Terminou o maior evento realizado na história da humanidade, ao que parece. Os chineses cumpriram as suas metas, como num plano quinquenal. Metas são para ser cumpridas, ao que parece...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Shanghai Expo Sets Record With 73 Million Visitors
By DAVID BARBOZA
The New York Times, November 2, 2010
According to tourism experts, state employees and government bureaucrats from virtually every part of the nation were ordered to pile onto buses, trains and planes and head to the Expo 2010 in Shanghai.
SHANGHAI — When city officials here promised the biggest and best World Expo ever, they were not just blowing smoke, as Tao Renran and 60 co-workers at a state-run garment factory found out recently when they were asked to visit this year’s Shanghai World Expo.
That odd request, they said, quickly became a threat. “We were required to come, otherwise, they said, they would cut our wages,” the 46-year-old Ms. Tao said last week, after traveling eight hours by bus to get a one-day glimpse of the Expo.
Ms. Tao and her co-workers had lots of company. According to tourism experts, state employees and government bureaucrats from virtually every part of the nation were ordered to pile onto buses, trains and planes and head to the Expo 2010 in Shanghai, this year’s singular national event, which ended on Sunday.
State-run tourist agencies had travel quotas, and state companies handed out free vouchers good for a one-day visit, all in the hopes of helping pump up the numbers.
“I’m in charge of encouraging 5,000 workers to get on this Expo trip organized by our company,” Chen Hao, 23, deputy chief of the labor union at a state-run steel mill in Shanxi Province in northern China, said last week, after posing for photographs near the China Pavilion. “I got free tickets from the travel agency.”
This government campaign had a simple but noble objective: helping the six-month-long Shanghai Expo reach its target of 70 million visitors, which would shatter Japan’s Expo attendance record of 64 million, set in Osaka in 1970.
Breaking the record was a matter of national pride, and in a country with a history of mass mobilizations and state propaganda, reaching the target was not a question of whether but when.
That day arrived on Oct. 24, when Expo attendance eclipsed the 70 million mark, with a week to go. By the time the Expo closed with a glittery ceremony attended by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, just over 73 million visitors had passed through the Expo turnstiles; it is believed to be one of the biggest events ever staged.
Of course, only 5.8 percent of the visitors — about 4.2 million — were foreigners, according to government data.
Liu Kang, who teaches at Duke University and Jiaotong University in Shanghai, said there was never much doubt Shanghai would meet its target.
“China always has these quotas,” Professor Liu said Monday, as the Expo Park was being dismantled after its 184-day run. “And if they don’t make the numbers, it’s not good for those in power.”
Using state resources to achieve such lofty goals is part of the game.
It is known, for instance, that in 2008 the Beijing Olympic torch relay was masterfully stage-managed for millions of viewers of state-run television here, with crowds bused in to line the relay route and cheer on the torch bearers.
Soon after the torch runner passed by, the cheering crowds were ordered to get back onto their designated buses and head to the next location along the route, where they were expected to cheer for the cameras all over again.
Shanghai officials had even bigger ambitions for the Expo, beginning with the clearing of two square miles for the Expo site by relocating hundreds of factories and moving tens of thousands of families.
When the Expo opened on May 1, a sprawling multibillion-dollar global theme park came to life with hundreds of national pavilions, including Saudi Arabia’s spectacularly expensive IMAX-equipped pavilion and Britain’s design gem, known as the “seed cathedral.”
Long before the Expo got under way, Shanghai authorities predicted that it would largely be attended by a domestic audience. Drawing huge crowds would be easy, organizers said, because only a small percentage of China’s residents get to travel overseas.
But hopes for a record-breaking effort seemed in doubt after visitor numbers dipped to 131,000 a day on May 3. That was far below the 380,000 daily average organizers said was necessary to break the record.
Soon after, Expo officials reminded the media that Shanghai’s 20 million residents would each be given a free one-day Expo pass. The city also started a promotional blitz on the nation’s state-run networks. State travel agencies were pressed to deliver on their Expo quotas. And they did.
“We had to entertain lots of government tourists,” said Ni Ni, a spokeswoman for the Jiangxi International Travel Agency in Jiangxi Province, in western China. “We arranged for a group of 1,000 for our local state-owned company. These kinds of trips are all covered by the government. Each travel agency partnering with the Expo has a quota. As far as I know even the very remote areas like Anhui, Henan and here in Jiangxi Province have all surpassed the quota.”
By early summer, it was clear that Shanghai was on track. Millions of schoolchildren began arriving. And overflow crowds jammed the Expo grounds. Entire villages of farmers, sometimes wearing matching Tang Dynasty-era nylon jackets, camped out.
With long lines at the American, French, German and British pavilions, which were among the most elaborate, many visitors opted for those of Slovakia, the Maldives and North Korea (which featured a fountain, Korean folk songs and an English sign that said “Paradise for People”).
Plastic ferns, artificial flowers and department store mannequins dressed in national garb did not deter visitors from fighting for positions at dozens of smaller pavilions and exhibition halls.
“This place has its own uniqueness,” said Jing Yangfa, a retired Shanghai university professor, while examining carpets at the exhibition hall created for Tajikistan, a country on China’s northwest border. “This is really like a visit to Tajikistan.”
In the sweltering heat of August, and in pouring rain two weeks ago, many queues involved three-hour waits. People lined up for four hours last week to get into Japan’s pavilion, dubbed the “purple silkworm.” And the line snaking around Saudi Arabia’s pavilion was eight hours long.
Some desperate visitors tried to con their way into the special access line of pavilions by pretending to be confined to a wheelchair. And there were reports that elderly women were standing near the entrance gates offering to rent themselves out as Expo escorts for $25 a day — a sure way to pass through the special access line.
Scalpers even began hawking V.I.P. tickets to the Saudi Pavilion for nearly $150.
By then, of course, Shanghai was well on its way to meeting its target. On Oct. 16, a record 1.03 million visitors jammed the Expo park — breaking another Japanese record set in 1970. And two days later, the 70 millionth visitor arrived. Headlines in the state-run news media declared “70 million-plus reasons to celebrate.”
One of the last visitors to the Expo, on the final day, was Zhao Chengui, 55, who works for a state power company in Hubei Province.
He said he was leading a group of homemakers to the China Pavilion.
“Our department arranged for 20 honored wives of pioneering workers in our department to come here,” he said. “Some of them have never been to other cities before. The company pays all the accommodation — everything.”
The day after the conclusion of the so-called Green Expo — as it was called because of its emphasis on sustainable, environmentally friendly cities — something unexpected happened: pollution levels in Shanghai jumped to a near six-month high.
Apparently, the state mandates to close neighboring factories had been lifted, creating a post-Expo haze.
Chen Xiaoduan contributed research.
Wednesday, November 3, 2010
Tuesday, November 2, 2010
China, abertura do "Imperio do Centro" (anos 1980) - Paulo Antônio Pereira Pinto
China – Década de 1980, abertura para um universo de influência cultural do “Império do Centro”
Paulo Antônio Pereira Pinto
Meridiano 47, novembro 2010
Há cerca de dez anos, tenho tido o privilégio de contar com este espaço, concedido pela Universidade de Brasília, para exercícios de reflexão sobre minha vivência, entre China, Sudeste Asiático, Taiwan, Índia e, agora, Cáucaso. Peço vênia, nesta oportunidade, para a recapitulação dos “melhores momentos” destes estudos. O primeiro artigo trata do período entre 1982 e 1995, dividido entre Pequim (Brasília), Kuala Lumpur, Cingapura e Manila. Analisa o processo de abertura chinesa, consequências no plano interno e nas relações da RPC com seu entorno imediato, no Sudeste Asiático.
Assim, meus depoimentos se iniciam, a partir da década de 1980, quando começa uma nova fase na história recente da China, com processo de modernização e abertura do país ao exterior, após o período turbulento da Revolução Cultural.
Tanto no plano interno, como no externo, identificam-se, naquele momento, alterações determinadas por condicionantes da forma de pensar chinesa, cuja história é marcada por ciclos que se repetem em resposta a sucessivas novas contradições. Buscam-se, sempre, outros pontos de equilíbrio. O ocorrido na década de 1980 significava o início de nova cena de partida, de um passado recente, que estabeleceu bases para o cenário em vigor na China. Daí, talvez, o interesse quanto à reflexão sobre o que se passou, para o melhor entendimento do que está acontecendo e virá a ocorrer.
Naquele período, cabe ressaltar, não era possível deixar de sentir uma certa tristeza, pelo fato de que havia sido encerrada, na China, uma era de convicção poética maoista. A partir de 1949, acreditara-se que, em benefício do interesse comum da sociedade, centenas de milhões de pessoas poderiam ser levadas a patamar mais elevado do que o egoísmo individual.
A experiência chinesa de busca de uma sociedade igualitária encantara a muitos. Os países do Terceiro Mundo admiravam sua combatividade e auto-suficiência. Os economistas ocidentais registravam o pleno emprego atingido no campo e invejavam sua força de trabalho disciplinada, na indústria. O exercício de observação diário e o aprendizado da realidade do país, no entanto, indicavam que não se vivera na China, nas três décadas anteriores, tantos motivos de encantamento[1].
Na verdade, naquele período, perdurara o elitismo e a corrupção entre os dirigentes do partido e do governo. O lento progresso obtido na economia demonstrara não ser tão fácil, desenvolver-se com os próprios recursos, sem a infusão de investimento, tecnologia ou ajuda externa.
Em suas relações internacionais, sabe-se que a República Popular, desde sua fundação, em 1949, havia mantido um vasto exército e milícias armadas e desenvolvido a bomba atômica. A China tivera conflitos com a União Soviética e Índia e fricções com o Japão, com respeito às Ilhas de Senkaku e com o Vietnã, quanto às Spratlys. Não se tratava, portanto, de país totalmente “amante da paz”, conforme se divulgava em Pequim aos visitantes estrangeiros.
No plano interno, à medida que se conhecia melhor a real situação chinesa, ficavam diminuídos, inclusive, os ganhos considerados, por exemplo, no controle familiar – enorme. No entanto, verificava-se o custo em termos de direitos humanos, na proibição de casamentos antes dos 20 anos e obrigatoriedade de apenas um filho por casal.
Não se quer negar, no entanto, as grandes conquistas do período maoísta, nem os feitos do povo chinês. Um país que, na primeira metade do século XX, fora devastado por guerras internas, encontrava-se, no início da década de 1980, unificado, apesar das crises de liderança resultantes da Revolução Cultural.
Como era possível verificar, a China alimentava e vestia seu povo. Um esforço descomunal fora feito para construir represas, diques e sistemas de irrigação, bem como no sentido da auto-suficiência alimentar. Mas seria isso suficiente? Tais conquistas teriam que ser vistas em perspectiva.
Mao Zedong tornara a “necessidade” em “virtude”, como base de sustentação para política de auto-suficiência. Em grande parte, tratava-se de reação ao fato de que os soviéticos terem cessado toda e qualquer auxílio, a partir de 1960, levando consigo, inclusive as matrizes de fábricas cuja instalação já havia sido iniciada.
O Grande Timoneiro, então, colocou toda sua crença na “genialidade do povo chinês”. Doravante, tudo seria resolvido com a mobilização permanente das “massas”. Daí, surgiriam energias e talentos até então escondidos por sistema social opressivo. Na década de 1960, por exemplo, ampla campanha nacional encorajava simples operários a fazerem sugestões sobre inovações tecnológicas. Exageros evidentes eram noticiados a respeito do aumento de produtividade como resultado de soluções práticas obtidas nos canteiros de obras, campos agrícolas e operadores de máquinas nas fábricas.
O caráter “anticientífico” das práticas maoistas chegou ao apogeu durante a chamada Revolução Cultural, quando professores e alunos foram obrigados a curvar-se diante da “sabedoria” das massas.
Postura semelhante foi adotada nas forças armadas chinesas, onde o conceito maoista de “guerra popular” baseava-se na premissa de que “homens contavam mais do que máquinas”. Nessa perspectiva, centenas de milhares de soldados de infantaria, com armamento obsoleto, seriam capazes de derrotar um Exército soviético equipado com armas modernas. Mantinha-se, no entanto, a dissuasão nuclear, na medida em que a China não renunciava a sua própria bomba atômica.
Com a derrota do “bando dos quatro”, a China desencadeou outra campanha, desta feita para condenar a viúva de Mao, visando a acusá-la e a seus três cúmplices de Xangai pela maioria dos fracassos e fraquezas do anos anteriores. Este novo processo implicou, novamente, em notáveis exageros nas acusações. A mensagem, no entanto, era clara: os dirigentes chineses haviam tomado consciência de que suas políticas de auto-suficiência, recusa em aceitar ajuda externa e negativa à aquisição de tecnologia estrangeira haviam reduzido as taxas de crescimento e o progresso em quase todos os setores da economia.
A rejeição da ideologia passada foi feita na forma de pronunciamentos que, gradativamente, desautorizassem o autoritarismo vigente na fase que se encerrava. Enquanto isso, o corpo de Mao Zedong era reverenciado no Mausoléu, em Pequim, com todas as honras devidas ao fundador da República Popular da China. Tratava-se, no entanto, de trazê-lo a proporções humanas.
Começava o processo de estabelecer seu lugar na história, como um grande líder revolucionário, mas como um homem com menor sucesso, quando se tratou de administrar um país. Suas principais preocupações diziam respeito à eliminação dos dogmas socialistas, agora vistos como impedimento à nova marcha da China, em direção à modernização. O principal responsável pelas alterações na condução das políticas, econômica e social da China, a partir de 1978, e “Novo Timoneiro”, passou a ser o então Vice-Primeiro-Ministro Deng Xiao-Ping.
O julgamento público de Mao, no entanto, tinha dimensões restritas. Todos os erros cometidos no período de radicalização maoísta eram atribuídos a Lin Piao e ao “bando dos quatro”. Para o cidadão chinês, contudo, havia implicações óbvias: não era possível aceitar que toda a culpa fosse atribuída a um traidor e a quatro radicais – na prática, os atuais dirigentes em Pequim estavam admitindo que a “Grande Revolução Proletária Cultural” havia sido um fracasso enorme e custoso.
O próprio retorno de Deng Xiao-Ping ao poder, como Vice-Primeiro Ministro já significava uma rejeição eloqüente do julgamento de Mao, que havia dado seu apoio pessoal às duas quedas anteriores de Deng.
Não era possível ignorar, contudo, que Mao tinha razão quanto ao diagnóstico sobre os males que atingiam a China. Assim, de acordo com sua visão, o maior perigo para o país seria o retorno à estagnação imposta pela burocracia do partido e do estado. Suas soluções eram poéticas e imaginativas: uma série de campanhas para mobilizar os intelectuais – “O Movimento de Cem Flores” – a busca de um caminho mais curto para o Socialismo – “O Grande Salto Adiante” – e a provocação de uma “discórdia criativa” entre a juventude do país e a burocracia estatal – “A Revolução Cultural”.
Sabe-se, contudo, que Mao não obteve sucesso na criação do “homem socialista”. Ele pediu demais, tanto dos chineses, quanto da natureza humana.
No final da década de 1970, no entanto, todo este processo havia sido esquecido. Ficara provado que, em tese era uma boa idéia encorajar os trabalhadores a pensarem o aumento da produção com seus próprios meios. Na prática, a premissa ideológica, sobre a qual se baseava – a de que a sabedoria está consagrada nos trabalhadores – conduziu a medidas impraticáveis, como por exemplo, a utilização de máquinas antiquadas sendo utilizadas em velocidade inapropirada, provocando acidentes ou resultados negativos.
Com a morte de Mao Zedong e a derrubada do “Bando dos Quatro”, a China poderia, finalmente, defrontar-se com estes fatos negativos e tomar as decisões cabíveis, para superá-los.
Havia sido abandonado, no entanto, o fundamento da filosofia maoista: o “conceito hegeliano” de que a unidade deve ser dividida em duas partes e que cada situação contém em si contradições saudáveis que são necessárias para a luta e o progresso, levando, assim, à noção de luta de classes contínua e revolução permanente[2].
Segundo Mao, a China não deveria jamais permitir-se cair na complacência da “unidade” e, de acordo com esta filosofia, o “Grande Timoneiro” teve a audácia poética de desencadear uma revolução contra seu próprio governo e partido. O veredito da história será provavelmente o de que, enquanto Mao foi um dos maiores líderes revolucionários, demonstrou ser um governante menos habilidoso, uma vez que sua revolução tornou-se vencedora. Provocou, assim, severas perdas a seu país, enquanto perseguia suas visões utópicas.
Sob nova liderança, Pequim pareceria retomar a abordagem mais tradicional à forma de governança, recuperando a busca filosófica chinesa do “Caminho Real”.
Recorda-se, então, que, desde os primórdios da civilização chinesa, há 4000 anos, às margens do Rio Amarelo, que pensadores buscam equilíbrio e harmonia como forma de governança a ser chamada de “Caminho Real”, quando haveria “ordem social” em que os monarcas exerceriam suas responsabilidades e a população cumpriria seus deveres.
Nas palavras de Confúcio: “Quando um governante faz o que é certo, influenciará as pessoas, sem ordená-las. Quando o governante não faz o que é certo, seus comandos não são obedecidos”. Implícita fica a noção de que, caso a autoridade local não crie condições de governança adequadas ao funcionamento harmonioso da sociedade, os cidadãos podem ignorar o governante.
No início da década de 1980, portanto, o sentimento dominante era o de que a morte havia “humanizado” Mao Zedong e “desmitificado” a China, que, então, admitia suas limitações no trato com os grandes problemas do país.
Abertura para um Mundo de “Desordem sob os Céus”
Nos anos em que foram registradas as observações acima – entre 1982 e 1985– o cenário internacional era bipolar, com centros de poder em Washington e Moscou. Segundo classificação adotada no Ocidente, o planeta era dividido em “Três Mundos”. Os países industrializados de economia de mercado foram incluídos no Primeiro Mundo. Os de sistema econômico centralmente planificado participavam do Segundo. Os em desenvolvimento eram despachados para o Terceiro.
Durante a fase maoista, no entanto, os chineses tinham uma visão própria do globo terrestre. Este estaria dividido em duas partes antagônicas – a metade que apoiava o bloco soviético e a outra que se opunha, incluindo a China. A política externa da RPC seguia esta rigidez, baseada no pressuposto de que qualquer coisa que pudesse prejudicar os interesses de Moscou seria favorável a Pequim.
Sob a nova liderança de Deng Xiaoping, tornou-se mais pragmática também a postura chinesa no plano externo. Este “último Grande Timoneiro do século XX” – como se referem a ele alguns historiadores – apresentara, a propósito, teoria própria quanto à existência de “Três Mundos”[3].
Segundo Deng:
“A julgar pelas alterações nas relações internacionais, o mundo atual consiste de três partes, ou três mundos, que são tanto interconectados, quanto contraditórios. Os Estados Unidos e a União Soviética formam o Primeiro Mundo. Os países em desenvolvimento na Ásia, África e América Latina integram o Terceiro Mundo. Os desenvolvidos – sejam os do mundo capitalista ou do socialista – formam o Segundo Mundo”.
De acordo com o novo discurso chinês, o Sudeste Asiático, já então organizado por sua associação regional ASEAN (na sigla em inglês), representaria, em meados da década de 1970, exatamente o tipo de interlocutor capaz de implementar a cooperação – e refletir as contradições – entre países do Terceiro Mundo e entre estes e o Segundo Mundo, conforme defendido pela China. Assim, em oposição ao congelamento das esferas de influência das superpotências—ambas integrantes exclusivas do Primeiro Mundo imaginado pelos chineses.
Tais desenvolvimentos induziam, desde então, à percepção de que a estrutura de poder bipolar que vinha permeando a região estaria sendo alterada em função de nova “multipolaridade”, na Ásia-Pacífico, onde quatro potências principais – os Estados Unidos, a União Soviética, a China e o Japão – teriam, doravante, sua parcela de influência.
Verifica-se, a propósito, que, desde o início da atual política de modernização da China, na década de 1980, houve desdobramentos que facilitaram o atual avanço do processo de congruência entre a área de influência tradicional da cultura chinesa e uma nova fronteira econômica da RPC .
A crescente regionalização da produção evoluía, de forma que a interação de novas tendências, como a redução nos custos da mobilidade dos fatores de produção e as economias de escala exigidas por processos produtivos crescentemente sofisticados, proporcionavam o surgimento dos chamados “tigres” ou “novas economias industrializadas”. Os efeitos de tais reajustes seriam evidentes no aparecimento de formas de relacionamento inovadoras, que incluiriam diferentes tipos de parcerias entre Japão, novas economias industrializadas no Sudeste Asiático e partes da China.
A emergência de certos países e agrupamentos regionais, sempre de acordo com esta linha de raciocínio, não se deveria a experiências isoladas, mas a fenômeno integrado, que projetaria sobre a área como um todo os benefícios da acumulação de capital e da experiência modernizadora resultante da aplicação prática de novos conhecimentos científicos e tecnológicos[4].
A estabilidade e o progresso na Ásia-Pacífico passaram a ser entendidos, por setores de opinião, como dependentes, cada vez mais, de processos de cooperação que garantissem a negociação entre suas diferentes culturas. Nesse contexto, despertavam crescente interesse os vínculos históricos entre a China e o Sudeste Asiático.
Isto porque a maioria dos países do Sudeste Asiático compartilha de passado que os inseriu, em maior ou menor escala, em esfera de influência de duas grandes civilizações: a chinesa e a indiana, que interagiram, através dos séculos, com culturas locais. O Budismo, o Islã, o Hinduismo e o Confucionismo deixaram, assim, marcas profundas que continuam a diferenciar ou aproximar pessoas.
A este mosaico de heranças culturais seculares, somou-se, mais recentemente, o colonialismo europeu que impôs pela força, novos valores e normas de organização e comportamento. A partir do término da Segunda Grande Guerra, os Estados recém-independentes da região foram divididos, pela rivalidade ideológica das superpotências, entre os que serviriam como a vitrine da economia de mercado e os que seguiriam o sistema de planejamento centralmente planificado.
Com a multipolaridade resultante do término da Guerra Fria, ocorreu o recuo das esferas de domínio de Washington e Moscou. Como consequência, no Sudeste Asiático, tornou-se possível o ressurgimento de influências político-culturais antigas, como a chinesa. Hoje, quando se discutem os efeitos da presença avassaladora da cultura de massa, resultante da globalização, os países da área buscam, em sua própria região, marcos de referência que permitam afirmar valores, idéias e crenças, consolidadas através de uma história compartilhada numa geografia determinada.
No Sudeste Asiático, nessa perspectiva, verificou-se a gestação de um novo conjunto de mudanças que afetaram não apenas a economia, através da reorganização freqüente de suas vantagens competitivas, transformações técnico-industriais nas formas de produzir e alterações na organização da sociedade. Tudo isso ocorreu, no entanto, com a preservação de valores culturais que, passando de geração a geração, garantiram uma base de sustenção do modelo que se consolidava.
Tal panorama leva alguns estudiosos, como Léon Vandermeersch[5], a contribuir para a tese de que existe uma base cultural para avaliar o fenômeno do dinamismo dos países objeto deste estudo. Isto porque, apesar de sua diversidade, em termos de extensão geográfica, população, estágio de desenvolvimento, sistema político e experiência colonial, alguns países do Sudeste Asiático possuem, em comum, conjunto de valores herdados de período de influência cultural chinesa.
Na prática, este processo de complementação/contradição – segundo o pensamento de Deng Xiaoping, citado acima – evoluiu com a busca da construção de sucessivos “building blocks”, a partir da integração do próprio sistema econômico da China. Isto levaria a moldura política regional com forte influência do ordenamento histórico em que, durante séculos, parte da área hoje situada entre Myanmar e Vietnã esteve inserida em grande arco de Estados vinculados ao Império do Centro.
Na primeira etapa dessa construção de blocos, logo após ao desaparecimento de Mao Zedong, integrou-se o próprio sistema econômico chinês. Em seguida, foi permitida a abertura de cidades costeiras ao comércio internacional, com a criação das Áreas Econômicas Especiais, onde foram adotadas práticas de economia de mercado dentro de um sistema centralmente planificado mais amplo. Os blocos seguintes foram surgindo ao longo do rio Yantze, até chegar a Xangai, onde se situaria a “cabeça do dragão”[6].
Gradativamente, houve a consolidação de Hong Kong e Macau no sistema produtivo da RPC. A crescente integração econômica – e futuramente política – com Taiwan será o passo seguinte. A expansão da fronteira econômica chinesa em direção ao Sudeste Asiático será a fase posterior, que está sendo facilitada pela existência, ao Sul da China, de uma rede de indivíduos com origem étnica comum, chamados “chineses de ultramar”, que têm como referência uma mesma identidade cultural.
Assim, gradativamente, chegar-se-ía a uma futura congruência entre a área de influência tradicional da cultura chinesa e uma nova fronteira econômica da RPC.
Este último desenvolvimento ocorreria através de um fenômeno de “cross fertilization”[7], caracterizado por intercâmbio de referenciais de valores, entre aquela área considerada historicamente como situada na periferia do Império do Centro e a RPC.
O conjunto de transformações ocorreu de forma a sugerir, mesmo, a emergência de um novo paradigma regional. Isto porque, por um lado, a existência de uma base cultural chinesa servia de plataforma de sustentação para um processo de cooperação com o Sudeste Asiático.
Por outro, haveria os tipos de contribuições seguintes:
os países bem sucedidos como a “vitrine do Capitalismo no Sudeste Asiático” – a exemplo de Cingapura – indicariam os rumos para o aperfeiçoamento da “economia socialista de mercado”, com características chinesas, ora buscada pelo programa de modernização da RPC;
a persistência do Vietnã em manter seu sistema central de planejamento, ao mesmo tempo em que adota “práticas de economia de mercado”, reforça a proposta chinesa de preservar a vertente “socialista” entre as medidas que estão sendo crescentemente adotadas, no programa de modernização da República Popular da China; e
o esforço de composição constante no sentido da manutenção da harmonia e convivência pacífica entre a população de origem chinesa e os de fé islâmica na Malásia e Indonésia serve como inspiração para exercício semelhante a ser promovido na região central da RPC, principalmente na província de Xinjiang, onde há expressivo contingente de muçulmanos. Outrossim, estende-se a necessidade de relacionar-se com novas Repúblicas, como a do Tajiquistão, onde predomina a mesma religião.
A tese de que estaria em curso tal desenvolvimento considera que, quando se fala em influência político-cultural chinesa, se tem em conta os efeitos dessa herança histórica na ação das sociedades civis, como facilitador do processo da cooperação entre a China e o Sudeste Asiático[8].
Não estão sendo consideradas, portanto, iniciativas de “políticas de Estado”. Isto porque, tanto na China, quanto no Sudeste Asiático, o conceito de Estado evoluiu em diferentes estágios, sempre a partir da perspectiva de que o centro de tudo era a figura do dirigente local, desvinculada de um espaço geográfico definido. A concepção chinesa, ademais, sempre atribuiu importância fundamental aos laços sanguíneos, como marco de referência para a soberania do Imperador. As fronteiras eram definidas em termos de população, sem levar em conta limites territoriais.
O interesse quanto à reflexão sobre o tema deve-se à influência que a emergência de um bloco político de interesses recíprocos e de mega proporções – como o representado pela China e o Sudeste Asiático – exercerá no ritmo de integração e cooperação na Ásia-Pacífico, um dos laboratórios de modernidade do planeta. Ademais, existe a possibilidade de que laços culturais possam vir a ser fator determinante na expansão de fronteira econômica na área em questão, em oposição ao exercício da força como garantia de esfera hegemônica, conforme ocorrido, com freqüência, em outras partes do mundo.
O processo de abertura da China, na década de 1980, portanto, foi facilitado por conjunto de reciprocidades entre a RPC e o Sudeste Asiático, que, ao consolidarem seu relacionamento, desenvolvem projeto regional com agenda de preocupações próprias.
CONCLUSÃO
A partir do processo de abertura, na década de 1980, a evolução social na China inicia novo ciclo histórico, em obediência ao paradigma ditado pela tradição chinesa. Nessa sequência, acontecem mais consensos do que compromissos. Há novas “cenas de partida” que se sucedem [9]. A RPC superava, naquele momento, o ponto de equilíbrio alcançado pelo princípio socialista, segundo o qual “de cada um de acordo com suas habilidades e a cada um de acordo com suas necessidades”. Seguindo a tradição confucionista, a busca da estabilidade social deveria, então, recorrer a novos fundamentos.
Segundo especialistas no assunto, Mao não teria sido um líder na concepção de Confúcio. Pois, não abraçou as normas ditadas pela “li”, que estabelecem a conduta adequada à ordem social. Teria agido no estilo de um “Macaco Rei”, liberando forças de “luan” (desordem e rebelião) para mobiizar a população e manter-se no poder. Assim, na essência do pensamento maoista se encontrava a rejeição à concepção confucionista de estabilidade. O progresso, para Mao, só poderia ser obtido pela luta contínua e permanente.
Deng Xiaoping, no entanto, personificou o retorno da China à tradição confucionista, no sentido de que caberia ao líder benevolente buscar o caminho certo para a estabilidade, segurança e o estabelecimento de forma de governança que favorecesse o progresso. Sua liderança proporcionou, também, a consolidação do relacionamento entre a China e o Sudeste Asiático, em função dos laços históricos, mencionados no decorrer do texto, que têm sido capazes de garantir a inserção internacional chinesa atual em universo de influência cultural do antigo “Império do Centro”[10].
Por precaução, cabe seguir identificando se predominam, hoje, na sociedade chinesa, normas ditadas por “li” ou se há riscos de “luan”.
[1] Tais observações decorrem do fato de o autor ter servido na Embaixada do Brasil em Pequim, no período de 1982 a 1985, quando era leitor assíduo das revistas semanais “Far Eastern Economic Review” e “Asiweek”, editadas, então, em Hong Kong, entre as poucas fontes de informação sobre o que se passava na China.
[2] Vide “Mao prend le Pouvoir”, por Roland Lew, Éditions Complexe 1981.
[3] “Teng Hsiao-Ping, a Political Biography”, por Chi Hsin. Cosmos Books. Ltd. 1978.
[4] Tais observações decorrem do fato de o autor ter servido, no período de 1986 a 1995, no Sudeste Asiático, sucessivamente, nas Embaixadas do Brasil em Kuala Lumpur, 86-88, Cingapura, 89-90, e Manila, 91-95. Durante estes nove anos, participou de numerosos seminários e conferências em centros de estudos estratégicos destas capitais.
[5] “Le Nouveau Confucionisme” – Léon Vandermeersch, Le Débat – número 66, septembre-octobre 1991.
[6] O “China Institute of Contemporary International Relations”, em estudo intitulado “China’s Economic Reform and Opening-up”, publicado em abril de 1993, menciona que: “To vitalize the domestic economy and to open it to the outside world are two inseparable and basic parts of China’s economic restructuring and are also an important expression of the socialism with Chinese characteristics. The opening up and development of Pudong Area in Shanghai will make it a “dragon-head” to lead the economic development of the Yangtze Delta and even the whole Yangtze River valley. Shanghai will become a “Hong Kong” on the Chinese mainland and resume its position as one of the international economic, financial and trade centers”.
[7] Segundo “The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition Unabridges”, “Cross fertilization” pode ser entendido como : “interaction or interchange, as between two or more cultures, fields of activity or knowledge, or the like, that is mutually beneficial and productive”.
[8] Pereira Pinto, Paulo Antônio – A China e o Sudeste Asiático, Editora da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. 2000.
[9] Vide Pereira Pinto, Paulo Antônio, “Iruan nas Reinações Asiáticas”, Editora Age, Porto Alegre,2004. O autor procura associar sua participação na batalha judicial para o retorno do menor brasileiro Iruan Ergui Wu, retido em Taiwan, ao Rio Grande do Sul, com a forma de negociação cultural com o universo de influência chinesa, do qual a ilha de Formosa faz parte.
[10] Denominação usada pelos chineses de outrora para definir sua posição hegemônica na Terra.
Paulo Antônio Pereira Pinto é Diplomata. Primeiro Embaixador do Brasil residente em Baku, Azerbaijão. Serviu, anteriormente, como Cônsul-Geral em Mumbai, entre 2006 e 2009 e, a partir de 1982, durante vinte anos, na Ásia Oriental, sucessivamente, em Pequim, Kuala Lumpur, Cingapura, Manila e Taipé. Na década de 1970 trabalhou, na África, nas Embaixadas em Libreville, Gabão, e Maputo, Moçambique e foi Encarregado de Negócios em Pretória, África do Sul. As opiniões expressas são de sua inteira responsabilidade e não refletem pontos de vista do Ministério das Relações Exteriores (papinto2006@gmail.com).
Paulo Antônio Pereira Pinto
Meridiano 47, novembro 2010
Há cerca de dez anos, tenho tido o privilégio de contar com este espaço, concedido pela Universidade de Brasília, para exercícios de reflexão sobre minha vivência, entre China, Sudeste Asiático, Taiwan, Índia e, agora, Cáucaso. Peço vênia, nesta oportunidade, para a recapitulação dos “melhores momentos” destes estudos. O primeiro artigo trata do período entre 1982 e 1995, dividido entre Pequim (Brasília), Kuala Lumpur, Cingapura e Manila. Analisa o processo de abertura chinesa, consequências no plano interno e nas relações da RPC com seu entorno imediato, no Sudeste Asiático.
Assim, meus depoimentos se iniciam, a partir da década de 1980, quando começa uma nova fase na história recente da China, com processo de modernização e abertura do país ao exterior, após o período turbulento da Revolução Cultural.
Tanto no plano interno, como no externo, identificam-se, naquele momento, alterações determinadas por condicionantes da forma de pensar chinesa, cuja história é marcada por ciclos que se repetem em resposta a sucessivas novas contradições. Buscam-se, sempre, outros pontos de equilíbrio. O ocorrido na década de 1980 significava o início de nova cena de partida, de um passado recente, que estabeleceu bases para o cenário em vigor na China. Daí, talvez, o interesse quanto à reflexão sobre o que se passou, para o melhor entendimento do que está acontecendo e virá a ocorrer.
Naquele período, cabe ressaltar, não era possível deixar de sentir uma certa tristeza, pelo fato de que havia sido encerrada, na China, uma era de convicção poética maoista. A partir de 1949, acreditara-se que, em benefício do interesse comum da sociedade, centenas de milhões de pessoas poderiam ser levadas a patamar mais elevado do que o egoísmo individual.
A experiência chinesa de busca de uma sociedade igualitária encantara a muitos. Os países do Terceiro Mundo admiravam sua combatividade e auto-suficiência. Os economistas ocidentais registravam o pleno emprego atingido no campo e invejavam sua força de trabalho disciplinada, na indústria. O exercício de observação diário e o aprendizado da realidade do país, no entanto, indicavam que não se vivera na China, nas três décadas anteriores, tantos motivos de encantamento[1].
Na verdade, naquele período, perdurara o elitismo e a corrupção entre os dirigentes do partido e do governo. O lento progresso obtido na economia demonstrara não ser tão fácil, desenvolver-se com os próprios recursos, sem a infusão de investimento, tecnologia ou ajuda externa.
Em suas relações internacionais, sabe-se que a República Popular, desde sua fundação, em 1949, havia mantido um vasto exército e milícias armadas e desenvolvido a bomba atômica. A China tivera conflitos com a União Soviética e Índia e fricções com o Japão, com respeito às Ilhas de Senkaku e com o Vietnã, quanto às Spratlys. Não se tratava, portanto, de país totalmente “amante da paz”, conforme se divulgava em Pequim aos visitantes estrangeiros.
No plano interno, à medida que se conhecia melhor a real situação chinesa, ficavam diminuídos, inclusive, os ganhos considerados, por exemplo, no controle familiar – enorme. No entanto, verificava-se o custo em termos de direitos humanos, na proibição de casamentos antes dos 20 anos e obrigatoriedade de apenas um filho por casal.
Não se quer negar, no entanto, as grandes conquistas do período maoísta, nem os feitos do povo chinês. Um país que, na primeira metade do século XX, fora devastado por guerras internas, encontrava-se, no início da década de 1980, unificado, apesar das crises de liderança resultantes da Revolução Cultural.
Como era possível verificar, a China alimentava e vestia seu povo. Um esforço descomunal fora feito para construir represas, diques e sistemas de irrigação, bem como no sentido da auto-suficiência alimentar. Mas seria isso suficiente? Tais conquistas teriam que ser vistas em perspectiva.
Mao Zedong tornara a “necessidade” em “virtude”, como base de sustentação para política de auto-suficiência. Em grande parte, tratava-se de reação ao fato de que os soviéticos terem cessado toda e qualquer auxílio, a partir de 1960, levando consigo, inclusive as matrizes de fábricas cuja instalação já havia sido iniciada.
O Grande Timoneiro, então, colocou toda sua crença na “genialidade do povo chinês”. Doravante, tudo seria resolvido com a mobilização permanente das “massas”. Daí, surgiriam energias e talentos até então escondidos por sistema social opressivo. Na década de 1960, por exemplo, ampla campanha nacional encorajava simples operários a fazerem sugestões sobre inovações tecnológicas. Exageros evidentes eram noticiados a respeito do aumento de produtividade como resultado de soluções práticas obtidas nos canteiros de obras, campos agrícolas e operadores de máquinas nas fábricas.
O caráter “anticientífico” das práticas maoistas chegou ao apogeu durante a chamada Revolução Cultural, quando professores e alunos foram obrigados a curvar-se diante da “sabedoria” das massas.
Postura semelhante foi adotada nas forças armadas chinesas, onde o conceito maoista de “guerra popular” baseava-se na premissa de que “homens contavam mais do que máquinas”. Nessa perspectiva, centenas de milhares de soldados de infantaria, com armamento obsoleto, seriam capazes de derrotar um Exército soviético equipado com armas modernas. Mantinha-se, no entanto, a dissuasão nuclear, na medida em que a China não renunciava a sua própria bomba atômica.
Com a derrota do “bando dos quatro”, a China desencadeou outra campanha, desta feita para condenar a viúva de Mao, visando a acusá-la e a seus três cúmplices de Xangai pela maioria dos fracassos e fraquezas do anos anteriores. Este novo processo implicou, novamente, em notáveis exageros nas acusações. A mensagem, no entanto, era clara: os dirigentes chineses haviam tomado consciência de que suas políticas de auto-suficiência, recusa em aceitar ajuda externa e negativa à aquisição de tecnologia estrangeira haviam reduzido as taxas de crescimento e o progresso em quase todos os setores da economia.
A rejeição da ideologia passada foi feita na forma de pronunciamentos que, gradativamente, desautorizassem o autoritarismo vigente na fase que se encerrava. Enquanto isso, o corpo de Mao Zedong era reverenciado no Mausoléu, em Pequim, com todas as honras devidas ao fundador da República Popular da China. Tratava-se, no entanto, de trazê-lo a proporções humanas.
Começava o processo de estabelecer seu lugar na história, como um grande líder revolucionário, mas como um homem com menor sucesso, quando se tratou de administrar um país. Suas principais preocupações diziam respeito à eliminação dos dogmas socialistas, agora vistos como impedimento à nova marcha da China, em direção à modernização. O principal responsável pelas alterações na condução das políticas, econômica e social da China, a partir de 1978, e “Novo Timoneiro”, passou a ser o então Vice-Primeiro-Ministro Deng Xiao-Ping.
O julgamento público de Mao, no entanto, tinha dimensões restritas. Todos os erros cometidos no período de radicalização maoísta eram atribuídos a Lin Piao e ao “bando dos quatro”. Para o cidadão chinês, contudo, havia implicações óbvias: não era possível aceitar que toda a culpa fosse atribuída a um traidor e a quatro radicais – na prática, os atuais dirigentes em Pequim estavam admitindo que a “Grande Revolução Proletária Cultural” havia sido um fracasso enorme e custoso.
O próprio retorno de Deng Xiao-Ping ao poder, como Vice-Primeiro Ministro já significava uma rejeição eloqüente do julgamento de Mao, que havia dado seu apoio pessoal às duas quedas anteriores de Deng.
Não era possível ignorar, contudo, que Mao tinha razão quanto ao diagnóstico sobre os males que atingiam a China. Assim, de acordo com sua visão, o maior perigo para o país seria o retorno à estagnação imposta pela burocracia do partido e do estado. Suas soluções eram poéticas e imaginativas: uma série de campanhas para mobilizar os intelectuais – “O Movimento de Cem Flores” – a busca de um caminho mais curto para o Socialismo – “O Grande Salto Adiante” – e a provocação de uma “discórdia criativa” entre a juventude do país e a burocracia estatal – “A Revolução Cultural”.
Sabe-se, contudo, que Mao não obteve sucesso na criação do “homem socialista”. Ele pediu demais, tanto dos chineses, quanto da natureza humana.
No final da década de 1970, no entanto, todo este processo havia sido esquecido. Ficara provado que, em tese era uma boa idéia encorajar os trabalhadores a pensarem o aumento da produção com seus próprios meios. Na prática, a premissa ideológica, sobre a qual se baseava – a de que a sabedoria está consagrada nos trabalhadores – conduziu a medidas impraticáveis, como por exemplo, a utilização de máquinas antiquadas sendo utilizadas em velocidade inapropirada, provocando acidentes ou resultados negativos.
Com a morte de Mao Zedong e a derrubada do “Bando dos Quatro”, a China poderia, finalmente, defrontar-se com estes fatos negativos e tomar as decisões cabíveis, para superá-los.
Havia sido abandonado, no entanto, o fundamento da filosofia maoista: o “conceito hegeliano” de que a unidade deve ser dividida em duas partes e que cada situação contém em si contradições saudáveis que são necessárias para a luta e o progresso, levando, assim, à noção de luta de classes contínua e revolução permanente[2].
Segundo Mao, a China não deveria jamais permitir-se cair na complacência da “unidade” e, de acordo com esta filosofia, o “Grande Timoneiro” teve a audácia poética de desencadear uma revolução contra seu próprio governo e partido. O veredito da história será provavelmente o de que, enquanto Mao foi um dos maiores líderes revolucionários, demonstrou ser um governante menos habilidoso, uma vez que sua revolução tornou-se vencedora. Provocou, assim, severas perdas a seu país, enquanto perseguia suas visões utópicas.
Sob nova liderança, Pequim pareceria retomar a abordagem mais tradicional à forma de governança, recuperando a busca filosófica chinesa do “Caminho Real”.
Recorda-se, então, que, desde os primórdios da civilização chinesa, há 4000 anos, às margens do Rio Amarelo, que pensadores buscam equilíbrio e harmonia como forma de governança a ser chamada de “Caminho Real”, quando haveria “ordem social” em que os monarcas exerceriam suas responsabilidades e a população cumpriria seus deveres.
Nas palavras de Confúcio: “Quando um governante faz o que é certo, influenciará as pessoas, sem ordená-las. Quando o governante não faz o que é certo, seus comandos não são obedecidos”. Implícita fica a noção de que, caso a autoridade local não crie condições de governança adequadas ao funcionamento harmonioso da sociedade, os cidadãos podem ignorar o governante.
No início da década de 1980, portanto, o sentimento dominante era o de que a morte havia “humanizado” Mao Zedong e “desmitificado” a China, que, então, admitia suas limitações no trato com os grandes problemas do país.
Abertura para um Mundo de “Desordem sob os Céus”
Nos anos em que foram registradas as observações acima – entre 1982 e 1985– o cenário internacional era bipolar, com centros de poder em Washington e Moscou. Segundo classificação adotada no Ocidente, o planeta era dividido em “Três Mundos”. Os países industrializados de economia de mercado foram incluídos no Primeiro Mundo. Os de sistema econômico centralmente planificado participavam do Segundo. Os em desenvolvimento eram despachados para o Terceiro.
Durante a fase maoista, no entanto, os chineses tinham uma visão própria do globo terrestre. Este estaria dividido em duas partes antagônicas – a metade que apoiava o bloco soviético e a outra que se opunha, incluindo a China. A política externa da RPC seguia esta rigidez, baseada no pressuposto de que qualquer coisa que pudesse prejudicar os interesses de Moscou seria favorável a Pequim.
Sob a nova liderança de Deng Xiaoping, tornou-se mais pragmática também a postura chinesa no plano externo. Este “último Grande Timoneiro do século XX” – como se referem a ele alguns historiadores – apresentara, a propósito, teoria própria quanto à existência de “Três Mundos”[3].
Segundo Deng:
“A julgar pelas alterações nas relações internacionais, o mundo atual consiste de três partes, ou três mundos, que são tanto interconectados, quanto contraditórios. Os Estados Unidos e a União Soviética formam o Primeiro Mundo. Os países em desenvolvimento na Ásia, África e América Latina integram o Terceiro Mundo. Os desenvolvidos – sejam os do mundo capitalista ou do socialista – formam o Segundo Mundo”.
De acordo com o novo discurso chinês, o Sudeste Asiático, já então organizado por sua associação regional ASEAN (na sigla em inglês), representaria, em meados da década de 1970, exatamente o tipo de interlocutor capaz de implementar a cooperação – e refletir as contradições – entre países do Terceiro Mundo e entre estes e o Segundo Mundo, conforme defendido pela China. Assim, em oposição ao congelamento das esferas de influência das superpotências—ambas integrantes exclusivas do Primeiro Mundo imaginado pelos chineses.
Tais desenvolvimentos induziam, desde então, à percepção de que a estrutura de poder bipolar que vinha permeando a região estaria sendo alterada em função de nova “multipolaridade”, na Ásia-Pacífico, onde quatro potências principais – os Estados Unidos, a União Soviética, a China e o Japão – teriam, doravante, sua parcela de influência.
Verifica-se, a propósito, que, desde o início da atual política de modernização da China, na década de 1980, houve desdobramentos que facilitaram o atual avanço do processo de congruência entre a área de influência tradicional da cultura chinesa e uma nova fronteira econômica da RPC .
A crescente regionalização da produção evoluía, de forma que a interação de novas tendências, como a redução nos custos da mobilidade dos fatores de produção e as economias de escala exigidas por processos produtivos crescentemente sofisticados, proporcionavam o surgimento dos chamados “tigres” ou “novas economias industrializadas”. Os efeitos de tais reajustes seriam evidentes no aparecimento de formas de relacionamento inovadoras, que incluiriam diferentes tipos de parcerias entre Japão, novas economias industrializadas no Sudeste Asiático e partes da China.
A emergência de certos países e agrupamentos regionais, sempre de acordo com esta linha de raciocínio, não se deveria a experiências isoladas, mas a fenômeno integrado, que projetaria sobre a área como um todo os benefícios da acumulação de capital e da experiência modernizadora resultante da aplicação prática de novos conhecimentos científicos e tecnológicos[4].
A estabilidade e o progresso na Ásia-Pacífico passaram a ser entendidos, por setores de opinião, como dependentes, cada vez mais, de processos de cooperação que garantissem a negociação entre suas diferentes culturas. Nesse contexto, despertavam crescente interesse os vínculos históricos entre a China e o Sudeste Asiático.
Isto porque a maioria dos países do Sudeste Asiático compartilha de passado que os inseriu, em maior ou menor escala, em esfera de influência de duas grandes civilizações: a chinesa e a indiana, que interagiram, através dos séculos, com culturas locais. O Budismo, o Islã, o Hinduismo e o Confucionismo deixaram, assim, marcas profundas que continuam a diferenciar ou aproximar pessoas.
A este mosaico de heranças culturais seculares, somou-se, mais recentemente, o colonialismo europeu que impôs pela força, novos valores e normas de organização e comportamento. A partir do término da Segunda Grande Guerra, os Estados recém-independentes da região foram divididos, pela rivalidade ideológica das superpotências, entre os que serviriam como a vitrine da economia de mercado e os que seguiriam o sistema de planejamento centralmente planificado.
Com a multipolaridade resultante do término da Guerra Fria, ocorreu o recuo das esferas de domínio de Washington e Moscou. Como consequência, no Sudeste Asiático, tornou-se possível o ressurgimento de influências político-culturais antigas, como a chinesa. Hoje, quando se discutem os efeitos da presença avassaladora da cultura de massa, resultante da globalização, os países da área buscam, em sua própria região, marcos de referência que permitam afirmar valores, idéias e crenças, consolidadas através de uma história compartilhada numa geografia determinada.
No Sudeste Asiático, nessa perspectiva, verificou-se a gestação de um novo conjunto de mudanças que afetaram não apenas a economia, através da reorganização freqüente de suas vantagens competitivas, transformações técnico-industriais nas formas de produzir e alterações na organização da sociedade. Tudo isso ocorreu, no entanto, com a preservação de valores culturais que, passando de geração a geração, garantiram uma base de sustenção do modelo que se consolidava.
Tal panorama leva alguns estudiosos, como Léon Vandermeersch[5], a contribuir para a tese de que existe uma base cultural para avaliar o fenômeno do dinamismo dos países objeto deste estudo. Isto porque, apesar de sua diversidade, em termos de extensão geográfica, população, estágio de desenvolvimento, sistema político e experiência colonial, alguns países do Sudeste Asiático possuem, em comum, conjunto de valores herdados de período de influência cultural chinesa.
Na prática, este processo de complementação/contradição – segundo o pensamento de Deng Xiaoping, citado acima – evoluiu com a busca da construção de sucessivos “building blocks”, a partir da integração do próprio sistema econômico da China. Isto levaria a moldura política regional com forte influência do ordenamento histórico em que, durante séculos, parte da área hoje situada entre Myanmar e Vietnã esteve inserida em grande arco de Estados vinculados ao Império do Centro.
Na primeira etapa dessa construção de blocos, logo após ao desaparecimento de Mao Zedong, integrou-se o próprio sistema econômico chinês. Em seguida, foi permitida a abertura de cidades costeiras ao comércio internacional, com a criação das Áreas Econômicas Especiais, onde foram adotadas práticas de economia de mercado dentro de um sistema centralmente planificado mais amplo. Os blocos seguintes foram surgindo ao longo do rio Yantze, até chegar a Xangai, onde se situaria a “cabeça do dragão”[6].
Gradativamente, houve a consolidação de Hong Kong e Macau no sistema produtivo da RPC. A crescente integração econômica – e futuramente política – com Taiwan será o passo seguinte. A expansão da fronteira econômica chinesa em direção ao Sudeste Asiático será a fase posterior, que está sendo facilitada pela existência, ao Sul da China, de uma rede de indivíduos com origem étnica comum, chamados “chineses de ultramar”, que têm como referência uma mesma identidade cultural.
Assim, gradativamente, chegar-se-ía a uma futura congruência entre a área de influência tradicional da cultura chinesa e uma nova fronteira econômica da RPC.
Este último desenvolvimento ocorreria através de um fenômeno de “cross fertilization”[7], caracterizado por intercâmbio de referenciais de valores, entre aquela área considerada historicamente como situada na periferia do Império do Centro e a RPC.
O conjunto de transformações ocorreu de forma a sugerir, mesmo, a emergência de um novo paradigma regional. Isto porque, por um lado, a existência de uma base cultural chinesa servia de plataforma de sustentação para um processo de cooperação com o Sudeste Asiático.
Por outro, haveria os tipos de contribuições seguintes:
os países bem sucedidos como a “vitrine do Capitalismo no Sudeste Asiático” – a exemplo de Cingapura – indicariam os rumos para o aperfeiçoamento da “economia socialista de mercado”, com características chinesas, ora buscada pelo programa de modernização da RPC;
a persistência do Vietnã em manter seu sistema central de planejamento, ao mesmo tempo em que adota “práticas de economia de mercado”, reforça a proposta chinesa de preservar a vertente “socialista” entre as medidas que estão sendo crescentemente adotadas, no programa de modernização da República Popular da China; e
o esforço de composição constante no sentido da manutenção da harmonia e convivência pacífica entre a população de origem chinesa e os de fé islâmica na Malásia e Indonésia serve como inspiração para exercício semelhante a ser promovido na região central da RPC, principalmente na província de Xinjiang, onde há expressivo contingente de muçulmanos. Outrossim, estende-se a necessidade de relacionar-se com novas Repúblicas, como a do Tajiquistão, onde predomina a mesma religião.
A tese de que estaria em curso tal desenvolvimento considera que, quando se fala em influência político-cultural chinesa, se tem em conta os efeitos dessa herança histórica na ação das sociedades civis, como facilitador do processo da cooperação entre a China e o Sudeste Asiático[8].
Não estão sendo consideradas, portanto, iniciativas de “políticas de Estado”. Isto porque, tanto na China, quanto no Sudeste Asiático, o conceito de Estado evoluiu em diferentes estágios, sempre a partir da perspectiva de que o centro de tudo era a figura do dirigente local, desvinculada de um espaço geográfico definido. A concepção chinesa, ademais, sempre atribuiu importância fundamental aos laços sanguíneos, como marco de referência para a soberania do Imperador. As fronteiras eram definidas em termos de população, sem levar em conta limites territoriais.
O interesse quanto à reflexão sobre o tema deve-se à influência que a emergência de um bloco político de interesses recíprocos e de mega proporções – como o representado pela China e o Sudeste Asiático – exercerá no ritmo de integração e cooperação na Ásia-Pacífico, um dos laboratórios de modernidade do planeta. Ademais, existe a possibilidade de que laços culturais possam vir a ser fator determinante na expansão de fronteira econômica na área em questão, em oposição ao exercício da força como garantia de esfera hegemônica, conforme ocorrido, com freqüência, em outras partes do mundo.
O processo de abertura da China, na década de 1980, portanto, foi facilitado por conjunto de reciprocidades entre a RPC e o Sudeste Asiático, que, ao consolidarem seu relacionamento, desenvolvem projeto regional com agenda de preocupações próprias.
CONCLUSÃO
A partir do processo de abertura, na década de 1980, a evolução social na China inicia novo ciclo histórico, em obediência ao paradigma ditado pela tradição chinesa. Nessa sequência, acontecem mais consensos do que compromissos. Há novas “cenas de partida” que se sucedem [9]. A RPC superava, naquele momento, o ponto de equilíbrio alcançado pelo princípio socialista, segundo o qual “de cada um de acordo com suas habilidades e a cada um de acordo com suas necessidades”. Seguindo a tradição confucionista, a busca da estabilidade social deveria, então, recorrer a novos fundamentos.
Segundo especialistas no assunto, Mao não teria sido um líder na concepção de Confúcio. Pois, não abraçou as normas ditadas pela “li”, que estabelecem a conduta adequada à ordem social. Teria agido no estilo de um “Macaco Rei”, liberando forças de “luan” (desordem e rebelião) para mobiizar a população e manter-se no poder. Assim, na essência do pensamento maoista se encontrava a rejeição à concepção confucionista de estabilidade. O progresso, para Mao, só poderia ser obtido pela luta contínua e permanente.
Deng Xiaoping, no entanto, personificou o retorno da China à tradição confucionista, no sentido de que caberia ao líder benevolente buscar o caminho certo para a estabilidade, segurança e o estabelecimento de forma de governança que favorecesse o progresso. Sua liderança proporcionou, também, a consolidação do relacionamento entre a China e o Sudeste Asiático, em função dos laços históricos, mencionados no decorrer do texto, que têm sido capazes de garantir a inserção internacional chinesa atual em universo de influência cultural do antigo “Império do Centro”[10].
Por precaução, cabe seguir identificando se predominam, hoje, na sociedade chinesa, normas ditadas por “li” ou se há riscos de “luan”.
[1] Tais observações decorrem do fato de o autor ter servido na Embaixada do Brasil em Pequim, no período de 1982 a 1985, quando era leitor assíduo das revistas semanais “Far Eastern Economic Review” e “Asiweek”, editadas, então, em Hong Kong, entre as poucas fontes de informação sobre o que se passava na China.
[2] Vide “Mao prend le Pouvoir”, por Roland Lew, Éditions Complexe 1981.
[3] “Teng Hsiao-Ping, a Political Biography”, por Chi Hsin. Cosmos Books. Ltd. 1978.
[4] Tais observações decorrem do fato de o autor ter servido, no período de 1986 a 1995, no Sudeste Asiático, sucessivamente, nas Embaixadas do Brasil em Kuala Lumpur, 86-88, Cingapura, 89-90, e Manila, 91-95. Durante estes nove anos, participou de numerosos seminários e conferências em centros de estudos estratégicos destas capitais.
[5] “Le Nouveau Confucionisme” – Léon Vandermeersch, Le Débat – número 66, septembre-octobre 1991.
[6] O “China Institute of Contemporary International Relations”, em estudo intitulado “China’s Economic Reform and Opening-up”, publicado em abril de 1993, menciona que: “To vitalize the domestic economy and to open it to the outside world are two inseparable and basic parts of China’s economic restructuring and are also an important expression of the socialism with Chinese characteristics. The opening up and development of Pudong Area in Shanghai will make it a “dragon-head” to lead the economic development of the Yangtze Delta and even the whole Yangtze River valley. Shanghai will become a “Hong Kong” on the Chinese mainland and resume its position as one of the international economic, financial and trade centers”.
[7] Segundo “The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition Unabridges”, “Cross fertilization” pode ser entendido como : “interaction or interchange, as between two or more cultures, fields of activity or knowledge, or the like, that is mutually beneficial and productive”.
[8] Pereira Pinto, Paulo Antônio – A China e o Sudeste Asiático, Editora da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. 2000.
[9] Vide Pereira Pinto, Paulo Antônio, “Iruan nas Reinações Asiáticas”, Editora Age, Porto Alegre,2004. O autor procura associar sua participação na batalha judicial para o retorno do menor brasileiro Iruan Ergui Wu, retido em Taiwan, ao Rio Grande do Sul, com a forma de negociação cultural com o universo de influência chinesa, do qual a ilha de Formosa faz parte.
[10] Denominação usada pelos chineses de outrora para definir sua posição hegemônica na Terra.
Paulo Antônio Pereira Pinto é Diplomata. Primeiro Embaixador do Brasil residente em Baku, Azerbaijão. Serviu, anteriormente, como Cônsul-Geral em Mumbai, entre 2006 e 2009 e, a partir de 1982, durante vinte anos, na Ásia Oriental, sucessivamente, em Pequim, Kuala Lumpur, Cingapura, Manila e Taipé. Na década de 1970 trabalhou, na África, nas Embaixadas em Libreville, Gabão, e Maputo, Moçambique e foi Encarregado de Negócios em Pretória, África do Sul. As opiniões expressas são de sua inteira responsabilidade e não refletem pontos de vista do Ministério das Relações Exteriores (papinto2006@gmail.com).
Thursday, October 28, 2010
Asia: publications on economic growth and transformation
Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010
Books, Periodicals, Studies, and Reports
On-line edition: Free of Charge
Hardcopy price: US$75.00
ISSN: 0116-3000
Paperback (Pub. Date: 2010)
link:
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2010/pdf/Key-Indicators-2010.pdf
The Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010 is the flagship annual statistical data book of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It presents the latest available economic, financial, social, environmental, and Millennium Development Goals (MDG) indicators for regional members of ADB. Data are grouped under MDG and Regional Tables. Nontechnical explanations and brief analyses of the MDG achievements and economic, financial, social, and environmental developments are included. The regional tables are largely based on a comprehensive set of country tables. The country tables are not available in printed form but are available in CD-ROM and through ADB’s website. The special chapter in Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010 “The Rise of Asia’s Middle Class” looks at the growth and impacts of the region’s rapidly expanding middle class, and resulting economic and policy implications.
The Key Indicators 2010 is divided into the following parts:
Highlights
Part I: A special chapter on “The Rise of Asia’s Middle Class”
Part II: Millennium Development Goals
Part III: Regional Tables
Part IV: Definitions
Country tables, available only in CD-ROM and through ADB’s website at www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2010/Country.asp,
carry a 20-year time-series of data on:
population
price indexes
international reserves
labor force
money and banking
exchange rates
national accounts
government finance
external indebtedness
production
external trade
energy
balance of payments
================
Asian Development Outlook 2010 Update: The Future of Growth in Asia
link:
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2010/Update/ado2010-update.pdf
Contents
Foreword, Acknowledgments, Contents, Definitions, Acronyms and Abbreviations [ PDF: 160kB | 8 pages ]
Highlights [ PDF: 90kB | 8 pages ]
Shifting Global Economic Fortunes [ PDF: 1,359kB | 34 pages ]
Wavering Recovery in Industrial Economies
Solid Recovery in Developing Asia
Policy Foundation for Growth
Constraints to Long-term Growth
The Future of Growth in Asia [ PDF: 878kB | 56 pages ]
Refocusing on the Long-term
Trade and Growth
Human Capital Accumulation in Economic Growth
Infrastructure in Economic Growth
Financial Development and Economic Growth
Key Policy Messages
Economic Trends and Prospects in Developing Asia [ PDF: 1,772kB | 81 pages ]
Subregional Summaries [ PDF: 298kB | 34 pages ]
Bangladesh [ PDF: 157kB | 5 pages ]
People's Republic of China [ PDF: 180kB | 6 pages ]
India [ PDF: 431kB | 6 pages ]
Indonesia [ PDF: 231kB | 4 pages ]
Malaysia [ PDF: 165kB | 5 pages ]
Pakistan [ PDF: 151kB | 5 pages ]
Philippines [ PDF: 149kB | 5 pages ]
Thailand [ PDF: 160kB | 4 pages ] ภาษาไทย
Viet Nam [ PDF: 253kB | 5 pages ] tiếng Việt
Statistical Appendix [ PDF: 461kB | 7 pages ]
Statistical Notes and Tables
Books, Periodicals, Studies, and Reports
On-line edition: Free of Charge
Hardcopy price: US$75.00
ISSN: 0116-3000
Paperback (Pub. Date: 2010)
link:
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2010/pdf/Key-Indicators-2010.pdf
The Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010 is the flagship annual statistical data book of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It presents the latest available economic, financial, social, environmental, and Millennium Development Goals (MDG) indicators for regional members of ADB. Data are grouped under MDG and Regional Tables. Nontechnical explanations and brief analyses of the MDG achievements and economic, financial, social, and environmental developments are included. The regional tables are largely based on a comprehensive set of country tables. The country tables are not available in printed form but are available in CD-ROM and through ADB’s website. The special chapter in Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010 “The Rise of Asia’s Middle Class” looks at the growth and impacts of the region’s rapidly expanding middle class, and resulting economic and policy implications.
The Key Indicators 2010 is divided into the following parts:
Highlights
Part I: A special chapter on “The Rise of Asia’s Middle Class”
Part II: Millennium Development Goals
Part III: Regional Tables
Part IV: Definitions
Country tables, available only in CD-ROM and through ADB’s website at www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2010/Country.asp,
carry a 20-year time-series of data on:
population
price indexes
international reserves
labor force
money and banking
exchange rates
national accounts
government finance
external indebtedness
production
external trade
energy
balance of payments
================
Asian Development Outlook 2010 Update: The Future of Growth in Asia
link:
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2010/Update/ado2010-update.pdf
Contents
Foreword, Acknowledgments, Contents, Definitions, Acronyms and Abbreviations [ PDF: 160kB | 8 pages ]
Highlights [ PDF: 90kB | 8 pages ]
Shifting Global Economic Fortunes [ PDF: 1,359kB | 34 pages ]
Wavering Recovery in Industrial Economies
Solid Recovery in Developing Asia
Policy Foundation for Growth
Constraints to Long-term Growth
The Future of Growth in Asia [ PDF: 878kB | 56 pages ]
Refocusing on the Long-term
Trade and Growth
Human Capital Accumulation in Economic Growth
Infrastructure in Economic Growth
Financial Development and Economic Growth
Key Policy Messages
Economic Trends and Prospects in Developing Asia [ PDF: 1,772kB | 81 pages ]
Subregional Summaries [ PDF: 298kB | 34 pages ]
Bangladesh [ PDF: 157kB | 5 pages ]
People's Republic of China [ PDF: 180kB | 6 pages ]
India [ PDF: 431kB | 6 pages ]
Indonesia [ PDF: 231kB | 4 pages ]
Malaysia [ PDF: 165kB | 5 pages ]
Pakistan [ PDF: 151kB | 5 pages ]
Philippines [ PDF: 149kB | 5 pages ]
Thailand [ PDF: 160kB | 4 pages ] ภาษาไทย
Viet Nam [ PDF: 253kB | 5 pages ] tiếng Việt
Statistical Appendix [ PDF: 461kB | 7 pages ]
Statistical Notes and Tables
Currency strategy of China: renminbi convertibility
'One Currency, Two Systems’: China’s Renminbi Strategy
Paola Subacchi
Chattam House Briefing Paper, October 2010
Download Paper here
* As the rhetoric on 'currency wars' heats up, escalating tensions between the United States and China are casting a shadow over the world economy.
* The Chinese leadership is unlikely to yield to US pressures, but is aware that it needs to move eventually to a more flexible exchange rate regime and a fully convertible currency. It has therefore embarked on a gradual process to develop the renminbi (RMB) as an international currency and ultimately as one of the world's key reserve currencies. Understanding this process is critical to grasp the current debate on the international monetary system and to gauge how it will evolve.
* Beijing's biggest policy challenge is to achieve currency internationalization under controlled convertibility. It is pursuing a two-track strategy: boosting cross-border usage of the RMB in trade settlements and making the RMB attractive by building an offshore market in Hong Kong for RMB-denominated assets.
* What China is trying to do is unprecedented. It is the first emerging country to seek to establish a truly international currency when there is no link, even residual, between the reserve currency and gold.
* Despite the enormous challenges there is ample scope for policy experimentation. Success will depend on a combination of well-designed policies and market forces, and on the role that China is playing, and aspires to play, in Asia.
This briefing paper forms part of the project on The Changing Balance of Financial Markets and International Financial Centres >>
Paola Subacchi
Chattam House Briefing Paper, October 2010
Download Paper here
* As the rhetoric on 'currency wars' heats up, escalating tensions between the United States and China are casting a shadow over the world economy.
* The Chinese leadership is unlikely to yield to US pressures, but is aware that it needs to move eventually to a more flexible exchange rate regime and a fully convertible currency. It has therefore embarked on a gradual process to develop the renminbi (RMB) as an international currency and ultimately as one of the world's key reserve currencies. Understanding this process is critical to grasp the current debate on the international monetary system and to gauge how it will evolve.
* Beijing's biggest policy challenge is to achieve currency internationalization under controlled convertibility. It is pursuing a two-track strategy: boosting cross-border usage of the RMB in trade settlements and making the RMB attractive by building an offshore market in Hong Kong for RMB-denominated assets.
* What China is trying to do is unprecedented. It is the first emerging country to seek to establish a truly international currency when there is no link, even residual, between the reserve currency and gold.
* Despite the enormous challenges there is ample scope for policy experimentation. Success will depend on a combination of well-designed policies and market forces, and on the role that China is playing, and aspires to play, in Asia.
This briefing paper forms part of the project on The Changing Balance of Financial Markets and International Financial Centres >>
China and its Nb. 1 Supercomputer: ahead of the US
Chinese Supercomputer Wrests Title From U.S.
By ASHLEE VANCE
The New York Times, October 28, 2010
A Chinese scientific research center has built the fastest supercomputer ever made, replacing the United States as maker of the swiftest machine, and giving China bragging rights as a technology superpower.
The computer, known as Tianhe-1A, has 1.4 times the horsepower of the current top computer, which is at a national laboratory in Tennessee, as measured by the standard test used to gauge how well the systems handle mathematical calculations, said Jack Dongarra, a University of Tennessee computer scientist who maintains the official supercomputer rankings.
Although the official list of the top 500 fastest machines, which comes out every six months, is not due to be completed by Mr. Dongarra until next week, he said the Chinese computer “blows away the existing No. 1 machine.” He added, “We don’t close the books until Nov. 1, but I would say it is unlikely we will see a system that is faster.”
Officials from the Chinese research center, the National University of Defense Technology, are expected to reveal the computer’s performance on Thursday at a conference in Beijing. The center says it is “under the dual supervision of the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Education.”
The race to build the fastest supercomputer has become a source of national pride as these machines are valued for their ability to solve problems critical to national interests in areas like defense, energy, finance and science. Supercomputing technology also finds its way into mainstream business; oil and gas companies use it to find reservoirs and Wall Street traders use it for superquick automated trades. Procter & Gamble even uses supercomputers to make sure that Pringles go into cans without breaking.
And typically, research centers with large supercomputers are magnets for top scientific talent, adding significance to the presence of the machines well beyond just cranking through calculations.
Over the last decade, the Chinese have steadily inched up in the rankings of supercomputers. Tianhe-1A stands as the culmination of billions of dollars in investment and scientific development, as China has gone from a computing afterthought to a world technology superpower.
“What is scary about this is that the U.S. dominance in high-performance computing is at risk,” said Wu-chun Feng, a supercomputing expert and professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. “One could argue that this hits the foundation of our economic future.”
Modern supercomputers are built by combining thousands of small computer servers and using software to turn them into a single entity. In that sense, any organization with enough money and expertise can buy what amount to off-the-shelf components and create a fast machine.
The Chinese system follows that model by linking thousands upon thousands of chips made by the American companies Intel and Nvidia. But the secret sauce behind the system — and the technological achievement — is the interconnect, or networking technology, developed by Chinese researchers that shuttles data back and forth across the smaller computers at breakneck rates, Mr. Dongarra said.
“That technology was built by them,” Mr. Dongarra said. “They are taking supercomputing very seriously and making a deep commitment.”
The Chinese interconnect can handle data at about twice the speed of a common interconnect called InfiniBand used in many supercomputers.
For decades, the United States has developed most of the underlying technology that goes into the massive supercomputers and has built the largest, fastest machines at research laboratories and universities. Some of the top systems simulate the effects of nuclear weapons, while others predict the weather and aid in energy research.
In 2002, the United States lost its crown as supercomputing kingpin for the first time in stunning fashion when Japan unveiled a machine with more horsepower than the top 20 American computers combined. The United States government responded in kind, forming groups to plot a comeback and pouring money into supercomputing projects. The United States regained its leadership status in 2004, and has kept it, until now.
At the computing conference on Thursday in China, the researchers will discuss how they are using the new system for scientific research in fields like astrophysics and bio-molecular modeling. Tianhe-1A, which is housed in a building at the National Supercomputing Center in Tianjin, can perform mathematical operations about 29 million times faster than one of the earliest supercomputers, built in 1976.
For the record, it performs 2.5 times 10 to the 15th power mathematical operations per second.
Mr. Dongarra said a long-running Chinese project to build chips to rival those from Intel and others remained under way and looked promising. “It’s not quite there yet, but it will be in a year or two,” he said.
He also said that in November, when the list comes out, he expected a second Chinese computer to be in the top five, culminating years of investment.
“The Japanese came out of nowhere and really caught people off guard,” Mr. Feng said. “With China, you could see this one coming.”
Steven J. Wallach, a well-known computer designer, played down the importance of taking the top spot on the supercomputer rankings.
“It’s interesting, but it’s like getting to the four-minute mile,” Mr. Wallach said. “The world didn’t stop. This is just a snapshot in time.”
The research labs often spend weeks tuning their systems to perform well on the standard horsepower test. But just because a system can hammer through trillions of calculations per second does not mean it will do well on the specialized jobs that researchers want to use it for, Mr. Wallach added.
The United States has plans in place to make much faster machines out of proprietary components and to advance the software used by these systems so that they are easy for researchers to use. But those computers remain years away, and for now, China is king.
“They want to show they are No. 1 in the world, no matter what it is,” Mr. Wallach said. “I don’t blame them.”
By ASHLEE VANCE
The New York Times, October 28, 2010
A Chinese scientific research center has built the fastest supercomputer ever made, replacing the United States as maker of the swiftest machine, and giving China bragging rights as a technology superpower.
The computer, known as Tianhe-1A, has 1.4 times the horsepower of the current top computer, which is at a national laboratory in Tennessee, as measured by the standard test used to gauge how well the systems handle mathematical calculations, said Jack Dongarra, a University of Tennessee computer scientist who maintains the official supercomputer rankings.
Although the official list of the top 500 fastest machines, which comes out every six months, is not due to be completed by Mr. Dongarra until next week, he said the Chinese computer “blows away the existing No. 1 machine.” He added, “We don’t close the books until Nov. 1, but I would say it is unlikely we will see a system that is faster.”
Officials from the Chinese research center, the National University of Defense Technology, are expected to reveal the computer’s performance on Thursday at a conference in Beijing. The center says it is “under the dual supervision of the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Education.”
The race to build the fastest supercomputer has become a source of national pride as these machines are valued for their ability to solve problems critical to national interests in areas like defense, energy, finance and science. Supercomputing technology also finds its way into mainstream business; oil and gas companies use it to find reservoirs and Wall Street traders use it for superquick automated trades. Procter & Gamble even uses supercomputers to make sure that Pringles go into cans without breaking.
And typically, research centers with large supercomputers are magnets for top scientific talent, adding significance to the presence of the machines well beyond just cranking through calculations.
Over the last decade, the Chinese have steadily inched up in the rankings of supercomputers. Tianhe-1A stands as the culmination of billions of dollars in investment and scientific development, as China has gone from a computing afterthought to a world technology superpower.
“What is scary about this is that the U.S. dominance in high-performance computing is at risk,” said Wu-chun Feng, a supercomputing expert and professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. “One could argue that this hits the foundation of our economic future.”
Modern supercomputers are built by combining thousands of small computer servers and using software to turn them into a single entity. In that sense, any organization with enough money and expertise can buy what amount to off-the-shelf components and create a fast machine.
The Chinese system follows that model by linking thousands upon thousands of chips made by the American companies Intel and Nvidia. But the secret sauce behind the system — and the technological achievement — is the interconnect, or networking technology, developed by Chinese researchers that shuttles data back and forth across the smaller computers at breakneck rates, Mr. Dongarra said.
“That technology was built by them,” Mr. Dongarra said. “They are taking supercomputing very seriously and making a deep commitment.”
The Chinese interconnect can handle data at about twice the speed of a common interconnect called InfiniBand used in many supercomputers.
For decades, the United States has developed most of the underlying technology that goes into the massive supercomputers and has built the largest, fastest machines at research laboratories and universities. Some of the top systems simulate the effects of nuclear weapons, while others predict the weather and aid in energy research.
In 2002, the United States lost its crown as supercomputing kingpin for the first time in stunning fashion when Japan unveiled a machine with more horsepower than the top 20 American computers combined. The United States government responded in kind, forming groups to plot a comeback and pouring money into supercomputing projects. The United States regained its leadership status in 2004, and has kept it, until now.
At the computing conference on Thursday in China, the researchers will discuss how they are using the new system for scientific research in fields like astrophysics and bio-molecular modeling. Tianhe-1A, which is housed in a building at the National Supercomputing Center in Tianjin, can perform mathematical operations about 29 million times faster than one of the earliest supercomputers, built in 1976.
For the record, it performs 2.5 times 10 to the 15th power mathematical operations per second.
Mr. Dongarra said a long-running Chinese project to build chips to rival those from Intel and others remained under way and looked promising. “It’s not quite there yet, but it will be in a year or two,” he said.
He also said that in November, when the list comes out, he expected a second Chinese computer to be in the top five, culminating years of investment.
“The Japanese came out of nowhere and really caught people off guard,” Mr. Feng said. “With China, you could see this one coming.”
Steven J. Wallach, a well-known computer designer, played down the importance of taking the top spot on the supercomputer rankings.
“It’s interesting, but it’s like getting to the four-minute mile,” Mr. Wallach said. “The world didn’t stop. This is just a snapshot in time.”
The research labs often spend weeks tuning their systems to perform well on the standard horsepower test. But just because a system can hammer through trillions of calculations per second does not mean it will do well on the specialized jobs that researchers want to use it for, Mr. Wallach added.
The United States has plans in place to make much faster machines out of proprietary components and to advance the software used by these systems so that they are easy for researchers to use. But those computers remain years away, and for now, China is king.
“They want to show they are No. 1 in the world, no matter what it is,” Mr. Wallach said. “I don’t blame them.”
Thursday, October 21, 2010
China's Rise: Regional Responses and Lessons for Washington - Hudson Institute
China's Rise: Regional Responses and Lessons for Washington
Hudson Institute
Wednesday, October 27 12:00 - 2:00 PM
E-mail
As recent incidents in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Yellow Sea confirm, China’s military expansion and the possible implications for American strategic interests in Asia are serious. Less known is the evolving strategy that countries such as Taiwan, Australia, Japan, and South Korea are crafting in response.
Discussants include:
Dan Blumenthal, AEI Resident Fellow, speaking on how Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are seeking to respond to China’s rise.
John Lee, Foreign Policy Fellow at Sydney's Center for Independent Studies and Hudson Visiting Fellow, speaking on the evolving nature of China’s multidimensional challenge to U.S. strategic primacy in Asia.
Andrew Shearer, Director of Studies at the Lowy Institute in Sydney, speaking on the current Australian response.
Hudson Senior Fellow Seth Cropsey will chair the discussion and will speak on the lessons Washington ought to be learning and how the United States should respond.
This event will be streamed live on Hudson's website, www.hudson.org/WatchLive.
Hudson Institute
Wednesday, October 27 12:00 - 2:00 PM
As recent incidents in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Yellow Sea confirm, China’s military expansion and the possible implications for American strategic interests in Asia are serious. Less known is the evolving strategy that countries such as Taiwan, Australia, Japan, and South Korea are crafting in response.
Discussants include:
Dan Blumenthal, AEI Resident Fellow, speaking on how Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are seeking to respond to China’s rise.
John Lee, Foreign Policy Fellow at Sydney's Center for Independent Studies and Hudson Visiting Fellow, speaking on the evolving nature of China’s multidimensional challenge to U.S. strategic primacy in Asia.
Andrew Shearer, Director of Studies at the Lowy Institute in Sydney, speaking on the current Australian response.
Hudson Senior Fellow Seth Cropsey will chair the discussion and will speak on the lessons Washington ought to be learning and how the United States should respond.
This event will be streamed live on Hudson's website, www.hudson.org/WatchLive.
Tuesday, October 19, 2010
China bypassing sanctions against Iran
U.S. says Chinese businesses and banks are bypassing U.N. sanctions against Iran
By John Pomfret
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, October 18, 2010; 1:58 AM
The Obama administration has concluded that Chinese firms are helping Iran to improve its missile technology and develop nuclear weapons, and has asked China to stop such activity, a senior U.S. official said.
During a visit to Beijing last month, a delegation led by Robert J. Einhorn, the State Department's special adviser for nonproliferation and arms control, handed a "significant list" of companies and banks to their Chinese counterparts, according to the senior U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive issue in U.S.-Chinese relations. The official said the Obama administration thinks that the companies are violating U.N. sanctions, but that China did not authorize their activities.
The Obama administration faces a balancing act in pressing Beijing to stop the deals and limit Chinese investments in Iran's energy industry. U.S. officials say they need to preserve their ability to work with China on issues ranging from the value of its currency to the stability of North Korea. But the administration also wants to make progress in efforts to dissuade Iran from building a nuclear weapon and to convince other powerful states that China is not receiving lenient treatment because of its energy needs.
"My government will investigate the issues raised by the U.S. side," said Wang Baodong, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy.
Einhorn's trip is part of a worldwide effort by the Obama administration to persuade countries to push Iran to enter into negotiations over its nuclear program, which the Islamic Republic says is peaceful. The Obama administration has cobbled together a growing network of countries and companies that have announced measures to cut investments in Iran.
China's involvement in Iran's energy sector and the role that some of its companies are believed to be playing in Tehran's military modernization could disrupt U.S.-Chinese relations. In a recent meetings on Capitol Hill, China's outgoing deputy chief of mission, Xie Feng, was told that "if he ever wanted to see Congress united, Democrats and Republicans, it would be on the issue of China's interaction with Iran," one participant said, speaking on condition of anonymity to disclose a private discussion.
After the U.N. Security Council authorized enhanced sanctions against Iran in June, the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Canada passed laws to further restrict investment in Iran's energy sector. The U.S. law authorized the president to sanction any company found to be selling gasoline to Iran or that had invested $20 million or more in Iran's energy sector. INPEX, the Japanese energy giant, announced last week that it was pulling out of Iran.
China thus becomes the last major economy with significant investments in Iran's energy industry. Russia does not have major investments there and recently canceled the sale of an advanced antiaircraft missile to Iran, refunding the $900 million sticker price.
"China now is the only country with a major oil and gas industry that's prepared to deal with Iran," the U.S. official said. "Everyone else has pulled out. They stand alone."
Each nation, particularly permanent members of the Security Council such as China, is responsible for abiding by the U.N. sanctions.
If one country does not, others can point out those failures, which is what Einhorn did. Other nations can also ban their companies from doing business with the wayward firms. The U.S. government did that at least 62 times with Chinese companies during President George W. Bush's first term, generally regarding dealing with Iran.
The U.S. official speaking anonymously said U.S. intelligence thinks that several Chinese companies have also been involved in providing restricted technology and materials to Iran's military programs. He said that Chinese banks were found to be involved in these and other deals with Iran, and that these deals occurred both before and after the enhanced U.N. sanctions were approved in June.
The U.S. official said that most of the deals concerned Iran's missile program. However, a senior official from a Western intelligence agency said Chinese firms were also discovered selling high-quality carbon fiber to Iran to help it build better centrifuges, which are used in enriching uranium. The official said he had no information to corroborate that reporting.
The official declined to say how many companies were on the list or to name the companies. He added that some of the company names were provided to the Chinese as case studies of how sanctions were being violated and that others were cited as examples of "ongoing concerns."
Other officials and analysts said the number of firms involved in not following sanctions was less important than the quality of the technology Iran was obtaining. In 2008, for example, Iran obtained 108 pressure gauges, which are critical to the functioning of a centrifuge, from one Chinese company.
A year earlier, a small company in the Chinese port city of Dalian provided Iran with a range of sensitive materials, including graphite, tungsten copper, tungsten powder, high- strength aluminum alloys and high-strength maraging steel, again for its nuclear program. That firm allegedly received payment from Iran via U.S. banks.
The U.S. official credited China with working hard to establish the bureaucratic structures and laws to control the export of sensitive technologies, but he said China so far has not devoted resources to crack down on violators.
"China has come a long way in putting in place an export-control system," he said. "But it's one thing to have a system that looks good on the books and it's another thing to have a system that they enforce conscientiously.. . . Where China's system is deficient is on the enforcement side."
China is generally believed to have supplied Pakistan with a blueprint for a nuclear weapon in the 1970s. But Bonnie S. Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said most experts agree that since the late 1990s, China has taken the issue more seriously. Some have argued that President Bill Clinton's administration persuaded China to embrace the issue because it was important to the United States. Others have said China itself understood that selling missile and nuclear weapons-technology, especially to neighbors such as North Korea, was a bad idea.
Both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations determined that China's government was no longer intentionally proliferating. That conclusion allowed Bush to open the door for U.S. nuclear-energy technology to be sold to China in contracts that are expected to be worth billions.
During the trip to China, the U.S. delegation also pushed oil companies, specifically the China National Petroleum Corp. and the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, to stop or limit their investments in Iran. Both firms have been in negotiations to invest billions in Iran's energy sector although, according to Erica Downs of the Brookings Institution, it is unclear how much they have spent there.
The delegation informed the Chinese of the ramifications that the new U.S. law - the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 - might have for Chinese firms and banks that continued to conduct business in Iran.
"Any Chinese enterprise that has . . . a big stake in good business relations with the United States would have to be mindful of U.S. laws," the U.S. official said.
Still, the official said, the U.S. delegation emphasized that China did not have to cut back on purchases of energy from Iran, from which China obtains around 8 percent of its oil. Nor does China need to end its "energy cooperation with Iran on a permanent basis," he said.
"What we want is some near-term pragmatic restraint," he said.
This approach, according to Downs, could spell trouble with European and Asian firms and their governments.
"What the Japanese and European companies are most concerned about is that they've left projects that are real prizes in Iran," she said. "Their biggest concern is stepping away under pressure and having the Chinese go in."
"We believe normal trade and economic cooperation with Iran that don't violate U.N. resolutions should not be hurt or disturbed," said Wang, the embassy spokesman.
By John Pomfret
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, October 18, 2010; 1:58 AM
The Obama administration has concluded that Chinese firms are helping Iran to improve its missile technology and develop nuclear weapons, and has asked China to stop such activity, a senior U.S. official said.
During a visit to Beijing last month, a delegation led by Robert J. Einhorn, the State Department's special adviser for nonproliferation and arms control, handed a "significant list" of companies and banks to their Chinese counterparts, according to the senior U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive issue in U.S.-Chinese relations. The official said the Obama administration thinks that the companies are violating U.N. sanctions, but that China did not authorize their activities.
The Obama administration faces a balancing act in pressing Beijing to stop the deals and limit Chinese investments in Iran's energy industry. U.S. officials say they need to preserve their ability to work with China on issues ranging from the value of its currency to the stability of North Korea. But the administration also wants to make progress in efforts to dissuade Iran from building a nuclear weapon and to convince other powerful states that China is not receiving lenient treatment because of its energy needs.
"My government will investigate the issues raised by the U.S. side," said Wang Baodong, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy.
Einhorn's trip is part of a worldwide effort by the Obama administration to persuade countries to push Iran to enter into negotiations over its nuclear program, which the Islamic Republic says is peaceful. The Obama administration has cobbled together a growing network of countries and companies that have announced measures to cut investments in Iran.
China's involvement in Iran's energy sector and the role that some of its companies are believed to be playing in Tehran's military modernization could disrupt U.S.-Chinese relations. In a recent meetings on Capitol Hill, China's outgoing deputy chief of mission, Xie Feng, was told that "if he ever wanted to see Congress united, Democrats and Republicans, it would be on the issue of China's interaction with Iran," one participant said, speaking on condition of anonymity to disclose a private discussion.
After the U.N. Security Council authorized enhanced sanctions against Iran in June, the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Canada passed laws to further restrict investment in Iran's energy sector. The U.S. law authorized the president to sanction any company found to be selling gasoline to Iran or that had invested $20 million or more in Iran's energy sector. INPEX, the Japanese energy giant, announced last week that it was pulling out of Iran.
China thus becomes the last major economy with significant investments in Iran's energy industry. Russia does not have major investments there and recently canceled the sale of an advanced antiaircraft missile to Iran, refunding the $900 million sticker price.
"China now is the only country with a major oil and gas industry that's prepared to deal with Iran," the U.S. official said. "Everyone else has pulled out. They stand alone."
Each nation, particularly permanent members of the Security Council such as China, is responsible for abiding by the U.N. sanctions.
If one country does not, others can point out those failures, which is what Einhorn did. Other nations can also ban their companies from doing business with the wayward firms. The U.S. government did that at least 62 times with Chinese companies during President George W. Bush's first term, generally regarding dealing with Iran.
The U.S. official speaking anonymously said U.S. intelligence thinks that several Chinese companies have also been involved in providing restricted technology and materials to Iran's military programs. He said that Chinese banks were found to be involved in these and other deals with Iran, and that these deals occurred both before and after the enhanced U.N. sanctions were approved in June.
The U.S. official said that most of the deals concerned Iran's missile program. However, a senior official from a Western intelligence agency said Chinese firms were also discovered selling high-quality carbon fiber to Iran to help it build better centrifuges, which are used in enriching uranium. The official said he had no information to corroborate that reporting.
The official declined to say how many companies were on the list or to name the companies. He added that some of the company names were provided to the Chinese as case studies of how sanctions were being violated and that others were cited as examples of "ongoing concerns."
Other officials and analysts said the number of firms involved in not following sanctions was less important than the quality of the technology Iran was obtaining. In 2008, for example, Iran obtained 108 pressure gauges, which are critical to the functioning of a centrifuge, from one Chinese company.
A year earlier, a small company in the Chinese port city of Dalian provided Iran with a range of sensitive materials, including graphite, tungsten copper, tungsten powder, high- strength aluminum alloys and high-strength maraging steel, again for its nuclear program. That firm allegedly received payment from Iran via U.S. banks.
The U.S. official credited China with working hard to establish the bureaucratic structures and laws to control the export of sensitive technologies, but he said China so far has not devoted resources to crack down on violators.
"China has come a long way in putting in place an export-control system," he said. "But it's one thing to have a system that looks good on the books and it's another thing to have a system that they enforce conscientiously.. . . Where China's system is deficient is on the enforcement side."
China is generally believed to have supplied Pakistan with a blueprint for a nuclear weapon in the 1970s. But Bonnie S. Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said most experts agree that since the late 1990s, China has taken the issue more seriously. Some have argued that President Bill Clinton's administration persuaded China to embrace the issue because it was important to the United States. Others have said China itself understood that selling missile and nuclear weapons-technology, especially to neighbors such as North Korea, was a bad idea.
Both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations determined that China's government was no longer intentionally proliferating. That conclusion allowed Bush to open the door for U.S. nuclear-energy technology to be sold to China in contracts that are expected to be worth billions.
During the trip to China, the U.S. delegation also pushed oil companies, specifically the China National Petroleum Corp. and the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, to stop or limit their investments in Iran. Both firms have been in negotiations to invest billions in Iran's energy sector although, according to Erica Downs of the Brookings Institution, it is unclear how much they have spent there.
The delegation informed the Chinese of the ramifications that the new U.S. law - the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 - might have for Chinese firms and banks that continued to conduct business in Iran.
"Any Chinese enterprise that has . . . a big stake in good business relations with the United States would have to be mindful of U.S. laws," the U.S. official said.
Still, the official said, the U.S. delegation emphasized that China did not have to cut back on purchases of energy from Iran, from which China obtains around 8 percent of its oil. Nor does China need to end its "energy cooperation with Iran on a permanent basis," he said.
"What we want is some near-term pragmatic restraint," he said.
This approach, according to Downs, could spell trouble with European and Asian firms and their governments.
"What the Japanese and European companies are most concerned about is that they've left projects that are real prizes in Iran," she said. "Their biggest concern is stepping away under pressure and having the Chinese go in."
"We believe normal trade and economic cooperation with Iran that don't violate U.N. resolutions should not be hurt or disturbed," said Wang, the embassy spokesman.
Xi Jinping, o futuro presidente da China
Xi Jinping, o futuro presidente da China
Atual vice-presidente da China, o político pró-mercado Xi Jinping foi alçado ao posto de vice-presidente da Comissão Central Militar, uma indicação de que vai substituir Hu Jintao em 2012
As reformas das últimas três décadas transformaram a China socialista na segunda maior economia do mundo, mas a adoção do capitalismo não transformou o ambiente político do país asiático. Na política, ainda valem as tradições do Partido Comunista da China e, nesta segunda-feira (18), ficou claro o nome do sucessor de Hu Jintao como secretário-geral do PCC e presidente da China. A partir de 2012, o país deve ser chefiado por Xi Jinping.
A notícia que deixou clara a linha sucessória foi divulgada pela imprensa estatal do país. Durante o congresso anual do partido, encerrado no domingo (17), Xi Jinping foi alçado ao posto de vice-presidente da Comissão Central Militar, um cargo que tradicionalmente é ocupado pelo futuro secretário-geral do partido. Esse foi o último estágio pelo qual Hu Jintao passou antes de substituir Jiang Zemin, em 2003.
Xi é atualmente vice-presidente da China e um dos integrantes do famigerado Politburo do Partido Comunista Chinês, um comitê decisório que é, de fato, o responsável pelos rumos do país. Em 2007, quando foi eleito integrante do Politburo, Xi teve a companhia de Li Keqiang, atual vice-presidente executivo da China, visto como seu principal concorrente. A escolha de Xi para a Comissão Central Militar era esperada para 2009, mas como não foi anunciada na época, surgiram dúvidas a respeito da disputa entre os dois. Com a nomeação feita neste ano, parece claro que Xi entrará no lugar de Hu Jintao quando o mandato deste acabar, em 2012.
Novo líder é pró-mercado
A escolha de Xi Jinping significa que a China deve continuar no rumo pró-mercado que percorreu nos últimos anos. Em 2007, a revista Foreign Policy publicou uma análise de Xi e Li e mostrou que o primeiro é o candidato dos empresários e da classe média e que, nas províncias que administrou – Zhejiang e Xangai – fez um governo marcado pela promoção da iniciativa privada. De acordo com essa análise, Xi fará, se for confirmado como novo chefe do partido e da nação, um governo que promova a liberalização da economia, o crescimento rápido e a integração da China na economia mundial.
O perfil de Xi vai ao encontro das diretrizes que o Partido Comunista divulgou para o 12º Plano Quinquenal (2011-2015), que incluem a “participação ativa” na governança da economia global e a abertura econômica.
Ao site do canal de TV americano Bloomberg, o professor de história da Universidade da China em Hong Kong Willy Wo-Lap Lam afirmou que, segundo a tradição do partido, “Xi Jinping, como próximo secretário-geral, deve ser capaz de lidar com a comissão militar por dois anos antes da troca de poder”. Isso não deve ser uma dificuldade para Xi, que tem contatos militares por ter sido assessor do Ministério da Defesa.
Disputa interna
Xi faz parte de um grupo político conhecido como princelings (principezinhos, na tradução literal), por incluir filhos de figuras importantes do PCC. Xi Jinping é filho de Xi Zhongxun, ex-membro do Politburo nos anos 1980.
Com a ascensão de Xi, Li Keqiang, seu concorrente, deve ser o próximo primeiro-ministro da China, em substituição a Wen Jiabao. Li é um político de origem bem diferente da de Xi Jinping. Ele vem de uma família humilde, foi fazendeiro e chegou ao topo do comando do partido por meio da Liga da Juventude Comunista, um grupo de grande força política do qual também fez parte Hu Jintao.
Segundo a análise da Foreign Policy, ao optar por Xi, Hu Jintao evita críticas de que estaria favorecendo a Juventude Comunista, divisões entre este grupo e o dos principezinhos, entre as regiões costeiras – mais desenvolvidas – e o interior do país, e entre os setores mais favorecidos pelas reformas e aqueles que ainda não conseguiram melhorar suas condições de vida desde o início da abertura econômica. É uma opção para manter a tranquilidade de um partido que precisa de crescimento e estabilidade para evitar um estado de convulsão social que ameaçaria sua proeminência política.
Atual vice-presidente da China, o político pró-mercado Xi Jinping foi alçado ao posto de vice-presidente da Comissão Central Militar, uma indicação de que vai substituir Hu Jintao em 2012
As reformas das últimas três décadas transformaram a China socialista na segunda maior economia do mundo, mas a adoção do capitalismo não transformou o ambiente político do país asiático. Na política, ainda valem as tradições do Partido Comunista da China e, nesta segunda-feira (18), ficou claro o nome do sucessor de Hu Jintao como secretário-geral do PCC e presidente da China. A partir de 2012, o país deve ser chefiado por Xi Jinping.
A notícia que deixou clara a linha sucessória foi divulgada pela imprensa estatal do país. Durante o congresso anual do partido, encerrado no domingo (17), Xi Jinping foi alçado ao posto de vice-presidente da Comissão Central Militar, um cargo que tradicionalmente é ocupado pelo futuro secretário-geral do partido. Esse foi o último estágio pelo qual Hu Jintao passou antes de substituir Jiang Zemin, em 2003.
Xi é atualmente vice-presidente da China e um dos integrantes do famigerado Politburo do Partido Comunista Chinês, um comitê decisório que é, de fato, o responsável pelos rumos do país. Em 2007, quando foi eleito integrante do Politburo, Xi teve a companhia de Li Keqiang, atual vice-presidente executivo da China, visto como seu principal concorrente. A escolha de Xi para a Comissão Central Militar era esperada para 2009, mas como não foi anunciada na época, surgiram dúvidas a respeito da disputa entre os dois. Com a nomeação feita neste ano, parece claro que Xi entrará no lugar de Hu Jintao quando o mandato deste acabar, em 2012.
Novo líder é pró-mercado
A escolha de Xi Jinping significa que a China deve continuar no rumo pró-mercado que percorreu nos últimos anos. Em 2007, a revista Foreign Policy publicou uma análise de Xi e Li e mostrou que o primeiro é o candidato dos empresários e da classe média e que, nas províncias que administrou – Zhejiang e Xangai – fez um governo marcado pela promoção da iniciativa privada. De acordo com essa análise, Xi fará, se for confirmado como novo chefe do partido e da nação, um governo que promova a liberalização da economia, o crescimento rápido e a integração da China na economia mundial.
O perfil de Xi vai ao encontro das diretrizes que o Partido Comunista divulgou para o 12º Plano Quinquenal (2011-2015), que incluem a “participação ativa” na governança da economia global e a abertura econômica.
Ao site do canal de TV americano Bloomberg, o professor de história da Universidade da China em Hong Kong Willy Wo-Lap Lam afirmou que, segundo a tradição do partido, “Xi Jinping, como próximo secretário-geral, deve ser capaz de lidar com a comissão militar por dois anos antes da troca de poder”. Isso não deve ser uma dificuldade para Xi, que tem contatos militares por ter sido assessor do Ministério da Defesa.
Disputa interna
Xi faz parte de um grupo político conhecido como princelings (principezinhos, na tradução literal), por incluir filhos de figuras importantes do PCC. Xi Jinping é filho de Xi Zhongxun, ex-membro do Politburo nos anos 1980.
Com a ascensão de Xi, Li Keqiang, seu concorrente, deve ser o próximo primeiro-ministro da China, em substituição a Wen Jiabao. Li é um político de origem bem diferente da de Xi Jinping. Ele vem de uma família humilde, foi fazendeiro e chegou ao topo do comando do partido por meio da Liga da Juventude Comunista, um grupo de grande força política do qual também fez parte Hu Jintao.
Segundo a análise da Foreign Policy, ao optar por Xi, Hu Jintao evita críticas de que estaria favorecendo a Juventude Comunista, divisões entre este grupo e o dos principezinhos, entre as regiões costeiras – mais desenvolvidas – e o interior do país, e entre os setores mais favorecidos pelas reformas e aqueles que ainda não conseguiram melhorar suas condições de vida desde o início da abertura econômica. É uma opção para manter a tranquilidade de um partido que precisa de crescimento e estabilidade para evitar um estado de convulsão social que ameaçaria sua proeminência política.
Sunday, October 17, 2010
Liberty, Freedom, Democracy, in China - Tom Friedman
Op-Ed Columnist
Going Long Liberty in China
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
The New York Times, October 16, 2010
There has been a lot of buzz lately about investors “shorting” China’s overheated real estate market, basically betting that it will go down. I say that’s peanuts. There is a much more interesting shorting opportunity in China today. It is truly “The Big Short,” and that is betting that China can’t continue to grow at this pace indefinitely by only permitting its people to have economic liberty without political liberty. I’m sure Goldman Sachs would write you a credit default swap on that, and the Chinese Communist Party would take the other side. Are you game? It seems that the Nobel Prize Committee is. I’d be, too.
The Norwegian committee just awarded its 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, the jailed Chinese pro-democracy activist. The message to Beijing, I’d argue, was simple: Liberty is a value in and of itself, because without it human beings can never develop their full potential. And, therefore, liberty is also an essential ingredient for any society that wants to thrive in the 21st century. Otherwise, it can’t develop its full potential. China has thrived since Deng Xiaoping by offering its people economic freedom without political freedom. And surely one of the most intriguing political science questions in the world today is: Can China continue to prosper, while censoring the Internet, controlling its news media and insisting on a monopoly of political power by the Chinese Communist Party?
I don’t think so. To be sure, China has thrived up to now — impressively — by permitting its people only economic liberty. This may have been the sole way to quickly take a vast country of 1.3 billion people from massive poverty to much-improved standards of living, basic education for all, modernized infrastructure and even riches for some urbanites.
But the Nobel committee did China a favor in sending the tacit message with its peace prize: Don’t get too cocky and think that you have rewritten the laws of gravity. The “Beijing Consensus,” of economic liberty without political liberty, may have been a great strategy for takeoff, but it won’t get you to the next level. So this might actually be a good time for Beijing to engage peaceful democracy advocates like Liu, who is now serving an 11-year sentence, or the 23 retired Chinese Communist Party officials who last week published an open letter challenging the government to improve speech and press freedoms. (Bloomberg News said that an Internet link to the Chinese-language version of the letter could not be opened in China. Screens showed “network error.”)
My reason for believing China will have to open up sooner than its leadership thinks has to do with its basic challenge: It has to get rich before it gets old.
Because of its one-child population-control policy China, over the next few decades, will go from a country where two sets of grandparents and one set of parents are all saving for the computer for one kid, to a country where one kid will be supporting the retirement of two parents and maybe one grandparent — with little government help. Moreover, because of the practice in some families of aborting female fetuses, there could be 20 million to 40 million more men than women in China in the next few decades, and that will force some men to go abroad to find brides.
The only stable way to handle that is to raise incomes by moving more Chinese from low-wage manufacturing jobs to more knowledge- and services-based jobs, as Hong Kong did. But, and here’s the rub, today’s knowledge industries are all being built on social networks that enable open collaboration, the free sharing of ideas and the formation of productive relationships — both within companies and around the globe. The logic is that all of us are smarter than one of us, and the unique feature of today’s flat world is that you can actually tap the brains and skills of all of us, or at least more people in more places. Companies and countries that enable that will thrive more than those that don’t.
Curtis Carlson, the C.E.O. of SRI International, the innovation hub in Silicon Valley, has a tongue-in-cheek way of putting it: “In a world where so many people now have access to education and cheap tools of innovation, innovation that happens from the bottom up tends to be chaotic but smart. Innovation that happens from the top down tends to be orderly but dumb.” As a result, says Carlson, “On balance, the sweet spot for innovation today is moving down, not up.”
As such, government’s job today is to inspire, liberate, empower and enable all that stuff coming up from below, while learning to live with and manage the chaos. But what would happen if China had 600 million villagers on Twitter? In a country that already has thousands of protests every week over land seizures and corruption, its system probably could not handle that much unrestricted bottom-up energy. It is a real problem for Beijing. China can’t afford chaos, and China can’t afford not to gradually unleash more bottom-up and less top-down energies. I don’t know how China’s leaders are going to balance these imperatives.
Maybe they should ask Liu Xiaobo.
A version of this op-ed appeared in print on October 17, 2010, on page WK8 of the New York edition.
Going Long Liberty in China
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
The New York Times, October 16, 2010
There has been a lot of buzz lately about investors “shorting” China’s overheated real estate market, basically betting that it will go down. I say that’s peanuts. There is a much more interesting shorting opportunity in China today. It is truly “The Big Short,” and that is betting that China can’t continue to grow at this pace indefinitely by only permitting its people to have economic liberty without political liberty. I’m sure Goldman Sachs would write you a credit default swap on that, and the Chinese Communist Party would take the other side. Are you game? It seems that the Nobel Prize Committee is. I’d be, too.
The Norwegian committee just awarded its 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, the jailed Chinese pro-democracy activist. The message to Beijing, I’d argue, was simple: Liberty is a value in and of itself, because without it human beings can never develop their full potential. And, therefore, liberty is also an essential ingredient for any society that wants to thrive in the 21st century. Otherwise, it can’t develop its full potential. China has thrived since Deng Xiaoping by offering its people economic freedom without political freedom. And surely one of the most intriguing political science questions in the world today is: Can China continue to prosper, while censoring the Internet, controlling its news media and insisting on a monopoly of political power by the Chinese Communist Party?
I don’t think so. To be sure, China has thrived up to now — impressively — by permitting its people only economic liberty. This may have been the sole way to quickly take a vast country of 1.3 billion people from massive poverty to much-improved standards of living, basic education for all, modernized infrastructure and even riches for some urbanites.
But the Nobel committee did China a favor in sending the tacit message with its peace prize: Don’t get too cocky and think that you have rewritten the laws of gravity. The “Beijing Consensus,” of economic liberty without political liberty, may have been a great strategy for takeoff, but it won’t get you to the next level. So this might actually be a good time for Beijing to engage peaceful democracy advocates like Liu, who is now serving an 11-year sentence, or the 23 retired Chinese Communist Party officials who last week published an open letter challenging the government to improve speech and press freedoms. (Bloomberg News said that an Internet link to the Chinese-language version of the letter could not be opened in China. Screens showed “network error.”)
My reason for believing China will have to open up sooner than its leadership thinks has to do with its basic challenge: It has to get rich before it gets old.
Because of its one-child population-control policy China, over the next few decades, will go from a country where two sets of grandparents and one set of parents are all saving for the computer for one kid, to a country where one kid will be supporting the retirement of two parents and maybe one grandparent — with little government help. Moreover, because of the practice in some families of aborting female fetuses, there could be 20 million to 40 million more men than women in China in the next few decades, and that will force some men to go abroad to find brides.
The only stable way to handle that is to raise incomes by moving more Chinese from low-wage manufacturing jobs to more knowledge- and services-based jobs, as Hong Kong did. But, and here’s the rub, today’s knowledge industries are all being built on social networks that enable open collaboration, the free sharing of ideas and the formation of productive relationships — both within companies and around the globe. The logic is that all of us are smarter than one of us, and the unique feature of today’s flat world is that you can actually tap the brains and skills of all of us, or at least more people in more places. Companies and countries that enable that will thrive more than those that don’t.
Curtis Carlson, the C.E.O. of SRI International, the innovation hub in Silicon Valley, has a tongue-in-cheek way of putting it: “In a world where so many people now have access to education and cheap tools of innovation, innovation that happens from the bottom up tends to be chaotic but smart. Innovation that happens from the top down tends to be orderly but dumb.” As a result, says Carlson, “On balance, the sweet spot for innovation today is moving down, not up.”
As such, government’s job today is to inspire, liberate, empower and enable all that stuff coming up from below, while learning to live with and manage the chaos. But what would happen if China had 600 million villagers on Twitter? In a country that already has thousands of protests every week over land seizures and corruption, its system probably could not handle that much unrestricted bottom-up energy. It is a real problem for Beijing. China can’t afford chaos, and China can’t afford not to gradually unleash more bottom-up and less top-down energies. I don’t know how China’s leaders are going to balance these imperatives.
Maybe they should ask Liu Xiaobo.
A version of this op-ed appeared in print on October 17, 2010, on page WK8 of the New York edition.
News from Shanghai: a book by Qiu Xiaolong
The News From Shanghai
By JESS ROW
The New York Times Review of Books, October 15, 2010
YEARS OF RED DUST: Stories of Shanghai
By Qiu Xiaolong
St. Martin's Press, September 2010, 227 pp.; $24.99;
ISBN: 978-0-312-62809-3, ISBN10: 0-312-62809-9, 5 1/2 x 8 1/4 inches, 240 pp.
In the first four decades of the People’s Republic, Shanghai existed in a strange limbo, a kind of ghostly half-life. No longer the jeweled sewer of decadence and corruption it had once been — a city of opium smokers and courtesans, millionaires and beggars, the high elegance of the Bund and the conspiratorial darkness of the foreign concessions — it lingered on under Communism as an industrial center, a vital source of taxable wealth, but symbolically something of an embarrassment, its foreignness a stain that couldn’t be washed away. Then, after Deng Xiaoping liberalized its economy in 1991, Shanghai roared back to life and regained its place as a financial and cultural hub, a symbol of China’s dizzying emergence on the world stage.
Qiu Xiaolong’s “Years of Red Dust” is an account of those lost years and their aftermath, beginning in 1949 and ending in 2005, and one of the most striking things about it is that it doesn’t feel very, well, Shanghainese. Though it’s set in a longtang, or lane, a narrow street populated by Shanghai’s once-characteristic shikumen, courtyard houses, and though Qiu emphasizes the distinctive culture of gossip and intermingling that goes on in such close quarters, the stories that make up each episode are consumed with China’s national upheavals: the five-year plans, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the death of Mao, the Tiananmen Square massacre and what came after. Shanghai itself — its language, its legends, its cuisine — appears here and there, but in the most muted fashion. Reading this book alongside Han Bangqing’s “Sing-Song Girls of Shanghai” or Kazuo Ishiguro’s “When We Were Orphans” is an object lesson in how Communism erased China’s local histories (even the history of a great cosmopolis) and imposed a rigid new national identity in their place.
This puts “Years of Red Dust” at something of a disadvantage because many of the stories Qiu tells are already quite familiar in the West. Taking on such a wide swath of history and using as its organizing principle a location rather than a family or a single character, he can present only fragments and headlines. Literally so, because each chapter begins with the neighborhood’s final “blackboard newsletter” of the year, summing up the significant (national) events of, say, 1952, 1966 or 1980. This makes the book interesting as a historical text, but somewhat unsatisfying as a work of fiction.
Which isn’t to say there aren’t many moments of pathos and pungent humor as we witness the rise and fall of individual fortunes over the course of such turbulent times: the “(tofu) worker poet,” once exalted for his proletarian verses, reduced to selling tofu when his work goes out of style; the young army nurse, lionized as a heroic casualty of the Korean War, who later returns, under suspicion that she has been brainwashed in an American P.O.W. camp; the pensioner who would rather stop taking his heart medicine than accept money from his son, who owns a karaoke club with a sideline in prostitution. These are rich and evocative stories, but Qiu (who was born and raised in Shanghai, but now lives in Missouri) treats them sketchily, as illustrations rather than fully formed narratives. At times we have the uncomfortable sense that he may want us to see these characters as victims of history rather than independent actors.
With its almanac-like form, “Years of Red Dust,” reminded me of Han Shaogong’s novel “A Dictionary of Maqiao,” which describes how the residents of a remote village kept their eccentric folkways alive during the same four decades. But Maqiao had the great advantage of being tiny, insignificant and thus shielded from the full glare of Mao’s attention. As the saying goes, shan gao, huangdi yuan, “The mountains are high, and the emperor is far away.” The residents of Qiu’s longtang aren’t nearly so lucky.
Jess Row is the author of a collection of stories, “The Train to Lo Wu.”
A version of this review appeared in print on October 17, 2010, on page BR21 of the Sunday Book Review.
Excerpt: ‘Years of Red Dust’ (macmillan.com)
Welcome to Red Dust Lane
(1949)
Now, as your would-be landlord—to be exact, your second landlord, nifangdong—I’ve lived in this lane for twenty years by the end of 1949. For a new college student not yet familiar with Shanghai, looking for a place characteristic of the city, a place that is convenient, that is decent, and yet inexpensive, Red Dust is the best choice for you. For the real Shanghai life, I mean.
Red Dust Lane—what a fantastic name! According to a feng shui master, there is a lot of profound learning in the choice of a name. No point in selecting insignificant words, but none in pompous words, either. The evil spirit might get envious of something too grand or good. We’re all made of dust, which is common yet essential, and the epithet red lends a world of difference to it. All of the connotations of the color: human passion, revolution, sacrifice, vanity …
You are an honest, hardworking young man, I know, so I hope you will become one of my subtenants here. Let’s take a walk along the lane, so you can really see for yourself.
The first record of the lane is from the late Qing dynasty. Look at this impressive street sign written in the magnificent calligraphy of a Qing dynasty Juren—a successful civil service examination candidate at the provincial level. After that, it was developed as part of the French concession, though not as a central part of it. Indeed, so many changes, like the white clouds in the sky—one moment, a gray dog; the next moment, a black weasel … Of course, now things are changing again. The Communists are advancing with flying colors and the Nationalists retreating helter-skelter. But the one thing under the sun that will never change, I assure you: this is a most marvelous lane.
Think about the location—at the very center of Shanghai. To the south, the City God Temple Market, no more than fifteen minutes’ walk, where you can enjoy an amazing variety of Shanghai snacks. To the north, you can stroll along to Nanjing Road, the street-long shopping center of Shanghai. If you prefer the fancier stores on Huaihai Road, it takes no more than fifteen minutes to get there. On a summer night, you may occasionally smell the characteristic twang from the Huangpu River. Strolling around those foreign buildings lined up along the Bund, like the Hong Kong Bank or the Cathay Hotel, you may feel as if the river were flowing through you, and the heart of the city beating along with you.
Our lane is medium-sized with several sublanes. Another plus, I will say. The front entrance opens onto Jinling Road. There, just a block ahead, you can see the Zhonghui Mansion—the high-rise owned by Big Brother Shen of the notorious Blue Triad, now down and out in Hong Kong. Karma. As for the back entrance of the lane, it leads into the Ninghai Food Market. In case of an unexpected visitor, you can run out in your slippers and come back with a live carp still gasping for air. In addition, there are two side entrances on Fujian Road, with a cluster of small shops and stalls. And peddlers too. Nothing can beat the location here.
This lane, or longtang, of Red Dust, may in itself tell you something of Shanghai history. After the Opium War, the city was forced open to the Western powers as a treaty port with areas selected as foreign concessions. The expatriates were then unable to tap the immense potential of the city, so some Chinese were allowed to move in. Soon the concession authorities had collective dwellings built for them in the designated lots. To make them convenient to manage, the houses were designed in the same architectural style, then arranged in lines like barracks, row after row, accessible to the main lane from sublanes. As in other lanes, most of the buildings in Red Dust belong to the shikumen style, the typical Shanghai two-storied house with a stone doorframe and a small courtyard. In the early concession days, a shikumen house was designed for one family, with rooms for different purposes—wings, hall, front room, dining room, corner room, back room, attic, dark room, and tingzijian, a cubicle above the kitchen. As a result of the city housing shortage, some of the rooms were leased. Then individually subleased, with the rooms further partitioned or subdivided, so now a “room” is practically the space for a family. You may have heard of a comedy called 72 Families in a House, which is about such an overcrowded housing situation. Red Dust is not like that. There are no more than fifteen families in our shikumen, you have my word on it.
In Red Dust, people of differing social or financial status are mixed together. Small-business owners or executives take the wing or a floor, while ordinary workers choose the back room or the attic. As for the tingzijian, it usually goes to those struggling men of letters—the tingzijian writers. They are really fantastic places for creative souls, with constant inspiration coming from the lane.
Indeed, your life is incredibly enriched with all the activity and interaction of the lane. You become part of the lane, and the lane, a part of you. Through the open black-painted door, you see this first-floor hall, don’t you? It was turned into a common kitchen area long ago, with the coal stoves of a dozen or more families all squeezed in, along with pots and pans, coal briquettes, and pigeon-house-like cabinets hung on the walls. Squeezed, but not necessarily so bad. Cooking in here, you may learn the recipes of provincial cuisines from your neighbors. Coming back soaked one rainy night, you don’t have to worry about catching a cold: a pot of ginger tea is being brewed for you on your neighbor Uncle Zhao’s stove, and Elder Sister Wu will add a spoonful of brown sugar into the steaming hot drink. Nor will you find it monotonous scrubbing your clothes on a washboard in the courtyard, where Granny Liu or Auntie Chen will keep you informed of all the latest news of the lane. Some say Shanghainese are born wheelers and dealers. That’s not true, but there may be something of that which comes out of the way people in Shanghai have always lived in a kind of miniature society, constantly handling relationships among close neighbors.
People get together a lot not only in the shikumen, but in the lane too. Their rooms being so crowded, people need to find space elsewhere. All day long, the lane is vibrant with life—informal, relaxing, and spontaneous. In the early gray light, women will come out in their pajamas, first carrying chamber pots, then later hurrying to the food market, returning with full bamboo baskets and preparing food in the common sinks of the lane while spreading the gossip heard overnight. Men will stretch out, practicing Tai Chi outside, brewing the first pot of Dragon Well tea, singing snatches of Beijing opera, and exchanging a few words about the weather or the political weather. For lunchtime, those people at home will step out again, holding rice bowls, chatting, laughing, or exchanging a slice of fried pork for a nugget of steamed belt fish. In the evening, Red Dust gets even more exciting—men playing chess or cards or mahjong under the lane lamp, women chatting or knitting or washing. In summer, it is so hot inside that some will take out bamboo recliners or mats. And a few even choose to sleep out in the lane—
Let’s take a turn here. Watch out for the droplets from the laundry on these bamboo poles across the sky of the lane. An American journalist once said that the colorful clothing festooned on a network of bamboo poles presents an Impressionist scene. But according to a folk belief, walking under women’s underwear may bring bad luck. Whether you believe it or not, it can’t hurt to take a detour. And that’s another convenience of those sublanes. You can move through the lane a number of different ways. Here we are, coming to the front entrance of the lane.
Oh, look at those people gathered here, sitting on bamboo chairs, wooden stools, and holding teas, cigarettes, and paper fans. This is another special thing about the lane. The evening talk of Red Dust Lane—Red Dust talk.
You may well find chess and card games and talk among neighbors in other lanes of the city. But what is going on here is truly one of a kind. Some people have moved away but still come back to Red Dust for the evening talk. It is a time-honored tradition here. Except in bad weather, a group of people always turns out for the evening conversation of the lane and about the lane.
Now what’s special, you may say, about neighbors talking? Well, what makes it unique is the way they make a story out of everything, a way of seeing the world in a grain of sand. Of course, the lane residents don’t invent stories with real heroes or heroines—certainly not the type of “the talented scholar and beautiful girl” or “un-rivaled kung fu master.” Nor stories with conflicts or climaxes as in books. Still, our storytellers try all kinds of experiments, traditional or avant-garde, flashing back and forth, showing but not telling, sometimes narrating from a special point of view, and sometimes from all points of view.
Since the characters are real people, the evening talk is enhanced through its interaction with the real Red Dust life. While listening to a story, we offer interpretations from our own perspectives, and contributions too, if we happen to know something the narrator knows not. After all, a narrator is not always that reliable, what with their told or untold reasons for making an omission or alteration. The audience knows better and is capable of pulling a story to pieces and retelling it in different ways.
A written story inevitably comes to an end at the last page of a book, whether happily ever after or not. Nothing is like that in real life. You can put an end to your narrative one intoxicated evening, but in a few years, there will be some new development or unexpected twist. A comedy turns into a tragedy, or vice versa, which changes the meaning of the earlier story. Needless to say, sometimes we also play a part, however inadvertent or insignificant, in the stories of others, which, in turn, come to affect ours.
Now look at this young man sitting in the center of the group. He’s called Old Root—his surname is Geng, a homonym for “root,” and he invented the nickname for himself. According to him, “old” in Chinese does not necessarily refer to one’s age; it also connotes wisdom and experience. Though in his twenties, he has an old head on his young shoulders. Self-educated, he reads books like someone swallowing dates without worrying about their pits. Like the proverb goes, the water does not have to run deep: a dragon in it will make it special. Judging from the position of his chair, he must be the storyteller for the evening.
Oh, there’s a blackboard leaning against his chair. I don’t know anything about the blackboard, but there must be something exciting about it. And sitting next to him is Four-Eyed Liu, another bookworm, who likes to give his newspaper-based interpretation to everything. And Big Hua, who is as curious as a cat. Let’s stay here and listen here for a while. Don’t worry about the time. If it gets late, I will buy you a night snack—as your second landlord in Red Dust Lane.
Do you remember the opening lines of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms? After peace comes war, and after war comes peace. Things are just like that, an endless repetition in this mundane world of ours. Time rolls up and down, waves upon waves, leaving behind, on the moon-bleached beach, stories like shells. Open it, and you may find something after your heart, but if not, don’t be too disappointed. It is only a matter of perspective that things appear to be either good or bad. In the year 1949, with the Communists in, and the Nationalists out, there are many things appearing and disappearing, like always, with the change of dynasties.
In the early spring days of 1949, the Nationalist government boasted of making Shanghai an oriental Stalin grad, a turning point in China’s civil war, but to the people here it felt unreal. Shortly after Chiang Kai-shek announced his resignation, a monstrous white snake was killed by lightning in Qingpu county—a portentous sign similar to the one at the end of the Qing dynasty. Then panic spread, after news came that the vaults of the Shanghai Bank had been emptied of their stock of bullion. My friend Cai, a waiter in Dexing Restaurant, told me something he saw with his own eyes. For several days in April, the restaurant was reserved by the top commanders of the Nationalist troops. One night, he brought a platter of sea cucumber with shrimp roe to a reserved private room, where he saw a celebrated courtesan reclining naked on the table, feeding her big toe like a fresh scallop to a four-star general, her white foot still flexing to a tune from the gramophone: “After tonight, when will you come back?” Dexing was a genuine Shanghai cuisine restaurant, and these Nationalists knew they could never enjoy a Shanghai banquet again. With high-ranking officials being so decadent and pessimistic, how could the Chiang dynasty not fall?
Well, don’t be impatient, my Red Dust fellows. I’m not going to give you a long lecture on the change of dynasties. I’m coming round to the story for the evening, and to the blackboard too. It’s just that it always takes one thing to lead to another in this world. Karma in Buddhism, or whatever you want to call it. Things are related and interrelated, though this is not so easily comprehensible to laymen like you or me.
Back to the story. Because of the negative propaganda about the Communists in those days, rich Shanghainese started fleeing the city by what ever means possible—rushing to the airport, to the train station, to the harbor. Like others, in March my boss fled to Taiwan without notice, abandoning the factory. I had to find work to support myself, so I borrowed from the food market a tricycle used for shipping frozen fish bars in its trunk. With the war raging near Ningbo, the market hadn’t had a supply of fish for days.
My idea was simple. As people were frantically leaving with all their belongings, transportation within the city had become a huge problem. For some, a tricycle could be the very means they needed, and that presented an opportunity for me. Also, some were getting rid of their things very cheaply. A heavy mahogany Ming-style cabinet of exquisite craftsmanship sold for a silver dollar, I heard. In fact, I myself got a radio for practically nothing. It was the chance of a lifetime—if you had a way to carry what you found.
Excerpted from Years of Red Dust by Qiu Xiaolong.
Copyright © 2010 by Qiu Xiaolong.
Published in October 2010 by St. Martin’s Press.
All rights reserved. This work is protected under copyright laws and reproduction is strictly prohibited. Permission to reproduce the material in any manner or medium must be secured from the Publisher.
QIU XIAOLONG is a poet, professor and author of five previous novels featuring Inspector Chen. Born and raised in Shanghai, where he was a renowned poet and translator, Qiu lives with his family in St. Louis, Missouri.
Qui Xialong's Website
By JESS ROW
The New York Times Review of Books, October 15, 2010
YEARS OF RED DUST: Stories of Shanghai
By Qiu Xiaolong
St. Martin's Press, September 2010, 227 pp.; $24.99;
ISBN: 978-0-312-62809-3, ISBN10: 0-312-62809-9, 5 1/2 x 8 1/4 inches, 240 pp.
In the first four decades of the People’s Republic, Shanghai existed in a strange limbo, a kind of ghostly half-life. No longer the jeweled sewer of decadence and corruption it had once been — a city of opium smokers and courtesans, millionaires and beggars, the high elegance of the Bund and the conspiratorial darkness of the foreign concessions — it lingered on under Communism as an industrial center, a vital source of taxable wealth, but symbolically something of an embarrassment, its foreignness a stain that couldn’t be washed away. Then, after Deng Xiaoping liberalized its economy in 1991, Shanghai roared back to life and regained its place as a financial and cultural hub, a symbol of China’s dizzying emergence on the world stage.
Qiu Xiaolong’s “Years of Red Dust” is an account of those lost years and their aftermath, beginning in 1949 and ending in 2005, and one of the most striking things about it is that it doesn’t feel very, well, Shanghainese. Though it’s set in a longtang, or lane, a narrow street populated by Shanghai’s once-characteristic shikumen, courtyard houses, and though Qiu emphasizes the distinctive culture of gossip and intermingling that goes on in such close quarters, the stories that make up each episode are consumed with China’s national upheavals: the five-year plans, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the death of Mao, the Tiananmen Square massacre and what came after. Shanghai itself — its language, its legends, its cuisine — appears here and there, but in the most muted fashion. Reading this book alongside Han Bangqing’s “Sing-Song Girls of Shanghai” or Kazuo Ishiguro’s “When We Were Orphans” is an object lesson in how Communism erased China’s local histories (even the history of a great cosmopolis) and imposed a rigid new national identity in their place.
This puts “Years of Red Dust” at something of a disadvantage because many of the stories Qiu tells are already quite familiar in the West. Taking on such a wide swath of history and using as its organizing principle a location rather than a family or a single character, he can present only fragments and headlines. Literally so, because each chapter begins with the neighborhood’s final “blackboard newsletter” of the year, summing up the significant (national) events of, say, 1952, 1966 or 1980. This makes the book interesting as a historical text, but somewhat unsatisfying as a work of fiction.
Which isn’t to say there aren’t many moments of pathos and pungent humor as we witness the rise and fall of individual fortunes over the course of such turbulent times: the “(tofu) worker poet,” once exalted for his proletarian verses, reduced to selling tofu when his work goes out of style; the young army nurse, lionized as a heroic casualty of the Korean War, who later returns, under suspicion that she has been brainwashed in an American P.O.W. camp; the pensioner who would rather stop taking his heart medicine than accept money from his son, who owns a karaoke club with a sideline in prostitution. These are rich and evocative stories, but Qiu (who was born and raised in Shanghai, but now lives in Missouri) treats them sketchily, as illustrations rather than fully formed narratives. At times we have the uncomfortable sense that he may want us to see these characters as victims of history rather than independent actors.
With its almanac-like form, “Years of Red Dust,” reminded me of Han Shaogong’s novel “A Dictionary of Maqiao,” which describes how the residents of a remote village kept their eccentric folkways alive during the same four decades. But Maqiao had the great advantage of being tiny, insignificant and thus shielded from the full glare of Mao’s attention. As the saying goes, shan gao, huangdi yuan, “The mountains are high, and the emperor is far away.” The residents of Qiu’s longtang aren’t nearly so lucky.
Jess Row is the author of a collection of stories, “The Train to Lo Wu.”
A version of this review appeared in print on October 17, 2010, on page BR21 of the Sunday Book Review.
Excerpt: ‘Years of Red Dust’ (macmillan.com)
Welcome to Red Dust Lane
(1949)
Now, as your would-be landlord—to be exact, your second landlord, nifangdong—I’ve lived in this lane for twenty years by the end of 1949. For a new college student not yet familiar with Shanghai, looking for a place characteristic of the city, a place that is convenient, that is decent, and yet inexpensive, Red Dust is the best choice for you. For the real Shanghai life, I mean.
Red Dust Lane—what a fantastic name! According to a feng shui master, there is a lot of profound learning in the choice of a name. No point in selecting insignificant words, but none in pompous words, either. The evil spirit might get envious of something too grand or good. We’re all made of dust, which is common yet essential, and the epithet red lends a world of difference to it. All of the connotations of the color: human passion, revolution, sacrifice, vanity …
You are an honest, hardworking young man, I know, so I hope you will become one of my subtenants here. Let’s take a walk along the lane, so you can really see for yourself.
The first record of the lane is from the late Qing dynasty. Look at this impressive street sign written in the magnificent calligraphy of a Qing dynasty Juren—a successful civil service examination candidate at the provincial level. After that, it was developed as part of the French concession, though not as a central part of it. Indeed, so many changes, like the white clouds in the sky—one moment, a gray dog; the next moment, a black weasel … Of course, now things are changing again. The Communists are advancing with flying colors and the Nationalists retreating helter-skelter. But the one thing under the sun that will never change, I assure you: this is a most marvelous lane.
Think about the location—at the very center of Shanghai. To the south, the City God Temple Market, no more than fifteen minutes’ walk, where you can enjoy an amazing variety of Shanghai snacks. To the north, you can stroll along to Nanjing Road, the street-long shopping center of Shanghai. If you prefer the fancier stores on Huaihai Road, it takes no more than fifteen minutes to get there. On a summer night, you may occasionally smell the characteristic twang from the Huangpu River. Strolling around those foreign buildings lined up along the Bund, like the Hong Kong Bank or the Cathay Hotel, you may feel as if the river were flowing through you, and the heart of the city beating along with you.
Our lane is medium-sized with several sublanes. Another plus, I will say. The front entrance opens onto Jinling Road. There, just a block ahead, you can see the Zhonghui Mansion—the high-rise owned by Big Brother Shen of the notorious Blue Triad, now down and out in Hong Kong. Karma. As for the back entrance of the lane, it leads into the Ninghai Food Market. In case of an unexpected visitor, you can run out in your slippers and come back with a live carp still gasping for air. In addition, there are two side entrances on Fujian Road, with a cluster of small shops and stalls. And peddlers too. Nothing can beat the location here.
This lane, or longtang, of Red Dust, may in itself tell you something of Shanghai history. After the Opium War, the city was forced open to the Western powers as a treaty port with areas selected as foreign concessions. The expatriates were then unable to tap the immense potential of the city, so some Chinese were allowed to move in. Soon the concession authorities had collective dwellings built for them in the designated lots. To make them convenient to manage, the houses were designed in the same architectural style, then arranged in lines like barracks, row after row, accessible to the main lane from sublanes. As in other lanes, most of the buildings in Red Dust belong to the shikumen style, the typical Shanghai two-storied house with a stone doorframe and a small courtyard. In the early concession days, a shikumen house was designed for one family, with rooms for different purposes—wings, hall, front room, dining room, corner room, back room, attic, dark room, and tingzijian, a cubicle above the kitchen. As a result of the city housing shortage, some of the rooms were leased. Then individually subleased, with the rooms further partitioned or subdivided, so now a “room” is practically the space for a family. You may have heard of a comedy called 72 Families in a House, which is about such an overcrowded housing situation. Red Dust is not like that. There are no more than fifteen families in our shikumen, you have my word on it.
In Red Dust, people of differing social or financial status are mixed together. Small-business owners or executives take the wing or a floor, while ordinary workers choose the back room or the attic. As for the tingzijian, it usually goes to those struggling men of letters—the tingzijian writers. They are really fantastic places for creative souls, with constant inspiration coming from the lane.
Indeed, your life is incredibly enriched with all the activity and interaction of the lane. You become part of the lane, and the lane, a part of you. Through the open black-painted door, you see this first-floor hall, don’t you? It was turned into a common kitchen area long ago, with the coal stoves of a dozen or more families all squeezed in, along with pots and pans, coal briquettes, and pigeon-house-like cabinets hung on the walls. Squeezed, but not necessarily so bad. Cooking in here, you may learn the recipes of provincial cuisines from your neighbors. Coming back soaked one rainy night, you don’t have to worry about catching a cold: a pot of ginger tea is being brewed for you on your neighbor Uncle Zhao’s stove, and Elder Sister Wu will add a spoonful of brown sugar into the steaming hot drink. Nor will you find it monotonous scrubbing your clothes on a washboard in the courtyard, where Granny Liu or Auntie Chen will keep you informed of all the latest news of the lane. Some say Shanghainese are born wheelers and dealers. That’s not true, but there may be something of that which comes out of the way people in Shanghai have always lived in a kind of miniature society, constantly handling relationships among close neighbors.
People get together a lot not only in the shikumen, but in the lane too. Their rooms being so crowded, people need to find space elsewhere. All day long, the lane is vibrant with life—informal, relaxing, and spontaneous. In the early gray light, women will come out in their pajamas, first carrying chamber pots, then later hurrying to the food market, returning with full bamboo baskets and preparing food in the common sinks of the lane while spreading the gossip heard overnight. Men will stretch out, practicing Tai Chi outside, brewing the first pot of Dragon Well tea, singing snatches of Beijing opera, and exchanging a few words about the weather or the political weather. For lunchtime, those people at home will step out again, holding rice bowls, chatting, laughing, or exchanging a slice of fried pork for a nugget of steamed belt fish. In the evening, Red Dust gets even more exciting—men playing chess or cards or mahjong under the lane lamp, women chatting or knitting or washing. In summer, it is so hot inside that some will take out bamboo recliners or mats. And a few even choose to sleep out in the lane—
Let’s take a turn here. Watch out for the droplets from the laundry on these bamboo poles across the sky of the lane. An American journalist once said that the colorful clothing festooned on a network of bamboo poles presents an Impressionist scene. But according to a folk belief, walking under women’s underwear may bring bad luck. Whether you believe it or not, it can’t hurt to take a detour. And that’s another convenience of those sublanes. You can move through the lane a number of different ways. Here we are, coming to the front entrance of the lane.
Oh, look at those people gathered here, sitting on bamboo chairs, wooden stools, and holding teas, cigarettes, and paper fans. This is another special thing about the lane. The evening talk of Red Dust Lane—Red Dust talk.
You may well find chess and card games and talk among neighbors in other lanes of the city. But what is going on here is truly one of a kind. Some people have moved away but still come back to Red Dust for the evening talk. It is a time-honored tradition here. Except in bad weather, a group of people always turns out for the evening conversation of the lane and about the lane.
Now what’s special, you may say, about neighbors talking? Well, what makes it unique is the way they make a story out of everything, a way of seeing the world in a grain of sand. Of course, the lane residents don’t invent stories with real heroes or heroines—certainly not the type of “the talented scholar and beautiful girl” or “un-rivaled kung fu master.” Nor stories with conflicts or climaxes as in books. Still, our storytellers try all kinds of experiments, traditional or avant-garde, flashing back and forth, showing but not telling, sometimes narrating from a special point of view, and sometimes from all points of view.
Since the characters are real people, the evening talk is enhanced through its interaction with the real Red Dust life. While listening to a story, we offer interpretations from our own perspectives, and contributions too, if we happen to know something the narrator knows not. After all, a narrator is not always that reliable, what with their told or untold reasons for making an omission or alteration. The audience knows better and is capable of pulling a story to pieces and retelling it in different ways.
A written story inevitably comes to an end at the last page of a book, whether happily ever after or not. Nothing is like that in real life. You can put an end to your narrative one intoxicated evening, but in a few years, there will be some new development or unexpected twist. A comedy turns into a tragedy, or vice versa, which changes the meaning of the earlier story. Needless to say, sometimes we also play a part, however inadvertent or insignificant, in the stories of others, which, in turn, come to affect ours.
Now look at this young man sitting in the center of the group. He’s called Old Root—his surname is Geng, a homonym for “root,” and he invented the nickname for himself. According to him, “old” in Chinese does not necessarily refer to one’s age; it also connotes wisdom and experience. Though in his twenties, he has an old head on his young shoulders. Self-educated, he reads books like someone swallowing dates without worrying about their pits. Like the proverb goes, the water does not have to run deep: a dragon in it will make it special. Judging from the position of his chair, he must be the storyteller for the evening.
Oh, there’s a blackboard leaning against his chair. I don’t know anything about the blackboard, but there must be something exciting about it. And sitting next to him is Four-Eyed Liu, another bookworm, who likes to give his newspaper-based interpretation to everything. And Big Hua, who is as curious as a cat. Let’s stay here and listen here for a while. Don’t worry about the time. If it gets late, I will buy you a night snack—as your second landlord in Red Dust Lane.
Do you remember the opening lines of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms? After peace comes war, and after war comes peace. Things are just like that, an endless repetition in this mundane world of ours. Time rolls up and down, waves upon waves, leaving behind, on the moon-bleached beach, stories like shells. Open it, and you may find something after your heart, but if not, don’t be too disappointed. It is only a matter of perspective that things appear to be either good or bad. In the year 1949, with the Communists in, and the Nationalists out, there are many things appearing and disappearing, like always, with the change of dynasties.
In the early spring days of 1949, the Nationalist government boasted of making Shanghai an oriental Stalin grad, a turning point in China’s civil war, but to the people here it felt unreal. Shortly after Chiang Kai-shek announced his resignation, a monstrous white snake was killed by lightning in Qingpu county—a portentous sign similar to the one at the end of the Qing dynasty. Then panic spread, after news came that the vaults of the Shanghai Bank had been emptied of their stock of bullion. My friend Cai, a waiter in Dexing Restaurant, told me something he saw with his own eyes. For several days in April, the restaurant was reserved by the top commanders of the Nationalist troops. One night, he brought a platter of sea cucumber with shrimp roe to a reserved private room, where he saw a celebrated courtesan reclining naked on the table, feeding her big toe like a fresh scallop to a four-star general, her white foot still flexing to a tune from the gramophone: “After tonight, when will you come back?” Dexing was a genuine Shanghai cuisine restaurant, and these Nationalists knew they could never enjoy a Shanghai banquet again. With high-ranking officials being so decadent and pessimistic, how could the Chiang dynasty not fall?
Well, don’t be impatient, my Red Dust fellows. I’m not going to give you a long lecture on the change of dynasties. I’m coming round to the story for the evening, and to the blackboard too. It’s just that it always takes one thing to lead to another in this world. Karma in Buddhism, or whatever you want to call it. Things are related and interrelated, though this is not so easily comprehensible to laymen like you or me.
Back to the story. Because of the negative propaganda about the Communists in those days, rich Shanghainese started fleeing the city by what ever means possible—rushing to the airport, to the train station, to the harbor. Like others, in March my boss fled to Taiwan without notice, abandoning the factory. I had to find work to support myself, so I borrowed from the food market a tricycle used for shipping frozen fish bars in its trunk. With the war raging near Ningbo, the market hadn’t had a supply of fish for days.
My idea was simple. As people were frantically leaving with all their belongings, transportation within the city had become a huge problem. For some, a tricycle could be the very means they needed, and that presented an opportunity for me. Also, some were getting rid of their things very cheaply. A heavy mahogany Ming-style cabinet of exquisite craftsmanship sold for a silver dollar, I heard. In fact, I myself got a radio for practically nothing. It was the chance of a lifetime—if you had a way to carry what you found.
Excerpted from Years of Red Dust by Qiu Xiaolong.
Copyright © 2010 by Qiu Xiaolong.
Published in October 2010 by St. Martin’s Press.
All rights reserved. This work is protected under copyright laws and reproduction is strictly prohibited. Permission to reproduce the material in any manner or medium must be secured from the Publisher.
QIU XIAOLONG is a poet, professor and author of five previous novels featuring Inspector Chen. Born and raised in Shanghai, where he was a renowned poet and translator, Qiu lives with his family in St. Louis, Missouri.
Qui Xialong's Website
Saturday, October 16, 2010
China detonates its first nuclear device: October 16, 1964
On Oct. 16, 1964, China detonated its first atomic bomb.
China Tests Atomic Bomb, Asks Summit Talk On Ban; Johnson Minimizes Peril
By SEYMOUR TOPPING
The New York Times, October 16, 1964
U.S. Is Denounced Peking Says Purpose of Test Is to Defend Peace of World U.S. Is Denounced as Peace Threat Peking Pledges It Will Not Be First to Use Weapon- Parley Aim Discounted
RELATED HEADLINES
Johnson Minimizes Peril: He Sees 'Tragedy': Calls Costs Too Great for Chinese, Though Weapon Is Crude
Hong Kong, Oct. 16--Communist China announced tonight that it had exploded its first atom bomb. Peking pledged that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons in the future.
A communique stated that a nuclear test was successfully conducted at 3 P.M. Peking time (3 A.M., Eastern daylight time) in the western region of China. No details were disclosed. [In Washington, the test site was reported to be in Sinkiang, a province bordering the Soviet Union.]
"The success of China's nuclear test is a major achievement of the Chinese people in the strengthening of their national defense and the safeguarding of their motherland as well as a major contribution by the Chinese people to the cause of the defense of world peace," the communique asserted.
An accompanying Government statement declared that the purpose of developing nuclear weapons was to protect the Chinese people "from the danger of the United States' launching a nuclear war."
Excesses Ruled Out
"On the question of nuclear weapons, China will commit neither the error of adventurism, nor the error of capitulation," the statement said. "The Chinese people can be trusted."
The Peking statement formally proposed to the governments of the world that a universal summit conference be convened to discuss the question of a complete prohibition on and the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.
It said that as a first step the summit conference "should reach agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which will soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use them against nonnuclear countries and nuclear-free zones nor against each other."
The proposal was dismissed by Western observers here as propaganda. The terms do not allow for practical negotiations with a view to reaching specific agreements, they commented.
Although Communist China became the world's fifth nuclear nation, following the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France, specialists here doubted that it had the capability of becoming a first-class military power during this decade.
The principal advantage accruing to it immediately is psychological and political. The entry of the first nonwhite nation into the exclusive "nuclear club" was regarded here as certain to have a strong impact on the peoples of Asia and Africa despite United States efforts to prepare them for Peking's accomplishment.
Western experts have estimated that it will take several years before the Chinese can build a delivery system. The withdrawal of Soviet military aid in 1960 disrupted Peking's program to develop ballistic missiles and left its air force largely obsolescent.
Altogether, this has been a triumphant day for Communist China.
The nuclear test was successfully carried out less than 12 hours after the announcement that Nikita S. Khrushchev, ideological arch-enemy of Peking, had been ousted from the leadership of the Soviet party and Government.
Greetings Sent to Brezhnev
Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese Communist party, and other top leaders, extended "warm greetings" in a message to Leonid I. Brezhnev, the new Soviet party leader; Aleksei N. Kosygin, the new Premier, and Anastas I. Mikoyan, President, who retained his office.
A cautiously worded Chinese message avoided mentioning Mr. Khrushchev or any outstanding issues. However, it concluded with a series of exhortations that analysts here viewed as an invitation to a new attempt at some kind of rapprochement. The message said:
"May the Chinese and Soviet parties and the two countries unite on the basis of Marxism- Leninism and proletarian internationalism!
"May the fraternal, unbreakable friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples continuously develop!
"May the Chinese and Soviet peoples win one victory after another in their common struggled against imperialism headed by the United States and for the defense of world peace!"
Wishes for Soviet Success
The message also expressed the hope that the Soviet party and Government "will achieve new successes in their construction work in all fields and in the struggle for the defense of world peace."
The signers of the message were Mr. Mao; Liu Shao-chi, President; Marshal Chu Teh, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples' Congress, and Chou En-lai, Premier.
Specialists on Soviet relations believe that the imminence of the detonation of the Chinese bomb was a factor in the decision by the Central Committee Wednesday to remove Mr. Khrushchev. A majority of the Soviet leadership evidently decided, for tactical reasons, at least, to adopt a more flexible attitude toward Communist China.
The Italian and Rumanian and many other parties have been opposed to any move to exclude the Chinese from the international movement. The imminent nuclear test was certain to give more weight to their views.
The analysts said that a formal split in the international Communist movement had been postponed and possibly averted by the ouster of Mr. Khrushchev.
The texts of the Moscow announcements were published this morning in Peking newspapers without comment. Jenmin Jih Pao, official organ, which carried the announcements under the headline "Kruschev Steps Down," subordinated them to a report on the cotton industry.
There was no expectation among analysts here that the change in Moscow would lead to any early settlement of the fundamental issues between Moscow and Peking. Divergencies of both ideological and national interests have become so profound that no quick solution is regarded as possible.
As part of the day's triumphs, the Labor victory in Britain was certain to please the Chinese Communists. Harold Wilson, the new British Prime Minister, has favored an improvement of relations with Peking and the detonation of its bomb was thought likely to reinforce his attitude.
The United States has opposed any disarmament agreement that would ban nuclear weapons without concurrent restrictions on conventional arms. Confronted by a Chinese Communist Army of two and a half million men, the United States, in defending Southeast Asia or Taiwan, would have to depend on its nuclear arsenal to curb aggression.
The Chinese statement obviously was intended to reassure the nonaligned nations, which have expressed misgivings about Peking's failure to adhere to the nuclear test ban treaty signed in Moscow last summer by the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union.
The statement described the treaty as a "big fraud" to fool the world about attempts by the signatories to consolidate their nuclear monopoly.
>The statement reiterated the thesis of Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese Communist party, that the "atom bomb is a paper tiger" and that people, not weapons, decide wars. It said that aim of Communist China in developing nuclear weapons was "to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons."
Hsinhua, the Chinese Communist press agency, reported that Mr. Mao and other leaders received more than a thousand young people, who sang and danced in a performance entitled "The East Glows Red."
OTHER HEADLINES
Pravda Says Khrushchev Is Harebrained Schemer; Gives West Peace Pledge: Policies Outlined: New Chiefs Promise to Continue Efforts for 'Coexistence'
Brezhnev Urged End of China Rift
Johnson Briefed:Exchanges Messages With New Leaders -- Sees Dobrynin
Wilson Is Prime Minister; Labor Has 4-Seat Margin:New Leader Sees a Complete Mandate Despite Narrow Majority -- He Names Defeated Aide Foreign Secretary
Secret Service Had Jenkins File: Knew in 1961 of His First Arrest but Told No One -- Johnson Orders Inquiry
Rome Authorizes Changes in Mass: Under Revisions Advanced by Council, Priests Are to Face the Congregation
Blue Cross Found Near Bankruptcy: Court Upholds Rate Rise to Help Bar Its Collapse
Wagner Backs Plan For Improving Port
Berra Out as Manager; Keane Quits Cards: St. Louis Manager Turns in Notice Dated Sept. 28
Signs About Jenkins Draw Ire of Johnson
Pay Pacts Scored by Treasury Aide: Accords 'Probably Too Big' This Year, Roosa Says
China Tests Atomic Bomb, Asks Summit Talk On Ban; Johnson Minimizes Peril
By SEYMOUR TOPPING
The New York Times, October 16, 1964
U.S. Is Denounced Peking Says Purpose of Test Is to Defend Peace of World U.S. Is Denounced as Peace Threat Peking Pledges It Will Not Be First to Use Weapon- Parley Aim Discounted
RELATED HEADLINES
Johnson Minimizes Peril: He Sees 'Tragedy': Calls Costs Too Great for Chinese, Though Weapon Is Crude
Hong Kong, Oct. 16--Communist China announced tonight that it had exploded its first atom bomb. Peking pledged that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons in the future.
A communique stated that a nuclear test was successfully conducted at 3 P.M. Peking time (3 A.M., Eastern daylight time) in the western region of China. No details were disclosed. [In Washington, the test site was reported to be in Sinkiang, a province bordering the Soviet Union.]
"The success of China's nuclear test is a major achievement of the Chinese people in the strengthening of their national defense and the safeguarding of their motherland as well as a major contribution by the Chinese people to the cause of the defense of world peace," the communique asserted.
An accompanying Government statement declared that the purpose of developing nuclear weapons was to protect the Chinese people "from the danger of the United States' launching a nuclear war."
Excesses Ruled Out
"On the question of nuclear weapons, China will commit neither the error of adventurism, nor the error of capitulation," the statement said. "The Chinese people can be trusted."
The Peking statement formally proposed to the governments of the world that a universal summit conference be convened to discuss the question of a complete prohibition on and the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.
It said that as a first step the summit conference "should reach agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which will soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use them against nonnuclear countries and nuclear-free zones nor against each other."
The proposal was dismissed by Western observers here as propaganda. The terms do not allow for practical negotiations with a view to reaching specific agreements, they commented.
Although Communist China became the world's fifth nuclear nation, following the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France, specialists here doubted that it had the capability of becoming a first-class military power during this decade.
The principal advantage accruing to it immediately is psychological and political. The entry of the first nonwhite nation into the exclusive "nuclear club" was regarded here as certain to have a strong impact on the peoples of Asia and Africa despite United States efforts to prepare them for Peking's accomplishment.
Western experts have estimated that it will take several years before the Chinese can build a delivery system. The withdrawal of Soviet military aid in 1960 disrupted Peking's program to develop ballistic missiles and left its air force largely obsolescent.
Altogether, this has been a triumphant day for Communist China.
The nuclear test was successfully carried out less than 12 hours after the announcement that Nikita S. Khrushchev, ideological arch-enemy of Peking, had been ousted from the leadership of the Soviet party and Government.
Greetings Sent to Brezhnev
Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese Communist party, and other top leaders, extended "warm greetings" in a message to Leonid I. Brezhnev, the new Soviet party leader; Aleksei N. Kosygin, the new Premier, and Anastas I. Mikoyan, President, who retained his office.
A cautiously worded Chinese message avoided mentioning Mr. Khrushchev or any outstanding issues. However, it concluded with a series of exhortations that analysts here viewed as an invitation to a new attempt at some kind of rapprochement. The message said:
"May the Chinese and Soviet parties and the two countries unite on the basis of Marxism- Leninism and proletarian internationalism!
"May the fraternal, unbreakable friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples continuously develop!
"May the Chinese and Soviet peoples win one victory after another in their common struggled against imperialism headed by the United States and for the defense of world peace!"
Wishes for Soviet Success
The message also expressed the hope that the Soviet party and Government "will achieve new successes in their construction work in all fields and in the struggle for the defense of world peace."
The signers of the message were Mr. Mao; Liu Shao-chi, President; Marshal Chu Teh, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples' Congress, and Chou En-lai, Premier.
Specialists on Soviet relations believe that the imminence of the detonation of the Chinese bomb was a factor in the decision by the Central Committee Wednesday to remove Mr. Khrushchev. A majority of the Soviet leadership evidently decided, for tactical reasons, at least, to adopt a more flexible attitude toward Communist China.
The Italian and Rumanian and many other parties have been opposed to any move to exclude the Chinese from the international movement. The imminent nuclear test was certain to give more weight to their views.
The analysts said that a formal split in the international Communist movement had been postponed and possibly averted by the ouster of Mr. Khrushchev.
The texts of the Moscow announcements were published this morning in Peking newspapers without comment. Jenmin Jih Pao, official organ, which carried the announcements under the headline "Kruschev Steps Down," subordinated them to a report on the cotton industry.
There was no expectation among analysts here that the change in Moscow would lead to any early settlement of the fundamental issues between Moscow and Peking. Divergencies of both ideological and national interests have become so profound that no quick solution is regarded as possible.
As part of the day's triumphs, the Labor victory in Britain was certain to please the Chinese Communists. Harold Wilson, the new British Prime Minister, has favored an improvement of relations with Peking and the detonation of its bomb was thought likely to reinforce his attitude.
The United States has opposed any disarmament agreement that would ban nuclear weapons without concurrent restrictions on conventional arms. Confronted by a Chinese Communist Army of two and a half million men, the United States, in defending Southeast Asia or Taiwan, would have to depend on its nuclear arsenal to curb aggression.
The Chinese statement obviously was intended to reassure the nonaligned nations, which have expressed misgivings about Peking's failure to adhere to the nuclear test ban treaty signed in Moscow last summer by the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union.
The statement described the treaty as a "big fraud" to fool the world about attempts by the signatories to consolidate their nuclear monopoly.
>The statement reiterated the thesis of Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese Communist party, that the "atom bomb is a paper tiger" and that people, not weapons, decide wars. It said that aim of Communist China in developing nuclear weapons was "to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons."
Hsinhua, the Chinese Communist press agency, reported that Mr. Mao and other leaders received more than a thousand young people, who sang and danced in a performance entitled "The East Glows Red."
OTHER HEADLINES
Pravda Says Khrushchev Is Harebrained Schemer; Gives West Peace Pledge: Policies Outlined: New Chiefs Promise to Continue Efforts for 'Coexistence'
Brezhnev Urged End of China Rift
Johnson Briefed:Exchanges Messages With New Leaders -- Sees Dobrynin
Wilson Is Prime Minister; Labor Has 4-Seat Margin:New Leader Sees a Complete Mandate Despite Narrow Majority -- He Names Defeated Aide Foreign Secretary
Secret Service Had Jenkins File: Knew in 1961 of His First Arrest but Told No One -- Johnson Orders Inquiry
Rome Authorizes Changes in Mass: Under Revisions Advanced by Council, Priests Are to Face the Congregation
Blue Cross Found Near Bankruptcy: Court Upholds Rate Rise to Help Bar Its Collapse
Wagner Backs Plan For Improving Port
Berra Out as Manager; Keane Quits Cards: St. Louis Manager Turns in Notice Dated Sept. 28
Signs About Jenkins Draw Ire of Johnson
Pay Pacts Scored by Treasury Aide: Accords 'Probably Too Big' This Year, Roosa Says
Tuesday, October 12, 2010
Regional Security in East Asia: Conference by FPRI and ROA
A pity that I can't attend...
Regional Security in East Asia: Sustaining Stability, Coping with Conflict, Building Cooperation?
A Conference Sponsored By Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Reserve Officers Association
Monday, November 1, 2010
Except for the problem of North Korea, East Asia has been a region of comparative stability. U.S.-PRC relations have continued a long period of stability despite the frictions that have accompanied China’s rise.
Cross-Strait relations have warmed rapidly. U.S.-Japan security ties have remained strong, underpinned by common regional interests and concerns.
Despite this overall stability, regional security faces challenges from old conflicts and newly emerging tensions, ranging from legacies of history that cast a shadow over Japan’s relations with its neighbors and its international security roles, the now-perennial crisis of North Korea’s weapons programs and the long-rising worries over an increasingly powerful and assertive China to the sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan, the controversy over the U.S. base at Futenma, Japan, and the dispute over Japan’s detention of a Chinese ship.
Relatively recent changes in leadership or ruling parties and the prospect of more such changes in the relatively near future in almost all of the major states in the region create further uncertainty. Regional states and extraregional states with security interests in the region have turned to multilateral cooperation and engagement to sustain stability and cope with potential conflict. What are the prospects for maintaining stability and containing or avoiding conflict now and in the near future? What roles can and should regional cooperation play?
9:00 a.m. Opening Remarks
Maj. Gen. David R. Bockel, Executive Director, ROA - Harvey Sicherman, President, FPRI
9:15 a.m. Panel 1: China’s Rise, Chinese Strategy and Regional Security
Paper: Gilbert Rozman, Princeton University, Wilson Center, and FPRI
Chinese Strategic Thinking on Multilateral Regional Security
Commentators:
Jacques deLisle, Director, FPRI Asia Program, and Professor of Law, UPenn
Bonnie Glaser, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Moderator: Harvey Sicherman, President, FPRI
10:45 a.m. Panel 2: Japan’s Regional Security Role: Continuity and Change?
Paper: T.J. Pempel, University of California at Berkeley
Commentators:
Richard Samuels, MIT
Paul Goldstein, FPRI
Moderator: Mackubin T. Owens, Editor, Orbis
1:15 p.m. U.S. Security Interests: Aims and Challenges in an Evolving Asia
Remarks by Aaron Friedberg, Princeton University
With a response by Harvey Sicherman, President, FPRI
2:30 p.m. Panel 3: Taiwan and the Koreas: Different Trajectories for Perennial Sources of Regional Security Challenges?
Papers:
Richard Bush, Brookings Institution
Victor Cha, Georgetown University
Commentators:
Vincent Wang, University of Richmond
Kyung Hoon Leem, Seoul National University, and Visiting Scholar, Center for East Asian Studies, University of Pennsylvania
Moderator: Jacques de Lisle, Director, FPRI Asia Program, and Stephen Cozen - Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania
4:30 p.m. Concluding remarks: Harvey Sicherman, President, FPRI
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Registration Form – 2010 Conference on East Asia
Attendance at the Program and Lunch is free for FPRI & ROA Members, and $35 for Non-Members
Registration for the webcast is free.
To register for the webcast, email lux@fpri.org for instructions.
FPRI, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19102
RSVP 215 732 3774, ext 303 or lux@fpri.org
Regional Security in East Asia: Sustaining Stability, Coping with Conflict, Building Cooperation?
A Conference Sponsored By Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Reserve Officers Association
Monday, November 1, 2010
Except for the problem of North Korea, East Asia has been a region of comparative stability. U.S.-PRC relations have continued a long period of stability despite the frictions that have accompanied China’s rise.
Cross-Strait relations have warmed rapidly. U.S.-Japan security ties have remained strong, underpinned by common regional interests and concerns.
Despite this overall stability, regional security faces challenges from old conflicts and newly emerging tensions, ranging from legacies of history that cast a shadow over Japan’s relations with its neighbors and its international security roles, the now-perennial crisis of North Korea’s weapons programs and the long-rising worries over an increasingly powerful and assertive China to the sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan, the controversy over the U.S. base at Futenma, Japan, and the dispute over Japan’s detention of a Chinese ship.
Relatively recent changes in leadership or ruling parties and the prospect of more such changes in the relatively near future in almost all of the major states in the region create further uncertainty. Regional states and extraregional states with security interests in the region have turned to multilateral cooperation and engagement to sustain stability and cope with potential conflict. What are the prospects for maintaining stability and containing or avoiding conflict now and in the near future? What roles can and should regional cooperation play?
9:00 a.m. Opening Remarks
Maj. Gen. David R. Bockel, Executive Director, ROA - Harvey Sicherman, President, FPRI
9:15 a.m. Panel 1: China’s Rise, Chinese Strategy and Regional Security
Paper: Gilbert Rozman, Princeton University, Wilson Center, and FPRI
Chinese Strategic Thinking on Multilateral Regional Security
Commentators:
Jacques deLisle, Director, FPRI Asia Program, and Professor of Law, UPenn
Bonnie Glaser, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Moderator: Harvey Sicherman, President, FPRI
10:45 a.m. Panel 2: Japan’s Regional Security Role: Continuity and Change?
Paper: T.J. Pempel, University of California at Berkeley
Commentators:
Richard Samuels, MIT
Paul Goldstein, FPRI
Moderator: Mackubin T. Owens, Editor, Orbis
1:15 p.m. U.S. Security Interests: Aims and Challenges in an Evolving Asia
Remarks by Aaron Friedberg, Princeton University
With a response by Harvey Sicherman, President, FPRI
2:30 p.m. Panel 3: Taiwan and the Koreas: Different Trajectories for Perennial Sources of Regional Security Challenges?
Papers:
Richard Bush, Brookings Institution
Victor Cha, Georgetown University
Commentators:
Vincent Wang, University of Richmond
Kyung Hoon Leem, Seoul National University, and Visiting Scholar, Center for East Asian Studies, University of Pennsylvania
Moderator: Jacques de Lisle, Director, FPRI Asia Program, and Stephen Cozen - Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania
4:30 p.m. Concluding remarks: Harvey Sicherman, President, FPRI
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Registration Form – 2010 Conference on East Asia
Attendance at the Program and Lunch is free for FPRI & ROA Members, and $35 for Non-Members
Registration for the webcast is free.
To register for the webcast, email lux@fpri.org for instructions.
FPRI, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19102
RSVP 215 732 3774, ext 303 or lux@fpri.org
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