China copia marcas do Brasil e exporta para outros países
PEDRO SOARES
da Folha de S.Paulo, no Rio, 31/08/2009
Comum no comércio popular de rua das grandes cidades do país, a pirataria de artigos de grifes internacionais -como Nike, Adidas, Gucci, Versace, Montblanc e tantas outras- atinge também marcas brasileiras, copiadas especialmente na China e até exportadas para outros países. Existem casos de pirataria de tesouras, biquínis, cadeados, fechaduras, calçados e bebidas, entre outros artigos.
Em julho deste ano, a aduana do Peru apreendeu um carregamento de 13,5 mil tesouras com a marca brasileira Mundial, pirateadas na China, conforme comprovaram notas fiscais. Em 2005, outra carga com 17 mil unidades do produto também foi confiscada, diz Rafael Lima, sócio do escritório de advocacia Dannemann Siemsen, que cuida da marca Mundial e de outras empresas.
O escritório, diz, teve informações, pela filial da Mundial na China, de que havia a possibilidade de uma exportação irregular para o Peru. Contatou, então, a aduana e o órgão de marcas e patentes local (o Inpi de lá) e fez as apreensões.
Diferentemente do Brasil, não é necessária ação da polícia ou da Justiça para realizar as apreensões, ordenadas pelo órgão de marcas e patentes do Peru. O mesmo ocorre na China.
Por conta disso, diz, foi possível apreender um lote de 960 mil tesouras "clonadas" da Mundial numa fábrica chinesa em 2005. "Conseguimos infiltrar um funcionário na fábrica, que fez fotos e colheu provas", afirma Lima.
Ousadia maior foi a de uma empresa de bebidas da China que pirateou uma marca líder brasileira, cujo fabricante não permite a divulgação do nome. Os produtos eram vendidos com o rótulo da marca nacional em churrascarias em Xangai e Pequim. Foram apreendidos, na época, 600 mil vasilhames.
Em junho, a fabricante gaúcha de fechaduras e cadeados Soprano conseguiu reaver sua marca na China, que havia sido registrada irregularmente por uma empresa local. O início da disputa pela propriedade da marca ocorreu após o fim do contrato de licença entre a Soprano e a chinesa Gold God.
Gustavo Miotti, diretor da Soprano, diz que os produtos eram distribuídos no mercado chinês. "Achamos nossas fechaduras em lojas do Carrefour de lá. A situação está mudando, mas era muito comum ver produtos pirateados em saldões dos supermercados chineses."
Perda de tempo e dinheiro
A reportagem também ouviu o relato de uma marca famosa de sandálias de dedo e calçados pirateados na China e exportados para outros mercados. Procurada pela Folha, a empresa não se manifestou até a conclusão desta edição.
Uma das marcas mais famosas de moda praia do país, a carioca Salinas também foi alvo de pirataria. Biquínis, estampas e marca da empresa foram copiados em vários mercados, como EUA, México e Coreia.
No México, a Salinas, que vende seus produtos para 42 países, acionou uma firma local que produzia biquínis idênticos aos de suas coleções. A disputa levou três anos e só há pouco tempo a empresa conseguiu exportar para o México.
Recentemente, também conseguiu tirar do ar um site da Coreia que usava sua logomarca e vendia produtos similares aos seus.
"Manter uma marca é um custo muito alto. Gastamos US$ 35 mil em cada uma dessas disputas e mais de US$ 2.000 em cada país para registrar a marca. Muitas vezes nem vale a pena exportar", diz Antonio de Biasi, sócio da empresa.
Michael Ceitlin, presidente da Mundial, afirma que a marca já foi diversas vezes pirateada no Brasil e no exterior. "É uma prática muito mais comum do que se imagina. A pirataria de marcas brasileiras está crescendo porque as empresas do país estão se destacando em muitos mercados."
Mas a situação já foi pior. "A China já começa a dar decisões favoráveis às empresas internacionais. Desde que o país entrou para a OMC, ocorreram revisões de leis e regulamentações", diz Gustavo Rabello, do Noronha Advogados, que cuidou do caso da Soprano.
Monday, August 31, 2009
Sunday, August 30, 2009
15) China: movimento Carta 08 pede democracia e reformas profundas
O presente post sobre o movimento Carta 2008 na China foi por mim recolhido nas páginas da The New York Review of Books, e publicada em outro blog meu, dedicado a textos diversos, em 29 de dezembro de 2008 (neste link), assim que tomei conhecimento da divulgação do texto.
Efetuei a seguinte introdução ao texto:
O precedente mais imediato desta iniciativa, abaixo transcrita, situa-se exatamente um século atrás, quando estudantes começaram manifestações pacíficas para modernizar o então sistema imperial, acabar com a autocracia e criar um moderno sistema parlamentar na China.
O resultado foi a revolução republicana de Sun-Yat Sen, em 1911, que acabou com a monarquia e tentou instalar um regime republicano parlamentar.
Não foi possivel estabilizar um regime democrático, inclusive porque a China vivia submetida ao regime de concessões em favor das principais potências imperiais européias, EUA inclusive, a partir dos tratados desiguais de 1844 (que terminaram apenas um século depois, em plena Segunda Guerra) que concederam Honk-Kong para a GB por um século e impuseram o sistema de extra-territorialidade em favor dos estrangeiros, que inclusive dispunham de zonas exclusivas em várias cidades e portos.
A China, já humilhada pelo Japão em 1895, mergulhou, a partir dos anos 1920, num quadro de guerras intermitentes entre generais e chefes regionais, o que impeliu o Japão a invadi-la e submetê-la, a partir da Mandchuria, em 1931.
O resto foi história, de guerra ou de totalitarismo, inclusive o massacre de Nanquim, perpetrado pelos japoneses, em 1937, e a guerra civil depois da derrota do Japão, em 1945, que culminou com a vitória dos comunistas em 1949, e a expulsão dos nacionalistas para Taiwan.
Talvez a Carta 08 consiga seus objetivos, dentro de mais uma geração, provavelmente, quando a prosperidade for suficiente para que o Partido Comunista admita uma liberalização ampliada...
A China NUNCA conheceu democracia, jamais... (como a Russia, aliás...).
-------------
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
China's Charter 08
The New York Review of Books, Volume 56, Number 1 · January 15, 2009
Translated from the Chinese by Perry Link
The document below, signed by more than two thousand Chinese citizens, was conceived and written in conscious admiration of the founding of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, where, in January 1977, more than two hundred Czech and Slovak intellectuals formed a loose, informal, and open association of people...united by the will to strive individually and collectively for respect for human and civil rights in our country and throughout the world.
The Chinese document calls not for ameliorative reform of the current political system but for an end to some of its essential features, including one-party rule, and their replacement with a system based on human rights and democracy.
The prominent citizens who have signed the document are from both outside and inside the government, and include not only well-known dissidents and intellectuals, but also middle-level officials and rural leaders. They chose December 10, the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as the day on which to express their political ideas and to outline their vision of a constitutional, democratic China. They want Charter 08 to serve as a blueprint for fundamental political change in China in the years to come. The signers of the document will form an informal group, open-ended in size but united by a determination to promote democratization and protection of human rights in China and beyond.
Following the text is a postscript describing some of the regime's recent reactions to it.
—Perry Link
I. FOREWORD
A hundred years have passed since the writing of China's first constitution. 2008 also marks the sixtieth anniversary of the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the thirtieth anniversary of the appearance of the Democracy Wall in Beijing, and the tenth of China's signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. We are approaching the twentieth anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre of pro-democracy student protesters. The Chinese people, who have endured human rights disasters and uncountable struggles across these same years, now include many who see clearly that freedom, equality, and human rights are universal values of humankind and that democracy and constitutional government are the fundamental framework for protecting these values.
By departing from these values, the Chinese government's approach to "modernization" has proven disastrous. It has stripped people of their rights, destroyed their dignity, and corrupted normal human intercourse. So we ask: Where is China headed in the twenty-first century? Will it continue with "modernization" under authoritarian rule, or will it embrace universal human values, join the mainstream of civilized nations, and build a democratic system? There can be no avoiding these questions.
The shock of the Western impact upon China in the nineteenth century laid bare a decadent authoritarian system and marked the beginning of what is often called "the greatest changes in thousands of years" for China. A "self-strengthening movement" followed, but this aimed simply at appropriating the technology to build gunboats and other Western material objects. China's humiliating naval defeat at the hands of Japan in 1895 only confirmed the obsolescence of China's system of government. The first attempts at modern political change came with the ill-fated summer of reforms in 1898, but these were cruelly crushed by ultraconservatives at China's imperial court. With the revolution of 1911, which inaugurated Asia's first republic, the authoritarian imperial system that had lasted for centuries was finally supposed to have been laid to rest. But social conflict inside our country and external pressures were to prevent it; China fell into a patchwork of warlord fiefdoms and the new republic became a fleeting dream.
The failure of both "self- strengthening" and political renovation caused many of our forebears to reflect deeply on whether a "cultural illness" was afflicting our country. This mood gave rise, during the May Fourth Movement of the late 1910s, to the championing of "science and democracy." Yet that effort, too, foundered as warlord chaos persisted and the Japanese invasion [beginning in Manchuria in 1931] brought national crisis.
Victory over Japan in 1945 offered one more chance for China to move toward modern government, but the Communist defeat of the Nationalists in the civil war thrust the nation into the abyss of totalitarianism. The "new China" that emerged in 1949 proclaimed that "the people are sovereign" but in fact set up a system in which "the Party is all-powerful." The Communist Party of China seized control of all organs of the state and all political, economic, and social resources, and, using these, has produced a long trail of human rights disasters, including, among many others, the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957), the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960), the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969), the June Fourth [Tiananmen Square] Massacre (1989), and the current repression of all unauthorized religions and the suppression of the weiquan rights movement [a movement that aims to defend citizens' rights promulgated in the Chinese Constitution and to fight for human rights recognized by international conventions that the Chinese government has signed]. During all this, the Chinese people have paid a gargantuan price. Tens of millions have lost their lives, and several generations have seen their freedom, their happiness, and their human dignity cruelly trampled.
During the last two decades of the twentieth century the government policy of "Reform and Opening" gave the Chinese people relief from the pervasive poverty and totalitarianism of the Mao Zedong era, and brought substantial increases in the wealth and living standards of many Chinese as well as a partial restoration of economic freedom and economic rights. Civil society began to grow, and popular calls for more rights and more political freedom have grown apace. As the ruling elite itself moved toward private ownership and the market economy, it began to shift from an outright rejection of "rights" to a partial acknowledgment of them.
In 1998 the Chinese government signed two important international human rights conventions; in 2004 it amended its constitution to include the phrase "respect and protect human rights"; and this year, 2008, it has promised to promote a "national human rights action plan." Unfortunately most of this political progress has extended no further than the paper on which it is written. The political reality, which is plain for anyone to see, is that China has many laws but no rule of law; it has a constitution but no constitutional government. The ruling elite continues to cling to its authoritarian power and fights off any move toward political change.
The stultifying results are endemic official corruption, an undermining of the rule of law, weak human rights, decay in public ethics, crony capitalism, growing inequality between the wealthy and the poor, pillage of the natural environment as well as of the human and historical environments, and the exacerbation of a long list of social conflicts, especially, in recent times, a sharpening animosity between officials and ordinary people.
As these conflicts and crises grow ever more intense, and as the ruling elite continues with impunity to crush and to strip away the rights of citizens to freedom, to property, and to the pursuit of happiness, we see the powerless in our society—the vulnerable groups, the people who have been suppressed and monitored, who have suffered cruelty and even torture, and who have had no adequate avenues for their protests, no courts to hear their pleas—becoming more militant and raising the possibility of a violent conflict of disastrous proportions. The decline of the current system has reached the point where change is no longer optional.
II. OUR FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
This is a historic moment for China, and our future hangs in the balance. In reviewing the political modernization process of the past hundred years or more, we reiterate and endorse basic universal values as follows:
Freedom. Freedom is at the core of universal human values. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom in where to live, and the freedoms to strike, to demonstrate, and to protest, among others, are the forms that freedom takes. Without freedom, China will always remain far from civilized ideals.
Human rights. Human rights are not bestowed by a state. Every person is born with inherent rights to dignity and freedom. The government exists for the protection of the human rights of its citizens. The exercise of state power must be authorized by the people. The succession of political disasters in China's recent history is a direct consequence of the ruling regime's disregard for human rights.
Equality. The integrity, dignity, and freedom of every person—regardless of social station, occupation, sex, economic condition, ethnicity, skin color, religion, or political belief—are the same as those of any other. Principles of equality before the law and equality of social, economic, cultural, civil, and political rights must be upheld.
Republicanism. Republicanism, which holds that power should be balanced among different branches of government and competing interests should be served, resembles the traditional Chinese political ideal of "fairness in all under heaven." It allows different interest groups and social assemblies, and people with a variety of cultures and beliefs, to exercise democratic self-government and to deliberate in order to reach peaceful resolution of public questions on a basis of equal access to government and free and fair competition.
Democracy. The most fundamental principles of democracy are that the people are sovereign and the people select their government. Democracy has these characteristics: (1) Political power begins with the people and the legitimacy of a regime derives from the people. (2) Political power is exercised through choices that the people make. (3) The holders of major official posts in government at all levels are determined through periodic competitive elections. (4) While honoring the will of the majority, the fundamental dignity, freedom, and human rights of minorities are protected. In short, democracy is a modern means for achieving government truly "of the people, by the people, and for the people."
Constitutional rule. Constitutional rule is rule through a legal system and legal regulations to implement principles that are spelled out in a constitution. It means protecting the freedom and the rights of citizens, limiting and defining the scope of legitimate government power, and providing the administrative apparatus necessary to serve these ends.
III. WHAT WE ADVOCATE
Authoritarianism is in general decline throughout the world; in China, too, the era of emperors and overlords is on the way out. The time is arriving everywhere for citizens to be masters of states. For China the path that leads out of our current predicament is to divest ourselves of the authoritarian notion of reliance on an "enlightened overlord" or an "honest official" and to turn instead toward a system of liberties, democracy, and the rule of law, and toward fostering the consciousness of modern citizens who see rights as fundamental and participation as a duty. Accordingly, and in a spirit of this duty as responsible and constructive citizens, we offer the following recommendations on national governance, citizens' rights, and social development:
1. A New Constitution. We should recast our present constitution, rescinding its provisions that contradict the principle that sovereignty resides with the people and turning it into a document that genuinely guarantees human rights, authorizes the exercise of public power, and serves as the legal underpinning of China's democratization. The constitution must be the highest law in the land, beyond violation by any individual, group, or political party.
2. Separation of Powers. We should construct a modern government in which the separation of legislative, judicial, and executive power is guaranteed. We need an Administrative Law that defines the scope of government responsibility and prevents abuse of administrative power. Government should be responsible to taxpayers. Division of power between provincial governments and the central government should adhere to the principle that central powers are only those specifically granted by the constitution and all other powers belong to the local governments.
3. Legislative Democracy. Members of legislative bodies at all levels should be chosen by direct election, and legislative democracy should observe just and impartial principles.
4. An Independent Judiciary. The rule of law must be above the interests of any particular political party and judges must be independent. We need to establish a constitutional supreme court and institute procedures for constitutional review. As soon as possible, we should abolish all of the Committees on Political and Legal Affairs that now allow Communist Party officials at every level to decide politically sensitive cases in advance and out of court. We should strictly forbid the use of public offices for private purposes.
5. Public Control of Public Servants. The military should be made answerable to the national government, not to a political party, and should be made more professional. Military personnel should swear allegiance to the constitution and remain nonpartisan. Political party organizations must be prohibited in the military. All public officials including police should serve as nonpartisans, and the current practice of favoring one political party in the hiring of public servants must end.
6. Guarantee of Human Rights. There must be strict guarantees of human rights and respect for human dignity. There should be a Human Rights Committee, responsible to the highest legislative body, that will prevent the government from abusing public power in violation of human rights. A democratic and constitutional China especially must guarantee the personal freedom of citizens. No one should suffer illegal arrest, detention, arraignment, interrogation, or punishment. The system of "Reeducation through Labor" must be abolished.
7. Election of Public Officials. There should be a comprehensive system of democratic elections based on "one person, one vote." The direct election of administrative heads at the levels of county, city, province, and nation should be systematically implemented. The rights to hold periodic free elections and to participate in them as a citizen are inalienable.
8. Rural–Urban Equality. The two-tier household registry system must be abolished. This system favors urban residents and harms rural residents. We should establish instead a system that gives every citizen the same constitutional rights and the same freedom to choose where to live.
9. Freedom to Form Groups. The right of citizens to form groups must be guaranteed. The current system for registering nongovernment groups, which requires a group to be "approved," should be replaced by a system in which a group simply registers itself. The formation of political parties should be governed by the constitution and the laws, which means that we must abolish the special privilege of one party to monopolize power and must guarantee principles of free and fair competition among political parties.
10. Freedom to Assemble. The constitution provides that peaceful assembly, demonstration, protest, and freedom of expression are fundamental rights of a citizen. The ruling party and the government must not be permitted to subject these to illegal interference or unconstitutional obstruction.
11. Freedom of Expression. We should make freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and academic freedom universal, thereby guaranteeing that citizens can be informed and can exercise their right of political supervision. These freedoms should be upheld by a Press Law that abolishes political restrictions on the press. The provision in the current Criminal Law that refers to "the crime of incitement to subvert state power" must be abolished. We should end the practice of viewing words as crimes.
12. Freedom of Religion. We must guarantee freedom of religion and belief, and institute a separation of religion and state. There must be no governmental interference in peaceful religious activities. We should abolish any laws, regulations, or local rules that limit or suppress the religious freedom of citizens. We should abolish the current system that requires religious groups (and their places of worship) to get official approval in advance and substitute for it a system in which registry is optional and, for those who choose to register, automatic.
13. Civic Education. In our schools we should abolish political curriculums and examinations that are designed to indoctrinate students in state ideology and to instill support for the rule of one party. We should replace them with civic education that advances universal values and citizens' rights, fosters civic consciousness, and promotes civic virtues that serve society.
14. Protection of Private Property. We should establish and protect the right to private property and promote an economic system of free and fair markets. We should do away with government monopolies in commerce and industry and guarantee the freedom to start new enterprises. We should establish a Committee on State-Owned Property, reporting to the national legislature, that will monitor the transfer of state-owned enterprises to private ownership in a fair, competitive, and orderly manner. We should institute a land reform that promotes private ownership of land, guarantees the right to buy and sell land, and allows the true value of private property to be adequately reflected in the market.
15. Financial and Tax Reform. We should establish a democratically regulated and accountable system of public finance that ensures the protection of taxpayer rights and that operates through legal procedures. We need a system by which public revenues that belong to a certain level of government—central, provincial, county or local—are controlled at that level. We need major tax reform that will abolish any unfair taxes, simplify the tax system, and spread the tax burden fairly. Government officials should not be able to raise taxes, or institute new ones, without public deliberation and the approval of a democratic assembly. We should reform the ownership system in order to encourage competition among a wider variety of market participants.
16. Social Security. We should establish a fair and adequate social security system that covers all citizens and ensures basic access to education, health care, retirement security, and employment.
17. Protection of the Environment. We need to protect the natural environment and to promote development in a way that is sustainable and responsible to our descendants and to the rest of humanity. This means insisting that the state and its officials at all levels not only do what they must do to achieve these goals, but also accept the supervision and participation of nongovernmental organizations.
18. A Federated Republic. A democratic China should seek to act as a responsible major power contributing toward peace and development in the Asian Pacific region by approaching others in a spirit of equality and fairness. In Hong Kong and Macao, we should support the freedoms that already exist. With respect to Taiwan, we should declare our commitment to the principles of freedom and democracy and then, negotiating as equals and ready to compromise, seek a formula for peaceful unification. We should approach disputes in the national-minority areas of China with an open mind, seeking ways to find a workable framework within which all ethnic and religious groups can flourish. We should aim ultimately at a federation of democratic communities of China.
19. Truth in Reconciliation. We should restore the reputations of all people, including their family members, who suffered political stigma in the political campaigns of the past or who have been labeled as criminals because of their thought, speech, or faith. The state should pay reparations to these people. All political prisoners and prisoners of conscience must be released. There should be a Truth Investigation Commission charged with finding the facts about past injustices and atrocities, determining responsibility for them, upholding justice, and, on these bases, seeking social reconciliation.
China, as a major nation of the world, as one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and as a member of the UN Council on Human Rights, should be contributing to peace for humankind and progress toward human rights. Unfortunately, we stand today as the only country among the major nations that remains mired in authoritarian politics. Our political system continues to produce human rights disasters and social crises, thereby not only constricting China's own development but also limiting the progress of all of human civilization. This must change, truly it must. The democratization of Chinese politics can be put off no longer.
Accordingly, we dare to put civic spirit into practice by announcing Charter 08. We hope that our fellow citizens who feel a similar sense of crisis, responsibility, and mission, whether they are inside the government or not, and regardless of their social status, will set aside small differences to embrace the broad goals of this citizens' movement. Together we can work for major changes in Chinese society and for the rapid establishment of a free, democratic, and constitutional country. We can bring to reality the goals and ideals that our people have incessantly been seeking for more than a hundred years, and can bring a brilliant new chapter to Chinese civilization.
—Translated from the Chinese by Perry Link
POSTSCRIPT
The planning and drafting of Charter 08 began in the late spring of 2008, but Chinese authorities were apparently unaware of it or unconcerned by it until several days before it was announced on December 10. On December 6, Wen Kejian, a writer who signed the charter, was detained in the city of Hangzhou in eastern China and questioned for about an hour. Police told Wen that Charter 08 was "different" from earlier dissident statements, and "a fairly grave matter." They said there would be a coordinated investigation in all cities and provinces to "root out the organizers," and they advised Wen to remove his name from the charter. Wen declined, telling the authorities that he saw the charter as a fundamental turning point in history.
Meanwhile, on December 8, in Shenzhen in the far south of China, police called on Zhao Dagong, a writer and signer of the charter, for a "chat." They told Zhao that the central authorities were concerned about the charter and asked if he was the organizer in the Shenzhen area.
Later on December 8, at 11 PM in Beijing, about twenty police entered the home of Zhang Zuhua, one of the charter's main drafters. A few of the police took Zhang with them to the local police station while the rest stayed and, as Zhang's wife watched, searched the home and confiscated books, notebooks, Zhang's passport, all four of the family's computers, and all of their cash and credit cards. (Later Zhang learned that his family's bank accounts, including those of both his and his wife's parents, had been emptied.) Meanwhile, at the police station, Zhang was detained for twelve hours, where he was questioned in detail about Charter 08 and the group Chinese Human Rights Defenders in which he is active.
It was also late on December 8 that another of the charter's signers, the literary critic and prominent dissident Liu Xiaobo, was taken away by police. His telephone in Beijing went unanswered, as did e-mail and Skype messages sent to him. As of the present writing, he's believed to be in police custody, although the details of his detention are not known.
On the morning of December 9, Beijing lawyer Pu Zhiqiang was called in for a police "chat," and in the evening the physicist and philosopher Jiang Qisheng was called in as well. Both had signed the charter and were friends of the drafters. On December 10—the day the charter was formally announced—the Hangzhou police returned to the home of Wen Kejian, the writer they had questioned four days earlier. This time they were more threatening. They told Wen he would face severe punishment if he wrote about the charter or about Liu Xiaobo's detention. "Do you want three years in prison?" they asked. "Or four?"
On December 11 the journalist Gao Yu and the writer Liu Di, both well-known in Beijing, were interrogated about their signing of the Charter. The rights lawyer, Teng Biao, was approached by the police but declined, on principle, to meet with them. On December 12 and 13 there were reports of interrogations in many provinces—Shaanxi, Hunan, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and others—of people who had seen the charter on the Internet, found that they agreed with it, and signed. With these people the police focused on two questions: "How did you get involved?" and "What do you know about the drafters and organizers?"
The Chinese authorities seem unaware of the irony of their actions. Their efforts to quash Charter 08 only serve to underscore China's failure to uphold the very principles that the charter advances. The charter calls for "free expression" but the regime says, by its actions, that it has once again denied such expression. The charter calls for freedom to form groups, but the nationwide police actions that have accompanied the charter's release have specifically aimed at blocking the formation of a group. The charter says "we should end the practice of viewing words as crimes," and the regime says (literally, to Wen Kejian) "we can send you to prison for these words." The charter calls for the rule of law and the regime sends police in the middle of the night to act outside the law; the charter says "police should serve as nonpartisans," and here the police are plainly partisan.
Charter 08 is signed only by citizens of the People's Republic of China who are living inside China. But Chinese living outside China are signing a letter of strong support for the charter. The eminent historian Yu Ying-shih, the astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, writers Ha Jin and Zheng Yi, and more than 160 others have so far signed.
On December 12, the Dalai Lama issued his own letter in support of the charter, writing that "a harmonious society can only come into being when there is trust among the people, freedom from fear, freedom of expression, rule of law, justice, and equality." He called on the Chinese government to release prisoners "who have been detained for exercising their freedom of expression."
—Perry Link, December 18, 2008
Posted by Paulo R. de Almeida @ Segunda-feira, Dezembro 29, 2008
Efetuei a seguinte introdução ao texto:
O precedente mais imediato desta iniciativa, abaixo transcrita, situa-se exatamente um século atrás, quando estudantes começaram manifestações pacíficas para modernizar o então sistema imperial, acabar com a autocracia e criar um moderno sistema parlamentar na China.
O resultado foi a revolução republicana de Sun-Yat Sen, em 1911, que acabou com a monarquia e tentou instalar um regime republicano parlamentar.
Não foi possivel estabilizar um regime democrático, inclusive porque a China vivia submetida ao regime de concessões em favor das principais potências imperiais européias, EUA inclusive, a partir dos tratados desiguais de 1844 (que terminaram apenas um século depois, em plena Segunda Guerra) que concederam Honk-Kong para a GB por um século e impuseram o sistema de extra-territorialidade em favor dos estrangeiros, que inclusive dispunham de zonas exclusivas em várias cidades e portos.
A China, já humilhada pelo Japão em 1895, mergulhou, a partir dos anos 1920, num quadro de guerras intermitentes entre generais e chefes regionais, o que impeliu o Japão a invadi-la e submetê-la, a partir da Mandchuria, em 1931.
O resto foi história, de guerra ou de totalitarismo, inclusive o massacre de Nanquim, perpetrado pelos japoneses, em 1937, e a guerra civil depois da derrota do Japão, em 1945, que culminou com a vitória dos comunistas em 1949, e a expulsão dos nacionalistas para Taiwan.
Talvez a Carta 08 consiga seus objetivos, dentro de mais uma geração, provavelmente, quando a prosperidade for suficiente para que o Partido Comunista admita uma liberalização ampliada...
A China NUNCA conheceu democracia, jamais... (como a Russia, aliás...).
-------------
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
China's Charter 08
The New York Review of Books, Volume 56, Number 1 · January 15, 2009
Translated from the Chinese by Perry Link
The document below, signed by more than two thousand Chinese citizens, was conceived and written in conscious admiration of the founding of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, where, in January 1977, more than two hundred Czech and Slovak intellectuals formed a loose, informal, and open association of people...united by the will to strive individually and collectively for respect for human and civil rights in our country and throughout the world.
The Chinese document calls not for ameliorative reform of the current political system but for an end to some of its essential features, including one-party rule, and their replacement with a system based on human rights and democracy.
The prominent citizens who have signed the document are from both outside and inside the government, and include not only well-known dissidents and intellectuals, but also middle-level officials and rural leaders. They chose December 10, the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as the day on which to express their political ideas and to outline their vision of a constitutional, democratic China. They want Charter 08 to serve as a blueprint for fundamental political change in China in the years to come. The signers of the document will form an informal group, open-ended in size but united by a determination to promote democratization and protection of human rights in China and beyond.
Following the text is a postscript describing some of the regime's recent reactions to it.
—Perry Link
I. FOREWORD
A hundred years have passed since the writing of China's first constitution. 2008 also marks the sixtieth anniversary of the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the thirtieth anniversary of the appearance of the Democracy Wall in Beijing, and the tenth of China's signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. We are approaching the twentieth anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre of pro-democracy student protesters. The Chinese people, who have endured human rights disasters and uncountable struggles across these same years, now include many who see clearly that freedom, equality, and human rights are universal values of humankind and that democracy and constitutional government are the fundamental framework for protecting these values.
By departing from these values, the Chinese government's approach to "modernization" has proven disastrous. It has stripped people of their rights, destroyed their dignity, and corrupted normal human intercourse. So we ask: Where is China headed in the twenty-first century? Will it continue with "modernization" under authoritarian rule, or will it embrace universal human values, join the mainstream of civilized nations, and build a democratic system? There can be no avoiding these questions.
The shock of the Western impact upon China in the nineteenth century laid bare a decadent authoritarian system and marked the beginning of what is often called "the greatest changes in thousands of years" for China. A "self-strengthening movement" followed, but this aimed simply at appropriating the technology to build gunboats and other Western material objects. China's humiliating naval defeat at the hands of Japan in 1895 only confirmed the obsolescence of China's system of government. The first attempts at modern political change came with the ill-fated summer of reforms in 1898, but these were cruelly crushed by ultraconservatives at China's imperial court. With the revolution of 1911, which inaugurated Asia's first republic, the authoritarian imperial system that had lasted for centuries was finally supposed to have been laid to rest. But social conflict inside our country and external pressures were to prevent it; China fell into a patchwork of warlord fiefdoms and the new republic became a fleeting dream.
The failure of both "self- strengthening" and political renovation caused many of our forebears to reflect deeply on whether a "cultural illness" was afflicting our country. This mood gave rise, during the May Fourth Movement of the late 1910s, to the championing of "science and democracy." Yet that effort, too, foundered as warlord chaos persisted and the Japanese invasion [beginning in Manchuria in 1931] brought national crisis.
Victory over Japan in 1945 offered one more chance for China to move toward modern government, but the Communist defeat of the Nationalists in the civil war thrust the nation into the abyss of totalitarianism. The "new China" that emerged in 1949 proclaimed that "the people are sovereign" but in fact set up a system in which "the Party is all-powerful." The Communist Party of China seized control of all organs of the state and all political, economic, and social resources, and, using these, has produced a long trail of human rights disasters, including, among many others, the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957), the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960), the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969), the June Fourth [Tiananmen Square] Massacre (1989), and the current repression of all unauthorized religions and the suppression of the weiquan rights movement [a movement that aims to defend citizens' rights promulgated in the Chinese Constitution and to fight for human rights recognized by international conventions that the Chinese government has signed]. During all this, the Chinese people have paid a gargantuan price. Tens of millions have lost their lives, and several generations have seen their freedom, their happiness, and their human dignity cruelly trampled.
During the last two decades of the twentieth century the government policy of "Reform and Opening" gave the Chinese people relief from the pervasive poverty and totalitarianism of the Mao Zedong era, and brought substantial increases in the wealth and living standards of many Chinese as well as a partial restoration of economic freedom and economic rights. Civil society began to grow, and popular calls for more rights and more political freedom have grown apace. As the ruling elite itself moved toward private ownership and the market economy, it began to shift from an outright rejection of "rights" to a partial acknowledgment of them.
In 1998 the Chinese government signed two important international human rights conventions; in 2004 it amended its constitution to include the phrase "respect and protect human rights"; and this year, 2008, it has promised to promote a "national human rights action plan." Unfortunately most of this political progress has extended no further than the paper on which it is written. The political reality, which is plain for anyone to see, is that China has many laws but no rule of law; it has a constitution but no constitutional government. The ruling elite continues to cling to its authoritarian power and fights off any move toward political change.
The stultifying results are endemic official corruption, an undermining of the rule of law, weak human rights, decay in public ethics, crony capitalism, growing inequality between the wealthy and the poor, pillage of the natural environment as well as of the human and historical environments, and the exacerbation of a long list of social conflicts, especially, in recent times, a sharpening animosity between officials and ordinary people.
As these conflicts and crises grow ever more intense, and as the ruling elite continues with impunity to crush and to strip away the rights of citizens to freedom, to property, and to the pursuit of happiness, we see the powerless in our society—the vulnerable groups, the people who have been suppressed and monitored, who have suffered cruelty and even torture, and who have had no adequate avenues for their protests, no courts to hear their pleas—becoming more militant and raising the possibility of a violent conflict of disastrous proportions. The decline of the current system has reached the point where change is no longer optional.
II. OUR FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
This is a historic moment for China, and our future hangs in the balance. In reviewing the political modernization process of the past hundred years or more, we reiterate and endorse basic universal values as follows:
Freedom. Freedom is at the core of universal human values. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom in where to live, and the freedoms to strike, to demonstrate, and to protest, among others, are the forms that freedom takes. Without freedom, China will always remain far from civilized ideals.
Human rights. Human rights are not bestowed by a state. Every person is born with inherent rights to dignity and freedom. The government exists for the protection of the human rights of its citizens. The exercise of state power must be authorized by the people. The succession of political disasters in China's recent history is a direct consequence of the ruling regime's disregard for human rights.
Equality. The integrity, dignity, and freedom of every person—regardless of social station, occupation, sex, economic condition, ethnicity, skin color, religion, or political belief—are the same as those of any other. Principles of equality before the law and equality of social, economic, cultural, civil, and political rights must be upheld.
Republicanism. Republicanism, which holds that power should be balanced among different branches of government and competing interests should be served, resembles the traditional Chinese political ideal of "fairness in all under heaven." It allows different interest groups and social assemblies, and people with a variety of cultures and beliefs, to exercise democratic self-government and to deliberate in order to reach peaceful resolution of public questions on a basis of equal access to government and free and fair competition.
Democracy. The most fundamental principles of democracy are that the people are sovereign and the people select their government. Democracy has these characteristics: (1) Political power begins with the people and the legitimacy of a regime derives from the people. (2) Political power is exercised through choices that the people make. (3) The holders of major official posts in government at all levels are determined through periodic competitive elections. (4) While honoring the will of the majority, the fundamental dignity, freedom, and human rights of minorities are protected. In short, democracy is a modern means for achieving government truly "of the people, by the people, and for the people."
Constitutional rule. Constitutional rule is rule through a legal system and legal regulations to implement principles that are spelled out in a constitution. It means protecting the freedom and the rights of citizens, limiting and defining the scope of legitimate government power, and providing the administrative apparatus necessary to serve these ends.
III. WHAT WE ADVOCATE
Authoritarianism is in general decline throughout the world; in China, too, the era of emperors and overlords is on the way out. The time is arriving everywhere for citizens to be masters of states. For China the path that leads out of our current predicament is to divest ourselves of the authoritarian notion of reliance on an "enlightened overlord" or an "honest official" and to turn instead toward a system of liberties, democracy, and the rule of law, and toward fostering the consciousness of modern citizens who see rights as fundamental and participation as a duty. Accordingly, and in a spirit of this duty as responsible and constructive citizens, we offer the following recommendations on national governance, citizens' rights, and social development:
1. A New Constitution. We should recast our present constitution, rescinding its provisions that contradict the principle that sovereignty resides with the people and turning it into a document that genuinely guarantees human rights, authorizes the exercise of public power, and serves as the legal underpinning of China's democratization. The constitution must be the highest law in the land, beyond violation by any individual, group, or political party.
2. Separation of Powers. We should construct a modern government in which the separation of legislative, judicial, and executive power is guaranteed. We need an Administrative Law that defines the scope of government responsibility and prevents abuse of administrative power. Government should be responsible to taxpayers. Division of power between provincial governments and the central government should adhere to the principle that central powers are only those specifically granted by the constitution and all other powers belong to the local governments.
3. Legislative Democracy. Members of legislative bodies at all levels should be chosen by direct election, and legislative democracy should observe just and impartial principles.
4. An Independent Judiciary. The rule of law must be above the interests of any particular political party and judges must be independent. We need to establish a constitutional supreme court and institute procedures for constitutional review. As soon as possible, we should abolish all of the Committees on Political and Legal Affairs that now allow Communist Party officials at every level to decide politically sensitive cases in advance and out of court. We should strictly forbid the use of public offices for private purposes.
5. Public Control of Public Servants. The military should be made answerable to the national government, not to a political party, and should be made more professional. Military personnel should swear allegiance to the constitution and remain nonpartisan. Political party organizations must be prohibited in the military. All public officials including police should serve as nonpartisans, and the current practice of favoring one political party in the hiring of public servants must end.
6. Guarantee of Human Rights. There must be strict guarantees of human rights and respect for human dignity. There should be a Human Rights Committee, responsible to the highest legislative body, that will prevent the government from abusing public power in violation of human rights. A democratic and constitutional China especially must guarantee the personal freedom of citizens. No one should suffer illegal arrest, detention, arraignment, interrogation, or punishment. The system of "Reeducation through Labor" must be abolished.
7. Election of Public Officials. There should be a comprehensive system of democratic elections based on "one person, one vote." The direct election of administrative heads at the levels of county, city, province, and nation should be systematically implemented. The rights to hold periodic free elections and to participate in them as a citizen are inalienable.
8. Rural–Urban Equality. The two-tier household registry system must be abolished. This system favors urban residents and harms rural residents. We should establish instead a system that gives every citizen the same constitutional rights and the same freedom to choose where to live.
9. Freedom to Form Groups. The right of citizens to form groups must be guaranteed. The current system for registering nongovernment groups, which requires a group to be "approved," should be replaced by a system in which a group simply registers itself. The formation of political parties should be governed by the constitution and the laws, which means that we must abolish the special privilege of one party to monopolize power and must guarantee principles of free and fair competition among political parties.
10. Freedom to Assemble. The constitution provides that peaceful assembly, demonstration, protest, and freedom of expression are fundamental rights of a citizen. The ruling party and the government must not be permitted to subject these to illegal interference or unconstitutional obstruction.
11. Freedom of Expression. We should make freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and academic freedom universal, thereby guaranteeing that citizens can be informed and can exercise their right of political supervision. These freedoms should be upheld by a Press Law that abolishes political restrictions on the press. The provision in the current Criminal Law that refers to "the crime of incitement to subvert state power" must be abolished. We should end the practice of viewing words as crimes.
12. Freedom of Religion. We must guarantee freedom of religion and belief, and institute a separation of religion and state. There must be no governmental interference in peaceful religious activities. We should abolish any laws, regulations, or local rules that limit or suppress the religious freedom of citizens. We should abolish the current system that requires religious groups (and their places of worship) to get official approval in advance and substitute for it a system in which registry is optional and, for those who choose to register, automatic.
13. Civic Education. In our schools we should abolish political curriculums and examinations that are designed to indoctrinate students in state ideology and to instill support for the rule of one party. We should replace them with civic education that advances universal values and citizens' rights, fosters civic consciousness, and promotes civic virtues that serve society.
14. Protection of Private Property. We should establish and protect the right to private property and promote an economic system of free and fair markets. We should do away with government monopolies in commerce and industry and guarantee the freedom to start new enterprises. We should establish a Committee on State-Owned Property, reporting to the national legislature, that will monitor the transfer of state-owned enterprises to private ownership in a fair, competitive, and orderly manner. We should institute a land reform that promotes private ownership of land, guarantees the right to buy and sell land, and allows the true value of private property to be adequately reflected in the market.
15. Financial and Tax Reform. We should establish a democratically regulated and accountable system of public finance that ensures the protection of taxpayer rights and that operates through legal procedures. We need a system by which public revenues that belong to a certain level of government—central, provincial, county or local—are controlled at that level. We need major tax reform that will abolish any unfair taxes, simplify the tax system, and spread the tax burden fairly. Government officials should not be able to raise taxes, or institute new ones, without public deliberation and the approval of a democratic assembly. We should reform the ownership system in order to encourage competition among a wider variety of market participants.
16. Social Security. We should establish a fair and adequate social security system that covers all citizens and ensures basic access to education, health care, retirement security, and employment.
17. Protection of the Environment. We need to protect the natural environment and to promote development in a way that is sustainable and responsible to our descendants and to the rest of humanity. This means insisting that the state and its officials at all levels not only do what they must do to achieve these goals, but also accept the supervision and participation of nongovernmental organizations.
18. A Federated Republic. A democratic China should seek to act as a responsible major power contributing toward peace and development in the Asian Pacific region by approaching others in a spirit of equality and fairness. In Hong Kong and Macao, we should support the freedoms that already exist. With respect to Taiwan, we should declare our commitment to the principles of freedom and democracy and then, negotiating as equals and ready to compromise, seek a formula for peaceful unification. We should approach disputes in the national-minority areas of China with an open mind, seeking ways to find a workable framework within which all ethnic and religious groups can flourish. We should aim ultimately at a federation of democratic communities of China.
19. Truth in Reconciliation. We should restore the reputations of all people, including their family members, who suffered political stigma in the political campaigns of the past or who have been labeled as criminals because of their thought, speech, or faith. The state should pay reparations to these people. All political prisoners and prisoners of conscience must be released. There should be a Truth Investigation Commission charged with finding the facts about past injustices and atrocities, determining responsibility for them, upholding justice, and, on these bases, seeking social reconciliation.
China, as a major nation of the world, as one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and as a member of the UN Council on Human Rights, should be contributing to peace for humankind and progress toward human rights. Unfortunately, we stand today as the only country among the major nations that remains mired in authoritarian politics. Our political system continues to produce human rights disasters and social crises, thereby not only constricting China's own development but also limiting the progress of all of human civilization. This must change, truly it must. The democratization of Chinese politics can be put off no longer.
Accordingly, we dare to put civic spirit into practice by announcing Charter 08. We hope that our fellow citizens who feel a similar sense of crisis, responsibility, and mission, whether they are inside the government or not, and regardless of their social status, will set aside small differences to embrace the broad goals of this citizens' movement. Together we can work for major changes in Chinese society and for the rapid establishment of a free, democratic, and constitutional country. We can bring to reality the goals and ideals that our people have incessantly been seeking for more than a hundred years, and can bring a brilliant new chapter to Chinese civilization.
—Translated from the Chinese by Perry Link
POSTSCRIPT
The planning and drafting of Charter 08 began in the late spring of 2008, but Chinese authorities were apparently unaware of it or unconcerned by it until several days before it was announced on December 10. On December 6, Wen Kejian, a writer who signed the charter, was detained in the city of Hangzhou in eastern China and questioned for about an hour. Police told Wen that Charter 08 was "different" from earlier dissident statements, and "a fairly grave matter." They said there would be a coordinated investigation in all cities and provinces to "root out the organizers," and they advised Wen to remove his name from the charter. Wen declined, telling the authorities that he saw the charter as a fundamental turning point in history.
Meanwhile, on December 8, in Shenzhen in the far south of China, police called on Zhao Dagong, a writer and signer of the charter, for a "chat." They told Zhao that the central authorities were concerned about the charter and asked if he was the organizer in the Shenzhen area.
Later on December 8, at 11 PM in Beijing, about twenty police entered the home of Zhang Zuhua, one of the charter's main drafters. A few of the police took Zhang with them to the local police station while the rest stayed and, as Zhang's wife watched, searched the home and confiscated books, notebooks, Zhang's passport, all four of the family's computers, and all of their cash and credit cards. (Later Zhang learned that his family's bank accounts, including those of both his and his wife's parents, had been emptied.) Meanwhile, at the police station, Zhang was detained for twelve hours, where he was questioned in detail about Charter 08 and the group Chinese Human Rights Defenders in which he is active.
It was also late on December 8 that another of the charter's signers, the literary critic and prominent dissident Liu Xiaobo, was taken away by police. His telephone in Beijing went unanswered, as did e-mail and Skype messages sent to him. As of the present writing, he's believed to be in police custody, although the details of his detention are not known.
On the morning of December 9, Beijing lawyer Pu Zhiqiang was called in for a police "chat," and in the evening the physicist and philosopher Jiang Qisheng was called in as well. Both had signed the charter and were friends of the drafters. On December 10—the day the charter was formally announced—the Hangzhou police returned to the home of Wen Kejian, the writer they had questioned four days earlier. This time they were more threatening. They told Wen he would face severe punishment if he wrote about the charter or about Liu Xiaobo's detention. "Do you want three years in prison?" they asked. "Or four?"
On December 11 the journalist Gao Yu and the writer Liu Di, both well-known in Beijing, were interrogated about their signing of the Charter. The rights lawyer, Teng Biao, was approached by the police but declined, on principle, to meet with them. On December 12 and 13 there were reports of interrogations in many provinces—Shaanxi, Hunan, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and others—of people who had seen the charter on the Internet, found that they agreed with it, and signed. With these people the police focused on two questions: "How did you get involved?" and "What do you know about the drafters and organizers?"
The Chinese authorities seem unaware of the irony of their actions. Their efforts to quash Charter 08 only serve to underscore China's failure to uphold the very principles that the charter advances. The charter calls for "free expression" but the regime says, by its actions, that it has once again denied such expression. The charter calls for freedom to form groups, but the nationwide police actions that have accompanied the charter's release have specifically aimed at blocking the formation of a group. The charter says "we should end the practice of viewing words as crimes," and the regime says (literally, to Wen Kejian) "we can send you to prison for these words." The charter calls for the rule of law and the regime sends police in the middle of the night to act outside the law; the charter says "police should serve as nonpartisans," and here the police are plainly partisan.
Charter 08 is signed only by citizens of the People's Republic of China who are living inside China. But Chinese living outside China are signing a letter of strong support for the charter. The eminent historian Yu Ying-shih, the astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, writers Ha Jin and Zheng Yi, and more than 160 others have so far signed.
On December 12, the Dalai Lama issued his own letter in support of the charter, writing that "a harmonious society can only come into being when there is trust among the people, freedom from fear, freedom of expression, rule of law, justice, and equality." He called on the Chinese government to release prisoners "who have been detained for exercising their freedom of expression."
—Perry Link, December 18, 2008
Posted by Paulo R. de Almeida @ Segunda-feira, Dezembro 29, 2008
14) Debate sobre as ideologias na China
Este artigo tem mais de três anos, mas acredito que ele continua válido quanto ao debate público na China sobre as grandes orientações de políticas públicas.
A Sharp Debate Erupts in China Over Ideologies
By JOSEPH KAHN
The New York Times, March 12, 2006
BEIJING, March 11 — For the first time in perhaps a decade, the National People's Congress, the Communist Party-run legislature now convened in its annual two-week session, is consumed with an ideological debate over socialism and capitalism that many assumed had been buried by China's long streak of fast economic growth.
The controversy has forced the government to shelve a draft law to protect property rights that had been expected to win pro forma passage and highlighted the resurgent influence of a small but vocal group of socialist-leaning scholars and policy advisers. These old-style leftist thinkers have used China's rising income gap and increasing social unrest to raise doubts about what they see as the country's headlong pursuit of private wealth and market-driven economic development.
The roots of the current debate can be traced to a biting critique of the property rights law that circulated on the Internet last summer. The critique's author, Gong Xiantian, a professor at Beijing University Law School, accused the legal experts who wrote the draft of "copying capitalist civil law like slaves," and offering equal protection to "a rich man's car and a beggar man's stick." Most of all, he protested that the proposed law did not state that "socialist property is inviolable," a once sacred legal concept in China.
Those who dismissed his attack as a throwback to an earlier era underestimated the continued appeal of socialist ideas in a country where glaring disparities between rich and poor, rampant corruption, labor abuses and land seizures offer daily reminders of how far China has strayed from its official ideology.
"Our government only moves forward when it feels there is a strong consensus," said Mao Shoulong, a public policy specialist at People's University in Beijing. "Right now, the consensus is eroding and there is a debate over ideology, which we haven't seen for some time."
The divide does not appear likely to derail China's market-led growth. President Hu Jintao, in what Chinese political experts and party members said was a clear reference to the debate, told legislative delegates last week that China must "unshakably persist with economic reform."
China has generally stuck by its market-opening commitments to the World Trade Organization. Wen Jiabao, the prime minister, has allowed billions of dollars in foreign investment to flow into the once tightly protected financial sector.
Legislative officials insist that the proposed law, which has taken eight years to prepare and is intended to codify a more expansive notion of property rights added to the Constitution in 2003, will sooner or later be enacted, though possibly with some significant modifications.
But Mr. Hu and Mr. Wen wittingly or unwittingly invited the debate when they made tackling growing inequality a center of their propaganda efforts, political analysts say. The state-run news media are abuzz with calls to make "social equity" the focus of economic policy, replacing the earlier leadership's emphasis on rapid growth and wealth creation.
Since his rise to power in 2002, Mr. Hu has also tried to establish his leftist credentials, extolling Marxism, praising Mao and bankrolling research to make the country's official but often ignored socialist ideology more relevant to the current era.
He told party leaders in 2004 to study how Cuba and North Korea maintained political order, party officials say. And he has tried to distance himself from his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, who invited private businessmen to join the Communist Party and was viewed as permitting well-connected officials to enrich themselves with public property at the expense of the poor.
"Hu is himself a centrist who is not really pursuing one agenda or the other," observed a party official who said he could be punished for talking about leadership politics if he were quoted by name. "But he did pull us to the left to restore balance, and that gave the old guard an opportunity it has not had in years."
As a result, analysts say, the leadership may find it harder to pursue market-oriented solutions to some pressing problems, like providing health care to rural residents, grappling with rampant corruption in the state sector, expanding access to education and overhauling banks, insurance and securities companies.
Beijing's new plan to address its rural woes, labeled "building a new socialist countryside," promises an infusion of government cash for peasants and rural areas. But it steers clear of tackling some restrictions on economic activity, like a ban on private land sales in the countryside, that many pro-market economists say have left peasants economically disenfranchised.
"My impression is that allowing an expanded role for the market in education and health care is off the table," said Mr. Mao, the People's University policy expert. "Rural land ownership is also too sensitive to consider now."
The tensions reflect rising concern that breakneck growth averaging nearly 10 percent annually over 20 years has left China richer but also dirtier and, by the standards of the one-party state, politically volatile.
Corruption, pollution, land seizures and arbitrary fees and taxes are among the leading causes of a surge in social unrest. Riots have become a fixture of rural life in China — more than 200 "mass incidents of unrest" occurred each day in 2004, police statistics show — undermining the party's insistence on social stability.
Many Western and some Chinese experts have argued that these problems stem from China's authoritarian political system, and that they will not easily go away until people have a greater say in how they are governed. But the Communist Party and many left-leaning scholars reject that view. They say the ills are caused by capitalist excesses and rising inequality, which they say requires that the government reassert itself in economic affairs.
One measurement of inequality, the gap between the average incomes of urban and rural residents, has risen to about 3.3 to 1, according to the United Nations Development Program, higher than similar measures in the United States and one of the world's highest. A study by the party's Central Research Office estimates that the ratio could rise to 4 to 1 by 2020 if current trends continue, a level some Chinese economists say could incite wider social turmoil.
Such political fears seemed to give an opening to critics who felt economic policies had strayed too far toward capitalism. The strength of leftist opposition had faded throughout the 1990's after Deng Xiaoping, who called economic development "hard truth," and later Mr. Jiang tolerated little ideological discussion of the direction of changes.
Liu Guoguang, a Marxist economist and a former vice director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, stimulated an outpouring of opinions about inequality last summer when he gave a private talk that was transcribed and posted on the Internet. His talk supported the emphasis on growth and development but called for a much larger role for the government in managing economic affairs.
In a subsequent interview with Business Watch, a state-run magazine, Mr. Liu said, "If you establish a market economy in a place like China, where the rule of law is imperfect, if you do not emphasize the socialist spirit of fairness and social responsibility, then the market economy you establish is going to be an elitist market economy."
He has been joined by other scholars, including Mr. Gong, whose incendiary polemic on the property law prompted a succession of sympathetic essays and study sessions.
Also contributing to the response is the Hong Kong-based economist Lang Xianping, who has used a television show to pillory what he describes as raids on state assets by managers and foreign investors.
One top official who has come under scrutiny is Zhou Xiaochuan, the central bank governor and a promoter of market initiatives. Mr. Zhou attracted foreign investment to the financial sector, partly delinked China's currency from the United States dollar and steered the three biggest state-owned banks toward stock market listings overseas.
Mr. Zhou was attacked directly in a widely circulated Hong Kong newspaper article and indirectly by commentators in Beijing, who accuse financial officials of selling China's most valuable assets too cheaply.
Ji Baocheng, president of People's University in Beijing, criticized Mr. Zhou's banking changes in a public session of the legislature last week. He cited the big Hong Kong stock market listing of China Construction Bank, which was completed after the government injected billions of dollars to clean up its balance sheet.
Mr. Ji said the government priced shares in the bank too low, given the fresh infusion of capital, and he accused officials of "blindly sacrificing the interests of China and its people."
The government defends the overseas listings as a necessary step to raise capital, attract foreign experts to the boards and executive offices of the troubled banks and put the financial system on sounder footing.
Some pro-market economists, who seemed ascendant in the 1990's and early in this decade and now often sound defensive, have denounced the leftist revival as dangerous. Many also criticize the Hu-Wen administration for micromanaging investment and bank loans, tinkering with property and stock markets and declining to extend market-oriented policies to the countryside.
Zhou Ruijing, a retired newspaper editor associated with the pro-market camp, captured the sentiment in a January magazine essay.
"A widening gap between rich and poor is not the fault of market reforms," he wrote. "It's the natural result of them, which is neither good nor bad, but quite predictable."
A Sharp Debate Erupts in China Over Ideologies
By JOSEPH KAHN
The New York Times, March 12, 2006
BEIJING, March 11 — For the first time in perhaps a decade, the National People's Congress, the Communist Party-run legislature now convened in its annual two-week session, is consumed with an ideological debate over socialism and capitalism that many assumed had been buried by China's long streak of fast economic growth.
The controversy has forced the government to shelve a draft law to protect property rights that had been expected to win pro forma passage and highlighted the resurgent influence of a small but vocal group of socialist-leaning scholars and policy advisers. These old-style leftist thinkers have used China's rising income gap and increasing social unrest to raise doubts about what they see as the country's headlong pursuit of private wealth and market-driven economic development.
The roots of the current debate can be traced to a biting critique of the property rights law that circulated on the Internet last summer. The critique's author, Gong Xiantian, a professor at Beijing University Law School, accused the legal experts who wrote the draft of "copying capitalist civil law like slaves," and offering equal protection to "a rich man's car and a beggar man's stick." Most of all, he protested that the proposed law did not state that "socialist property is inviolable," a once sacred legal concept in China.
Those who dismissed his attack as a throwback to an earlier era underestimated the continued appeal of socialist ideas in a country where glaring disparities between rich and poor, rampant corruption, labor abuses and land seizures offer daily reminders of how far China has strayed from its official ideology.
"Our government only moves forward when it feels there is a strong consensus," said Mao Shoulong, a public policy specialist at People's University in Beijing. "Right now, the consensus is eroding and there is a debate over ideology, which we haven't seen for some time."
The divide does not appear likely to derail China's market-led growth. President Hu Jintao, in what Chinese political experts and party members said was a clear reference to the debate, told legislative delegates last week that China must "unshakably persist with economic reform."
China has generally stuck by its market-opening commitments to the World Trade Organization. Wen Jiabao, the prime minister, has allowed billions of dollars in foreign investment to flow into the once tightly protected financial sector.
Legislative officials insist that the proposed law, which has taken eight years to prepare and is intended to codify a more expansive notion of property rights added to the Constitution in 2003, will sooner or later be enacted, though possibly with some significant modifications.
But Mr. Hu and Mr. Wen wittingly or unwittingly invited the debate when they made tackling growing inequality a center of their propaganda efforts, political analysts say. The state-run news media are abuzz with calls to make "social equity" the focus of economic policy, replacing the earlier leadership's emphasis on rapid growth and wealth creation.
Since his rise to power in 2002, Mr. Hu has also tried to establish his leftist credentials, extolling Marxism, praising Mao and bankrolling research to make the country's official but often ignored socialist ideology more relevant to the current era.
He told party leaders in 2004 to study how Cuba and North Korea maintained political order, party officials say. And he has tried to distance himself from his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, who invited private businessmen to join the Communist Party and was viewed as permitting well-connected officials to enrich themselves with public property at the expense of the poor.
"Hu is himself a centrist who is not really pursuing one agenda or the other," observed a party official who said he could be punished for talking about leadership politics if he were quoted by name. "But he did pull us to the left to restore balance, and that gave the old guard an opportunity it has not had in years."
As a result, analysts say, the leadership may find it harder to pursue market-oriented solutions to some pressing problems, like providing health care to rural residents, grappling with rampant corruption in the state sector, expanding access to education and overhauling banks, insurance and securities companies.
Beijing's new plan to address its rural woes, labeled "building a new socialist countryside," promises an infusion of government cash for peasants and rural areas. But it steers clear of tackling some restrictions on economic activity, like a ban on private land sales in the countryside, that many pro-market economists say have left peasants economically disenfranchised.
"My impression is that allowing an expanded role for the market in education and health care is off the table," said Mr. Mao, the People's University policy expert. "Rural land ownership is also too sensitive to consider now."
The tensions reflect rising concern that breakneck growth averaging nearly 10 percent annually over 20 years has left China richer but also dirtier and, by the standards of the one-party state, politically volatile.
Corruption, pollution, land seizures and arbitrary fees and taxes are among the leading causes of a surge in social unrest. Riots have become a fixture of rural life in China — more than 200 "mass incidents of unrest" occurred each day in 2004, police statistics show — undermining the party's insistence on social stability.
Many Western and some Chinese experts have argued that these problems stem from China's authoritarian political system, and that they will not easily go away until people have a greater say in how they are governed. But the Communist Party and many left-leaning scholars reject that view. They say the ills are caused by capitalist excesses and rising inequality, which they say requires that the government reassert itself in economic affairs.
One measurement of inequality, the gap between the average incomes of urban and rural residents, has risen to about 3.3 to 1, according to the United Nations Development Program, higher than similar measures in the United States and one of the world's highest. A study by the party's Central Research Office estimates that the ratio could rise to 4 to 1 by 2020 if current trends continue, a level some Chinese economists say could incite wider social turmoil.
Such political fears seemed to give an opening to critics who felt economic policies had strayed too far toward capitalism. The strength of leftist opposition had faded throughout the 1990's after Deng Xiaoping, who called economic development "hard truth," and later Mr. Jiang tolerated little ideological discussion of the direction of changes.
Liu Guoguang, a Marxist economist and a former vice director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, stimulated an outpouring of opinions about inequality last summer when he gave a private talk that was transcribed and posted on the Internet. His talk supported the emphasis on growth and development but called for a much larger role for the government in managing economic affairs.
In a subsequent interview with Business Watch, a state-run magazine, Mr. Liu said, "If you establish a market economy in a place like China, where the rule of law is imperfect, if you do not emphasize the socialist spirit of fairness and social responsibility, then the market economy you establish is going to be an elitist market economy."
He has been joined by other scholars, including Mr. Gong, whose incendiary polemic on the property law prompted a succession of sympathetic essays and study sessions.
Also contributing to the response is the Hong Kong-based economist Lang Xianping, who has used a television show to pillory what he describes as raids on state assets by managers and foreign investors.
One top official who has come under scrutiny is Zhou Xiaochuan, the central bank governor and a promoter of market initiatives. Mr. Zhou attracted foreign investment to the financial sector, partly delinked China's currency from the United States dollar and steered the three biggest state-owned banks toward stock market listings overseas.
Mr. Zhou was attacked directly in a widely circulated Hong Kong newspaper article and indirectly by commentators in Beijing, who accuse financial officials of selling China's most valuable assets too cheaply.
Ji Baocheng, president of People's University in Beijing, criticized Mr. Zhou's banking changes in a public session of the legislature last week. He cited the big Hong Kong stock market listing of China Construction Bank, which was completed after the government injected billions of dollars to clean up its balance sheet.
Mr. Ji said the government priced shares in the bank too low, given the fresh infusion of capital, and he accused officials of "blindly sacrificing the interests of China and its people."
The government defends the overseas listings as a necessary step to raise capital, attract foreign experts to the boards and executive offices of the troubled banks and put the financial system on sounder footing.
Some pro-market economists, who seemed ascendant in the 1990's and early in this decade and now often sound defensive, have denounced the leftist revival as dangerous. Many also criticize the Hu-Wen administration for micromanaging investment and bank loans, tinkering with property and stock markets and declining to extend market-oriented policies to the countryside.
Zhou Ruijing, a retired newspaper editor associated with the pro-market camp, captured the sentiment in a January magazine essay.
"A widening gap between rich and poor is not the fault of market reforms," he wrote. "It's the natural result of them, which is neither good nor bad, but quite predictable."
Friday, August 28, 2009
13) Ascensao da China, 2 (Antonio Barros de Castro)
Apenas transpondo um artigo...
Enfrentando rupturas
Antonio Barros de Castro
Valor Econômico, 28/08/2009
Economia Mundial: Em algum momento, países e empresas terão de enfrentar o desafio de reposicionar-se em um novo mapa econômico e geopolítico
"A Ásia terá um papel de grande destaque , em que se fará o aproveitamento da natureza de forma mais amigável e mais criativa" (na foto, autopistas em Xangai)
O período em que vivemos é profundamente marcado pela ascensão da China, pela tomada de consciência de que a nave espacial Terra não comporta a universalização dos padrões modernos de consumo - fenômeno aparentemente em pleno curso, e que tem como símbolo a expansão contemporânea da economia chinesa - e pela crise financeira internacional.
A ascensão da China, historicamente, só tem paralelo na emergência dos Estados Unidos no fim do século XIX. A derrocada financeira recentemente verificada, por sua vez, só encontra paralelo na crise de 29. E a própria questão ecológica, nas dimensões que vem adquirindo, tampouco tem precedente.
Cada um desses megaeventos seria capaz, isoladamente, de induzir transformações substantivas nas mais diferentes economias. A combinação dos três, contudo, leva a uma verdadeira ruptura com o que conhecemos. O mundo que temos pela frente é outro, e os êxitos e fracassos na assimilação ou aproveitamento desses megaeventos dominarão por um bom período a evolução da economia mundial.
Atores internacionais como o Banco Mundial e o FMI tratarão, primordialmente, é de se presumir, de questões associadas à crise financeira. Já a ascensão da China, bem como certas manifestações e consequências da crise financeira internacional, introduzem questões que, por sua natureza e extrema diferenciação entre os países, devem ser enfrentadas e respondidas por políticas nacionais - e, claro, num outro plano, pelas empresas, em sua permanente busca da criação de valor, em contextos agora profundamente alterados.
O que acaba de ser dito põe em evidência o que genericamente podemos denominar de desafio do "reposicionamento", com que mais cedo ou mais tarde haverão de se defrontar, países e empresas. Há que reconhecer, de saída, que este é um tema vaga ou insuficientemente percebido e jamais sistematicamente discutido. Ele comporta extremos: há casos - os países bálticos e a Islândia seriam exemplos - levados à UTI pela crise financeira e que tiveram, a seguir, os seus aparelhos simplesmente desligados. A bem dizer, o esquema ao qual essas economias estavam se integrando inicialmente, aliás, com grande sucesso, não existe mais, e elas teriam de ser "reinventadas", vale dizer, profunda ou radicalmente reposicionadas. No extremo oposto existem economias, sobretudo na África, que emergiram do caos e da marginalidade para uma expansão vertiginosa e que têm chances de retomar um forte crescimento, após o tropeção por que acabam de passar. Muito dependerá, no caso, do desempenho da economia chinesa - vale dizer, do fôlego e intensidade do seu crescimento - e da capacidade possivelmente por elas construida de introduzir reposicionamentos, digamos, marginais, na sua trajetória evolutiva.
Alguns traços dominantes do mapa econômico e geopolítico que está se desenhando já podem ser percebidos.
No que toca à China, o desempenho nos próximos anos comporta duas visões antagônicas. Trata-se, para alguns, de uma economia em que o crescimento é puxado pelas exportações e, mais tipicamente, pelas compras americanas. Como os Estados Unidos se encontram, ao que tudo indica, condenados a reduzir substancialmente o seu déficit de transações correntes, os que compartilham essa visão vêm com ceticismo o prosseguimento do crescimento chinês. Discordam dessa interpretação os que vêm no dinamismo chinês uma versão atualizada - e acentuadamente peculiar ou diferenciada - do êxito histórico da Alemanha em fins do século XIX, do Japão e, contemporaneamente, da Coreia e da Irlanda, entre outras experiências de emparelhamento ("catching-up").
Em cada uma dessas experiências de industrialização retardatária foi montada uma máquina de crescer que rapidamente absorvia progresso técnico, permitindo ao país queimar etapas na absorção e difusão de novas tecnologias e formas de organização da produção. Vista nessa perspectiva, a função das exportações é, sim, de puxar a demanda, mas, também, e, decisivamente, de facultar o acesso a novas tecnologias. Este último objetivo pode, inclusive, tornar-se dominante, ali onde - como é o caso da China contemporânea - o esforço de investimento é particularmente intenso e o mercado doméstico é vasto e promissor. A razão entre investimento e crescimento na China, da ordem de quatro (40% do PIB de investimento, 10% de crescimento médio), sugere, aliás, numa primeira aproximação, uma considerável eficiência na absorção e domínio de novas técnicas, por parte das empresas e dos trabalhadores em geral. Como, além disso, o país conta com notável blindagem financeira (US 1,2 trilhão de reservas) e um sólido quadro macroeconômico, é bastante plausível supor que a máquina de crescer chinesa poderá prosseguir longamente em operação - beneficiando os mercados de matérias-primas e energia, e contribuindo para o crescimento dos fornecedoras desses produtos.
Voltêmo-nos momentaneamente para as economias desenvolvidas, a propósito das quais um verdadeiro consenso aponta no sentido de um difícil e modesto crescimento nos próximos anos. O problema com esse tipo de visão é que se atribui excessivo destaque às sequelas deixadas pelo endividamento (de empresas, famílias e, não raro, poderes públicos), uma vez iniciada a atual crise financeira. Há que ter em conta, além disso, que em diversos casos o crescimento pré-crise dependeu, em grande medida, das finanças e da construção civil - o Reino Unido e a Espanha são as referências óbvias. Em outras palavras, esse tipo de argumento deixa de lado o fato de que, para alcançar o crescimento sustentável, essas economias têm que fazer muito mais do que lamber as feridas deixadas pela crise do crédito. É preciso, minimamente, descobrir algo que entre no lugar dos setores ou segmentos que puxavam anteriormente o crescimento. Em outras palavras, além de (penosamente) liquidar as travas deixadas pelo elevado grau de endividamento, há que reposicionar-se, cavando espaços próprios, frente a mercados severamente disputados, seja no exterior, seja no âmbito doméstico. E entram aqui em cena o megaevento China e seus efeitos. Vejamos porquê.
Existem diferenças substanciais entre os países desenvolvidos, havendo casos em que a especialização na fase pré-crise se mostra, digamos, projetável. A Alemanha, por exemplo, exportava em massa equipamentos para a Ásia, e não tem porque abandonar essa fértil divisão internacional do trabalho. O que dizer, porém, daqueles países cujo crescimento dependeu, em boa medida, das finanças e da construção civil? É claro que, inicialmente pelo menos, seus problemas não provêm da China e sim do colapso financeiro contemporâneo. Na medida, contudo, em que essas economias não cresçam nos próximos anos, a superioridade tecnológica frente à China, ali onde porventura ainda exista, rapidamente desaparecerá - tornando mais estreitas ou limitadas as possibilidades de realocar recursos, visando renovar e ampliar a geração de valor. Mais que isso, podem vir a ser seriamente colocadas em questão estruturas e acordos internacionais que presentemente não apenas impedem que o câmbio reflita as dificuldades enfrentadas por essas economias, como dificultam o emprego de políticas públicas para apoiar seu reposicionamento.
O tamanho e a natureza das dificuldades que acabam de ser apontadas são intimidadores. Mas há que ter em conta que reposicionamentos abrangentes e profundos foram levados a efeito no passado pelos países que puseram exitosamente em marcha (houve certamente fracassos) o seu processo de "catching up". Há, aqui, que aproveitar, crítica e criativamente, possíveis lições da história. Além disso, é fundamental destacar que há países mais e menos aptos ou bem dotados para ingressar num mundo em que a implosão financeira deixou profundas marcas, em que a Ásia terá um papel de grande destaque, em que o aproveitamento da natureza será feito de forma mais amigável e, sobretudo - aqui, também - mais criativa.
Antonio Barros de Castro é professor emérito do Instituto de Economia da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), assessor da presidência do BNDES e organizador do seminário "Reposicionamentos Estratégicos, Políticas e Inovação em Tempos de Crise", que ocorre entre 1º e 3 de setembro na UFRJ
Enfrentando rupturas
Antonio Barros de Castro
Valor Econômico, 28/08/2009
Economia Mundial: Em algum momento, países e empresas terão de enfrentar o desafio de reposicionar-se em um novo mapa econômico e geopolítico
"A Ásia terá um papel de grande destaque , em que se fará o aproveitamento da natureza de forma mais amigável e mais criativa" (na foto, autopistas em Xangai)
O período em que vivemos é profundamente marcado pela ascensão da China, pela tomada de consciência de que a nave espacial Terra não comporta a universalização dos padrões modernos de consumo - fenômeno aparentemente em pleno curso, e que tem como símbolo a expansão contemporânea da economia chinesa - e pela crise financeira internacional.
A ascensão da China, historicamente, só tem paralelo na emergência dos Estados Unidos no fim do século XIX. A derrocada financeira recentemente verificada, por sua vez, só encontra paralelo na crise de 29. E a própria questão ecológica, nas dimensões que vem adquirindo, tampouco tem precedente.
Cada um desses megaeventos seria capaz, isoladamente, de induzir transformações substantivas nas mais diferentes economias. A combinação dos três, contudo, leva a uma verdadeira ruptura com o que conhecemos. O mundo que temos pela frente é outro, e os êxitos e fracassos na assimilação ou aproveitamento desses megaeventos dominarão por um bom período a evolução da economia mundial.
Atores internacionais como o Banco Mundial e o FMI tratarão, primordialmente, é de se presumir, de questões associadas à crise financeira. Já a ascensão da China, bem como certas manifestações e consequências da crise financeira internacional, introduzem questões que, por sua natureza e extrema diferenciação entre os países, devem ser enfrentadas e respondidas por políticas nacionais - e, claro, num outro plano, pelas empresas, em sua permanente busca da criação de valor, em contextos agora profundamente alterados.
O que acaba de ser dito põe em evidência o que genericamente podemos denominar de desafio do "reposicionamento", com que mais cedo ou mais tarde haverão de se defrontar, países e empresas. Há que reconhecer, de saída, que este é um tema vaga ou insuficientemente percebido e jamais sistematicamente discutido. Ele comporta extremos: há casos - os países bálticos e a Islândia seriam exemplos - levados à UTI pela crise financeira e que tiveram, a seguir, os seus aparelhos simplesmente desligados. A bem dizer, o esquema ao qual essas economias estavam se integrando inicialmente, aliás, com grande sucesso, não existe mais, e elas teriam de ser "reinventadas", vale dizer, profunda ou radicalmente reposicionadas. No extremo oposto existem economias, sobretudo na África, que emergiram do caos e da marginalidade para uma expansão vertiginosa e que têm chances de retomar um forte crescimento, após o tropeção por que acabam de passar. Muito dependerá, no caso, do desempenho da economia chinesa - vale dizer, do fôlego e intensidade do seu crescimento - e da capacidade possivelmente por elas construida de introduzir reposicionamentos, digamos, marginais, na sua trajetória evolutiva.
Alguns traços dominantes do mapa econômico e geopolítico que está se desenhando já podem ser percebidos.
No que toca à China, o desempenho nos próximos anos comporta duas visões antagônicas. Trata-se, para alguns, de uma economia em que o crescimento é puxado pelas exportações e, mais tipicamente, pelas compras americanas. Como os Estados Unidos se encontram, ao que tudo indica, condenados a reduzir substancialmente o seu déficit de transações correntes, os que compartilham essa visão vêm com ceticismo o prosseguimento do crescimento chinês. Discordam dessa interpretação os que vêm no dinamismo chinês uma versão atualizada - e acentuadamente peculiar ou diferenciada - do êxito histórico da Alemanha em fins do século XIX, do Japão e, contemporaneamente, da Coreia e da Irlanda, entre outras experiências de emparelhamento ("catching-up").
Em cada uma dessas experiências de industrialização retardatária foi montada uma máquina de crescer que rapidamente absorvia progresso técnico, permitindo ao país queimar etapas na absorção e difusão de novas tecnologias e formas de organização da produção. Vista nessa perspectiva, a função das exportações é, sim, de puxar a demanda, mas, também, e, decisivamente, de facultar o acesso a novas tecnologias. Este último objetivo pode, inclusive, tornar-se dominante, ali onde - como é o caso da China contemporânea - o esforço de investimento é particularmente intenso e o mercado doméstico é vasto e promissor. A razão entre investimento e crescimento na China, da ordem de quatro (40% do PIB de investimento, 10% de crescimento médio), sugere, aliás, numa primeira aproximação, uma considerável eficiência na absorção e domínio de novas técnicas, por parte das empresas e dos trabalhadores em geral. Como, além disso, o país conta com notável blindagem financeira (US 1,2 trilhão de reservas) e um sólido quadro macroeconômico, é bastante plausível supor que a máquina de crescer chinesa poderá prosseguir longamente em operação - beneficiando os mercados de matérias-primas e energia, e contribuindo para o crescimento dos fornecedoras desses produtos.
Voltêmo-nos momentaneamente para as economias desenvolvidas, a propósito das quais um verdadeiro consenso aponta no sentido de um difícil e modesto crescimento nos próximos anos. O problema com esse tipo de visão é que se atribui excessivo destaque às sequelas deixadas pelo endividamento (de empresas, famílias e, não raro, poderes públicos), uma vez iniciada a atual crise financeira. Há que ter em conta, além disso, que em diversos casos o crescimento pré-crise dependeu, em grande medida, das finanças e da construção civil - o Reino Unido e a Espanha são as referências óbvias. Em outras palavras, esse tipo de argumento deixa de lado o fato de que, para alcançar o crescimento sustentável, essas economias têm que fazer muito mais do que lamber as feridas deixadas pela crise do crédito. É preciso, minimamente, descobrir algo que entre no lugar dos setores ou segmentos que puxavam anteriormente o crescimento. Em outras palavras, além de (penosamente) liquidar as travas deixadas pelo elevado grau de endividamento, há que reposicionar-se, cavando espaços próprios, frente a mercados severamente disputados, seja no exterior, seja no âmbito doméstico. E entram aqui em cena o megaevento China e seus efeitos. Vejamos porquê.
Existem diferenças substanciais entre os países desenvolvidos, havendo casos em que a especialização na fase pré-crise se mostra, digamos, projetável. A Alemanha, por exemplo, exportava em massa equipamentos para a Ásia, e não tem porque abandonar essa fértil divisão internacional do trabalho. O que dizer, porém, daqueles países cujo crescimento dependeu, em boa medida, das finanças e da construção civil? É claro que, inicialmente pelo menos, seus problemas não provêm da China e sim do colapso financeiro contemporâneo. Na medida, contudo, em que essas economias não cresçam nos próximos anos, a superioridade tecnológica frente à China, ali onde porventura ainda exista, rapidamente desaparecerá - tornando mais estreitas ou limitadas as possibilidades de realocar recursos, visando renovar e ampliar a geração de valor. Mais que isso, podem vir a ser seriamente colocadas em questão estruturas e acordos internacionais que presentemente não apenas impedem que o câmbio reflita as dificuldades enfrentadas por essas economias, como dificultam o emprego de políticas públicas para apoiar seu reposicionamento.
O tamanho e a natureza das dificuldades que acabam de ser apontadas são intimidadores. Mas há que ter em conta que reposicionamentos abrangentes e profundos foram levados a efeito no passado pelos países que puseram exitosamente em marcha (houve certamente fracassos) o seu processo de "catching up". Há, aqui, que aproveitar, crítica e criativamente, possíveis lições da história. Além disso, é fundamental destacar que há países mais e menos aptos ou bem dotados para ingressar num mundo em que a implosão financeira deixou profundas marcas, em que a Ásia terá um papel de grande destaque, em que o aproveitamento da natureza será feito de forma mais amigável e, sobretudo - aqui, também - mais criativa.
Antonio Barros de Castro é professor emérito do Instituto de Economia da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), assessor da presidência do BNDES e organizador do seminário "Reposicionamentos Estratégicos, Políticas e Inovação em Tempos de Crise", que ocorre entre 1º e 3 de setembro na UFRJ
12) Ascensao da China, 1 (PRA)
Apenas reflexões livres...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
A China demorou dois ou três séculos para decair de verdade, e foi, de fato, uma decadência espetacular: espezinhada, humilhada, esquartejada pelas potências ocidentais, ela ainda foi invadida, violada, mutilada e ensanguentada pelo Império japonês, em sua fase militarista-fascista (e ele ainda não se redimiu por isso).
Agora, ou desde duas décadas aproximadamente, a China está numa lenta, mas segura ascensao, que tende a se acelerar, mas que vai continuar pelas próximas décadas, talvez um século e meio (depois disso é difícil prever), um processo que a converterá em um país, digamos, "normal", ou seja, com uma economia de mercado atingindo o grosso da sua população e sistemas razoáveis de administração econômica, social e, sobretudo, política (sim, esperamos que ela se converta em uma democracia, num futuro não muito distante).
Mais difícil vai ser fazê-la ostentar um nível de renda similar ao dos EUA, por exemplo, algo que alguns julgam difícil, outros impossível ou indesejado.
Difícil, porque depende de incorporar mais 800 ou 900 milhões de chineses a padrões de vida médios (digamos, 20 mil dólares de hoje, o que pode querer dizer 50 ou 60 mil em 30 anos). Não acredito que a China atinja a renda per capita dos EUA antes de 100 ou 120 anos, pelo menos, talvez um pouco mais.
Mas, isso pode ser impossível ou indesejável, segundo alguns economistas e outros ecologistas alarmistas. Dizem que se os chineses tivessem um padrão de vida estilo americano (ou seja, com o dispêndio médio de um americano em energia e bens de consumo), isso significaria que o planeta Terra estaria sendo ocupado por 75 bilhões de pessoas, o que parece uma rematada loucura.
Em termos estritamente demográficos, a população da Terra pode alcançar ainda perto de 9 bilhões de pessoas (em torno de 2040, talvez), para declinar, depois.
Resta saber como acomodar todo esse povo.
Mas, pessoalmente estou convencido de que, graças a seu desenvolvimento tecnológico, e a própria pressão que ela já coloca sobre os recursos naturais, a China será parte da solução, e não parte do problema.
Talvez eu esteja sendo otimista, mas é o que penso...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
A China demorou dois ou três séculos para decair de verdade, e foi, de fato, uma decadência espetacular: espezinhada, humilhada, esquartejada pelas potências ocidentais, ela ainda foi invadida, violada, mutilada e ensanguentada pelo Império japonês, em sua fase militarista-fascista (e ele ainda não se redimiu por isso).
Agora, ou desde duas décadas aproximadamente, a China está numa lenta, mas segura ascensao, que tende a se acelerar, mas que vai continuar pelas próximas décadas, talvez um século e meio (depois disso é difícil prever), um processo que a converterá em um país, digamos, "normal", ou seja, com uma economia de mercado atingindo o grosso da sua população e sistemas razoáveis de administração econômica, social e, sobretudo, política (sim, esperamos que ela se converta em uma democracia, num futuro não muito distante).
Mais difícil vai ser fazê-la ostentar um nível de renda similar ao dos EUA, por exemplo, algo que alguns julgam difícil, outros impossível ou indesejado.
Difícil, porque depende de incorporar mais 800 ou 900 milhões de chineses a padrões de vida médios (digamos, 20 mil dólares de hoje, o que pode querer dizer 50 ou 60 mil em 30 anos). Não acredito que a China atinja a renda per capita dos EUA antes de 100 ou 120 anos, pelo menos, talvez um pouco mais.
Mas, isso pode ser impossível ou indesejável, segundo alguns economistas e outros ecologistas alarmistas. Dizem que se os chineses tivessem um padrão de vida estilo americano (ou seja, com o dispêndio médio de um americano em energia e bens de consumo), isso significaria que o planeta Terra estaria sendo ocupado por 75 bilhões de pessoas, o que parece uma rematada loucura.
Em termos estritamente demográficos, a população da Terra pode alcançar ainda perto de 9 bilhões de pessoas (em torno de 2040, talvez), para declinar, depois.
Resta saber como acomodar todo esse povo.
Mas, pessoalmente estou convencido de que, graças a seu desenvolvimento tecnológico, e a própria pressão que ela já coloca sobre os recursos naturais, a China será parte da solução, e não parte do problema.
Talvez eu esteja sendo otimista, mas é o que penso...
Thursday, August 20, 2009
11) Seminário sobre Combate a Pobreza na China e no Brasil
Seminário Internacional
China-Brasil: Compartilhando Experiências em Proteção Social
O Centro Internacional de Políticas para o Crescimento Inclusivo (IPC-IG) tem o prazer de convidar Vossa Senhoria para o Seminário Internacional “China-Brasil: Compartilhando Experiências em Proteção Social”, que tomará lugar no dia 24 de agosto em Brasília.
Programação
Recepção aos delegados chineses
Pronunciamentos de abertura
Sr. Ministro-Conselheiro Zhu Qingqiao, Encarregado de Negócios Interino da Embaixada da República Popular da China no Brasil
Sra. Rita Bered de Curtis, Divisão de Temas Sociais do Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE)
Sra. Secretária Eliana Pedrosa, Secretária de Estado de Desenvolvimento Social e Transferência de Renda do Governo do Distrito Federal
Representante do Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (MDS)
Sr. Cui Guozhu, Diretor da Delegação Chinesa
Sr. Mário Lisboa Theodoro, Diretor de Cooperação e Desenvolvimento do Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea)
Sr. Degol Hailu, Diretor a.i. do IPC-IG
Sra. Maristela Baioni, Representante-Residente Assistente do Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento em Brasília
Painéis e debate
Coordenação: Sra. Melissa Andrade, Coordenadora da Unidade Aprendizado Sul-Sul do IPC-IG
Políticas e Iniciativas da Estratégica Chinesa de Redução da Pobreza a partir do Desenvolvimento Rural
Sr. Cui Guozhu, Diretor do Escritório para o Alívio da Pobreza e Desenvolvimento da Região Autônoma da Mongólia Interior, República Popular da China
O Sistema de Proteção Social da China e a Redução da Pobreza
Sr. Liu Qiu, Secretário-Geral Adjunto do Governo Popular da Província de Anhui; Diretor do Escritório para o Alívio da Pobreza e Desenvolvimento da Província de Anhui
Painel III
11:40 - 12:00
Debate
12:00 – 12:30
Proteção Social no Brasil
Sr. Jorge Abrahão, Diretor de Estudos Sociais do Ipea
Diálogo China-Brasil em Proteção Social e Redução da Pobreza
Debate com a participação dos delegados chineses, convidados e participantes.
Contextualização
O Seminário Internacional corresponde à abertura da Missão de Estudos “China - Brasil: Ampliando a Agenda de Cooperação em Proteção Social", que está sendo organizada pelo IPC-IG em parceria com o IPRCC e será realizada entre os dias 24 e 26 de agosto em Brasília. Contando com a participação de representantes do alto escalão do Governo da República Popular da China e de instituições de pesquisa do país, a Missão de Estudos
busca promover o intercâmbio de conhecimento e melhores práticas em proteção social. Representa um importante passo para a troca de experiências entre os dois países na área social, diante de um contexto de crescentes laços nas áreas econômica e política. Os eventos estão inseridos no âmbito do Memorando de Entendimento assinado entre o IPC-IG e o IPRCCC, o qual designa 2009 como o Ano da Proteção Social.
Confira a agenda completa da Missão de Estudos no site: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pressroom/2009-08/6.pdf
Delegação chinesa
Sr. Cui Guozhu, Diretor da Delegação
Sr. Liu Junwen, Secretário-Geral da Delegação; Diretor-Geral Adjunto do Escritório para o Alívio da Pobreza e Desenvolvimento do Conselho do Estado da República Popular da China
Sr. Liu Qi, Secretário-Geral Adjunto do Governo Popular da Província de Anhui; Diretor do Escritório para o Alívio da Pobreza e Desenvolvimento da Província de Anhui
Sr. Jiang Wenbin, Diretor Geral do Escritório para o Alívio da Pobreza e Desenvolvimento da Província de Heilongjiang
Sr. Zhang Huidong, Representante do Centro Internacional de Redução da Pobreza na China (IPRCC)
Sr. Sun Lei, Representante do Centro Internacional de Economia & Intercâmbios Técnicos do Ministério do Comércio, República Popular da China
China-Brasil: Compartilhando Experiências em Proteção Social
O Centro Internacional de Políticas para o Crescimento Inclusivo (IPC-IG) tem o prazer de convidar Vossa Senhoria para o Seminário Internacional “China-Brasil: Compartilhando Experiências em Proteção Social”, que tomará lugar no dia 24 de agosto em Brasília.
Programação
Recepção aos delegados chineses
Pronunciamentos de abertura
Sr. Ministro-Conselheiro Zhu Qingqiao, Encarregado de Negócios Interino da Embaixada da República Popular da China no Brasil
Sra. Rita Bered de Curtis, Divisão de Temas Sociais do Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE)
Sra. Secretária Eliana Pedrosa, Secretária de Estado de Desenvolvimento Social e Transferência de Renda do Governo do Distrito Federal
Representante do Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (MDS)
Sr. Cui Guozhu, Diretor da Delegação Chinesa
Sr. Mário Lisboa Theodoro, Diretor de Cooperação e Desenvolvimento do Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea)
Sr. Degol Hailu, Diretor a.i. do IPC-IG
Sra. Maristela Baioni, Representante-Residente Assistente do Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento em Brasília
Painéis e debate
Coordenação: Sra. Melissa Andrade, Coordenadora da Unidade Aprendizado Sul-Sul do IPC-IG
Políticas e Iniciativas da Estratégica Chinesa de Redução da Pobreza a partir do Desenvolvimento Rural
Sr. Cui Guozhu, Diretor do Escritório para o Alívio da Pobreza e Desenvolvimento da Região Autônoma da Mongólia Interior, República Popular da China
O Sistema de Proteção Social da China e a Redução da Pobreza
Sr. Liu Qiu, Secretário-Geral Adjunto do Governo Popular da Província de Anhui; Diretor do Escritório para o Alívio da Pobreza e Desenvolvimento da Província de Anhui
Painel III
11:40 - 12:00
Debate
12:00 – 12:30
Proteção Social no Brasil
Sr. Jorge Abrahão, Diretor de Estudos Sociais do Ipea
Diálogo China-Brasil em Proteção Social e Redução da Pobreza
Debate com a participação dos delegados chineses, convidados e participantes.
Contextualização
O Seminário Internacional corresponde à abertura da Missão de Estudos “China - Brasil: Ampliando a Agenda de Cooperação em Proteção Social", que está sendo organizada pelo IPC-IG em parceria com o IPRCC e será realizada entre os dias 24 e 26 de agosto em Brasília. Contando com a participação de representantes do alto escalão do Governo da República Popular da China e de instituições de pesquisa do país, a Missão de Estudos
busca promover o intercâmbio de conhecimento e melhores práticas em proteção social. Representa um importante passo para a troca de experiências entre os dois países na área social, diante de um contexto de crescentes laços nas áreas econômica e política. Os eventos estão inseridos no âmbito do Memorando de Entendimento assinado entre o IPC-IG e o IPRCCC, o qual designa 2009 como o Ano da Proteção Social.
Confira a agenda completa da Missão de Estudos no site: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pressroom/2009-08/6.pdf
Delegação chinesa
Sr. Cui Guozhu, Diretor da Delegação
Sr. Liu Junwen, Secretário-Geral da Delegação; Diretor-Geral Adjunto do Escritório para o Alívio da Pobreza e Desenvolvimento do Conselho do Estado da República Popular da China
Sr. Liu Qi, Secretário-Geral Adjunto do Governo Popular da Província de Anhui; Diretor do Escritório para o Alívio da Pobreza e Desenvolvimento da Província de Anhui
Sr. Jiang Wenbin, Diretor Geral do Escritório para o Alívio da Pobreza e Desenvolvimento da Província de Heilongjiang
Sr. Zhang Huidong, Representante do Centro Internacional de Redução da Pobreza na China (IPRCC)
Sr. Sun Lei, Representante do Centro Internacional de Economia & Intercâmbios Técnicos do Ministério do Comércio, República Popular da China
Sunday, August 16, 2009
10) Relacoes estrategicas EUA-China
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Over 50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation
www.fpri.org
PROLONGING EAST ASIA'S SURPRISING PEACE-CAN IT BE MANAGED?
by Avery Goldstein
August 14, 2009
Avery Goldstein is a Senior Fellow at FPRI and David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.
For related essays, visit:
http://www.fpri.org/bysubject.html#asia
PROLONGING EAST ASIA'S SURPRISING PEACE-CAN IT BE MANAGED?
by Avery Goldstein
News of the first Strategic and Economic Dialogue held between the U.S. and China dominated headlines last month. The Dialogue was focused on "addressing the challenges and opportunities that both countries face on a wide range of bilateral, regional and global areas of immediate and long-term strategic and economic interests," according to the U.S. Treasury website. Putting this Dialogue in perspective may prove helpful, as it builds on more than a decade of mainly constructive Sino-American relations and peace in East Asia.
Over the past fifteen years, prudent choices by leaders in Washington and Beijing have prevented inevitable disagreements and conflicts from undermining regional stability. East Asia's surprising post-Cold War peace,
defying the pessimistic predictions many offered in the early 1990s, has prevailed in large part due to the statesmanship exhibited by Chinese Presidents Jiang and Hu and American Presidents Clinton and Bush. But leaders in
both countries continue to face formidable challenges that will try their ability to manage bilateral relations as China rises within a fluid regional and international order.
The list of substantive issues that pose challenges for Washington and Beijing is by now familiar, and includes policy disagreements about currency, Taiwan, human rights, Darfur, North Korea, and the global environment. In addition, however, contemporary Sino-American ties face strains that reflect underlying, perhaps more vexing, challenges. Three challenges, in particular, are likely to
persist for the foreseeable future. How well Chinese and American leaders cope with them will go a long way to determining whether the recent era of East Asian peace endures.
Transparency and the "Security Dilemma"
Experts often note the lack of any international authority above states to enforce pledges they might make to reassure one another. This condition of anarchy creates uncertainty about the future that drives a pattern of action and reaction known as "the security dilemma." Such uncertainty about the implications of China's military modernization has already had this predicted effect and, in response, led to
calls for greater transparency to clarify a rising China's intentions. Though it might mitigate the intensity of this security dilemma, however, increased transparency would not eliminate the underlying challenge it poses for U.S.-China
relations and East Asian stability in the 21st century.
Greater transparency would clarify the increasingly diverse and sophisticated military forces China is deploying; however, it would not eliminate the uncertainty that drives debates about how China might use these forces. Weapons
characteristics, after all, rarely limit their uses to only defensive or offensive purposes. Even if the weapons deployed today were believed to reflect China's repeatedly professed defensive intentions, a change in international circumstances or domestic preferences could prompt Beijing's current leaders, or their successors, to redefine their goals, rethink the uses for existing forces, or deploy
different forces. Nor can this troubling possibility be eliminated by crafting international agreements designed to boost confidence in assessments of intentions that greater transparency might suggest. Because there is no reliable mechanism for enforcing such agreements, even states that bind themselves to reassuring commitments today will have the option of behaving as they see fit tomorrow. Simply put, transparency cannot eliminate worries whose source is not a shortage of information but rather uncertainty about the future that is inherent in the anarchic realm of international politics.
Nevertheless, this readily understood limit on the value of increased transparency does not negate the benefits it can provide. In at least two related ways, greater transparency can help lessen the severity of the security dilemma. First, it can reduce the incentives for adversaries to rely on worst-case estimates which may seem only prudent when lacking good information about a potential rival's
capabilities. The consequences of underestimating a prospective foe's strength are likely to appear more dire than the consequences of overestimation. Overestimation, however, feeds a cycle of action and reaction that drives
arms races. Leaders may anticipate that the result of this kind of competitive arms buildup driven by worst-case hedging will ultimately fail to enhance, or may even undermine, their country's security. If so, they could argue for self-restraint. But that argument will rest on assertions about the strategic interdependence of choices a state and its adversary will make in future years, a stance likely to be a tough sell in policy debates when it confronts the more straightforward argument that it is "better to be safe than sorry." Increased transparency alone won't guarantee that proponents of restraint carry the
day. However, it can provide information that reduces the likelihood that unrealistically exaggerated worst-case estimates of a rival's capabilities will drive an intense arms competition.
Second, greater transparency, especially when reinforced by verifiable international agreements, can establish baselines and expectations about future capabilities and behavior that reduces the risk of overreacting to a rival's new military
deployments and actions. Without this information, surprise at the discovery that a prospective adversary has more, better, or more forward deployed weapons than previously known or expected often adds a subjective fillip of alarm to
assessments about the rival's capabilities and intentions that aggravates the security dilemma.
Where do leaders in Beijing and Washington come down on the matter of transparency? The United States demands greater transparency, arguing it is essential to alleviate suspicions about what the Chinese are up to. But, as noted, even if transparency increases, it will not decisively deflate the anxiety reflected in variations of the questions that former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked about China's military modernization: "Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases? Why these continuing robust deployments?" China's position on
transparency is quite different. While making modest nods to clarification in its recent defense white papers, China resists revealing information that it believes would add enhanced intelligence to the substantial military advantages the United States enjoys. Because China must rely on clever tactics and strategies to offset U.S. military superiority, it already worries about U.S. reconnaissance technologies
and forward based intelligence assets that monitor PLA capabilities. Consequently, it sometimes takes risky actions to signal unhappiness about U.S. naval and air forces gathering information close to the Chinese homeland. In short, China values opacity over transparency. Opacity complicates U.S. contingency planning; and China does not need increased transparency to clearly discern the superiority of American forces it would engage.
These contrasting Chinese and American perspectives seem irreconcilable. Leaders in Beijing and Washington could, however, recast their discussions about transparency by focusing on the mutual benefits available to both countries through reducing the intensity of a security dilemma that threatens to cast a pall over East Asia. The starting point is recognizing that the United States overstates and China understates the real payoffs from increased transparency. U.S. rhetoric exaggerates the benefits when it suggests that transparency can somehow eliminate suspicions about China's intentions. China, in contrast,
underestimates the benefits of transparency and the costs it pays for continued opacity-especially the nervous reaction by the United States and others who harbor Rumsfeld's concerns. Leaders in both countries who articulate more measured views about transparency's benefits will be better positioned to explain how it enhances national interests by reducing the likelihood of unintended provocation. They will also be in a stronger position to respond to domestic
critics who otherwise can seize upon high levels of uncertainty to demand the greater military investment justified by worst-case planning.
China's Rise and America's Preponderance
Current economic difficulties in the United States, rapid development by China over the last three decades, and limits to U.S. military power revealed in Iraq and Afghanistan, feed speculation about possible future U.S. decline. The reality of the early 21st century, however, is that unipolarity-especially U.S. military preponderance-endures. Yet the expectation that China's rise could eventually herald the end of unipolarity poses another long-term challenge to leaders in Beijing and Washington. So far, their responses provide reason for both hope and concern about continued peace in East Asia.
In two broadly different ways, Beijing has been hedging against the possibility that the United States might try to jeopardize China's vital interests or frustrate its desire to play a larger regional and international role. On the one hand, American preponderance has led an "outgunned" China to invest in military capabilities that serve asymmetric strategies. Thus, Beijing invests in modernizing
a still small, and vulnerable, nuclear arsenal that poses a risk of unacceptable punishment for any prospective adversary endangering China's vital interests. Beijing also continues with its selective development, testing, and deployment of advanced nonnuclear weapons that complicate U.S. planning for contingencies in which it might confront China, and increase the costs that the superior U.S.
military would pay even in conflicts that China would be likely to lose. Such responses to the unfavorable military reality Beijing faces in a world where the United States remains the sole superpower may reflect nothing more than prudent planning by a cautious and conservative regime. Nevertheless, because others, even if only out of prudence, question what such steps might portend about Beijing's future intentions, their predictable effect is to deepen concerns about a more powerful China. As noted above, leaders can try to manage, but cannot fully eliminate these concerns.
On the other hand, the daunting challenge of coping with remarkably robust American preponderance has also induced Beijing to embrace proactive diplomacy as a way to reduce the likelihood that a concerned United States and its allies might act to isolate or contain China. China tries to encourage them instead to recognize the advantages of partnering with China, despite uncertainty about the future.
The enticement of trade and investment opportunities in China, Beijing's cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, help in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem, and joint efforts to address global environmental, public health, and economic concerns are some of the familiar ways in which China has sought to build a favorable international environment for its continued "peaceful development," as it rises in the shadow of a dominant United States. Beijing acts out of self-interest, to be sure, but its diplomacy benefits others as well. Indeed, China's approach since the late 1990s has been largely consistent
with the U.S. interest, as articulated by Robert Zoellick, that China become a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system.
However, Beijing's new diplomacy is only one facet of a rising China's response to American preponderance, and the prospects for its continuation are far from assured. On the contrary, it is easy to see pitfalls ahead. It is unlikely that Beijing will sustain its commitment to act in the ways expected of a responsible stakeholder on the world stage if it becomes clear that doing so means indefinitely accepting the lesser stake it presently holds, one that entails deference to U.S. leadership of the regional and international order. As important, it is unclear that that the United States will be prepared to satisfy China's
aspirations for significantly greater influence if that entails a reduction in America's dominant position.
A smooth transition to a world in which a more powerful China wields greater influence will require the United States (and others) to embrace new and unfamiliar roles. Such an adjustment is conceivable. After all, it has
happened before. The process was managed rather smoothly when Britain gradually yielded its leading role to the United States in the first half of the twentieth century.
In that case, however, shared political values and culture, a clear recognition of the emerging asymmetry in the two countries' capabilities, and a common interest in coping with dangerous common adversaries (first Germany, then the Soviet Union) facilitated Anglo-American cooperation. In the Sino-American case, there are differences in political values and culture, uncertainty about the future balance of
capabilities, and no compelling common threat requiring close cooperation. Consequently, without creative thinking, dedication, and flexibility from leaders on both sides of the Pacific, it is hard to imagine a smooth adjustment to the greater international role China will expect to play. Hard work may make it possible to discover solutions that satisfy both Beijing's and Washington's interests. Even with such hard work, however, the process of adjustment undoubtedly will be difficult.
Domestic Political Constraints
A rising China's foreign policy is being shaped not just by the anarchic, unipolar international system in which it operates, but also by domestic political constraints. Among these, one of the most consequential facing leaders in Beijing is the deep-seated nationalism that has taken root in contemporary China. Popular expectations that an increasingly powerful China should be able to more effectively defend its interests contribute to heightened
sensitivity about other countries' statements and actions that can be construed as an affront to nationalist sensibilities. Leaders in Beijing have, as a result, found themselves constrained by domestic political considerations
in ways that one might have thought irrelevant for an authoritarian regime. These constraints can make it difficult to strike the compromises necessary if diplomacy is to serve as a buffer against military conflict. Where
contemporary challenges are intermingled with the legacies of an earlier era when a weak China was unable to defend its sovereignty, attempts at pragmatism are complicated by the need to satisfy nationalist expectations. Although China's communist leaders are not accountable to a democratic electorate, insensitivity to nationalist sentiment, some of which has been nurtured by the regime's educational and propaganda organs, risks disruptive popular protests as well
as challenges from like-minded elements in the civilian and military elite.
The constraints that resurgent nationalism places on China's foreign policy have been most clearly evident in relations with Japan. But the challenges that these passions present for policymakers in Beijing have also played an increasingly important role in the management of U.S.-China relations after the Cold War. A mostly stable era of bilateral ties has been periodically punctuated by tense confrontations.
Resolution, in these cases, has been complicated by popular Chinese outrage about alleged affronts to the country's sovereignty, interests, or pride. Although the specifics in each episode have varied (the rejection of China's bid to host the 2000 Olympics, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the EP-3 spyplane incident, criticism of China's handling of ethnic tensions and violence in Tibet
and Xinjiang), the general theme among China's loudest nationalist voices has remained constant. They call on Beijing to stand up to Washington, whose words and actions allegedly reveal an insensitivity to the country's sovereign rights and territorial integrity, not to mention "the feelings of the Chinese people." The advent of a less centrally controlled, if still not free, Chinese media
combined with the variety of information sources and outlets for the masses to express their views that the internet provides, have magnified the political pressure confronting China's leaders when they must respond to foreign policy
challenges that capture a more attentive public's eye. And because the regime has typically been more thorough in censoring the expression of views that question China's international claims and interests, the sample of popular
expression that emerges during these episodes is typically skewed. This selection effect reinforces the perception of support for strongly nationalist foreign policy positions which can, of course, provide the regime with a pretext for digging in its heels when it wants to stand firm. But it also limits flexibility when Beijing prefers to defuse such confrontations before they undermine its overriding interest
in a sound working relationship with Washington that is required to preserve the stable international setting essential for China's continued rise.
Can leaders in Beijing and Washington limit the risks that follow from the consequences of resurgent Chinese nationalism? Meeting this challenge will be especially tough not only because of the constraints China's leaders face, but also because it is unrealistic to expect American leaders to give priority to making life easier for the rulers in Beijing. American leaders conduct foreign policy to serve U.S. interests and face their own domestic political constraints. Public opinion and the voice given to it through Congress and the mass media require American leaders, no less than their Chinese counterparts, to be responsive to popular pressures. Perhaps even more than other challenges, then, surging Chinese nationalism is not a problem that can be solved, but rather a vexing challenge that can only be managed more or less effectively to minimize its explosive dangers. However unsatisfying, leaders in Beijing and Washington can probably do no better than to commit themselves to refrain from stoking nationalist passions and to recognize that neither side can fully control their effects.
Realistic Optimism
Will Chinese and U.S. leaders be able to prolong what has been a surprising era of peace in East Asia after the Cold War by continuing to successfully cope with the consequences of the three broad challenges described above? Given their intractability, pessimistic scenarios are certainly not hard to envision. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that tempered optimism is more than wishful thinking or naiveté.
For the foreseeable f uture, China's leaders will have their hands full dealing with major domestic problems. These include the need to ensure a brisk pace of economic growth while reducing stark inequalities in income, improving
environmental protection, and providing adequate health, education, and welfare services for an aging population. Moreover, it must do this while preserving stability in an anachronistic one-party political system that governs an increasingly complex society with many competing interests. These daunting domestic challenges will continue to impose a burden on Beijing that limits its ability to swiftly translate even impressive economic growth into the military
power that would enable China to play a more disruptive international role. A much more assertive foreign policy would require investing in military capabilities and paying opportunity costs in terms of economic development that would jeopardize the political viability of a Chinese regime that has struggled for decades to get its own house in order. That does not preclude Beijing from making such a dangerously foolish choice. China wouldn't be the first country to do so. The Soviet Union provides a dramatic example of a regime that underappreciated the need to face up to the "guns vs. butter" tradeoff. However, the clarity of the tradeoffs for China (and the lessons that leaders in Beijing have drawn from the Soviet failure) do argue against expecting that it is likely, let alone inevitable, that they will opt for a recklessly aggressive and self-defeating
foreign policy.
It is far more plausible, then, that Beijing's leaders will continue their pursuit of a gradually expanded international role. And as they do, relations with the United States will continue to be characterized by a mix of conflict and cooperation conditioned by the challenges described above. It is unlikely that Chinese and U.S. leaders will be able to eliminate these deeply rooted, chronic sources of friction.
That is almost certainly an unrealistic goal. But it is also unnecessary for prolonging the era of peace in East Asia. Instead, the standard for success should be whether Chinese and U.S. leaders can extend their so far impressive record of discovering satisfactory ways to manage the enduring challenges to bilateral relations so that they do not decisively undermine cooperation and exacerbate conflict. Continuing to manage challenges that defy resolution would be an impressive achievement-the handiwork of statesmen who recognize that the best need not be the enemy of the good.
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Over 50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation
www.fpri.org
PROLONGING EAST ASIA'S SURPRISING PEACE-CAN IT BE MANAGED?
by Avery Goldstein
August 14, 2009
Avery Goldstein is a Senior Fellow at FPRI and David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.
For related essays, visit:
http://www.fpri.org/bysubject.html#asia
PROLONGING EAST ASIA'S SURPRISING PEACE-CAN IT BE MANAGED?
by Avery Goldstein
News of the first Strategic and Economic Dialogue held between the U.S. and China dominated headlines last month. The Dialogue was focused on "addressing the challenges and opportunities that both countries face on a wide range of bilateral, regional and global areas of immediate and long-term strategic and economic interests," according to the U.S. Treasury website. Putting this Dialogue in perspective may prove helpful, as it builds on more than a decade of mainly constructive Sino-American relations and peace in East Asia.
Over the past fifteen years, prudent choices by leaders in Washington and Beijing have prevented inevitable disagreements and conflicts from undermining regional stability. East Asia's surprising post-Cold War peace,
defying the pessimistic predictions many offered in the early 1990s, has prevailed in large part due to the statesmanship exhibited by Chinese Presidents Jiang and Hu and American Presidents Clinton and Bush. But leaders in
both countries continue to face formidable challenges that will try their ability to manage bilateral relations as China rises within a fluid regional and international order.
The list of substantive issues that pose challenges for Washington and Beijing is by now familiar, and includes policy disagreements about currency, Taiwan, human rights, Darfur, North Korea, and the global environment. In addition, however, contemporary Sino-American ties face strains that reflect underlying, perhaps more vexing, challenges. Three challenges, in particular, are likely to
persist for the foreseeable future. How well Chinese and American leaders cope with them will go a long way to determining whether the recent era of East Asian peace endures.
Transparency and the "Security Dilemma"
Experts often note the lack of any international authority above states to enforce pledges they might make to reassure one another. This condition of anarchy creates uncertainty about the future that drives a pattern of action and reaction known as "the security dilemma." Such uncertainty about the implications of China's military modernization has already had this predicted effect and, in response, led to
calls for greater transparency to clarify a rising China's intentions. Though it might mitigate the intensity of this security dilemma, however, increased transparency would not eliminate the underlying challenge it poses for U.S.-China
relations and East Asian stability in the 21st century.
Greater transparency would clarify the increasingly diverse and sophisticated military forces China is deploying; however, it would not eliminate the uncertainty that drives debates about how China might use these forces. Weapons
characteristics, after all, rarely limit their uses to only defensive or offensive purposes. Even if the weapons deployed today were believed to reflect China's repeatedly professed defensive intentions, a change in international circumstances or domestic preferences could prompt Beijing's current leaders, or their successors, to redefine their goals, rethink the uses for existing forces, or deploy
different forces. Nor can this troubling possibility be eliminated by crafting international agreements designed to boost confidence in assessments of intentions that greater transparency might suggest. Because there is no reliable mechanism for enforcing such agreements, even states that bind themselves to reassuring commitments today will have the option of behaving as they see fit tomorrow. Simply put, transparency cannot eliminate worries whose source is not a shortage of information but rather uncertainty about the future that is inherent in the anarchic realm of international politics.
Nevertheless, this readily understood limit on the value of increased transparency does not negate the benefits it can provide. In at least two related ways, greater transparency can help lessen the severity of the security dilemma. First, it can reduce the incentives for adversaries to rely on worst-case estimates which may seem only prudent when lacking good information about a potential rival's
capabilities. The consequences of underestimating a prospective foe's strength are likely to appear more dire than the consequences of overestimation. Overestimation, however, feeds a cycle of action and reaction that drives
arms races. Leaders may anticipate that the result of this kind of competitive arms buildup driven by worst-case hedging will ultimately fail to enhance, or may even undermine, their country's security. If so, they could argue for self-restraint. But that argument will rest on assertions about the strategic interdependence of choices a state and its adversary will make in future years, a stance likely to be a tough sell in policy debates when it confronts the more straightforward argument that it is "better to be safe than sorry." Increased transparency alone won't guarantee that proponents of restraint carry the
day. However, it can provide information that reduces the likelihood that unrealistically exaggerated worst-case estimates of a rival's capabilities will drive an intense arms competition.
Second, greater transparency, especially when reinforced by verifiable international agreements, can establish baselines and expectations about future capabilities and behavior that reduces the risk of overreacting to a rival's new military
deployments and actions. Without this information, surprise at the discovery that a prospective adversary has more, better, or more forward deployed weapons than previously known or expected often adds a subjective fillip of alarm to
assessments about the rival's capabilities and intentions that aggravates the security dilemma.
Where do leaders in Beijing and Washington come down on the matter of transparency? The United States demands greater transparency, arguing it is essential to alleviate suspicions about what the Chinese are up to. But, as noted, even if transparency increases, it will not decisively deflate the anxiety reflected in variations of the questions that former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked about China's military modernization: "Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases? Why these continuing robust deployments?" China's position on
transparency is quite different. While making modest nods to clarification in its recent defense white papers, China resists revealing information that it believes would add enhanced intelligence to the substantial military advantages the United States enjoys. Because China must rely on clever tactics and strategies to offset U.S. military superiority, it already worries about U.S. reconnaissance technologies
and forward based intelligence assets that monitor PLA capabilities. Consequently, it sometimes takes risky actions to signal unhappiness about U.S. naval and air forces gathering information close to the Chinese homeland. In short, China values opacity over transparency. Opacity complicates U.S. contingency planning; and China does not need increased transparency to clearly discern the superiority of American forces it would engage.
These contrasting Chinese and American perspectives seem irreconcilable. Leaders in Beijing and Washington could, however, recast their discussions about transparency by focusing on the mutual benefits available to both countries through reducing the intensity of a security dilemma that threatens to cast a pall over East Asia. The starting point is recognizing that the United States overstates and China understates the real payoffs from increased transparency. U.S. rhetoric exaggerates the benefits when it suggests that transparency can somehow eliminate suspicions about China's intentions. China, in contrast,
underestimates the benefits of transparency and the costs it pays for continued opacity-especially the nervous reaction by the United States and others who harbor Rumsfeld's concerns. Leaders in both countries who articulate more measured views about transparency's benefits will be better positioned to explain how it enhances national interests by reducing the likelihood of unintended provocation. They will also be in a stronger position to respond to domestic
critics who otherwise can seize upon high levels of uncertainty to demand the greater military investment justified by worst-case planning.
China's Rise and America's Preponderance
Current economic difficulties in the United States, rapid development by China over the last three decades, and limits to U.S. military power revealed in Iraq and Afghanistan, feed speculation about possible future U.S. decline. The reality of the early 21st century, however, is that unipolarity-especially U.S. military preponderance-endures. Yet the expectation that China's rise could eventually herald the end of unipolarity poses another long-term challenge to leaders in Beijing and Washington. So far, their responses provide reason for both hope and concern about continued peace in East Asia.
In two broadly different ways, Beijing has been hedging against the possibility that the United States might try to jeopardize China's vital interests or frustrate its desire to play a larger regional and international role. On the one hand, American preponderance has led an "outgunned" China to invest in military capabilities that serve asymmetric strategies. Thus, Beijing invests in modernizing
a still small, and vulnerable, nuclear arsenal that poses a risk of unacceptable punishment for any prospective adversary endangering China's vital interests. Beijing also continues with its selective development, testing, and deployment of advanced nonnuclear weapons that complicate U.S. planning for contingencies in which it might confront China, and increase the costs that the superior U.S.
military would pay even in conflicts that China would be likely to lose. Such responses to the unfavorable military reality Beijing faces in a world where the United States remains the sole superpower may reflect nothing more than prudent planning by a cautious and conservative regime. Nevertheless, because others, even if only out of prudence, question what such steps might portend about Beijing's future intentions, their predictable effect is to deepen concerns about a more powerful China. As noted above, leaders can try to manage, but cannot fully eliminate these concerns.
On the other hand, the daunting challenge of coping with remarkably robust American preponderance has also induced Beijing to embrace proactive diplomacy as a way to reduce the likelihood that a concerned United States and its allies might act to isolate or contain China. China tries to encourage them instead to recognize the advantages of partnering with China, despite uncertainty about the future.
The enticement of trade and investment opportunities in China, Beijing's cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, help in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem, and joint efforts to address global environmental, public health, and economic concerns are some of the familiar ways in which China has sought to build a favorable international environment for its continued "peaceful development," as it rises in the shadow of a dominant United States. Beijing acts out of self-interest, to be sure, but its diplomacy benefits others as well. Indeed, China's approach since the late 1990s has been largely consistent
with the U.S. interest, as articulated by Robert Zoellick, that China become a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system.
However, Beijing's new diplomacy is only one facet of a rising China's response to American preponderance, and the prospects for its continuation are far from assured. On the contrary, it is easy to see pitfalls ahead. It is unlikely that Beijing will sustain its commitment to act in the ways expected of a responsible stakeholder on the world stage if it becomes clear that doing so means indefinitely accepting the lesser stake it presently holds, one that entails deference to U.S. leadership of the regional and international order. As important, it is unclear that that the United States will be prepared to satisfy China's
aspirations for significantly greater influence if that entails a reduction in America's dominant position.
A smooth transition to a world in which a more powerful China wields greater influence will require the United States (and others) to embrace new and unfamiliar roles. Such an adjustment is conceivable. After all, it has
happened before. The process was managed rather smoothly when Britain gradually yielded its leading role to the United States in the first half of the twentieth century.
In that case, however, shared political values and culture, a clear recognition of the emerging asymmetry in the two countries' capabilities, and a common interest in coping with dangerous common adversaries (first Germany, then the Soviet Union) facilitated Anglo-American cooperation. In the Sino-American case, there are differences in political values and culture, uncertainty about the future balance of
capabilities, and no compelling common threat requiring close cooperation. Consequently, without creative thinking, dedication, and flexibility from leaders on both sides of the Pacific, it is hard to imagine a smooth adjustment to the greater international role China will expect to play. Hard work may make it possible to discover solutions that satisfy both Beijing's and Washington's interests. Even with such hard work, however, the process of adjustment undoubtedly will be difficult.
Domestic Political Constraints
A rising China's foreign policy is being shaped not just by the anarchic, unipolar international system in which it operates, but also by domestic political constraints. Among these, one of the most consequential facing leaders in Beijing is the deep-seated nationalism that has taken root in contemporary China. Popular expectations that an increasingly powerful China should be able to more effectively defend its interests contribute to heightened
sensitivity about other countries' statements and actions that can be construed as an affront to nationalist sensibilities. Leaders in Beijing have, as a result, found themselves constrained by domestic political considerations
in ways that one might have thought irrelevant for an authoritarian regime. These constraints can make it difficult to strike the compromises necessary if diplomacy is to serve as a buffer against military conflict. Where
contemporary challenges are intermingled with the legacies of an earlier era when a weak China was unable to defend its sovereignty, attempts at pragmatism are complicated by the need to satisfy nationalist expectations. Although China's communist leaders are not accountable to a democratic electorate, insensitivity to nationalist sentiment, some of which has been nurtured by the regime's educational and propaganda organs, risks disruptive popular protests as well
as challenges from like-minded elements in the civilian and military elite.
The constraints that resurgent nationalism places on China's foreign policy have been most clearly evident in relations with Japan. But the challenges that these passions present for policymakers in Beijing have also played an increasingly important role in the management of U.S.-China relations after the Cold War. A mostly stable era of bilateral ties has been periodically punctuated by tense confrontations.
Resolution, in these cases, has been complicated by popular Chinese outrage about alleged affronts to the country's sovereignty, interests, or pride. Although the specifics in each episode have varied (the rejection of China's bid to host the 2000 Olympics, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the EP-3 spyplane incident, criticism of China's handling of ethnic tensions and violence in Tibet
and Xinjiang), the general theme among China's loudest nationalist voices has remained constant. They call on Beijing to stand up to Washington, whose words and actions allegedly reveal an insensitivity to the country's sovereign rights and territorial integrity, not to mention "the feelings of the Chinese people." The advent of a less centrally controlled, if still not free, Chinese media
combined with the variety of information sources and outlets for the masses to express their views that the internet provides, have magnified the political pressure confronting China's leaders when they must respond to foreign policy
challenges that capture a more attentive public's eye. And because the regime has typically been more thorough in censoring the expression of views that question China's international claims and interests, the sample of popular
expression that emerges during these episodes is typically skewed. This selection effect reinforces the perception of support for strongly nationalist foreign policy positions which can, of course, provide the regime with a pretext for digging in its heels when it wants to stand firm. But it also limits flexibility when Beijing prefers to defuse such confrontations before they undermine its overriding interest
in a sound working relationship with Washington that is required to preserve the stable international setting essential for China's continued rise.
Can leaders in Beijing and Washington limit the risks that follow from the consequences of resurgent Chinese nationalism? Meeting this challenge will be especially tough not only because of the constraints China's leaders face, but also because it is unrealistic to expect American leaders to give priority to making life easier for the rulers in Beijing. American leaders conduct foreign policy to serve U.S. interests and face their own domestic political constraints. Public opinion and the voice given to it through Congress and the mass media require American leaders, no less than their Chinese counterparts, to be responsive to popular pressures. Perhaps even more than other challenges, then, surging Chinese nationalism is not a problem that can be solved, but rather a vexing challenge that can only be managed more or less effectively to minimize its explosive dangers. However unsatisfying, leaders in Beijing and Washington can probably do no better than to commit themselves to refrain from stoking nationalist passions and to recognize that neither side can fully control their effects.
Realistic Optimism
Will Chinese and U.S. leaders be able to prolong what has been a surprising era of peace in East Asia after the Cold War by continuing to successfully cope with the consequences of the three broad challenges described above? Given their intractability, pessimistic scenarios are certainly not hard to envision. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that tempered optimism is more than wishful thinking or naiveté.
For the foreseeable f uture, China's leaders will have their hands full dealing with major domestic problems. These include the need to ensure a brisk pace of economic growth while reducing stark inequalities in income, improving
environmental protection, and providing adequate health, education, and welfare services for an aging population. Moreover, it must do this while preserving stability in an anachronistic one-party political system that governs an increasingly complex society with many competing interests. These daunting domestic challenges will continue to impose a burden on Beijing that limits its ability to swiftly translate even impressive economic growth into the military
power that would enable China to play a more disruptive international role. A much more assertive foreign policy would require investing in military capabilities and paying opportunity costs in terms of economic development that would jeopardize the political viability of a Chinese regime that has struggled for decades to get its own house in order. That does not preclude Beijing from making such a dangerously foolish choice. China wouldn't be the first country to do so. The Soviet Union provides a dramatic example of a regime that underappreciated the need to face up to the "guns vs. butter" tradeoff. However, the clarity of the tradeoffs for China (and the lessons that leaders in Beijing have drawn from the Soviet failure) do argue against expecting that it is likely, let alone inevitable, that they will opt for a recklessly aggressive and self-defeating
foreign policy.
It is far more plausible, then, that Beijing's leaders will continue their pursuit of a gradually expanded international role. And as they do, relations with the United States will continue to be characterized by a mix of conflict and cooperation conditioned by the challenges described above. It is unlikely that Chinese and U.S. leaders will be able to eliminate these deeply rooted, chronic sources of friction.
That is almost certainly an unrealistic goal. But it is also unnecessary for prolonging the era of peace in East Asia. Instead, the standard for success should be whether Chinese and U.S. leaders can extend their so far impressive record of discovering satisfactory ways to manage the enduring challenges to bilateral relations so that they do not decisively undermine cooperation and exacerbate conflict. Continuing to manage challenges that defy resolution would be an impressive achievement-the handiwork of statesmen who recognize that the best need not be the enemy of the good.
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Tuesday, August 11, 2009
9) China and Africa (Angola)
China quer depender menos de petróleo africano, diz estudo
Lisboa, 10 ago 2009 (Lusa)
As petrolíferas chinesas continuam "famintas" por petróleo africano - sobretudo angolano -, chegando a competir entre si. Contudo, Pequim prepara-se para diminuir dependência do "ouro negro", segundo um relatório divulgado nesta segunda-feira pela Chatham House.
"A China tem estado a modernizar as suas refinarias para reduzir as necessidades de petróleo da África. É de esperar que se torne menos dependente nos próximos anos", indica o relatório do centro de estudos estratégicos britânico.
De acordo com a Chatham House, a petrolífera Sinopec "continua faminta por novas aquisições em Angola", estando pré-qualificada para a próximo leilão de blocos petrolíferos (adiado devido à conjuntura depressiva do mercado), através da SIG e da SSI, um parceria com a estatal angolana Sonangol.
A recente aquisição da norte-americana Marathon Oil pela Sinopec de uma participação de 20% no Bloco 32 em Angola, negócio que contou com o interesse paralelo da também chinesa CNPC, demonstra uma nova tendência de disputa entre as petrolíferas de Pequim, defende.
"Pela primeira vez, as petrolíferas chinesas estão a concorrer abertamente entre elas por concessões angolanas", aponta o estudo.
O documento destaca também que são "altamente exagerados" os medos de que o setor petrolífero de Angola e Nigéria sejam apropriados por petrolíferas asiáticas, uma vez que são as grandes petrolíferas norte-americanas ou europeias que reclamam uma maioria das reservas.
"Nem Nigéria nem Angola encaixam no estereótipo dos frágeis estados africanos explorados implacavelmente por tigres asiáticos famintos de recursos", diz.
Abordagem
Os pesquisadores destacam ainda a abordagem mais pragmática da China em relação a Angola, em contraste com a de outros países asiáticos, sobretudo a Índia.
"Os laços entre negócios privados e estatais são um fator chave no sucesso das estratégias petrolíferas chinesas em Angola, face às de outros países asiáticos. As profundas relações políticas e empresariais entre China e Angola contrastam fortemente com a abordagem da Índia", frisa.
Angola é o maior fornecedor petrolífero africano da China - 599 milhões de barris em 2008, no valor de US$ 59,9 bilhões, segundo dados da Agência Internacional de Energia.
Além disso, os empréstimos da China, que tem o petróleo como garantia, têm financiado a reconstrução do país africano.
A assistência chinesa permitiu o início de cerca de 120 projetos desde 2004, e até março deste ano o volume de ajuda financeira estava estimado em US$ 15 bilhões.
Atualmente, destaca o relatório, os empréstimos já não são exclusivamente garantidos por petróleo e o último empréstimo chinês (de US$ 1 bilhão, em março) está direcionado para o desenvolvimento da agricultura.
Nota: O documento original intitulado “Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola”pode ser encontrado neste link.
Lisboa, 10 ago 2009 (Lusa)
As petrolíferas chinesas continuam "famintas" por petróleo africano - sobretudo angolano -, chegando a competir entre si. Contudo, Pequim prepara-se para diminuir dependência do "ouro negro", segundo um relatório divulgado nesta segunda-feira pela Chatham House.
"A China tem estado a modernizar as suas refinarias para reduzir as necessidades de petróleo da África. É de esperar que se torne menos dependente nos próximos anos", indica o relatório do centro de estudos estratégicos britânico.
De acordo com a Chatham House, a petrolífera Sinopec "continua faminta por novas aquisições em Angola", estando pré-qualificada para a próximo leilão de blocos petrolíferos (adiado devido à conjuntura depressiva do mercado), através da SIG e da SSI, um parceria com a estatal angolana Sonangol.
A recente aquisição da norte-americana Marathon Oil pela Sinopec de uma participação de 20% no Bloco 32 em Angola, negócio que contou com o interesse paralelo da também chinesa CNPC, demonstra uma nova tendência de disputa entre as petrolíferas de Pequim, defende.
"Pela primeira vez, as petrolíferas chinesas estão a concorrer abertamente entre elas por concessões angolanas", aponta o estudo.
O documento destaca também que são "altamente exagerados" os medos de que o setor petrolífero de Angola e Nigéria sejam apropriados por petrolíferas asiáticas, uma vez que são as grandes petrolíferas norte-americanas ou europeias que reclamam uma maioria das reservas.
"Nem Nigéria nem Angola encaixam no estereótipo dos frágeis estados africanos explorados implacavelmente por tigres asiáticos famintos de recursos", diz.
Abordagem
Os pesquisadores destacam ainda a abordagem mais pragmática da China em relação a Angola, em contraste com a de outros países asiáticos, sobretudo a Índia.
"Os laços entre negócios privados e estatais são um fator chave no sucesso das estratégias petrolíferas chinesas em Angola, face às de outros países asiáticos. As profundas relações políticas e empresariais entre China e Angola contrastam fortemente com a abordagem da Índia", frisa.
Angola é o maior fornecedor petrolífero africano da China - 599 milhões de barris em 2008, no valor de US$ 59,9 bilhões, segundo dados da Agência Internacional de Energia.
Além disso, os empréstimos da China, que tem o petróleo como garantia, têm financiado a reconstrução do país africano.
A assistência chinesa permitiu o início de cerca de 120 projetos desde 2004, e até março deste ano o volume de ajuda financeira estava estimado em US$ 15 bilhões.
Atualmente, destaca o relatório, os empréstimos já não são exclusivamente garantidos por petróleo e o último empréstimo chinês (de US$ 1 bilhão, em março) está direcionado para o desenvolvimento da agricultura.
Nota: O documento original intitulado “Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola”pode ser encontrado neste link.
8) China and Latin America
China makes big moves in Latin America
BY TYLER BRIDGES
The Miami Herald, August 10, 2009
All but invisible in Latin America a decade ago, China now is building cars in Uruguay, donating a soccer stadium to Costa Rica and lending $10 billion to Brazil's biggest oil company.
It has supplanted the United States to become the biggest trading partner with Brazil, South America's largest economy.
China has moved aggressively to fill a vacuum left by the United States in recent years, as the U.S. focused on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and struggled with the global economic crisis.
``China is rising while the U.S. is declining in Latin America,'' Riordan Roett, a professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University, said while visiting Sao Paulo. ``China is all over this region. They are following a state-driven policy to expand their peaceful presence.''
China is beefing up its embassies throughout Latin America, opening Confucian centers to expand Chinese culture, sending high-level trade delegations throughout the region and opening the door for ordinary Chinese to visit Machu Picchu, Rio and other tourism hot spots.
Aiping Yuan came to Rio de Janeiro from Beijing in 1997 on a lark, fell in love with the city and decided to stay. She studied Portuguese, and when Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made his first visit to China in 2004, she opened a small school in Rio to teach Mandarin.
She began with six students and today has 300, including senior executives at Petrobras, the country's biggest oil company, and Vale do Rio Doce, the biggest mineral producer. Both have growing business with China.
``Chinese is the language of the future for Brazil,'' Yuan said with a big smile.
China has forged a strategic alliance with Brazil that has allowed the two countries to partner with India and Russia in the so-called BRIC grouping, which is demanding a greater voice in global political and economic affairs. Indeed, China is making inroads with developing countries worldwide.
Beijing's main interest in Latin America has been guaranteeing access to the region's raw materials -- principally oil, iron ore, soybeans and copper -- to fuel its continued rapid growth. For many countries, there's a downside in the China trade, through which cheap imports have displaced local textiles.
China's growing role has alarmed policymakers in Washington. However, China has been careful not to establish a military presence in the region, since doing so would antagonize Washington. The United States has considered Latin America to be in its sphere of influence since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.
China treats Hugo Chávez as they do Alvaro Uribe and Lula, said Alexandre Barbosa, a consultant to the Sao Paulo-based consulting firm Prospectiva, referring to the presidents of Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil, respectively. ``They're interested in business.''
And what a voracious interest in business they've shown. Trade between Latin America and China rocketed from $10 billion in 2000 to $140 billion in 2008. China is buying zinc from Peru, copper from Chile and iron ore from Brazil. It's shipping electronic equipment to Brazil, buses to Cuba, clothes to Mexico and cars to Peru.
Peruvian President Alan Garcia is trying to position his country as a major commercial hub for China in South America. He's hoping to capitalize not only on Peru's ports in the center of South America but also on a shared history: Thousands of Chinese emigrated to Peru in the 19th and early 20th centuries to do manual labor. These immigrants have left a legacy of the so-called chifa restaurants, which offer Chinese food throughout Peru.
Today, China's biggest appetite is for Peru's plentiful minerals.
Two Chinese companies are moving forward with major mining projects in Peru while companies from other countries are suspending or canceling theirs, said John Youle, the executive president of ConsultAndes, a Lima-based firm.
China generally has been investing little money in Latin America, however. This has prompted criticism that it's simply tapping into the region's vast raw minerals, just as colonial powers did for centuries.
Although China has become a major player over the past decade, trade between the United States and Latin America still dwarfs China's trade with Latin America.
Beyond trade, China suddenly is rivaling the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank as a major lender to Latin America, at a time when China is flush with cash and many companies can't get access to bank loans.
Petrobras is borrowing $10 billion from China, to be paid off by shipping 150,000 barrels of crude per day to China this year and 200,000 barrels per day for the next nine years, said Erico Monte, a Petrobras spokesman.
Ecuador is borrowing $1 billion from China to finance investments by its state oil company and another $1.7 billion to build what would be the country's largest hydropower dam.
Venezuela is buying high-tech oil-drilling platforms from China and is sending some 380,000 barrels of oil there per day as Chávez diversifies Venezuelan exports away from the United States, his chief nemesis.
``But China has shown little enthusiasm in becoming entangled in Chávez's larger goal of counterbalancing U.S. influence in the hemisphere,'' Dan Erikson, a Latin American expert at the Inter-American Dialogue, a nonpartisan research center on Western Hemisphere affairs, wrote recently.
NONINTRUSIVE
Erikson said China was especially attractive to Latin American leaders because of its no-questions-asked foreign policy.
``The United States talks about the need for a battle against corruption, the need for transparency and improved human rights,'' Erikson told McClatchy. ``China is less ideological in its approach to Latin America than the U.S. is.''
Still, China uses its aid as a strategic tool to get countries to shift their diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the communist nation.
After Costa Rica became the first Central American country to establish ties with China, the communist country bought $300 million in Costa Rican bonds. More important to average Costa Ricans, China is spending $74 million to build a new national soccer stadium in San Jose.
It's scheduled to open in 2011.
CRITICS OF CHINA
Not everyone in Latin America welcomes China's growing presence. Chinese companies are taking business away from Mexican firms that exported clothes to the United States. Peruvians have tried to block the expansion of a Chinese mining project near the border with Ecuador that they say would pollute local rivers. And China has angered Brazilian companies by taking their place as the biggest exporter of clothing and textiles to Argentina.
Whether it's seen as a friendly uncle or a ruthless competitor, China's continued expansion in Latin America seems inevitable.
EBX is expanding its port in Rio de Janeiro state to handle Brazil's iron ore exports to China and has signed an agreement with China's Wuhan Iron and Steel to build a mammoth steel plant next to the port.
In May, Lula da Silva made his third trip to China, spotlighting the fact that China has become Brazil's biggest trade partner.
The development surprised Rodrigo Maciel, the executive secretary of the Brazil-China Business Council, based in Rio.
``We weren't expecting China to pass the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trading partner until 2011 or 2012,'' Maciel said.
BY TYLER BRIDGES
The Miami Herald, August 10, 2009
All but invisible in Latin America a decade ago, China now is building cars in Uruguay, donating a soccer stadium to Costa Rica and lending $10 billion to Brazil's biggest oil company.
It has supplanted the United States to become the biggest trading partner with Brazil, South America's largest economy.
China has moved aggressively to fill a vacuum left by the United States in recent years, as the U.S. focused on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and struggled with the global economic crisis.
``China is rising while the U.S. is declining in Latin America,'' Riordan Roett, a professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University, said while visiting Sao Paulo. ``China is all over this region. They are following a state-driven policy to expand their peaceful presence.''
China is beefing up its embassies throughout Latin America, opening Confucian centers to expand Chinese culture, sending high-level trade delegations throughout the region and opening the door for ordinary Chinese to visit Machu Picchu, Rio and other tourism hot spots.
Aiping Yuan came to Rio de Janeiro from Beijing in 1997 on a lark, fell in love with the city and decided to stay. She studied Portuguese, and when Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made his first visit to China in 2004, she opened a small school in Rio to teach Mandarin.
She began with six students and today has 300, including senior executives at Petrobras, the country's biggest oil company, and Vale do Rio Doce, the biggest mineral producer. Both have growing business with China.
``Chinese is the language of the future for Brazil,'' Yuan said with a big smile.
China has forged a strategic alliance with Brazil that has allowed the two countries to partner with India and Russia in the so-called BRIC grouping, which is demanding a greater voice in global political and economic affairs. Indeed, China is making inroads with developing countries worldwide.
Beijing's main interest in Latin America has been guaranteeing access to the region's raw materials -- principally oil, iron ore, soybeans and copper -- to fuel its continued rapid growth. For many countries, there's a downside in the China trade, through which cheap imports have displaced local textiles.
China's growing role has alarmed policymakers in Washington. However, China has been careful not to establish a military presence in the region, since doing so would antagonize Washington. The United States has considered Latin America to be in its sphere of influence since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.
China treats Hugo Chávez as they do Alvaro Uribe and Lula, said Alexandre Barbosa, a consultant to the Sao Paulo-based consulting firm Prospectiva, referring to the presidents of Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil, respectively. ``They're interested in business.''
And what a voracious interest in business they've shown. Trade between Latin America and China rocketed from $10 billion in 2000 to $140 billion in 2008. China is buying zinc from Peru, copper from Chile and iron ore from Brazil. It's shipping electronic equipment to Brazil, buses to Cuba, clothes to Mexico and cars to Peru.
Peruvian President Alan Garcia is trying to position his country as a major commercial hub for China in South America. He's hoping to capitalize not only on Peru's ports in the center of South America but also on a shared history: Thousands of Chinese emigrated to Peru in the 19th and early 20th centuries to do manual labor. These immigrants have left a legacy of the so-called chifa restaurants, which offer Chinese food throughout Peru.
Today, China's biggest appetite is for Peru's plentiful minerals.
Two Chinese companies are moving forward with major mining projects in Peru while companies from other countries are suspending or canceling theirs, said John Youle, the executive president of ConsultAndes, a Lima-based firm.
China generally has been investing little money in Latin America, however. This has prompted criticism that it's simply tapping into the region's vast raw minerals, just as colonial powers did for centuries.
Although China has become a major player over the past decade, trade between the United States and Latin America still dwarfs China's trade with Latin America.
Beyond trade, China suddenly is rivaling the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank as a major lender to Latin America, at a time when China is flush with cash and many companies can't get access to bank loans.
Petrobras is borrowing $10 billion from China, to be paid off by shipping 150,000 barrels of crude per day to China this year and 200,000 barrels per day for the next nine years, said Erico Monte, a Petrobras spokesman.
Ecuador is borrowing $1 billion from China to finance investments by its state oil company and another $1.7 billion to build what would be the country's largest hydropower dam.
Venezuela is buying high-tech oil-drilling platforms from China and is sending some 380,000 barrels of oil there per day as Chávez diversifies Venezuelan exports away from the United States, his chief nemesis.
``But China has shown little enthusiasm in becoming entangled in Chávez's larger goal of counterbalancing U.S. influence in the hemisphere,'' Dan Erikson, a Latin American expert at the Inter-American Dialogue, a nonpartisan research center on Western Hemisphere affairs, wrote recently.
NONINTRUSIVE
Erikson said China was especially attractive to Latin American leaders because of its no-questions-asked foreign policy.
``The United States talks about the need for a battle against corruption, the need for transparency and improved human rights,'' Erikson told McClatchy. ``China is less ideological in its approach to Latin America than the U.S. is.''
Still, China uses its aid as a strategic tool to get countries to shift their diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the communist nation.
After Costa Rica became the first Central American country to establish ties with China, the communist country bought $300 million in Costa Rican bonds. More important to average Costa Ricans, China is spending $74 million to build a new national soccer stadium in San Jose.
It's scheduled to open in 2011.
CRITICS OF CHINA
Not everyone in Latin America welcomes China's growing presence. Chinese companies are taking business away from Mexican firms that exported clothes to the United States. Peruvians have tried to block the expansion of a Chinese mining project near the border with Ecuador that they say would pollute local rivers. And China has angered Brazilian companies by taking their place as the biggest exporter of clothing and textiles to Argentina.
Whether it's seen as a friendly uncle or a ruthless competitor, China's continued expansion in Latin America seems inevitable.
EBX is expanding its port in Rio de Janeiro state to handle Brazil's iron ore exports to China and has signed an agreement with China's Wuhan Iron and Steel to build a mammoth steel plant next to the port.
In May, Lula da Silva made his third trip to China, spotlighting the fact that China has become Brazil's biggest trade partner.
The development surprised Rodrigo Maciel, the executive secretary of the Brazil-China Business Council, based in Rio.
``We weren't expecting China to pass the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trading partner until 2011 or 2012,'' Maciel said.
7) Conflitos sao sinais positivos, dizem diplomatas
Diplomatas chinês e brasileiro consideram conflitos comerciais um sinal positivo entre as relações bilaterais
Xinhua, 10/8/2009
Beijing, China - Conflitos são sinais positivos do aumento das relações comerciais entre a China e o Brasil, concordam o embaixador brasileiro na China, Clodoaldo Hugueney, e o ex-embaixador chinês no Brasil, Chen Duqing, no seminário "Parceria Estratégica Brasil-China em Novo Cenário Internacional".
O evento foi co-patronizado pela Embaixada Brasileira na China e o Centro de Estudos Brasileiros do Instituto da América Latina, da Academia de Ciências Sociais da China, para comemorar o 35º aniversário do estabelecimento das relações diplomáticas China-Brasil.
Os último 35 anos vêm testemunhando um progresso satisfatório no avanço dos laços bilaterais China-Brasil, disse o diplomata chinês, quando fez um retrospecto sobre a história diplomática entre as duas nações. "Agora as relações bilaterais estão no melhor momento na história", indicou Chen, acrescentando que nos segmentos de política, economia, cultura e tecnologia, entre os outros, a China e o Brasil gozam de uma base sólida e um espaço enorme de desenvolvimento, o que pode ser demonstrado pelos frequentes intercâmbios e visitas entre lideranças, aumentando a parceria comercial entre os dois países.
O ex-embaixador chinês afirmou que realmente existem conflitos no comércio China-Brasil, mas isto é um sinal muito bom, pois mostra que os dois lados estão produzindo mais trocas e intercâmbios. Sua opinião foi apoiada depois por Hugueney, que disse "conflitos só existem entre amigos ou casais".
Porém, Chen sublinhou que o investimento mútuo ainda é pequeno em comparação com a escala econômica das duas enormes potências emergentes. A "Agenda China" e o "Plano de Aceleração do Crescimento", esforços feitos pela parte brasileira oferecerão oportunidades e espaços para este sentido, os dois governos devem estimular a ampliação de investimento mútuo e a definir como uma meta de longo prazo, assinlou Chen.
Hugueney também fez o mesmo comentário ao analisar a situação atual e a perspectiva das relações entre o Brasil e a China. Segundo ele, o principal trabalho para o Brasil ainda envolve a diversificação da pauta dos produtos exportados do Brasil para a China, para que seja estabelecida uma arquitetura comercial mais estável entre as duas economias.
Hugueney indicou que, o Brasil e a China não têm divergências históricas, e todos os problemas podem ser resolvidos através do diálogo, neste contexto preferencial, as duas partes devem aproveitar todas as condições para promover a parceria estretégica Brasil-China.
"O desenvolvimento das relações entre o Brasil e a China nos próximos 35 anos será melhor que os últimos 35 anos", expressou o embaixador brasileiro, no final do discurso.
Também compareceram ao seminário representantes de vários órgãos governamentais e principais firmas chinesas e brasileiras.
Xinhua, 10/8/2009
Beijing, China - Conflitos são sinais positivos do aumento das relações comerciais entre a China e o Brasil, concordam o embaixador brasileiro na China, Clodoaldo Hugueney, e o ex-embaixador chinês no Brasil, Chen Duqing, no seminário "Parceria Estratégica Brasil-China em Novo Cenário Internacional".
O evento foi co-patronizado pela Embaixada Brasileira na China e o Centro de Estudos Brasileiros do Instituto da América Latina, da Academia de Ciências Sociais da China, para comemorar o 35º aniversário do estabelecimento das relações diplomáticas China-Brasil.
Os último 35 anos vêm testemunhando um progresso satisfatório no avanço dos laços bilaterais China-Brasil, disse o diplomata chinês, quando fez um retrospecto sobre a história diplomática entre as duas nações. "Agora as relações bilaterais estão no melhor momento na história", indicou Chen, acrescentando que nos segmentos de política, economia, cultura e tecnologia, entre os outros, a China e o Brasil gozam de uma base sólida e um espaço enorme de desenvolvimento, o que pode ser demonstrado pelos frequentes intercâmbios e visitas entre lideranças, aumentando a parceria comercial entre os dois países.
O ex-embaixador chinês afirmou que realmente existem conflitos no comércio China-Brasil, mas isto é um sinal muito bom, pois mostra que os dois lados estão produzindo mais trocas e intercâmbios. Sua opinião foi apoiada depois por Hugueney, que disse "conflitos só existem entre amigos ou casais".
Porém, Chen sublinhou que o investimento mútuo ainda é pequeno em comparação com a escala econômica das duas enormes potências emergentes. A "Agenda China" e o "Plano de Aceleração do Crescimento", esforços feitos pela parte brasileira oferecerão oportunidades e espaços para este sentido, os dois governos devem estimular a ampliação de investimento mútuo e a definir como uma meta de longo prazo, assinlou Chen.
Hugueney também fez o mesmo comentário ao analisar a situação atual e a perspectiva das relações entre o Brasil e a China. Segundo ele, o principal trabalho para o Brasil ainda envolve a diversificação da pauta dos produtos exportados do Brasil para a China, para que seja estabelecida uma arquitetura comercial mais estável entre as duas economias.
Hugueney indicou que, o Brasil e a China não têm divergências históricas, e todos os problemas podem ser resolvidos através do diálogo, neste contexto preferencial, as duas partes devem aproveitar todas as condições para promover a parceria estretégica Brasil-China.
"O desenvolvimento das relações entre o Brasil e a China nos próximos 35 anos será melhor que os últimos 35 anos", expressou o embaixador brasileiro, no final do discurso.
Também compareceram ao seminário representantes de vários órgãos governamentais e principais firmas chinesas e brasileiras.
6) Brasil na Shangai Expo 2010
Brasil gastará até R$ 80 milhões para promover sua imagem na China
Agência Brasil, 5/8/2009
O presidente da Apex-Brasil, Alessandro Teixeira, e o ministro-conselheiro da Embaixada da China no Brasil, Zhu Qingqiao, durante entrevista coletiva
A estratégia consistirá em reforçar a imagem do Brasil como um país moderno, de instituições sólidas e com legislação ambiental eficiente
Brasília, Brasil - Com o desafio de aumentar as exportações de produtos de maior valor agregado, o governo gastará até R$ 80 milhões para promover a imagem do Brasil na China.
O valor foi divulgado hoje (5) pelo Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior e pela Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimentos (Apex-Brasil), que detalharam a participação do país na exposição mundial que ocorrerá em Xangai, na China, no próximo ano.
A estratégia consistirá em reforçar a imagem do Brasil como um país moderno, de instituições sólidas e com legislação ambiental eficiente. Os setores que mais receberão destaque são os de alimentos e bebidas, máquinas e equipamentos, construção civil e moda de alto luxo. De acordo com a Apex-Brasil, tais produtos têm maior potencial de ampliação das vendas.
"A gente quer reverter a imagem de que o Brasil só exporta comida e minério para a China", destacou o presidente da Apex- Brasil, Alessandro Teixeira. "Vamos trabalhar a pujança da economia brasileira e oferecer uma oportunidade para aumentar o conhecimento mútuo e dinamizar as trocas comerciais."
Para promover a imagem do Brasil no evento, que ocorrerá de maio a outubro do próximo ano, o governo gastará de R$ 70 milhões a R$ 80 milhões. "Esses gastos englobam tanto a montagem do pavilhão como os eventos e as atividades culturais e turísticas", explicou Teixeira. Segundo ele, uma comissão formada por representantes do Tribunal de Contas da União, da Corregedoria-Geral da União, do Ministério do Desenvolvimento e da Apex-Brasil foi enviada à China para planejar a execução das despesas.
Com previsão de receber 70 milhões de visitantes, a Expo Xangai terá participação de 200 países e 48 organismos internacionais. Além da promoção comercial, o evento será dedicado ao debate dos problemas das grandes cidades em todo o mundo. Ao final da exposição, será assinada a Declaração de Xangai, com diretrizes para o desenvolvimento urbano sustentável.
De acordo com a Apex-Brasil, o pavilhão brasileiro deverá receber até 2 milhões de visitantes. O espaço também será palco da divulgação da Copa do Mundo de 2014 e dos Jogos Olímpicos de 2016, caso o Rio de Janeiro seja escolhido como sede da competição.
Obras do Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC) também serão expostas, mas o presidente da Apex-Brasil negou a intenção de captar recursos para os empreendimentos. "Os investimentos do PAC já estão definidos e em operação", esclareceu Teixeira. "Queremos apenas mostrar o que o Brasil vem fazendo para promover o crescimento da economia."
O ministro-conselheiro da Embaixada da China no Brasil, Zhu Qingqiao, afirmou que o Brasil representa um mercado de grande interesse para os chineses. "As relações comerciais e econômicas entre o Brasil e a China ainda têm potencial para crescer consideravelmente", afirmou.
Principal destino das exportações brasileiras, a China superou os Estados Unidos como o maior parceiro comercial do Brasil desde março deste ano. Atualmente, o país responde por 14,8% das vendas externas do Brasil, contra 10,2% dos Estados Unidos.
Nos sete primeiros meses do ano, as exportações para o país asiático cresceram 25,1% na comparação com o mesmo período de 2008. Em julho, no entanto, as vendas para a China caíram 21,7% em relação ao mesmo mês do ano passado.
Agência Brasil, 5/8/2009
O presidente da Apex-Brasil, Alessandro Teixeira, e o ministro-conselheiro da Embaixada da China no Brasil, Zhu Qingqiao, durante entrevista coletiva
A estratégia consistirá em reforçar a imagem do Brasil como um país moderno, de instituições sólidas e com legislação ambiental eficiente
Brasília, Brasil - Com o desafio de aumentar as exportações de produtos de maior valor agregado, o governo gastará até R$ 80 milhões para promover a imagem do Brasil na China.
O valor foi divulgado hoje (5) pelo Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior e pela Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimentos (Apex-Brasil), que detalharam a participação do país na exposição mundial que ocorrerá em Xangai, na China, no próximo ano.
A estratégia consistirá em reforçar a imagem do Brasil como um país moderno, de instituições sólidas e com legislação ambiental eficiente. Os setores que mais receberão destaque são os de alimentos e bebidas, máquinas e equipamentos, construção civil e moda de alto luxo. De acordo com a Apex-Brasil, tais produtos têm maior potencial de ampliação das vendas.
"A gente quer reverter a imagem de que o Brasil só exporta comida e minério para a China", destacou o presidente da Apex- Brasil, Alessandro Teixeira. "Vamos trabalhar a pujança da economia brasileira e oferecer uma oportunidade para aumentar o conhecimento mútuo e dinamizar as trocas comerciais."
Para promover a imagem do Brasil no evento, que ocorrerá de maio a outubro do próximo ano, o governo gastará de R$ 70 milhões a R$ 80 milhões. "Esses gastos englobam tanto a montagem do pavilhão como os eventos e as atividades culturais e turísticas", explicou Teixeira. Segundo ele, uma comissão formada por representantes do Tribunal de Contas da União, da Corregedoria-Geral da União, do Ministério do Desenvolvimento e da Apex-Brasil foi enviada à China para planejar a execução das despesas.
Com previsão de receber 70 milhões de visitantes, a Expo Xangai terá participação de 200 países e 48 organismos internacionais. Além da promoção comercial, o evento será dedicado ao debate dos problemas das grandes cidades em todo o mundo. Ao final da exposição, será assinada a Declaração de Xangai, com diretrizes para o desenvolvimento urbano sustentável.
De acordo com a Apex-Brasil, o pavilhão brasileiro deverá receber até 2 milhões de visitantes. O espaço também será palco da divulgação da Copa do Mundo de 2014 e dos Jogos Olímpicos de 2016, caso o Rio de Janeiro seja escolhido como sede da competição.
Obras do Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC) também serão expostas, mas o presidente da Apex-Brasil negou a intenção de captar recursos para os empreendimentos. "Os investimentos do PAC já estão definidos e em operação", esclareceu Teixeira. "Queremos apenas mostrar o que o Brasil vem fazendo para promover o crescimento da economia."
O ministro-conselheiro da Embaixada da China no Brasil, Zhu Qingqiao, afirmou que o Brasil representa um mercado de grande interesse para os chineses. "As relações comerciais e econômicas entre o Brasil e a China ainda têm potencial para crescer consideravelmente", afirmou.
Principal destino das exportações brasileiras, a China superou os Estados Unidos como o maior parceiro comercial do Brasil desde março deste ano. Atualmente, o país responde por 14,8% das vendas externas do Brasil, contra 10,2% dos Estados Unidos.
Nos sete primeiros meses do ano, as exportações para o país asiático cresceram 25,1% na comparação com o mesmo período de 2008. Em julho, no entanto, as vendas para a China caíram 21,7% em relação ao mesmo mês do ano passado.
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