Editorial
Security Council Blinks
The New York Times, July 9, 2010
“Lowest common denominator” is too often the standard at the United Nations. Even then, the Security Council’s new statement on the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan is absurdly, dangerously lame.
The Council deplored the attack and expressed “deep concern” over the findings of an international investigation that held Pyongyang responsible. But it also took “note” of North Korea’s insistence that it had nothing to do with the incident
Forty-six South Korean sailors died last March when the warship sank in disputed waters. Seoul quickly accused North Korea of torpedoing the ship but showed admirable restraint, inviting in an international team to investigate. The team did its work and agreed that a North Korean ship was responsible. South Korea produced a torpedo propeller with North Korean markings.
Afterward, Seoul and Washington both condemned Pyongyang’s actions and vowed to obtain a similarly tough Security Council statement. But all in all, South Korea continues to exercise restraint.
Which is why a clear condemnation from the Security Council was especially important. North Korea needs to know that such a brazen act of aggression will not be tolerated. And South Korea needs to know that there is diplomatic recourse in the face of such belligerence.
China, which has veto power on the Council, insisted on watering down the statement. The Obama administration could not change its mind. Beijing fears that a political collapse in North Korea would send millions of refugees streaming into China, and it has a long history of enabling Pyongyang. Even after the North exploded two nuclear devices, China continues to be its major supplier of aid, food and oil — and continues to shield it from the full effects of Security Council sanctions.
The statement “underscored the importance of preventing further such attacks or hostilities against” South Korea or in the region. But given the weasel wording about blame, it is hard to imagine that Pyongyang will listen. China has even more of a responsibility now to use its aid and its influence to curb the North’s excesses.
The United States and its partners in the long-stalled nuclear talks with North Korea — Japan, South Korea, Russia and China — must look for other ways to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula. They can start by helping the two Koreas agree on a demarcation line in the West Sea, where the Cheonan was attacked.
Showing posts with label North Korea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label North Korea. Show all posts
Sunday, July 11, 2010
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
Two Koreas: on the brink of war
The Two Koreas Step Back From the Brink
STRATFOR.COM Diary Archives
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
HE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MET behind closed doors Monday to see South Korean Ambassador Park In Kook and a team of investigators present their case on the ChonAn, the South Korean corvette that was sunk in March, which they claim was caused by a surprise North Korean submarine attack. The North Koreans were given the chance to respond and reportedly called the claims a “fabrication.” They are expected to deliver a fuller response on Tuesday.
Aside from the fire and brimstone that can be expected from Pyongyang’s rhetorical response, the meeting served to highlight the fact that the two Koreas have stepped back from the brink. There is no longer the sudden scare felt in the immediate aftermath of the ship’s sinking or the heightened sense of danger that was pervasive after the South made its allegations official in late May. The geopolitical maneuvering that characterizes the region will continue, but there is no longer a crisis to handle.
The reasons lie in the region’s current geopolitical configuration. From the first few days after the ship’s sinking, Seoul knew it would have to build a meticulous case, based on painstakingly acquired evidence from the seafloor and the wreckage, if it were to have a chance to corral the international community into supporting tough countermeasures against the North. This process lasted through April and half of May. Of course, winning support would be complicated, since in this context, the “international community” consists of the members of the six-party grouping (the Koreas, China, Russia, Japan and the United States) that makes on-again, off-again attempts to convince Pyongyang to abandon its quest for nuclear weapons. When the results were announced, the two states that were not included in the fact-finding mission — Russia and China — predictably resisted lending support to Seoul’s charges. Russia reviewed the facts and deemed them inconclusive, while China avoided reviewing them to prevent the need to make a decision.
The United States and Japan did lend support to Korea’s formal accusations in May, but even here South Korea ran up against constraints rather than enablers. It immediately became clear that even these two allies were not willing to endorse Seoul, to the point that it had no restraints in how far it went with its punitive actions. The Japanese decided not to present jointly at the United Nations a plan for punishing Pyongyang. Instead, it suggested tightening unilateral sanctions on the North, which amounted to little more than increasing controls on remittances from North Koreans living in Japan back to North Korea.
Meanwhile, the United States, which had allegedly held Seoul back in the immediate aftermath of the event, pledged enhanced military-to-military ties with South Korea and new anti-submarine warfare coordination and exercises in the Yellow Sea. This robust response gave the Chinese jitters, but also distanced the United States from a hard line. Washington rejected rumors that it would dispatch an aircraft carrier to the sea, and took other more subtle steps to calm the South down and avoid escalating the situation further.
“South Korea is not pursuing the ChonAn incident, but knows full well it was not North Korea’s last provocation.”
By June it had become apparent that the South Koreans were no longer even seeking new United Nations sanctions against the North. Given the resistance South Korea received from China and Russia, it instead sought merely a strongly worded statement. Further punishment would have to be meted out by Seoul and Washington alone.
The South is well aware of the limitations of its own unilateral sanctions against the North, since the North had, previous to the incident, revoked several points of cooperation in the relationship that the South theoretically could have used as leverage to exert pressure. For instance, the Kaesong joint economic zone between the two states remains intact, however often it has become a pawn of tensions on the peninsula. In addition, personnel changes in the upper echelons of both the North’s and the South’s militaries in recent weeks have enabled both states to claim to have rectified past wrongs.
None of this is to say that South Korea will not continue to seek retribution, only that most of that retribution from now on will come in the form of rhetoric, and the substantial parts will be carefully managed by the United States so as not to risk triggering an inter-Korean crisis, or a crisis with a suspicious China. Seoul’s actions, and those of the other players, reflect the bad options inherent in the Korean predicament. Neither Korea wants to ignite an internecine war; Beijing does not want a disastrous collapse on its border, or to give the United States and its allies an excuse to push up directly against it; and Japan does not wish to see its security undermined by any of the various possibilities. The United States, the one player with the most room for maneuver and the most distance from the fallout of any catastrophe on the peninsula, has far too many concerns (including its domestic economy and foreign engagements), to be willing to open itself to another.
Despite what was in all likelihood an unprovoked torpedo from the North, the major pieces remain in the same place on the chessboard. The players have refrained from bigger moves partly because the region’s security situation inherently verges on instability, and partly because the North has managed superbly to frighten everyone involved with its alternating displays of irrationality, aggression and desperation. Also, North Korea has managed to prevent a unified front against it with occasional offers of cooperation. There is even greater fear among outsiders as the country approaches a leadership transition and rumors spread of deepening rivalries between powerful factions. For these reasons Korea is not pursuing the ChonAn incident with vindictiveness, though it knows full well that it was by no means the last provocation it will face from the North.
STRATFOR.COM Diary Archives
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
HE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MET behind closed doors Monday to see South Korean Ambassador Park In Kook and a team of investigators present their case on the ChonAn, the South Korean corvette that was sunk in March, which they claim was caused by a surprise North Korean submarine attack. The North Koreans were given the chance to respond and reportedly called the claims a “fabrication.” They are expected to deliver a fuller response on Tuesday.
Aside from the fire and brimstone that can be expected from Pyongyang’s rhetorical response, the meeting served to highlight the fact that the two Koreas have stepped back from the brink. There is no longer the sudden scare felt in the immediate aftermath of the ship’s sinking or the heightened sense of danger that was pervasive after the South made its allegations official in late May. The geopolitical maneuvering that characterizes the region will continue, but there is no longer a crisis to handle.
The reasons lie in the region’s current geopolitical configuration. From the first few days after the ship’s sinking, Seoul knew it would have to build a meticulous case, based on painstakingly acquired evidence from the seafloor and the wreckage, if it were to have a chance to corral the international community into supporting tough countermeasures against the North. This process lasted through April and half of May. Of course, winning support would be complicated, since in this context, the “international community” consists of the members of the six-party grouping (the Koreas, China, Russia, Japan and the United States) that makes on-again, off-again attempts to convince Pyongyang to abandon its quest for nuclear weapons. When the results were announced, the two states that were not included in the fact-finding mission — Russia and China — predictably resisted lending support to Seoul’s charges. Russia reviewed the facts and deemed them inconclusive, while China avoided reviewing them to prevent the need to make a decision.
The United States and Japan did lend support to Korea’s formal accusations in May, but even here South Korea ran up against constraints rather than enablers. It immediately became clear that even these two allies were not willing to endorse Seoul, to the point that it had no restraints in how far it went with its punitive actions. The Japanese decided not to present jointly at the United Nations a plan for punishing Pyongyang. Instead, it suggested tightening unilateral sanctions on the North, which amounted to little more than increasing controls on remittances from North Koreans living in Japan back to North Korea.
Meanwhile, the United States, which had allegedly held Seoul back in the immediate aftermath of the event, pledged enhanced military-to-military ties with South Korea and new anti-submarine warfare coordination and exercises in the Yellow Sea. This robust response gave the Chinese jitters, but also distanced the United States from a hard line. Washington rejected rumors that it would dispatch an aircraft carrier to the sea, and took other more subtle steps to calm the South down and avoid escalating the situation further.
“South Korea is not pursuing the ChonAn incident, but knows full well it was not North Korea’s last provocation.”
By June it had become apparent that the South Koreans were no longer even seeking new United Nations sanctions against the North. Given the resistance South Korea received from China and Russia, it instead sought merely a strongly worded statement. Further punishment would have to be meted out by Seoul and Washington alone.
The South is well aware of the limitations of its own unilateral sanctions against the North, since the North had, previous to the incident, revoked several points of cooperation in the relationship that the South theoretically could have used as leverage to exert pressure. For instance, the Kaesong joint economic zone between the two states remains intact, however often it has become a pawn of tensions on the peninsula. In addition, personnel changes in the upper echelons of both the North’s and the South’s militaries in recent weeks have enabled both states to claim to have rectified past wrongs.
None of this is to say that South Korea will not continue to seek retribution, only that most of that retribution from now on will come in the form of rhetoric, and the substantial parts will be carefully managed by the United States so as not to risk triggering an inter-Korean crisis, or a crisis with a suspicious China. Seoul’s actions, and those of the other players, reflect the bad options inherent in the Korean predicament. Neither Korea wants to ignite an internecine war; Beijing does not want a disastrous collapse on its border, or to give the United States and its allies an excuse to push up directly against it; and Japan does not wish to see its security undermined by any of the various possibilities. The United States, the one player with the most room for maneuver and the most distance from the fallout of any catastrophe on the peninsula, has far too many concerns (including its domestic economy and foreign engagements), to be willing to open itself to another.
Despite what was in all likelihood an unprovoked torpedo from the North, the major pieces remain in the same place on the chessboard. The players have refrained from bigger moves partly because the region’s security situation inherently verges on instability, and partly because the North has managed superbly to frighten everyone involved with its alternating displays of irrationality, aggression and desperation. Also, North Korea has managed to prevent a unified front against it with occasional offers of cooperation. There is even greater fear among outsiders as the country approaches a leadership transition and rumors spread of deepening rivalries between powerful factions. For these reasons Korea is not pursuing the ChonAn incident with vindictiveness, though it knows full well that it was by no means the last provocation it will face from the North.
Saturday, May 29, 2010
China and North Korea: not yet sanctions
China toughens stance toward North Korea, but doesn't back sanctions
By Blaine Harden
Washington Post, Saturday, May 29, 2010; A12
SEOUL -- China toughened its position toward North Korea Friday but fell short of the support for a U.N. Security Council rebuke that South Korean leaders had hoped for during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's high-profile visit.
Wen told South Korean President Lee Myung-bak that China has not concluded whether North Korea is responsible for the March 26 sinking of a South Korean naval ship that killed 46 sailors. The incident has triggered one of the worst security crises on this divided peninsula since the 1950-53 Korean War.
That stance, in stark contrast to an international investigation blaming Pyongyang for the torpedo attack, reflects China's traditional kid-gloves approach to the isolated, impoverished and heavily armed dictatorship on its far eastern border.
Still, Wen signaled a shift in position by not simply supporting North Korea and by telling Lee that China would not defend anyone responsible for the sinking of the 1,200-ton Cheonan.
"It is a modest shift, but a pretty disappointing one," said Michael J. Green, a top adviser on North Korea in President George W. Bush's administration.
Green said that among China's leaders, Wen is one of the most sympathetic to South Korea's position and that his remarks indicate that China ultimately would support a U.N. resolution -- but "will do everything to water it down" and press for a return to negotiations. He noted that "Beijing never before has been under such pressure to choose between North and South," which is a major trading partner.
"We certainly hope that, you know, through this visit, China will recognize and support the conclusions of the investigation," State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said. "We think that the evidence is compelling. And we think that it's time for the international community to come together in a united and demonstrated way and send a clear message to North Korea."
North Korea adamantly denies sinking the ship and has threatened war if there is any move to punish it. Pyongyang also said this week that it is severing relations with the South, a move that followed Seoul's imposition of trade, diplomatic and military measures to punish North Korea.
The North: Sinking 'faked'
On Friday, a senior North Korean general said the sinking was a hoax perpetrated by Seoul, and he warned of war. At a rare news conference for a member of the powerful National Defense Commission, Maj. Gen. Pak Rim Su reportedly said South Korea had "faked" the sinking.
Wen said China is examining the international investigation that blamed North Korea, whose state-run economy depends almost exclusively on China for fuel, food aid and trade. The investigation, conducted by South Korea and experts from the United States and three other countries, found evidence that a North Korean-made torpedo fired by a North Korean mini-submarine sank the ship.
China "always opposes and condemns any acts detrimental to peace and stability on the peninsula," Wen said, according to the official New China News Agency. He added that Beijing "takes serious note of the results of a joint investigation by South Korea and other countries, as well as the reactions of all parties."
Wen is in South Korea for a three-day visit that presents a difficult diplomatic challenge. China has to balance its historically protective stance toward North Korea against the surging importance of its economic ties to South Korea and Japan. This weekend, Wen meets again with Lee and with Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama.
The South Korean government is working with the United States to secure Security Council condemnation of North Korea. In their meeting in Seoul, Lee pressed Wen "to play an active role in making North Korea admit its wrongdoing," the president's spokesman said.
Wen did not go nearly that far, according to accounts of their meeting. Yet his careful comments appeared to recalibrate the rules in Beijing's treatment of North Korea, which would almost certainly collapse without China's concessionary aid. Before Friday, China had confined its comments on the ship's sinking to expressions of sympathy for the loss of life while cautioning all governments to remain calm.
More consultations
China appears to be standing alone among veto-wielding members of the Security Council in questioning the findings of the investigation into the ship's sinking.
Russia announced this week that it will send a team of experts to examine evidence gathered by investigators. South Korean officials said they think that Russia is likely to accept their findings.
China has made no similar commitment to send its scientists to look at the evidence. But South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said in an interview Friday that it is his "expectation" that such a commitment will be made after officials "consult with the Chinese a bit more."
Yu said South Korea needs to move carefully in dealing with China on the ship incident, nudging Beijing to accept the "facts" of the investigation without derailing "very good relations" between the two countries.
"I don't want to push them," Yu said.
China is South Korea's most important trading partner, the primary focus of its foreign investment and its leading tourist destination. About 5 million people travel between the two countries every year.
Yu said his government understands that the warship's sinking has pushed Beijing into an awkward corner.
"China has a very special linkage and interest" in North Korea, Yu said. "So I presume that it is not that easy to ignore the North Koreans' appeal to support their position."
"If China will do anything, it will be done in a very quiet manner," Yu said. "China will never say in public what they are going to do."
Amid all the fiery rhetoric this week, an important door was left open: Both countries have not shut down the Kaesong industrial complex, a factory park just inside the North Korean border. More than 40,000 North Koreans work there for South Korean companies. Over the past six years, the complex has pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into the North's struggling economy.
"We don't want to spoil a good kind of showcase for North-South economic cooperation," Yu said.
As it moved this week to punish the North, South Korea said it would install propaganda loudspeakers along the border. In response, North Korea threatened to blow up the speakers and close down Kaesong.
But Yu said South Korea is open to delaying its psychological warfare operations if the North sends the right signals.
The North Korean government of Kim Jong Il also has been "very careful" not to use rhetoric that would force Kaesong to close, said a high-ranking South Korean official who briefed foreign reporters Friday.
"It is a kind of verbal chicken game," the official said. But he said North Korean authorities understand that the factory park supports the livelihoods of 200,000 people in the Kaesong area and that shutting it down could lead to unrest that might spread to other cities.
By Blaine Harden
Washington Post, Saturday, May 29, 2010; A12
SEOUL -- China toughened its position toward North Korea Friday but fell short of the support for a U.N. Security Council rebuke that South Korean leaders had hoped for during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's high-profile visit.
Wen told South Korean President Lee Myung-bak that China has not concluded whether North Korea is responsible for the March 26 sinking of a South Korean naval ship that killed 46 sailors. The incident has triggered one of the worst security crises on this divided peninsula since the 1950-53 Korean War.
That stance, in stark contrast to an international investigation blaming Pyongyang for the torpedo attack, reflects China's traditional kid-gloves approach to the isolated, impoverished and heavily armed dictatorship on its far eastern border.
Still, Wen signaled a shift in position by not simply supporting North Korea and by telling Lee that China would not defend anyone responsible for the sinking of the 1,200-ton Cheonan.
"It is a modest shift, but a pretty disappointing one," said Michael J. Green, a top adviser on North Korea in President George W. Bush's administration.
Green said that among China's leaders, Wen is one of the most sympathetic to South Korea's position and that his remarks indicate that China ultimately would support a U.N. resolution -- but "will do everything to water it down" and press for a return to negotiations. He noted that "Beijing never before has been under such pressure to choose between North and South," which is a major trading partner.
"We certainly hope that, you know, through this visit, China will recognize and support the conclusions of the investigation," State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said. "We think that the evidence is compelling. And we think that it's time for the international community to come together in a united and demonstrated way and send a clear message to North Korea."
North Korea adamantly denies sinking the ship and has threatened war if there is any move to punish it. Pyongyang also said this week that it is severing relations with the South, a move that followed Seoul's imposition of trade, diplomatic and military measures to punish North Korea.
The North: Sinking 'faked'
On Friday, a senior North Korean general said the sinking was a hoax perpetrated by Seoul, and he warned of war. At a rare news conference for a member of the powerful National Defense Commission, Maj. Gen. Pak Rim Su reportedly said South Korea had "faked" the sinking.
Wen said China is examining the international investigation that blamed North Korea, whose state-run economy depends almost exclusively on China for fuel, food aid and trade. The investigation, conducted by South Korea and experts from the United States and three other countries, found evidence that a North Korean-made torpedo fired by a North Korean mini-submarine sank the ship.
China "always opposes and condemns any acts detrimental to peace and stability on the peninsula," Wen said, according to the official New China News Agency. He added that Beijing "takes serious note of the results of a joint investigation by South Korea and other countries, as well as the reactions of all parties."
Wen is in South Korea for a three-day visit that presents a difficult diplomatic challenge. China has to balance its historically protective stance toward North Korea against the surging importance of its economic ties to South Korea and Japan. This weekend, Wen meets again with Lee and with Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama.
The South Korean government is working with the United States to secure Security Council condemnation of North Korea. In their meeting in Seoul, Lee pressed Wen "to play an active role in making North Korea admit its wrongdoing," the president's spokesman said.
Wen did not go nearly that far, according to accounts of their meeting. Yet his careful comments appeared to recalibrate the rules in Beijing's treatment of North Korea, which would almost certainly collapse without China's concessionary aid. Before Friday, China had confined its comments on the ship's sinking to expressions of sympathy for the loss of life while cautioning all governments to remain calm.
More consultations
China appears to be standing alone among veto-wielding members of the Security Council in questioning the findings of the investigation into the ship's sinking.
Russia announced this week that it will send a team of experts to examine evidence gathered by investigators. South Korean officials said they think that Russia is likely to accept their findings.
China has made no similar commitment to send its scientists to look at the evidence. But South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said in an interview Friday that it is his "expectation" that such a commitment will be made after officials "consult with the Chinese a bit more."
Yu said South Korea needs to move carefully in dealing with China on the ship incident, nudging Beijing to accept the "facts" of the investigation without derailing "very good relations" between the two countries.
"I don't want to push them," Yu said.
China is South Korea's most important trading partner, the primary focus of its foreign investment and its leading tourist destination. About 5 million people travel between the two countries every year.
Yu said his government understands that the warship's sinking has pushed Beijing into an awkward corner.
"China has a very special linkage and interest" in North Korea, Yu said. "So I presume that it is not that easy to ignore the North Koreans' appeal to support their position."
"If China will do anything, it will be done in a very quiet manner," Yu said. "China will never say in public what they are going to do."
Amid all the fiery rhetoric this week, an important door was left open: Both countries have not shut down the Kaesong industrial complex, a factory park just inside the North Korean border. More than 40,000 North Koreans work there for South Korean companies. Over the past six years, the complex has pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into the North's struggling economy.
"We don't want to spoil a good kind of showcase for North-South economic cooperation," Yu said.
As it moved this week to punish the North, South Korea said it would install propaganda loudspeakers along the border. In response, North Korea threatened to blow up the speakers and close down Kaesong.
But Yu said South Korea is open to delaying its psychological warfare operations if the North sends the right signals.
The North Korean government of Kim Jong Il also has been "very careful" not to use rhetoric that would force Kaesong to close, said a high-ranking South Korean official who briefed foreign reporters Friday.
"It is a kind of verbal chicken game," the official said. But he said North Korean authorities understand that the factory park supports the livelihoods of 200,000 people in the Kaesong area and that shutting it down could lead to unrest that might spread to other cities.
Thursday, May 6, 2010
North Korea and its seclusive leader - Washington Post
North Korean Can’t Avoid Sunshine in China Trip
By ANDREW JACOBS
The New York Times, May 5, 2010
BEIJING — Much as in the children’s book “Where’s Waldo?” the proof that North Korea’s president, Kim Jong-il, is indeed traveling through China can be obvious, if somewhat headache-inducing to arrive at.
The quest usually begins with a rumor, followed shortly by the unmistakable sight of the Dear Leader’s bulletproof train edging across the Yalu River bridge, the curtains safely drawn as its cars creep into the Chinese city of Dandong from North Korea.
In the days that follow, there are unconfirmed sightings, grainy images of Mr. Kim’s buoyant coif shot by South Korean or Japanese television cameras and the inevitable poker-faced obfuscations by Chinese officials. Only after Mr. Kim has safely returned to Pyongyang do both governments announce that the clandestine state visit took place at all.
The visit by Mr. Kim, which would be his fifth and may or may not have started at dawn Monday, has been no different. On Tuesday, Jiang Yu, a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, brushed off reporters’ inquiries about Mr. Kim’s putative sightings. “On this issue in which you are very interested, at present I don’t have any information to offer you,” she finally said.
But the effort to conceal the rare journey by Mr. Kim outside his diplomatically isolated and economically devastated country has not gone so well this time.
Despite an aggressive offense by Chinese police officers who detained several camera operators at one stop and asked them to erase images of their quarry, foreign journalists have managed to track his movements from a luxury hotel and car factory in the port city of Dalian to the official state guest house in Beijing where President Richard M. Nixon once dined on shark’s fin and steamed coconut chicken.
Even if the passengers were hidden behind tinted glass, a motorcade of three dozen vehicles that stopped traffic in the heart of the Chinese capital on Wednesday afternoon was a decent sign that someone important was in town.
Along the way, photographers have captured images of Mr. Kim’s thinning hair, the oversize designer sunglasses and the unmistakable dragging of his left leg, seemingly irrefutable proof that the 68-year-old leader is still grappling with the effects of a stroke he reportedly suffered two years ago.
If the Chinese-language media have avoided any mention of the visit, that is thought to be at the behest of Mr. Kim, whose fears of coups or assassination attempts are well-known. On his way back home from a previous China visit in 2004, an explosion killed at least 180 people at a railroad station in North Korea not long after his entourage had passed through. Even if South Korean analysts later judged it an accident, Mr. Kim’s minders take no chances and often send out decoy trains to confuse would-be saboteurs.
“His security team may be opposed to him flying because if something happens, there is no replacing Kim Jong-il at the moment,” said Haksoon Paik, director of Inter-Korean Relations at the Sejong Institute in Seoul. “He is all they have.”
In the vacuum of official information, the experts and tea-leaf readers have been left to surmise why Mr. Kim chose this moment to make his first foray outside North Korea in more than four years. Does President Hu Jintao want to personally prod Mr. Kim to rejoin the stalled talks over the North’s illicit nuclear weapons program? Or has the North Korean leader simply come, once again, seeking the Chinese food and fuel that will ease the suffering of his people?
Some analysts think Mr. Kim may be seeking China’s blessing for a succession plan that would install his youngest son, Kim Jung-un, as the country’s next leader.
“Maybe he wanted Chinese leaders to see how he drags his foot so they know he is really ill,” said Sang-Hyun Lee, director of Security Studies Program at the Sejong Institute in South Korea.
Given his health woes, succession worries and persistent isolation, Mr. Kim may simply be seeking succor from what may be his last friend on earth. Su Hao, director of the Center for Strategic and Conflict Management at China Foreign Affairs University, said the North Korean leader might have also come to explain whether his country played a role in the sinking of a South Korean military vessel in March that killed 46 sailors. The incident, which has enraged South Koreans, could derail any effort to restart the six-party talks and ease the U.N. sanctions that have strangled North Korean’s already ailing economy.
“I think the situation for North Korea right now is complicated and difficult,” Mr. Su said. “I’m sure the outside world does not want China to abandon North Korea at this moment. It would not be good for anybody.”
At the five-star Furama Hotel in Dalian where Mr. Kim was photographed leaving on Monday – and where white sheets had obscured the lobby windows – things were returning to normal on Wednesday. In a brief telephone conversation, an employee said the hotel’s 626 rooms were open to the public again. All except for one: the presidential suite reputedly occupied by Mr. Kim. “That room is not available,” the woman said mysteriously. “It’s under maintenance.”
Li Bibo contributed research.
By ANDREW JACOBS
The New York Times, May 5, 2010
BEIJING — Much as in the children’s book “Where’s Waldo?” the proof that North Korea’s president, Kim Jong-il, is indeed traveling through China can be obvious, if somewhat headache-inducing to arrive at.
The quest usually begins with a rumor, followed shortly by the unmistakable sight of the Dear Leader’s bulletproof train edging across the Yalu River bridge, the curtains safely drawn as its cars creep into the Chinese city of Dandong from North Korea.
In the days that follow, there are unconfirmed sightings, grainy images of Mr. Kim’s buoyant coif shot by South Korean or Japanese television cameras and the inevitable poker-faced obfuscations by Chinese officials. Only after Mr. Kim has safely returned to Pyongyang do both governments announce that the clandestine state visit took place at all.
The visit by Mr. Kim, which would be his fifth and may or may not have started at dawn Monday, has been no different. On Tuesday, Jiang Yu, a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, brushed off reporters’ inquiries about Mr. Kim’s putative sightings. “On this issue in which you are very interested, at present I don’t have any information to offer you,” she finally said.
But the effort to conceal the rare journey by Mr. Kim outside his diplomatically isolated and economically devastated country has not gone so well this time.
Despite an aggressive offense by Chinese police officers who detained several camera operators at one stop and asked them to erase images of their quarry, foreign journalists have managed to track his movements from a luxury hotel and car factory in the port city of Dalian to the official state guest house in Beijing where President Richard M. Nixon once dined on shark’s fin and steamed coconut chicken.
Even if the passengers were hidden behind tinted glass, a motorcade of three dozen vehicles that stopped traffic in the heart of the Chinese capital on Wednesday afternoon was a decent sign that someone important was in town.
Along the way, photographers have captured images of Mr. Kim’s thinning hair, the oversize designer sunglasses and the unmistakable dragging of his left leg, seemingly irrefutable proof that the 68-year-old leader is still grappling with the effects of a stroke he reportedly suffered two years ago.
If the Chinese-language media have avoided any mention of the visit, that is thought to be at the behest of Mr. Kim, whose fears of coups or assassination attempts are well-known. On his way back home from a previous China visit in 2004, an explosion killed at least 180 people at a railroad station in North Korea not long after his entourage had passed through. Even if South Korean analysts later judged it an accident, Mr. Kim’s minders take no chances and often send out decoy trains to confuse would-be saboteurs.
“His security team may be opposed to him flying because if something happens, there is no replacing Kim Jong-il at the moment,” said Haksoon Paik, director of Inter-Korean Relations at the Sejong Institute in Seoul. “He is all they have.”
In the vacuum of official information, the experts and tea-leaf readers have been left to surmise why Mr. Kim chose this moment to make his first foray outside North Korea in more than four years. Does President Hu Jintao want to personally prod Mr. Kim to rejoin the stalled talks over the North’s illicit nuclear weapons program? Or has the North Korean leader simply come, once again, seeking the Chinese food and fuel that will ease the suffering of his people?
Some analysts think Mr. Kim may be seeking China’s blessing for a succession plan that would install his youngest son, Kim Jung-un, as the country’s next leader.
“Maybe he wanted Chinese leaders to see how he drags his foot so they know he is really ill,” said Sang-Hyun Lee, director of Security Studies Program at the Sejong Institute in South Korea.
Given his health woes, succession worries and persistent isolation, Mr. Kim may simply be seeking succor from what may be his last friend on earth. Su Hao, director of the Center for Strategic and Conflict Management at China Foreign Affairs University, said the North Korean leader might have also come to explain whether his country played a role in the sinking of a South Korean military vessel in March that killed 46 sailors. The incident, which has enraged South Koreans, could derail any effort to restart the six-party talks and ease the U.N. sanctions that have strangled North Korean’s already ailing economy.
“I think the situation for North Korea right now is complicated and difficult,” Mr. Su said. “I’m sure the outside world does not want China to abandon North Korea at this moment. It would not be good for anybody.”
At the five-star Furama Hotel in Dalian where Mr. Kim was photographed leaving on Monday – and where white sheets had obscured the lobby windows – things were returning to normal on Wednesday. In a brief telephone conversation, an employee said the hotel’s 626 rooms were open to the public again. All except for one: the presidential suite reputedly occupied by Mr. Kim. “That room is not available,” the woman said mysteriously. “It’s under maintenance.”
Li Bibo contributed research.
Wednesday, May 5, 2010
China and North Korea: a troubling relationship
North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il's Visit to China
Victor Cha
The Center For Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
Critical Questions, May 5, 2010
Kim Jong-il's armored train arrived in the Chinese border city of Dandong on Monday, May 3, confirming months of media speculation that the North Korean leader's fifth trip to China was imminent. Kim's exact itinerary is unknown, but he reportedly toured areas in and around Dalian on Tuesday and is expected to visit Jinzhou next, followed by Shenyang and Beijing. President Hu Jintao of China is expected to meet with Kim and his delegation during the course of the visit. It remains to be seen if Kim Jong-un, Kim's youngest son and North Korea's heir apparent, is among his father's extensive entourage of senior advisers and officials. His presence in the North Korean delegation would be another strong indicator that he is Kim's intended successor.
Q1: When was the last time Kim visited China?
A1: Kim last visited China in January 2006, following an October 2005 trip by Hu Jintao to Pyongyang. In addition to bilateral talks and discussions on the nuclear issue, Kim took an extensive tour of southern China to survey the region's great economic progress. At the time there was speculation that North Korea was considering Chinese-style reforms to jumpstart its ailing economy. No such reforms were ever initiated.
Q2: Why is China meeting with Kim now?
A2: The Chinese contextualize this visit as a regularly scheduled summit within their long relationship with North Korea. News reports indicate that Kim has brought a substantial delegation with him including senior party officials. Hu met with President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea in Shanghai on April 30. His meeting with the North Korean leader, scheduled to occur only days later, typifies Beijing's efforts to maintain an equidistant stance from the two Koreas.
Q3: Why is Kim taking a rare trip outside the country to meet Hu?
A3: It is always difficult to fathom North Korean intentions, but it appears as though there may be three possible purposes. (1) To secure much-needed assistance from the DPRK's only benefactor these days. Sino-DPRK trade amounted to $2.68 billion for 2009; this figure does not include any additional trade and aid that Beijing provides through unreported party or military channels. (2) To gain some face time with China as suspicions mount that the DPRK was responsible for the March 26 unprovoked torpedoing of a ROK naval vessel, killing 46 sailors; an audience with the Chinese sends an unsubtle message that Beijing is unlikely to sign on to any UN Security Council actions in response to the incident. (3) If press speculation is correct that Kim Jong-un, Kim's youngest son and likely successor, is part of the delegation, then another possible purpose of the trip is to give the younger Kim some exposure to summit diplomacy with Pyongyang's only remaining supporter in the international system.
Q4: Why isn't Beijing delaying the summit with Kim given the unsettled situation regarding the sinking of the ROK vessel?
A4: Beijing has no formal pretext for delaying the scheduled meeting with Kim. There is no clear evidence of DPRK culpability. Nevertheless, 80 percent of South Koreans believe the incident was perpetrated by Pyongyang, and evidence strongly suggests so. In this context, Beijing might have sent a clear political message to Pyongyang by denying the meeting. It would have shown North Korea that there are costs to its provocative behavior. Moreover, it would have constituted a sign of respect and allegiance with South Korea. By any calculation, China's future on the Korean peninsula is with the ROK. Bilateral trade between Seoul and Beijing is $186 billion compared with $2.68 billion between Pyongyang and Beijing. South Korea has over 50,000 students studying in China, more than any other country. Statistics suggest that less than 1,000 North Korean students study in China.
Q5: How does China view North Korean provocations?
A5: The dilemma faced by Beijing is that provocative acts by the DPRK put pressure on China's strategic objective of separating its relations with North and South Korea. Since normalization with Seoul in 1992, China is the only major power (with Russia) in the region that has diplomatic relations with both Koreas and the potential to effect positive change. Yet, Beijing has consistently chosen to delink the two, neither calling on the DPRK to reciprocate ROK engagement, nor heeding Seoul's entreaties for Beijing to use its material leverage to help curb Pyongyang's bellicosity. While most understand China's dilemma, many see Beijing's "muddle through" strategy as a disappointing symbol of China's inability to play a leadership role in East Asia commensurate with its rise. This inability to make hard choices on the peninsula helps to explain the gap between China's rhetoric of cooperation with other members of the Six-Party Talks and its actions on the ground.
Q6: What is the road ahead out of the Kim-Hu summit?
A6: Very hard to tell. Beijing may hope that it can convince the DPRK to return to Six-Party Talks, dropping its previous resistance. But at this point-with the ship sinking incident unresolved-it is hard to imagine either Seoul or Washington being interested in such a return to the table. Denuclearization remains the paramount goal, but the unprecedented nature of the ship sinking makes it difficult to conduct diplomacy as usual.
Victor Cha holds the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Victor Cha
The Center For Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
Critical Questions, May 5, 2010
Kim Jong-il's armored train arrived in the Chinese border city of Dandong on Monday, May 3, confirming months of media speculation that the North Korean leader's fifth trip to China was imminent. Kim's exact itinerary is unknown, but he reportedly toured areas in and around Dalian on Tuesday and is expected to visit Jinzhou next, followed by Shenyang and Beijing. President Hu Jintao of China is expected to meet with Kim and his delegation during the course of the visit. It remains to be seen if Kim Jong-un, Kim's youngest son and North Korea's heir apparent, is among his father's extensive entourage of senior advisers and officials. His presence in the North Korean delegation would be another strong indicator that he is Kim's intended successor.
Q1: When was the last time Kim visited China?
A1: Kim last visited China in January 2006, following an October 2005 trip by Hu Jintao to Pyongyang. In addition to bilateral talks and discussions on the nuclear issue, Kim took an extensive tour of southern China to survey the region's great economic progress. At the time there was speculation that North Korea was considering Chinese-style reforms to jumpstart its ailing economy. No such reforms were ever initiated.
Q2: Why is China meeting with Kim now?
A2: The Chinese contextualize this visit as a regularly scheduled summit within their long relationship with North Korea. News reports indicate that Kim has brought a substantial delegation with him including senior party officials. Hu met with President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea in Shanghai on April 30. His meeting with the North Korean leader, scheduled to occur only days later, typifies Beijing's efforts to maintain an equidistant stance from the two Koreas.
Q3: Why is Kim taking a rare trip outside the country to meet Hu?
A3: It is always difficult to fathom North Korean intentions, but it appears as though there may be three possible purposes. (1) To secure much-needed assistance from the DPRK's only benefactor these days. Sino-DPRK trade amounted to $2.68 billion for 2009; this figure does not include any additional trade and aid that Beijing provides through unreported party or military channels. (2) To gain some face time with China as suspicions mount that the DPRK was responsible for the March 26 unprovoked torpedoing of a ROK naval vessel, killing 46 sailors; an audience with the Chinese sends an unsubtle message that Beijing is unlikely to sign on to any UN Security Council actions in response to the incident. (3) If press speculation is correct that Kim Jong-un, Kim's youngest son and likely successor, is part of the delegation, then another possible purpose of the trip is to give the younger Kim some exposure to summit diplomacy with Pyongyang's only remaining supporter in the international system.
Q4: Why isn't Beijing delaying the summit with Kim given the unsettled situation regarding the sinking of the ROK vessel?
A4: Beijing has no formal pretext for delaying the scheduled meeting with Kim. There is no clear evidence of DPRK culpability. Nevertheless, 80 percent of South Koreans believe the incident was perpetrated by Pyongyang, and evidence strongly suggests so. In this context, Beijing might have sent a clear political message to Pyongyang by denying the meeting. It would have shown North Korea that there are costs to its provocative behavior. Moreover, it would have constituted a sign of respect and allegiance with South Korea. By any calculation, China's future on the Korean peninsula is with the ROK. Bilateral trade between Seoul and Beijing is $186 billion compared with $2.68 billion between Pyongyang and Beijing. South Korea has over 50,000 students studying in China, more than any other country. Statistics suggest that less than 1,000 North Korean students study in China.
Q5: How does China view North Korean provocations?
A5: The dilemma faced by Beijing is that provocative acts by the DPRK put pressure on China's strategic objective of separating its relations with North and South Korea. Since normalization with Seoul in 1992, China is the only major power (with Russia) in the region that has diplomatic relations with both Koreas and the potential to effect positive change. Yet, Beijing has consistently chosen to delink the two, neither calling on the DPRK to reciprocate ROK engagement, nor heeding Seoul's entreaties for Beijing to use its material leverage to help curb Pyongyang's bellicosity. While most understand China's dilemma, many see Beijing's "muddle through" strategy as a disappointing symbol of China's inability to play a leadership role in East Asia commensurate with its rise. This inability to make hard choices on the peninsula helps to explain the gap between China's rhetoric of cooperation with other members of the Six-Party Talks and its actions on the ground.
Q6: What is the road ahead out of the Kim-Hu summit?
A6: Very hard to tell. Beijing may hope that it can convince the DPRK to return to Six-Party Talks, dropping its previous resistance. But at this point-with the ship sinking incident unresolved-it is hard to imagine either Seoul or Washington being interested in such a return to the table. Denuclearization remains the paramount goal, but the unprecedented nature of the ship sinking makes it difficult to conduct diplomacy as usual.
Victor Cha holds the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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