China's future (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004)
Fairbank, John King. China: A New History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2006)
Feuerwerker, Albert. "Chinese Economic History in Comparactive Perspective". In: Ropp, Paul (ed.). Heritage of China: contemporary perspectives on Chinese Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)
Gilley, Bruce. China's Democratic Future: How it will happen and where it will lead (NY: Columbia UP, 2005)
Goldman, Merle. "Epilogue: China ata the start ot the twenty-first century" and "The Post-Mao Reform Era". In: Fairbank, John King. China: A New History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2006)
Hutchings, Graham. Modern China: a guide to a century of change (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2001)
Hutton, Will. The Writing on the Wall: China and the West in the 21st Century (London: Little, Brown, 2007)
Lao Tzu. Tao Te Ching (London: Penguin, 1963)
Li, Cheng. China's Leaders: The New Generation (Lawman: Rowman, 2001)
Naughton, Barry. The Chinese Economy: Transition and Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007)
Needham, Joseph. Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridsge UP, 1954)
Perry, Elizabeth and Goldman, Merle (eds.). Grassroots Political reform in Contemporary China (Cambridge: Harvard Contemporary China Series, 2007)
Schram, Stuart (ed.) Foundations and Limits of State Power in China (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1987)
Shirk, Susan L. China: The Fragile Superpower (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007)
Zhang, Xudong. Intellectual Politics in Post-Tienanmen China (Durham: Duke UP, 1998)
Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian (eds.). China's Post-Jiang Leadership succession: problems and perspectives (River Edge, NJ: World Scientific, 2002)
Xiaoping, Deng. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982) (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994)
97) Quem sao os pensadores da China contemporanea?
Intelectuais da China:
listagem retirada do livro What does China think?
Mark Leonard:
O que a China Pensa?: o despertar chinês está moldando a nova ordem mundial
(São Paulo: Larousse do Brasil, 2008, 184 p.; ISBN: 978-85-7635-380-5)
Edição original: What does China think?
(Fourth Estate, 2008)
A China está deixando de ser um Estado totalitário tradicional e se convertendo em uma ditadura deliberativa.
Dramatis personae, capítulo final.
Cui Zhiyuan, Professor de Política Administrativa na Universidade Thsinghua, Beijing, membro da Nova Esquerda, alternativas ao capitalismo neoliberal; Universidade Chicago 1987 a 2004.
Fang Ning, escreveu o tratado ultranacionalista com Wang Xiaodong, China’s Road under the Shadow of Globalization (1999).
Gang Yang, Centro de Estudos Asiáticos da Universidade Hong Kong. Doutorado Universidade Chicago, Reflections on Liberalism (1997).
Hu Angang, enfant terrible da economia chinesa; escreveu com Wang Shaoguang, um relatório sobre a “capacidade de Estado da China”, em Yale, convencendo o governo a reforçar o papel do Estado, Professor e diretor do Centro de Estudos Chineses da Escola de Política Administrativa da Universidade Thsinghua, Beijing.
Pan Wei, Professor da Escola de Estudos Internacionais e diretor do Centro de Relações Exteriores da China, da Universidade Beijing. Propôs que a China modelasse seu sistema legal em Cingapura e não nos países ocidentais; doutorado em Berkeley, 1996; orientação conservadora e defende modelo chinês de desenvolvimento econômico e político.
Qin Yaqing, Professor e vice-presidente executivo da Universidade de Relações Exteriores da China (fundada por Zhou En Lai); defensor de uma “escola chinesa de relações internacionais”.
Shi Tinhong, Professor de RI na Universidade Popular de Beijing, propôs trégua com o Japão e uma Grande Estratégia da China. Professor visitante em Harvard, Carolina Norte, Denver. Internacionalista liberal.
Wang Hui, Professor, Pesquisador na Universidade Tsinghua, foi co-editor do jornal intelectual de maior prestigio da China, Dushu, de 1996 a 2007; participou de manifestações em Tiananmen em junho de 1989; entrou em Harvard em 1992, e passou tempo em UCLA. Trabalhou em fábrica durante a Revolução Cultural.
Wang Shaoguang, Professor da Universidade Chinesa de Hong Kong e editor da China Review, morou fora da China nas ultimas duas décadas. Ex-Guarda Vermelho; obteve doutoramento em Cornell em 1990 sobre a Revolução Cultural; lecionou em Yale de 1990 a 2000, antes de mudar para Hong Kong.
Wang Xiaodong, mais famoso erudito ultranacionalista da China, escreveu com Fang Ning o livro China’s Road under the Shadow of Globalization (1999).
Yan Xuetong, líder neocomunista, nacionalista convicto, quer abordagem mais direta com Taiwan, Japão, e EUA. Diretor de Estudos Internancionais da Universidade Tsinghua; É o mais famoso pensador da política externa da China; doutorado em Berkeley (1992), Pesquisador visitante do Instituto Chinês de Relações Internacionais Contemporâneas em 1982-84 e 1992-2000.
Yang Yao, é um dos poucos economistas que estudou as implicações das eleições e democracia enraizada no bem estar social. Professor, Vice-Diretor Centro Chinês para Pesquisa Econômica da Universidade Beijing. Doutorado em Wisconsin-Madison (1996)
Yang Yi, da Marinha chinesa (1968), Adido da Marinha na Embaixada da China em Washington de 1995-2000; Diretor do Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos na Universidade da Defesa Nacional do Exercito de Libertação do Povo.
Yu Keping, vice-diretor do Departamento Central de Tradução e Compilação; conselheiro informal do presidente Hu Jintao; primeiro livro, Democracy is a Good Thing; Doutor em Ciência Política na Universidade de Beijing 1988; marxista escutado.
Zheng Bijian, pensador controverso sobre Política Externa da China e reformas políticas; Professor. Universidade Popular. Vice-ministro do Departamento de Propaganda e Vice-Presidente da Escola Central do Partido Comunista Chinês; escreveu discursos de Deng Xiaoping na viagem ao sul 1992; 2004 lançou pesquisa sobre a ascensão pacéfica da China. Presidente do Fórum de Reforma da China, um instituto de pesquisa semi-oficial.
Zhang Weiying, um dos economistas mais famosos da nova Direita, Primeiro Reitor Associado da Escola Administração Guanghua da Universidade Beijing; nomeado “Homem do Ano da Economia Chinesa” pela CCTV-Chinese Central Television. Doutorado em Oxford sob supervisão do Prêmio Nobel James Mirrlees (1996); Oxford em 1990; reconhecido como escola econômica neoliberal; um dos economistas mais criticados na China hoje.
===============
Review by Dennis Littrell
Ideas from China's leading political theorists
Amazon, 30 April 2008
To get a perspective on what some Chinese political theorists are thinking, consider this. While Westerners "anguish" about how to manage China's rise, Chinese think-tankers debate about "how to manage the West's decline"! Wang Yiwei, from Fudan University, shares this worry, and asks, "How can we prevent the USA from declining too quickly?" (pp. 115-116)
What this book attempts to provide is a Chinese perspective on the rise of China and its place in the world as it has grown from a largely agrarian society in the days of Mao to a superpower of the 21st century. To do this, Mark Leonard, who wrote "Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century," traveled in China and interviewed many of China's leading thinkers on politics and economics. A number of these scholars have advanced degrees from American universities. They have taken Western ideas back to China and incorporated them into traditional Chinese ways of thinking, consistent with the dictates of the ruling Communist Party. Leonard shows that within this unique political culture there have arisen various points of view, from the "New Right" of, e.g., Zhang Weiying, to the "New Left" of, e.g., Wang Hui, from ideas about the "peaceful rise" of China to notions more in keeping with the thinking of the so-called "neo-comms." Part of the debate is about the use of military power, part of it is about how to influence other countries, and part of it is about how to manage its own people.
Since Deng Xiaoping opted for a market economy within the political dictatorship, the growth of China has been extraordinary. But with this growth have come problems: pollution, growing economic inequalities, the yearning for political democracy, and the infusion (perhaps one might even say the "invasion") of ideas foreign and inimical to the perceived interests of the communist state. To fight the disagreeable ideas from without, the government has trained "an e-police force of 100,000 people employed to scour the net, blocking sites and checking e-mails."
Leonard allows that this number may be exaggerated, but the point is clear: China wants to modernize, and to do so, must learn from the West, but at the same time it must not allow Western ideas to ferment dissention at home. Just how this delicate tightrope walk works in the public forums for China's leading thinkers is part of what makes this book interesting.
The "New Right" which led the change from Mao's soviet style economy to what the Chinese call "Yellow River Capitalism," which ushered in the gargantuan economic growth, has come under fire from various quarters, including the "New Left" which unlike the "old left" supports market reforms. However, as Wang Hui sees it, "China is caught between the two extremes of misguided socialism and crony capitalism...."He adds, "We must not give total priority to GDP growth to the exclusion of worker's rights and the environment." (p. 33) "Princeling" Pan Yue (as some of the privileged and talented members of the younger Chinese generation are called) "has talked of `China's environmental suicide,' and in an interview with the German magazine, Der Spiegel, predicted that `China's economic miracle will end soon because the environment can no longer keep pace.'" (p. 42-43)
Cui Zhiyuan, who is professor of Politics and Public Management at the Tsinghua University in Beijing, sees Chinese politics in Machiavellian terms: "For Machiavelli power was not divided between two levels: the state and the people. Florentine politics was split between three groups, the prince (the `one'), the nobles (the `few') and the people (the `many'). In today's China, the `one' is the Communist Party, the `few' are the super-rich, and the `many' are the people." (p. 47)
There have been some experiments in "deliberative democracy" at the village level to allow some input into central party decisions. The Chinese have learned from the experience of the Soviet Union that ignorance of what people at the grass roots level think can lead to not just inefficiency but to disaster. However this token gesture toward political reform is not likely to replace the "deliberative dictatorship" that current holds sway. Nonetheless, "The government seems to realize that developing institutional ways of dealing with grievances can make the state more stable." (p. 74)
I think this last point is one that we in the West and especially in the United States need to understand. For most people in the world the first responsibility of the state is to provide security and stability. After that perhaps political freedom can evolve. China, learning from the failed Soviet experiment, has put economic reform first and political reform later.
In international relationships, China is trying to develop "soft power" as a means to further its interests. The US, until the recent rise of George W. Bush and the neocons, exemplified the use of soft power to influence others through its culture and its economic strength. China wants to avoid the recent mistakes of the US such as invading other countries and is pursuing a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. Unfortunately it is also indiscriminately supporting dictators such as Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Leonard asserts that "China will never be supportive of multi-party elections and human rights: why would it promote rights for foreigners that it denies to its own citizens?" (p. 126)
Leonard provides a "Dramatis Personae" near the end of the book identifying some of China's leading political and economic thinkers. There are endnotes and an index. All things considered, this is a good, albeit short, introduction to contemporary Chinese political thinking.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
