Obama leva agenda global à China
Cláudia Trevisan, PEQUIM
O Estado de S.Paulo, 21.11.2009
Relação entre Washington e Pequim supera 'estágio bilateral' e agora é chave para solução de questões mundiais
A busca de cooperação em temas globais dará o tom da primeira visita à China do presidente americano, Barack Obama, que discutirá com seu colega Hu Jintao questões que não poderão ser resolvidas sem o empenho dos dois países, entre as quais as mais evidentes são a crise econômica mundial e a mudança climática.
"A China não cabe mais em uma relação bilateral. Ela perpassa cada problema doméstico, regional e global com os quais o presidente dos EUA tem de lidar. Essa é uma grande mudança nas relações entre os dois países", diz David Shambaugh, diretor do Programa de Política Chinesa da Universidade George Washington e professor visitante da Academia Chinesa de Ciências Sociais, em Pequim.
A agenda incluirá questões de segurança cruciais para os americanos, como os programas nucleares da Coreia do Norte e do Irã e a situação no Afeganistão e Paquistão, dois países que fazem fronteira com a instável província chinesa de Xinjiang, no extremo oeste.
Líder de uma economia que encolherá 2,4% neste ano, Obama desembarca hoje em uma China que protagoniza a mais espetacular ascensão da história e cujo PIB deverá crescer pelo menos 8% em 2009.
No próximo ano, o país ultrapassará o Japão e assumir o segundo lugar entre as maiores economias do mundo. Ainda assim, seu PIB ainda representará cerca de um terço do americano.
Os dois países construíram nesta década uma relação de dependência que se acentuou ainda mais com a crise disseminada pelo planeta em 2008. São vínculos financeiros, comerciais e de investimentos que deverão ser administrados com cautela no momento em que o mundo começa a se recuperar da mais profunda recessão das últimas sete décadas.
"Os EUA precisam da China mais do que em qualquer outro momento, para recuperar sua economia e estabilizar a situação econômica global", observa Wang Yong, professor da Escola de Estudos Internacionais e diretor do Centro para Política Econômica Internacional da Universidade de Pequim.
Segundo Wang, a China pode ajudar os EUA com a maior abertura de sua economia a investimentos estrangeiros, o aumento da importação de bens e, acima de tudo, a manutenção da compra de títulos do Tesouro Americano.
Na área ambiental, os dois países - os maiores emissores de gases do efeito estufa - são indispensáveis em qualquer acordo global que seja elaborado para combater o problema da mudança climática. O tema terá destaque nos encontros que ocorrem partir de hoje.
"Não teremos nenhum progresso significativo se os dois maiores emissores do mundo não estiverem de alguma foram no mesmo universo nessa questão. Portanto, a cooperação entre os dois países não é uma opção. Ela é necessária se quisermos fazer alguma coisa em relação ao problema", afirmou no dia 6, em Washington, o principal assessor de Obama para a Ásia, Jeffrey Bader.
Os americanos sustentam que não podem se comprometer a reduzir suas emissões se os chineses também não o fizerem. Os chineses respondem com o argumento de que o aquecimento global foi provocado pelos países ricos e as nações em desenvolvimento não podem assumir compromissos que restrinjam de maneira injusta seu crescimento industrial e econômico.
"A China está pronta para avançar nessa questão, mas espera que Estados Unidos e Europa deem o exemplo e comprometam-se com obrigações claramente definidas", ressalta Wang Yong.
Saturday, November 21, 2009
Friday, November 20, 2009
95) O Gigante Acordado - UGT Press
O GIGANTE ACORDADO: dizem que Napoleão, estrategista de qualidade insuperável, alertou: "não acordem a China, aquele que o fizer se arrependerá pelo resto de seus dias". Então, no século 20, o gigante asiático acordou e criou um sistema econômico livre, associado a um sistema político fechado que catapultou o país para próximo da primeira economia do mundo. Em 2008, o crescimento do PIB chinês foi de 9% contra 10% ou mais nos anos anteriores. Iniciada a crise mundial, a China apostou tudo em projetos de infraestrutura, algo que nunca abandonou nos anos em que construiu um fantástico superávit orçamentário e centenas de bilhões de dólares em reservas. O resultado disso é que as previsões para os anos vindouros são de crescimento por volta de, no mínimo, 8% ao ano. Um feito extraordinário.
APROXIMAÇÃO ESTADOS UNIDOS E CHINA: para quem pensava que o crescimento chinês iria incomodar o gigante do norte, estava reservada uma surpresa: é cada vez mais visível a aproximação e cooperação econômica entre Estados Unidos e China. No mês de julho de 2009, o presidente Barack Obama, disse: "se nós [China/USA] avançarmos nesses interesses por meio da cooperação, nossos povos vão se beneficiar e o mundo estará em situação melhor, já que a nossa capacidade de cooperar uns com os outros é um pré-requisito para o progresso em muitos de nossos desafios globais mais prementes. Essa é a responsabilidade que carregamos". A China é a maior credora americana e grande parte de suas reservas estão lastreadas em títulos do tesouro americano.
A CHINA COMPRA: não é de hoje que as autoridades chinesas estão estimulando suas empresas estatais a "irem para fora". Wen Jiabao, primeiro ministro chinês, falando com diplomatas em Pequim, disse: "devemos ir para fora e combinar a utilização das reservas externas com a ida para o exterior das nossas empresas". Sabe-se que o Brasil é um dos alvos das empresas chinesas: elas querem investir aqui e, com o dólar barato, poderão fazê-lo facilmente. Isso levou o analista do Estadão, Alberto Tamer, a escrever uma matéria com o título "Cuidado: estatais chinesas vão comprar tudo". Está certo, mas não há como ter cuidado numa economia aberta e sujeita às influências mais estranhas possíveis, incluindo a corrupção dos dois lados.
AS EMPRESAS CHINESAS: segundo um quadro da consultoria Ernest & Young, entre as dez maiores empresas do mundo quatro são chinesas. A Petrobrás é a 8ª e a Vale ocupa a 46ª posição. No momento, há excesso de liquidez na economia chinesa e a grande quantidade de dólares em reserva facilita os empréstimos para investimentos no exterior. Em setembro foram emprestados 517 bilhões de yuans, equivalentes a 76 bilhões de dólares.
MEDIDAS ANTI-CRISE: no total o pacote chinês anti-crise é da ordem de US$ 585 bilhões e as linhas de crédito abertas para os bancos ultrapassam a soma impressionante de um trilhão de dólares. O governo também aumentou os gastos com saúde, educação e planos de pensão. Como estímulo ao consumo, ofereceu subsídios para a compra de bens de consumo durável (carros econômicos e eletrodomésticos). Deu certo. Os trabalhadores demitidos estão voltando aos seus empregos, ações e imóveis estão em recuperação e as exportações chinesas experimentam nova vitalidade. Será possível superar até mesmo as previsões oficiais de crescimento, inicialmente projetadas para 8% em 2009.
94) Can China Go Green? - Elizabeth C. Economy
Global Environment
Can China Go Green?
By Elizabeth C. Economy
The Globalist, September 4, 2006
Can China simultaneously repair its ailing ecosystem and sustain its current levels of economic growth?
Can China overcome its abysmal environmental record and reverse decades of pollution and degradation of its natural resources? Elizabeth Economy, author of "The River Runs Black", outlines a possible scenario where sustained economic growth, sound policies and civil society all combine to put China on the path of becoming a model environmental citizen.
n the first scenario, China's economy continues to grow, producing more challenges for the environment but simultaneously spurring greater investment in environmental protection at both the local and national levels.
A booming environmental industry
If such a scenario were to play out, China's most vibrant
Premier Wen Jiabao uses his environmental expertise to push for broader environmental change.
cities – such as Shanghai and Dalian – serve as genuine models for other coastal and inland cities interested in attracting greater foreign investment and recognition for their livability.
As urbanization continues, satellite cities replicate the better environmental practices of the major urban centers rather than becoming dumping grounds for the cities' most polluting enterprises.
Shanghai becomes a center for the most advanced environmental thinking and cleaner production, prompting a booming industry in environmental technologies.
Environmentally conscious
Beautification campaigns clean up the city streets and Shanghai develops a high-speed transit system to its satellite cities, thereby sharply slowing the growth rate in car use in the city and surrounding environs.
The continued increasing wealth of the city and environmental education opportunities in schools spawn a highly energized green movement, which promotes recycling, water-saving measures and other grassroots efforts to protect the environment and the city's natural resources.
China's green future
In ten
China becomes world-renowned for the quality and quantity of its organic produce, particularly fruits and vegetables.
years, the water in the Huangpu River is once again safe for recreation and drinking, leading to a lively riverfront community.
At the same time, Premier Wen Jiabao uses his environmental expertise to push for broader environmental change. The political success of former Dalian mayor BC Xilai encourages other mayors to follow suit, using the environment as a stepping stone to positions of greater political prominence.
Throughout the country, tens of thousands of model environmental cities sprout, providing China's citizens with unprecedented access to a better future for themselves and their children.
Good-bye pollution
China’s entry into the WTO reinforces positive trends in the quality of goods produced, the development of a legal infrastructure and stronger enforcement capability.
Electricity supplied from the Three Gorges Dam – and natural gas provided by the West-East pipeline – dramatically improves China’s energy mix. Coal use decreases as the desire for efficiency and higher quality of life becomes paramount.
Fresh fruit — grown in China
Environment-related public health concerns diminish as China is
Tens of thousands of model environmental cities sprout, providing China’s citizens with unprecedented access to a better future for themselves and their children.
forced to rethink its rural development and agricultural strategies to accommodate WTO-levels of food safety.
As China moves away from intensive farming and toward other, more environmentally sustainable and lucrative crops, the country also becomes world-renowned for the quality and quantity of its organic produce, particularly fruits and vegetables.
In the automobile sector, Chinese joint ventures become leaders in producing fuel-efficient cars. Alternative fuel-cell vehicles dominate the roads, encouraged by the desire of Beijing to match consumer interests with the country's diminishing oil supply.
NGOs take the lead
On the governance front, China's NGOs continue to flourish, supported not only by the international community, but also increasingly by Chinese citizens who value a clean environment and are willing to contribute both financially and personally to ensure its sustainability.
China's top entrepreneurs become an important new source of funding for environmental NCOs, helped by new tax laws and a growing base of wealthy Chinese citizens.
The environment – a political platform
Small mass-based environmental NCOs emerge and the well-established NGOs expand
Urban planners, conservationists and business leaders join forces to develop western China in a model environmental fashion.
their membership and their mission as the next generation of environmental NGO leaders increasingly incorporates international practices of lobbying and lawsuits to protect the environment.
The international community — business, government and NGOs — joins forces with domestic NGOs and environmentally proactive government leaders to increase dramatically China’s technological and policy capacity to protect the environment.
A vast experiment
This partnership also transforms the Go West campaign into a vast experiment in sustainable development.
Urban planners, conservationists and business leaders join forces to develop western China in a model environmental fashion. They implement cleaner production, ensure public hearings for new development projects and establish local best practices with solar-powered office buildings, recycling centers and state-of-the-art public transportation.
Joining forces
The media, together with the public, serves as a watchdog to ensure that the
China's top entrepreneurs become an important new source of funding for environmental NCOs.
west does not become a new center for resource exploitation and polluting industry.
Finally, for the international community, this scenario offers the potential for improved implementation of international environmental agreements, declining or stable levels of China's greenhouse gas emissions and improvement in China's contribution to transboundary air problems, such as acid rain.
Reproduced from Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future. Copyright © 2004 by Cornell University. Used by permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press.
93) Photo Book: Liu Zheng, The Chinese
Book copyright © 2004 by ICP & Steidl Publishers
Published by the International Center of Photography and Steidl Publishers.
The Globalist PhotoGallery:
Liu Zheng's The Chinese
Photographs by Liu Zheng
176 pages. 120 color photographs.
Dimensions (in inches): 10.0 x 10.0.
Enter gallery
The Chinese
For the past decade, Chinese artist Liu Zheng has been working on his ambitious photographic project "The Chinese." In the finished work, Zheng has captured a people and a country in a unique time of flux.
Zheng seeks out moments in which archetypal Chinese characters are encountered in extreme and unexpected situations. His subjects have included street eccentrics, homeless children, street performers, provincial drug traffickers, coal miners, Buddhist monks, prison inmates, Taoist priests, waxwork figures in historical museums, and the dead and dying. Zheng's photographs betray a dark vision, albeit one that is laced with offsetting humor.
About Liu Zheng
One of China's most widely exhibited contemporary artists, Liu Zheng was born in 1969 in Wuqiang County in Hebei province and grew up in Shanxi province.
After studying optical engineering at Beijing Technology Institute, he served as a professional photojournalist for Worker's Daily from 1991 to 1997. Liu Zheng's work has been included in such major exhibitions as the "1st Guangzhou Triennial" and the "50th Venice Biennial."
92) A Chinese Perspective on a Changing World - Wu Jianmin
A Chinese Perspective on a Changing World
By Wu Jianmin
The Globalist, Monday, November 16, 2009
In light of President Obama's visit to China this week, many are asking how emerging powers can work with countries such as the United States to promote a more sustainable future. Former U.N. Ambassador Wu Jianmin, now a professor of China Foreign Affairs University, discusses the gaps in understanding between China and the Western world — as well as key points of convergence.
As the world undergoes tremendous changes at an unprecedented pace, I have examined three major global changes from my perspective as a Chinese scholar.
First, the center of gravity of international relations is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
We must contend with climate change, environmental degradation, terrorism, drug trafficking, pandemics, etc. No country — no matter how powerful it is — is able to meet these challenges alone.
Though we are still at the initial stage of this shift, it is the most important change in the last four centuries — which were dominated by the West. Now this situation is gradually coming to an end.
Asia was the most important continent in the world economy for many centuries. Until 1820, Asia’s GDP accounted for 60% of that of the world. However, after that, for the reasons we all know, Asia experienced a rapid decline.
After the Second World War, things started to change. Japan was the first to rise in Asia. We Asians are grateful to Japan for inventing this export-oriented development model, which helped initiate the process of Asia’s rise.
In the 1960s, the “four tigers” — namely Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea — joined Japan, following the same development model. By the early 1970s, some ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, followed suit.
In 1978, China started the policy of reform and opening up to the outside world, a policy that led to some stunning achievements. In the past 30 years, China’s annual average GDP growth was 9.8%. And in 1991, India decided to implement economic reform. As a result, India joined other economically rising Asian countries.
After China and India embarked on the path of reform, Asia’s rise gathered powerful momentum. Asia’s population represents 60% of the world today — and its rise is bound to change the world landscape. Asia’s GDP accounts for about 24% of the global GDP and many economists predict that by 2030 Asia’s GDP will rise to more than 40% of world GDP.
Asia’s rise differs from that of Europe and America. When Europe and America rose, they did it at the expense of others — there were many conflicts and wars. But today, Asia is rising with the rest of the world rather than against it.
The center of gravity of international relations is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Though we are still at the initial stage of this shift, it is the most important change in the last four centuries.
Let me cite China as an example. China succeeded by sharing our growth with others. We didn’t keep the benefit of economic growth for ourselves only. All countries and continents which have cooperation with China benefit from China’s growth. The peaceful rise of Asia is by no means accidental. Peace, globalization and Asian countries’ policy made it possible.
Second, mankind has never been bound together so closely by common interests and common challenges. It is true that the world is still facing many problems, conflicts and contradictions. But the interdependence between different countries has never been as deep as today.
Let me give you an example: China and the United States established diplomatic ties on January 1 1979. The trade volume between our two counties in 1979 amounted to only $2.4 billion. At that time, what happened in the U.S. economy had little impact on China, and vice versa.
But last year, China-U.S. trade volume amounted to more than $333 billion. China has also become the largest creditor of the United States. That was absolutely inconceivable 30 years ago
The challenges facing the world have never been as daunting as today. We must contend with climate change, environmental degradation, terrorism, drug trafficking, pandemics, etc. No country -- no matter how powerful it is -- is able to meet these challenges alone. The interdependence and common challenges call for united action of people around the world for a better future.
Today’s world is still influenced by the legacies of the past. WWII was followed by forty-year Cold War. The mentality of some people often lags behind the current reality. That is why we are seeing two major trends in the international relations competing with each other.
Asia’s population represents 60% of the world today — and its rise is bound to change the world landscape.
The first trend stands for peace, development and cooperation. The second trend stands for a continued Cold War, confrontation and conflict. The first trend represents the future — the second, the past. To a large extent, the destiny of mankind will be determined by the competition between these two trends in the 21st century.
Five or six years ago, America was at the height of unilateralism. The Chinese Minister of Culture went to United States for a cultural event. To an American audience, the Minister said, “The Chinese and Americans have different cultures. You Americans are always looking for an enemy. When you don’t have an enemy, you are worried. We Chinese don’t need an enemy, we need friends. When we don’t have friends, we are worried.”
Looking for an enemy is a typical manifestation of the Cold War mentality. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the U.S. neo-cons were looking for someone to replace it. That kind of mentality got the United States in big trouble. We are happy to see president Obama moving away from unilateralism.
Now I come to the third change. The world is on the eve of an energy revolution, a new industrial revolution and a revolution in our way of life. Two powerful factors are behind these three revolutions.
The first factor is the rise of many developing countries. In addition to rising Asia, South Africa, and Nigeria in Africa are also moving forward. In Latin America, Brazil and Mexico are rising. If you add up the population of all the rising developing countries, there are 3.3 billion people — half of the world population.
Last year, China-U.S. trade volume amounted to more than $333 billion. China has also become the largest creditor of the United States. That was absolutely inconceivable 30 years ago.
Never in the history of mankind has the world witnessed the half of the global population rising. In the past, when Europe and America started their rise, their population was small — but they had at their disposal the whole world’s resources. But today, half of the world’s population is rising.
If they follow the development model created by industrialized countries, the world’s resources simply cannot support their development.
The second factor is climate change. Green house gas is increasing rapidly in our atmosphere. The survival of human beings requires that the amount of CO2 should not exceed 550 parts per million (ppms). Today, it is already more than 380 ppm.
Climate change is the consequence accumulated greenhouse gas emitted mostly by the industrialized countries in the past centuries. Today, emerging countries are also emitting greenhouse gas. China is the largest emitter. For development purposes, the developing countries need to consume energy, otherwise, their economic growth would be impossible.
No one can ask the developing countries to stop development. That would be insane.
Looking for an enemy is a typical manifestation of the Cold War mentality.
The above two mentioned factors are leading the world to an energy revolution. This revolution has two facets. The first is to greatly reduce energy intensity. The industrialized world has to rebuild its infrastructure and transform its building facilities and transportation system in order to decrease energy consumption.
On the other hand, developing countries have to switch to a more sustainable development model. There is huge room for energy savings and energy efficiency. The second facet is to develop renewable energy, such as solar, wind, hydro and bio-mass. The world is bound to turn to renewable energy.
We are at a crossroads. It is up to sensible men and women around the world to work together to strengthen peace, development and cooperation. We Chinese are ready to do our part to make the world a better place to live.
By Wu Jianmin
The Globalist, Monday, November 16, 2009
In light of President Obama's visit to China this week, many are asking how emerging powers can work with countries such as the United States to promote a more sustainable future. Former U.N. Ambassador Wu Jianmin, now a professor of China Foreign Affairs University, discusses the gaps in understanding between China and the Western world — as well as key points of convergence.
As the world undergoes tremendous changes at an unprecedented pace, I have examined three major global changes from my perspective as a Chinese scholar.
First, the center of gravity of international relations is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
We must contend with climate change, environmental degradation, terrorism, drug trafficking, pandemics, etc. No country — no matter how powerful it is — is able to meet these challenges alone.
Though we are still at the initial stage of this shift, it is the most important change in the last four centuries — which were dominated by the West. Now this situation is gradually coming to an end.
Asia was the most important continent in the world economy for many centuries. Until 1820, Asia’s GDP accounted for 60% of that of the world. However, after that, for the reasons we all know, Asia experienced a rapid decline.
After the Second World War, things started to change. Japan was the first to rise in Asia. We Asians are grateful to Japan for inventing this export-oriented development model, which helped initiate the process of Asia’s rise.
In the 1960s, the “four tigers” — namely Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea — joined Japan, following the same development model. By the early 1970s, some ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, followed suit.
In 1978, China started the policy of reform and opening up to the outside world, a policy that led to some stunning achievements. In the past 30 years, China’s annual average GDP growth was 9.8%. And in 1991, India decided to implement economic reform. As a result, India joined other economically rising Asian countries.
After China and India embarked on the path of reform, Asia’s rise gathered powerful momentum. Asia’s population represents 60% of the world today — and its rise is bound to change the world landscape. Asia’s GDP accounts for about 24% of the global GDP and many economists predict that by 2030 Asia’s GDP will rise to more than 40% of world GDP.
Asia’s rise differs from that of Europe and America. When Europe and America rose, they did it at the expense of others — there were many conflicts and wars. But today, Asia is rising with the rest of the world rather than against it.
The center of gravity of international relations is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Though we are still at the initial stage of this shift, it is the most important change in the last four centuries.
Let me cite China as an example. China succeeded by sharing our growth with others. We didn’t keep the benefit of economic growth for ourselves only. All countries and continents which have cooperation with China benefit from China’s growth. The peaceful rise of Asia is by no means accidental. Peace, globalization and Asian countries’ policy made it possible.
Second, mankind has never been bound together so closely by common interests and common challenges. It is true that the world is still facing many problems, conflicts and contradictions. But the interdependence between different countries has never been as deep as today.
Let me give you an example: China and the United States established diplomatic ties on January 1 1979. The trade volume between our two counties in 1979 amounted to only $2.4 billion. At that time, what happened in the U.S. economy had little impact on China, and vice versa.
But last year, China-U.S. trade volume amounted to more than $333 billion. China has also become the largest creditor of the United States. That was absolutely inconceivable 30 years ago
The challenges facing the world have never been as daunting as today. We must contend with climate change, environmental degradation, terrorism, drug trafficking, pandemics, etc. No country -- no matter how powerful it is -- is able to meet these challenges alone. The interdependence and common challenges call for united action of people around the world for a better future.
Today’s world is still influenced by the legacies of the past. WWII was followed by forty-year Cold War. The mentality of some people often lags behind the current reality. That is why we are seeing two major trends in the international relations competing with each other.
Asia’s population represents 60% of the world today — and its rise is bound to change the world landscape.
The first trend stands for peace, development and cooperation. The second trend stands for a continued Cold War, confrontation and conflict. The first trend represents the future — the second, the past. To a large extent, the destiny of mankind will be determined by the competition between these two trends in the 21st century.
Five or six years ago, America was at the height of unilateralism. The Chinese Minister of Culture went to United States for a cultural event. To an American audience, the Minister said, “The Chinese and Americans have different cultures. You Americans are always looking for an enemy. When you don’t have an enemy, you are worried. We Chinese don’t need an enemy, we need friends. When we don’t have friends, we are worried.”
Looking for an enemy is a typical manifestation of the Cold War mentality. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the U.S. neo-cons were looking for someone to replace it. That kind of mentality got the United States in big trouble. We are happy to see president Obama moving away from unilateralism.
Now I come to the third change. The world is on the eve of an energy revolution, a new industrial revolution and a revolution in our way of life. Two powerful factors are behind these three revolutions.
The first factor is the rise of many developing countries. In addition to rising Asia, South Africa, and Nigeria in Africa are also moving forward. In Latin America, Brazil and Mexico are rising. If you add up the population of all the rising developing countries, there are 3.3 billion people — half of the world population.
Last year, China-U.S. trade volume amounted to more than $333 billion. China has also become the largest creditor of the United States. That was absolutely inconceivable 30 years ago.
Never in the history of mankind has the world witnessed the half of the global population rising. In the past, when Europe and America started their rise, their population was small — but they had at their disposal the whole world’s resources. But today, half of the world’s population is rising.
If they follow the development model created by industrialized countries, the world’s resources simply cannot support their development.
The second factor is climate change. Green house gas is increasing rapidly in our atmosphere. The survival of human beings requires that the amount of CO2 should not exceed 550 parts per million (ppms). Today, it is already more than 380 ppm.
Climate change is the consequence accumulated greenhouse gas emitted mostly by the industrialized countries in the past centuries. Today, emerging countries are also emitting greenhouse gas. China is the largest emitter. For development purposes, the developing countries need to consume energy, otherwise, their economic growth would be impossible.
No one can ask the developing countries to stop development. That would be insane.
Looking for an enemy is a typical manifestation of the Cold War mentality.
The above two mentioned factors are leading the world to an energy revolution. This revolution has two facets. The first is to greatly reduce energy intensity. The industrialized world has to rebuild its infrastructure and transform its building facilities and transportation system in order to decrease energy consumption.
On the other hand, developing countries have to switch to a more sustainable development model. There is huge room for energy savings and energy efficiency. The second facet is to develop renewable energy, such as solar, wind, hydro and bio-mass. The world is bound to turn to renewable energy.
We are at a crossroads. It is up to sensible men and women around the world to work together to strengthen peace, development and cooperation. We Chinese are ready to do our part to make the world a better place to live.
91) China’s Instability Paradox - The Globalist
China’s Instability Paradox
By Matthew Hulbert and Christian Brütsch
Globalist Analysis - Global Development, Tuesday, November 17, 2009
China is currently pursuing oil resources in unstable countries without regard for the political risk entailed. While that might play well in the short- to medium-term, it could cost China dearly down the line, argue Matthew Hulbert of CSS ETH in Zurich and Dr. Christian Brütsch of the University of Zurich.
Heightened levels of risk in politically unstable oil-producing countries allow relatively easy access for major Chinese oil companies in markets that would otherwise be tougher nuts to crack.
What better way to get your foot in the doors of oil producers than in the absence of Western counterparts?
Instability is only "good" for business for so long. But in the long run, this must still translate into consistent, stable supplies heading for Chinese ports.
For example, Chinese officials energetically struck deals in Guinea, merely a week after the West African dictatorship launched a forceful crackdown against opposition protestors.
Instability comes in many guises for oil majors to contend with. Hostile insurgencies, civil wars, terrorism, targeted use of political violence and civil unrest sit on one side of the political risk ledger. Expropriation, contract renegotiation, international sanctions and resource nationalism sit on the other side.
China isn’t particularly fussy about what internal problems any major oil producer has to deal with. Chinese diplomats and oil executives only want to know what geological surveys in those nations can tell them, regardless of the political risk entailed.
The pattern of Chinese involvement around the world is very clear. Beijing has not hesitated to energetically pursue deals for oil, food, metals and other natural resources in Uganda, Chad, Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, Burma, Venezuela, Russia, Iran and Iraq, whatever the level of political risk its companies have to face in any of them. The Chinese are even ready to deal with North Korea for natural resource extraction.
Money certainly isn’t a problem. China spent $25 billion on such investments in 2007, $52.2 billion in 2008 and is expected to record a far higher figure in 2009.
The reason is clear: Beijing has decided to turn its $2 trillion in foreign reserves into a commodities hedge as the dollar weakens.
As China’s global energy footprint grows, Beijing can no longer afford the luxury of remaining politically aloof from its major commodity suppliers.
But here’s the catch — instability is only "good" for business for so long. Winning concessions and cementing political and commercial positions are all critically important to China in the short- to medium-term to help shift the energy balance "East." But in the long run, this must still translate into consistent, stable supplies heading for Chinese ports.
The Chinese government also has to satisfy its immense domestic demand at an acceptable price. This goal remains a critical one for a political regime still staking its future on delivering economic growth rather than democratic legitimacy. It goes to the heart of the Chinese government’s quest to create a "moderately well-off" and "harmonious" society by 2030.
Therefore, what might play well in the short- to medium-term could cost China dearly down the line.
If China turns a blind eye to growing instability in states it increasingly relies on to provide natural resources, it risks major disruptions in supplies if those states collapse, devolve into civil war or undergo wrenching and disruptive regime changes.
This means that China has generated a political instability paradox when it comes to producer states.
Time vs. space
China is not deliberately exporting instability for its own commodity ends. However, Chinese policymakers and corporate executives have decided to only look at one side of the energy current account balance without considering what political debts they may be generating that will cause them problems in the future.
Iran and Sudan provide the most telling examples of the long-term problems being generated by China’s decision to put its short-term energy interests first, without regard for any sense of stewardship for the international order. That means Beijing’s political credibility could suffer considerably in Africa and the Middle East in the longer term.
And China is likely to suffer further major blows to its international standing when many of the corrupt and repressive regimes it is forging close ties with across central, eastern and western Africa also collapse and become failed states.
Being regarded as a good "international citizen" would certainly be nice for China. But Beijing’s core concern is to meet domestic energy demand.
The obvious question is why should China really care? It’s not as if the West has an ethically pure balance sheet in its dealings with repressive regimes across Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Indeed, Beijing doesn’t really have any option but to play its game at a time when some argue that global mastery of oil is potentially shifting from the West to the East.
Clearly, a strategic presence across multiple producer states provides China with some useful bargaining chips down the line should it need to cash in some assets in order to retain others.
Being regarded as a good "international citizen" would certainly be nice for China. But it isn't essential right now. Beijing’s core concern is that some of its spread bets on natural resources convert into winning tickets in time to meet domestic energy demand.
Therefore, China’s focus is still very much on striking more supply-side contracts with politically shaky regimes.
Beijing’s strategic goal is to guarantee plentiful and reliable supplies of natural resources, not to stabilize producer states already doing business with it. Creating stability in supplier states is still only seen by Chinese policymakers as a far-off potential option to be seriously considered (if at all) only after concessions have been signed for and Beijing’s market dominance is secured.
Such a strategy is entirely understandable to increase and secure China’s "energy space" in the world. But this strategy may well prove to be ultimately flawed.
Why should China really care? It’s not as if the West has an ethically pure balance sheet.
For the supply clock is ticking down for the Chinese Communist Party. Reserves simply have to become production for the Chinese, but as any political risk analyst will tell you, political instability simply does not augur well for long-term, stable supplies.
If China assumes it will be able to find a "magic button" capable of turning bastions of instability to oceans of calm just at the critical point when it needs the oil to flow thick and fast, it is likely to be disappointed.
China has put the energy cart in front of the stability horse to secure long-term reliable supplies.
But this strategy means Beijing is increasing the bargaining power of producer states to play fast and loose with contractual terms. The Chinese therefore face the future prospect that production of their vital materials will be disrupted when previously stable regions are faced with growing and unresolved regional or geopolitical tensions.
Once that starts to happen, we should expect China’s current "non-intervention" norm to die an early death — from a diplomatic perspective at the very least.
A credible Plan B?
China does have something of a Plan B. It has been building stronger relations with energy powerhouses, most notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates — all nations that do have a long track record of delivering the goods to major customers.
But even here, it remains uncertain that such supplies will stay online if China continues to nudge Iran towards the nuclear brink. Arab states still put politics ahead of oil on crucial issues. This is a factor that Beijing will have to consider as the cheapest, largest and most easily accessible global oil reserves remain in the Gulf region.
Clever use of joint ventures by putting local energy players on the political front line in Africa also appears a canny option for Beijing to hedge its political and reputational risks.
Beijing’s strategic goal is to guarantee plentiful and reliable supplies of natural resources, not to stabilize producer states already doing business with it.
But that approach assumes that local companies like Sonangol, the partially state-owned national oil company of Angola, will be more adept at steering African countries in which they operate towards greater stability and at securing long-term oil production than Beijing itself would be. Instead, "using proxies" this way could complicate regional politics further.
Therefore, as China’s global energy footprint grows, Beijing can no longer afford the luxury of remaining politically aloof from its major commodity suppliers.
Consequently, it is critical that Chinese strategists understand the local and regional contexts within which their energy companies are operating and the broader strategic implications of their activities.
Western diplomats and interlocutors should not try to make this case to the Chinese on some spurious grounds of supporting international order, as that would be massively hypocritical of the West to suggest.
However, the case for conducting a more politically responsible foreign policy towards supplier nations could be suggested, but purely in terms of the Chinese Communist Party’s own survival.
In conclusion
While it might look politically appealing in the short-term to sign new energy deals, planting the Chinese flag in resource-rich states could prove disastrous for Beijing if such actions generate growing instability.
The Chinese need to learn that the natural resources they need could remain buried in the ground if "above-ground" political risks are ignored for too long.
China is racing between time (bringing oil reserves and other natural resources online) and space (increasing its global footprint in politically broken states). Ultimately, that race will be lost if the instability paradox is not resolved.
Currently, China’s leaders do not worry about growing instability in their producer states. The challenges of energy (in)security will only become a major issue for them when the messy political realities of energy geopolitics play out.
But there is still time for Beijing’s policymakers to learn that treading more carefully now could pay significant dividends for their country in the future.
By Matthew Hulbert and Christian Brütsch
Globalist Analysis - Global Development, Tuesday, November 17, 2009
China is currently pursuing oil resources in unstable countries without regard for the political risk entailed. While that might play well in the short- to medium-term, it could cost China dearly down the line, argue Matthew Hulbert of CSS ETH in Zurich and Dr. Christian Brütsch of the University of Zurich.
Heightened levels of risk in politically unstable oil-producing countries allow relatively easy access for major Chinese oil companies in markets that would otherwise be tougher nuts to crack.
What better way to get your foot in the doors of oil producers than in the absence of Western counterparts?
Instability is only "good" for business for so long. But in the long run, this must still translate into consistent, stable supplies heading for Chinese ports.
For example, Chinese officials energetically struck deals in Guinea, merely a week after the West African dictatorship launched a forceful crackdown against opposition protestors.
Instability comes in many guises for oil majors to contend with. Hostile insurgencies, civil wars, terrorism, targeted use of political violence and civil unrest sit on one side of the political risk ledger. Expropriation, contract renegotiation, international sanctions and resource nationalism sit on the other side.
China isn’t particularly fussy about what internal problems any major oil producer has to deal with. Chinese diplomats and oil executives only want to know what geological surveys in those nations can tell them, regardless of the political risk entailed.
The pattern of Chinese involvement around the world is very clear. Beijing has not hesitated to energetically pursue deals for oil, food, metals and other natural resources in Uganda, Chad, Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, Burma, Venezuela, Russia, Iran and Iraq, whatever the level of political risk its companies have to face in any of them. The Chinese are even ready to deal with North Korea for natural resource extraction.
Money certainly isn’t a problem. China spent $25 billion on such investments in 2007, $52.2 billion in 2008 and is expected to record a far higher figure in 2009.
The reason is clear: Beijing has decided to turn its $2 trillion in foreign reserves into a commodities hedge as the dollar weakens.
As China’s global energy footprint grows, Beijing can no longer afford the luxury of remaining politically aloof from its major commodity suppliers.
But here’s the catch — instability is only "good" for business for so long. Winning concessions and cementing political and commercial positions are all critically important to China in the short- to medium-term to help shift the energy balance "East." But in the long run, this must still translate into consistent, stable supplies heading for Chinese ports.
The Chinese government also has to satisfy its immense domestic demand at an acceptable price. This goal remains a critical one for a political regime still staking its future on delivering economic growth rather than democratic legitimacy. It goes to the heart of the Chinese government’s quest to create a "moderately well-off" and "harmonious" society by 2030.
Therefore, what might play well in the short- to medium-term could cost China dearly down the line.
If China turns a blind eye to growing instability in states it increasingly relies on to provide natural resources, it risks major disruptions in supplies if those states collapse, devolve into civil war or undergo wrenching and disruptive regime changes.
This means that China has generated a political instability paradox when it comes to producer states.
Time vs. space
China is not deliberately exporting instability for its own commodity ends. However, Chinese policymakers and corporate executives have decided to only look at one side of the energy current account balance without considering what political debts they may be generating that will cause them problems in the future.
Iran and Sudan provide the most telling examples of the long-term problems being generated by China’s decision to put its short-term energy interests first, without regard for any sense of stewardship for the international order. That means Beijing’s political credibility could suffer considerably in Africa and the Middle East in the longer term.
And China is likely to suffer further major blows to its international standing when many of the corrupt and repressive regimes it is forging close ties with across central, eastern and western Africa also collapse and become failed states.
Being regarded as a good "international citizen" would certainly be nice for China. But Beijing’s core concern is to meet domestic energy demand.
The obvious question is why should China really care? It’s not as if the West has an ethically pure balance sheet in its dealings with repressive regimes across Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Indeed, Beijing doesn’t really have any option but to play its game at a time when some argue that global mastery of oil is potentially shifting from the West to the East.
Clearly, a strategic presence across multiple producer states provides China with some useful bargaining chips down the line should it need to cash in some assets in order to retain others.
Being regarded as a good "international citizen" would certainly be nice for China. But it isn't essential right now. Beijing’s core concern is that some of its spread bets on natural resources convert into winning tickets in time to meet domestic energy demand.
Therefore, China’s focus is still very much on striking more supply-side contracts with politically shaky regimes.
Beijing’s strategic goal is to guarantee plentiful and reliable supplies of natural resources, not to stabilize producer states already doing business with it. Creating stability in supplier states is still only seen by Chinese policymakers as a far-off potential option to be seriously considered (if at all) only after concessions have been signed for and Beijing’s market dominance is secured.
Such a strategy is entirely understandable to increase and secure China’s "energy space" in the world. But this strategy may well prove to be ultimately flawed.
Why should China really care? It’s not as if the West has an ethically pure balance sheet.
For the supply clock is ticking down for the Chinese Communist Party. Reserves simply have to become production for the Chinese, but as any political risk analyst will tell you, political instability simply does not augur well for long-term, stable supplies.
If China assumes it will be able to find a "magic button" capable of turning bastions of instability to oceans of calm just at the critical point when it needs the oil to flow thick and fast, it is likely to be disappointed.
China has put the energy cart in front of the stability horse to secure long-term reliable supplies.
But this strategy means Beijing is increasing the bargaining power of producer states to play fast and loose with contractual terms. The Chinese therefore face the future prospect that production of their vital materials will be disrupted when previously stable regions are faced with growing and unresolved regional or geopolitical tensions.
Once that starts to happen, we should expect China’s current "non-intervention" norm to die an early death — from a diplomatic perspective at the very least.
A credible Plan B?
China does have something of a Plan B. It has been building stronger relations with energy powerhouses, most notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates — all nations that do have a long track record of delivering the goods to major customers.
But even here, it remains uncertain that such supplies will stay online if China continues to nudge Iran towards the nuclear brink. Arab states still put politics ahead of oil on crucial issues. This is a factor that Beijing will have to consider as the cheapest, largest and most easily accessible global oil reserves remain in the Gulf region.
Clever use of joint ventures by putting local energy players on the political front line in Africa also appears a canny option for Beijing to hedge its political and reputational risks.
Beijing’s strategic goal is to guarantee plentiful and reliable supplies of natural resources, not to stabilize producer states already doing business with it.
But that approach assumes that local companies like Sonangol, the partially state-owned national oil company of Angola, will be more adept at steering African countries in which they operate towards greater stability and at securing long-term oil production than Beijing itself would be. Instead, "using proxies" this way could complicate regional politics further.
Therefore, as China’s global energy footprint grows, Beijing can no longer afford the luxury of remaining politically aloof from its major commodity suppliers.
Consequently, it is critical that Chinese strategists understand the local and regional contexts within which their energy companies are operating and the broader strategic implications of their activities.
Western diplomats and interlocutors should not try to make this case to the Chinese on some spurious grounds of supporting international order, as that would be massively hypocritical of the West to suggest.
However, the case for conducting a more politically responsible foreign policy towards supplier nations could be suggested, but purely in terms of the Chinese Communist Party’s own survival.
In conclusion
While it might look politically appealing in the short-term to sign new energy deals, planting the Chinese flag in resource-rich states could prove disastrous for Beijing if such actions generate growing instability.
The Chinese need to learn that the natural resources they need could remain buried in the ground if "above-ground" political risks are ignored for too long.
China is racing between time (bringing oil reserves and other natural resources online) and space (increasing its global footprint in politically broken states). Ultimately, that race will be lost if the instability paradox is not resolved.
Currently, China’s leaders do not worry about growing instability in their producer states. The challenges of energy (in)security will only become a major issue for them when the messy political realities of energy geopolitics play out.
But there is still time for Beijing’s policymakers to learn that treading more carefully now could pay significant dividends for their country in the future.
90) China: Dissident intellectuals have been attracted to Christianity
OPINION
The China President Obama Didn't See
By LESLIE HOOK
The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2009
Dissident intellectuals have been attracted to Christianity.
Beijing
In the northeast part of this city, not far from the old Friendship Hotel, stands a boxy little cinema specializing in anime. A nondescript building on a nondescript thoroughfare, it's hardly a place a tourist would notice, much less a visiting president. Yet had Barack Obama wanted to understand something of the real China, his time would have been better spent here than at the various state dinners, Forbidden City photo-ops, and carefully managed town-hall events that consumed the balance of his trip this week.
At 10 a.m. Sunday, more than 500 members of Shouwang church gathered at the cinema for a service. Shouwang, founded in 1993 by pastor Jin Tianming, is one of the city's largest unregistered churches and counts around 800 regular members. But until last weekend, they had never once been able to meet in such large numbers in an indoor space in Beijing.
Shouwang is what is known in China as a "house" church, meaning that it is an unregistered entity in a country where all religious groups are supposed to report to the State Administration for Religious Affairs. Officially, the Chinese government counts some 10 million Protestants and four million Catholics belonging to registered churches, which proscribe evangelical activity and preach a patriotic dogma.
But Chinese and foreign observers alike believe the number of Chinese belonging to underground churches may now exceed 100 million people. That figure has grown rapidly as more and more Chinese, particularly well-educated city dwellers, turn away from Communist Party atheism.
Life has never been easy for the underground churches, and recently it has gotten a lot harder. This is the result, according to the Christian charity group China Aid, of a state directive handed down in August. Why do China's powerful leaders fear these churches, most of which steer clear of politics? It may be that they have grown increasingly paranoid about the political power of religion given the unrest they have faced in Buddhist Tibet and Muslim Xinjiang. Or it could be because dissident intellectuals, such as jailed human-rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, have sometimes tended toward Christianity.
Whatever the reason, Shouwang in recent weeks has been forced to hold its services outdoors, including during a snowstorm, as attempts to find an indoor space were repeatedly rebuffed. Twenty minutes into Sunday's service, Pastor Tianming announced that "some of our brothers and sisters are being held at their homes and have not been able to come to church. But we are all one body in Christ, so we will wait for them to start the service."
After another hour of singing and praying, the congregation suddenly broke into applause—one of the detained members had apparently talked his way out and arrived. The service got underway; by the time it ended a second detained elder had arrived. The previous Sunday, it was Pastor Tianming who had been detained.
This story is hardly unique to Beijing. Earlier this month, police sealed the doors of the Wanbang church in Shanghai, scattering its congregation of 2,000 people. In Shanxi province the leaders of one of the country's largest house churches, with dozens of branches and tens of thousands of members, have been arrested in a crackdown that has worsened since September. Shouwang itself would not likely have obtained permission to hold its services at the cinema had Mr. Obama's trip not given authorities a reason to avoid ruffling feathers.
Now Mr. Obama is gone, after a visit that was conspicuous for its attentiveness to the sensibilities of China's leaders. In their quest for stability and "harmony," these rulers continue to roll back basic liberties. Shuttering underground churches is part of the trend.
But freedom of faith is something not even history's most repressive governments have ever been fully able to snuff out: not the Romans in their suppression of the earliest Christians; not the communists in their efforts to substitute History for God; not Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong or Kim Il Sung, who attempted to substitute themselves for God. So while Shouwang has no place to meet this coming Sunday, the church will still be there, only more deeply steeled in its faith. This is the side of China—the one Mr. Obama opted not to see—that will ultimately determine its future.
Ms. Hook is an editorial page writer for The Wall Street Journal Asia.
The China President Obama Didn't See
By LESLIE HOOK
The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2009
Dissident intellectuals have been attracted to Christianity.
Beijing
In the northeast part of this city, not far from the old Friendship Hotel, stands a boxy little cinema specializing in anime. A nondescript building on a nondescript thoroughfare, it's hardly a place a tourist would notice, much less a visiting president. Yet had Barack Obama wanted to understand something of the real China, his time would have been better spent here than at the various state dinners, Forbidden City photo-ops, and carefully managed town-hall events that consumed the balance of his trip this week.
At 10 a.m. Sunday, more than 500 members of Shouwang church gathered at the cinema for a service. Shouwang, founded in 1993 by pastor Jin Tianming, is one of the city's largest unregistered churches and counts around 800 regular members. But until last weekend, they had never once been able to meet in such large numbers in an indoor space in Beijing.
Shouwang is what is known in China as a "house" church, meaning that it is an unregistered entity in a country where all religious groups are supposed to report to the State Administration for Religious Affairs. Officially, the Chinese government counts some 10 million Protestants and four million Catholics belonging to registered churches, which proscribe evangelical activity and preach a patriotic dogma.
But Chinese and foreign observers alike believe the number of Chinese belonging to underground churches may now exceed 100 million people. That figure has grown rapidly as more and more Chinese, particularly well-educated city dwellers, turn away from Communist Party atheism.
Life has never been easy for the underground churches, and recently it has gotten a lot harder. This is the result, according to the Christian charity group China Aid, of a state directive handed down in August. Why do China's powerful leaders fear these churches, most of which steer clear of politics? It may be that they have grown increasingly paranoid about the political power of religion given the unrest they have faced in Buddhist Tibet and Muslim Xinjiang. Or it could be because dissident intellectuals, such as jailed human-rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, have sometimes tended toward Christianity.
Whatever the reason, Shouwang in recent weeks has been forced to hold its services outdoors, including during a snowstorm, as attempts to find an indoor space were repeatedly rebuffed. Twenty minutes into Sunday's service, Pastor Tianming announced that "some of our brothers and sisters are being held at their homes and have not been able to come to church. But we are all one body in Christ, so we will wait for them to start the service."
After another hour of singing and praying, the congregation suddenly broke into applause—one of the detained members had apparently talked his way out and arrived. The service got underway; by the time it ended a second detained elder had arrived. The previous Sunday, it was Pastor Tianming who had been detained.
This story is hardly unique to Beijing. Earlier this month, police sealed the doors of the Wanbang church in Shanghai, scattering its congregation of 2,000 people. In Shanxi province the leaders of one of the country's largest house churches, with dozens of branches and tens of thousands of members, have been arrested in a crackdown that has worsened since September. Shouwang itself would not likely have obtained permission to hold its services at the cinema had Mr. Obama's trip not given authorities a reason to avoid ruffling feathers.
Now Mr. Obama is gone, after a visit that was conspicuous for its attentiveness to the sensibilities of China's leaders. In their quest for stability and "harmony," these rulers continue to roll back basic liberties. Shuttering underground churches is part of the trend.
But freedom of faith is something not even history's most repressive governments have ever been fully able to snuff out: not the Romans in their suppression of the earliest Christians; not the communists in their efforts to substitute History for God; not Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong or Kim Il Sung, who attempted to substitute themselves for God. So while Shouwang has no place to meet this coming Sunday, the church will still be there, only more deeply steeled in its faith. This is the side of China—the one Mr. Obama opted not to see—that will ultimately determine its future.
Ms. Hook is an editorial page writer for The Wall Street Journal Asia.
Sunday, November 15, 2009
89) USA and Chine: bowing to his lender...
China’s Role as U.S. Lender Alters Dynamics for Obama
Helene Cooper, Michael Wines and David E. Sanger
The New York Times, November 15, 2009
When President Obama visits China for the first time on Sunday, he will, in many ways, be assuming the role of profligate spender coming to pay his respects to his banker.
That stark fact — China is the largest foreign lender to the United States — has changed the core of the relationship between the United States and the only country with a reasonable chance of challenging its status as the world’s sole superpower.
The result: unlike his immediate predecessors, who publicly pushed and prodded China to follow the Western model and become more open politically and economically, Mr. Obama will be spending less time exhorting Beijing and more time reassuring it.
In a July meeting, Chinese officials asked their American counterparts detailed questions about the health care legislation making its way through Congress. The president’s budget director, Peter R. Orszag, answered most of their questions. But the Chinese were not particularly interested in the public option or universal care for all Americans.
“They wanted to know, in painstaking detail, how the health care plan would affect the deficit,” one participant in the conversation recalled. Chinese officials expect that they will help finance whatever Congress and the White House settle on, mostly through buying Treasury debt, and like any banker, they wanted evidence that the United States had a plan to pay them back.
It is a long way from the days when President George W. Bush hectored China about currency manipulation, or when President Bill Clinton exhorted the Chinese to improve human rights.
Mr. Obama has struck a mollifying note with China. He pointedly singled out the emerging dynamic at play between the United States and China during a wide-ranging speech in Tokyo on Saturday that was meant to outline a new American relationship with Asia.
“The United States does not seek to contain China,” Mr. Obama said. “On the contrary, the rise of a strong, prosperous China can be a source of strength for the community of nations.”
He alluded to human rights but did not get specific. “We will not agree on every issue,” he said, “and the United States will never waver in speaking up for the fundamental values that we hold dear — and that includes respect for the religion and cultures of all people.”
White House officials have been working for months to make sure that Mr. Obama’s three-day visit to Shanghai and Beijing conveys a conciliatory image. For instance, in June, the White House told the Dalai Lama that while Mr. Obama would meet him at some point, he would not do so in October, when the Tibetan spiritual leader visited Washington, because it was too close to Mr. Obama’s visit to China.
Greeting the Dalai Lama, whom China condemns as a separatist, weeks before Mr. Obama’s first presidential trip to the country could alienate Beijing, administration officials said. Every president since George H. W. Bush in 1991 has met the Dalai Lama when he visited Washington, usually in private encounters at the White House, although in 2007 George W. Bush became the first president to welcome him publicly, bestowing the Congressional Gold Medal on him at the Capitol. Mr. Obama met the Dalai Lama as a senator.
Similarly, while he was campaigning for the presidency, Mr. Obama several times accused China of manipulating its currency, an allegation that the current Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, repeated during his confirmation hearings. But in April, the Treasury Department retreated from that criticism, issuing a report that said China was not manipulating its currency to increase its exports.
While American officials said privately that they remained frustrated that China’s currency policies lowered the cost of Chinese goods and made American products more expensive in foreign markets, they said that they were relieved that China was fighting the global recession with an enormous fiscal stimulus program to spur domestic growth, and added that now was not the time to antagonize Beijing.
China is not viewed as a trouble spot for the United States. But this administration, like its predecessor, has had difficulty grappling with a rising power that seems eager to avoid direct clashes with the United States but affects its interests in many areas, including currency policy, nuclear proliferation, climate change and military spending.
In that regard, two members of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy team said that the United States’ interactions with the Chinese had been far too narrow in past years, focusing on counterterrorism and North Korea. Too little was done, they said, to address China’s energy and environmental policies, or its expansion of influence in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Africa, where China has invested heavily and used billions of dollars in aid to advance its political influence.
One hint of the Obama administration’s new approach came in a speech this fall by James B. Steinberg, the deputy secretary of state, who has deep roots in China policy. He argued that China needed to adopt a policy of “strategic reassurance” to the rest of the world, a phrase that appeared intended to be the successor to the framework of the Bush era, when China was urged to embrace a role as a “responsible stakeholder.”
“Strategic reassurance rests on a core, if tacit, bargain,” Mr. Steinberg said. “Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China’s ‘arrival,’ ” he argued, the Chinese “must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others.”
The Chinese reaction has been mixed, at best. The official China Daily newspaper ran a column just before Mr. Obama’s arrival suggesting that the United States needed to provide some assurance of its own — to “respect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” code words for entirely backing away from the issues of how China deals with Taiwan and Tibet.
In the United States, the phrase “strategic reassurance” has been attacked by conservative commentators, who argue that any reassurance that the United States provides to China would be an acknowledgment of a decline in American power.
In an op-ed article in The Washington Post, the analysts Robert Kagan and Dan Blumenthal argued that the policy had echoes of Europe “ceding the Western Hemisphere to American hegemony” a century ago. “Lingering behind this concept is an assumption of America’s inevitable decline,” they wrote. White House officials shot back, insisting that it is China that needs to do the reassurance, not the United States.
In China, Mr. Obama will meet with local political leaders and will host an American-style town hall meeting with students in Shanghai. He will then spend two days in Beijing meeting with President Hu Jintao.
It seems unlikely that Mr. Obama will get the same celebrity-type reception in Beijing that he received in Cairo, Ghana, Paris and London. China seems mostly immune to the Obama fever that swept other parts of the world, and the Chinese are growing more confident that their country has the wherewithal to compete with the United States on the world stage, analysts say.
“Obama is still a positive guy, and all over the world most people think he’s more energetic, more sincere, than Bush, more a reformist,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor and an expert on United States-China relations at People’s University in Beijing. “But in China, Obama’s popularity is less than in Europe, than Japan or Southeast Asia.” In China, he said, “there is no worship of Obama.”
For instance, during the Bush and Clinton years, China might release a few political dissidents on the eve of a visit by the president as a good-will gesture. This time, American officials say, they do not expect any similar gestures, although they say that Mr. Obama will raise human rights issues privately with Mr. Hu.
“This time China will agree to have a human rights dialogue with the U.S. on some cases,” Mr. Shi said, but “the arguments have changed compared to the past. Now we say, ‘We are a different country, we have our own system, our own culture.’ ”
Helene Cooper reported from Singapore, Michael Wines from Beijing, and David E. Sanger from Washington.
Helene Cooper, Michael Wines and David E. Sanger
The New York Times, November 15, 2009
When President Obama visits China for the first time on Sunday, he will, in many ways, be assuming the role of profligate spender coming to pay his respects to his banker.
That stark fact — China is the largest foreign lender to the United States — has changed the core of the relationship between the United States and the only country with a reasonable chance of challenging its status as the world’s sole superpower.
The result: unlike his immediate predecessors, who publicly pushed and prodded China to follow the Western model and become more open politically and economically, Mr. Obama will be spending less time exhorting Beijing and more time reassuring it.
In a July meeting, Chinese officials asked their American counterparts detailed questions about the health care legislation making its way through Congress. The president’s budget director, Peter R. Orszag, answered most of their questions. But the Chinese were not particularly interested in the public option or universal care for all Americans.
“They wanted to know, in painstaking detail, how the health care plan would affect the deficit,” one participant in the conversation recalled. Chinese officials expect that they will help finance whatever Congress and the White House settle on, mostly through buying Treasury debt, and like any banker, they wanted evidence that the United States had a plan to pay them back.
It is a long way from the days when President George W. Bush hectored China about currency manipulation, or when President Bill Clinton exhorted the Chinese to improve human rights.
Mr. Obama has struck a mollifying note with China. He pointedly singled out the emerging dynamic at play between the United States and China during a wide-ranging speech in Tokyo on Saturday that was meant to outline a new American relationship with Asia.
“The United States does not seek to contain China,” Mr. Obama said. “On the contrary, the rise of a strong, prosperous China can be a source of strength for the community of nations.”
He alluded to human rights but did not get specific. “We will not agree on every issue,” he said, “and the United States will never waver in speaking up for the fundamental values that we hold dear — and that includes respect for the religion and cultures of all people.”
White House officials have been working for months to make sure that Mr. Obama’s three-day visit to Shanghai and Beijing conveys a conciliatory image. For instance, in June, the White House told the Dalai Lama that while Mr. Obama would meet him at some point, he would not do so in October, when the Tibetan spiritual leader visited Washington, because it was too close to Mr. Obama’s visit to China.
Greeting the Dalai Lama, whom China condemns as a separatist, weeks before Mr. Obama’s first presidential trip to the country could alienate Beijing, administration officials said. Every president since George H. W. Bush in 1991 has met the Dalai Lama when he visited Washington, usually in private encounters at the White House, although in 2007 George W. Bush became the first president to welcome him publicly, bestowing the Congressional Gold Medal on him at the Capitol. Mr. Obama met the Dalai Lama as a senator.
Similarly, while he was campaigning for the presidency, Mr. Obama several times accused China of manipulating its currency, an allegation that the current Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, repeated during his confirmation hearings. But in April, the Treasury Department retreated from that criticism, issuing a report that said China was not manipulating its currency to increase its exports.
While American officials said privately that they remained frustrated that China’s currency policies lowered the cost of Chinese goods and made American products more expensive in foreign markets, they said that they were relieved that China was fighting the global recession with an enormous fiscal stimulus program to spur domestic growth, and added that now was not the time to antagonize Beijing.
China is not viewed as a trouble spot for the United States. But this administration, like its predecessor, has had difficulty grappling with a rising power that seems eager to avoid direct clashes with the United States but affects its interests in many areas, including currency policy, nuclear proliferation, climate change and military spending.
In that regard, two members of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy team said that the United States’ interactions with the Chinese had been far too narrow in past years, focusing on counterterrorism and North Korea. Too little was done, they said, to address China’s energy and environmental policies, or its expansion of influence in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Africa, where China has invested heavily and used billions of dollars in aid to advance its political influence.
One hint of the Obama administration’s new approach came in a speech this fall by James B. Steinberg, the deputy secretary of state, who has deep roots in China policy. He argued that China needed to adopt a policy of “strategic reassurance” to the rest of the world, a phrase that appeared intended to be the successor to the framework of the Bush era, when China was urged to embrace a role as a “responsible stakeholder.”
“Strategic reassurance rests on a core, if tacit, bargain,” Mr. Steinberg said. “Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China’s ‘arrival,’ ” he argued, the Chinese “must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others.”
The Chinese reaction has been mixed, at best. The official China Daily newspaper ran a column just before Mr. Obama’s arrival suggesting that the United States needed to provide some assurance of its own — to “respect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” code words for entirely backing away from the issues of how China deals with Taiwan and Tibet.
In the United States, the phrase “strategic reassurance” has been attacked by conservative commentators, who argue that any reassurance that the United States provides to China would be an acknowledgment of a decline in American power.
In an op-ed article in The Washington Post, the analysts Robert Kagan and Dan Blumenthal argued that the policy had echoes of Europe “ceding the Western Hemisphere to American hegemony” a century ago. “Lingering behind this concept is an assumption of America’s inevitable decline,” they wrote. White House officials shot back, insisting that it is China that needs to do the reassurance, not the United States.
In China, Mr. Obama will meet with local political leaders and will host an American-style town hall meeting with students in Shanghai. He will then spend two days in Beijing meeting with President Hu Jintao.
It seems unlikely that Mr. Obama will get the same celebrity-type reception in Beijing that he received in Cairo, Ghana, Paris and London. China seems mostly immune to the Obama fever that swept other parts of the world, and the Chinese are growing more confident that their country has the wherewithal to compete with the United States on the world stage, analysts say.
“Obama is still a positive guy, and all over the world most people think he’s more energetic, more sincere, than Bush, more a reformist,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor and an expert on United States-China relations at People’s University in Beijing. “But in China, Obama’s popularity is less than in Europe, than Japan or Southeast Asia.” In China, he said, “there is no worship of Obama.”
For instance, during the Bush and Clinton years, China might release a few political dissidents on the eve of a visit by the president as a good-will gesture. This time, American officials say, they do not expect any similar gestures, although they say that Mr. Obama will raise human rights issues privately with Mr. Hu.
“This time China will agree to have a human rights dialogue with the U.S. on some cases,” Mr. Shi said, but “the arguments have changed compared to the past. Now we say, ‘We are a different country, we have our own system, our own culture.’ ”
Helene Cooper reported from Singapore, Michael Wines from Beijing, and David E. Sanger from Washington.
Saturday, November 14, 2009
88) Chine sees Tibet as American Civil War
China Focuses on Territorial Issues as It Equates Tibet to U.S. Civil War South
By EDWARD WONG
The New York Times, November 14, 2009
BEIJING — The Chinese government had a special message for President Obama on Thursday: He is black, he admires Abraham Lincoln, so he, of all people, should sympathize with Beijing’s effort to prevent Tibet from seceding and sliding back into what it was before its liberation by Chinese troops: a feudalistic, slaveholding society headed by the Dalai Lama.
“He is a black president, and he understands the slavery abolition movement and Lincoln’s major significance for that movement,” Qin Gang, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, said at a news conference.
Mr. Qin added: “Thus, on this issue we hope that President Obama, more than any other foreign leader, can better, more deeply grasp China’s stance on protecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
For many Americans, Mr. Qin’s analogy might sound like a stretch, but it revealed which issues Chinese leaders see as among their top priorities, ones that Mr. Obama will no doubt have to grapple with after he arrives in China on Sunday for his first trip here.
While much attention will be focused on broad international issues like trade and currency values, climate change and the ailing world economy, questions of sovereignty and territory remain an obsession of Chinese foreign policy. Some scholars and analysts see this as an expression of an aggressive expansionism that will only deepen as China moves toward superpower status. Others argue that China is driven more by the need to recover territory wrested from it during the decades it was known as the Sick Man of Asia, when pieces of it were humiliatingly annexed by European powers and Japan.
As a result, Mr. Obama can expect to get an earful from Chinese officials not only on the Dalai Lama, whom the president says he will meet after the China trip, but also on Taiwan, the self-governing island that China says is a rebel province. Taiwan receives annual arms shipments from the United States.
“Tibet and Taiwan are, from China’s perspective, the two core sovereignty issues, and they rank above all others in Chinese diplomacy,” said David Shambaugh, a visiting scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Disputed territory is also the biggest obstacle in relations between China and its largest neighbor, India. On Tuesday, Mr. Qin denounced the Dalai Lama for his visit this week to the Tibetan Buddhist enclave of Tawang in the Indian Himalayan state of Arunachal Pradesh.
Tawang is one of the most potent symbols of China’s unresolved sovereignty issues. China says it was once part of Tibet, which the Chinese military seized in 1951, and so belongs to Beijing. India says that Tibetan leaders ceded it to British-ruled India in a 1914 treaty. Tawang figured centrally in a border war between China and India in 1962.
Part of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party lies in the notion, rightly or wrongly held, that it ousted foreign influence from the country and has tried to reunite fragments of China to return the boundaries of the modern nation to roughly those of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) at its height. That includes Taiwan, Tibet, the western region of Xinjiang and, by China’s calculation, Tawang.
“In most respects, the People’s Republic of China, of course, inherits the fixed boundaries of its predecessor nation-state, the Republic of China, which declared as its territorial boundaries what had been mostly the messy frontiers of the Qing empire,” Alice Miller, a political scientist and research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, wrote in a China discussion forum posting that she agreed to make public.
“Messy” is the operative word here. In the age of empires, there were no hard and fast borders, whether the imperial rulers were the Ottoman Turks or the Manchus or the Moghuls. The seat of empire had its sphere of influence, radiating outward, with tributary states occupying the borderlands but rarely being governed in the same way as regions within a modern nation today.
Trying to define national borders along the contours of an old empire is a daunting task. If, for example, Tibet paid tribute to the Qing emperor at certain points in history, should Tibet be part of modern China? If Tawang did the same with Tibetan rulers in Lhasa, should Tawang be part of modern Tibet?
Along with India and Indonesia, China is one of a handful of vast, multiethnic nations that follow the contours of fallen empires. Because of their size and history, all three nations grapple with the same issues: border disputes, ethno-nationalism, occasionally violent movements by disaffected ethnic or religious minorities.
China is often criticized as handling uprisings harshly in Tibet and Xinjiang, which the country’s ethnic Han leaders consider internal issues of sovereignty. But in dealing with its neighbors on territorial issues, China has in the recent past generally sought to settle conflicts through negotiation, scholars say.
Since 1949, it has resolved 17 of 23 border disputes, offering concessions in 15 of those instances and, over all, receiving less than half of the contested territory, said M. Taylor Fravel, an associate professor of political science at M.I.T. The compromises have generally come at times of regime instability, when the Communist Party has felt threatened by external or internal forces, he added.
The big question, then, is whether Chinese leaders will continue to show flexibility on border issues as China becomes a greater world power, and as it stamps out internal threats.
China’s maritime disputes have proven harder to settle than those on land. In the resource-rich seas to its east and south, China is trying to assert control of various islands — most notably the Spratly, Paracel and Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands — that are also claimed in whole or in part by other Asian countries. In March, official Chinese news organizations reported that the government intended to send six more patrol vessels to the South China Sea in the next three to five years.
Even the United States has run directly afoul of China’s maritime border claims: On March 8, five Chinese vessels harassed an American surveillance ship in what Pentagon officials said are international waters. The Chinese insisted that the American ship, the Impeccable, was conducting illegal surveillance in waters under their jurisdiction.
Dennis C. Blair, the national intelligence director, told Congress that China’s general behavior in the South China Sea was “more military, aggressive, forward-pushing than we saw a couple of years before.”
This all speaks to how a bolder, brasher China might handle issues of sovereignty and territory, comparisons to Abraham Lincoln notwithstanding.
“The biggest unknown is how a stronger China will behave in its outstanding disputes,” Mr. Fravel said. “When it has compromised in the past, mostly in disputes on its land border, it was a relatively weak state. The question now becomes: how will a stronger China behave in its remaining territorial disputes over maritime sovereignty and with India?”
By EDWARD WONG
The New York Times, November 14, 2009
BEIJING — The Chinese government had a special message for President Obama on Thursday: He is black, he admires Abraham Lincoln, so he, of all people, should sympathize with Beijing’s effort to prevent Tibet from seceding and sliding back into what it was before its liberation by Chinese troops: a feudalistic, slaveholding society headed by the Dalai Lama.
“He is a black president, and he understands the slavery abolition movement and Lincoln’s major significance for that movement,” Qin Gang, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, said at a news conference.
Mr. Qin added: “Thus, on this issue we hope that President Obama, more than any other foreign leader, can better, more deeply grasp China’s stance on protecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
For many Americans, Mr. Qin’s analogy might sound like a stretch, but it revealed which issues Chinese leaders see as among their top priorities, ones that Mr. Obama will no doubt have to grapple with after he arrives in China on Sunday for his first trip here.
While much attention will be focused on broad international issues like trade and currency values, climate change and the ailing world economy, questions of sovereignty and territory remain an obsession of Chinese foreign policy. Some scholars and analysts see this as an expression of an aggressive expansionism that will only deepen as China moves toward superpower status. Others argue that China is driven more by the need to recover territory wrested from it during the decades it was known as the Sick Man of Asia, when pieces of it were humiliatingly annexed by European powers and Japan.
As a result, Mr. Obama can expect to get an earful from Chinese officials not only on the Dalai Lama, whom the president says he will meet after the China trip, but also on Taiwan, the self-governing island that China says is a rebel province. Taiwan receives annual arms shipments from the United States.
“Tibet and Taiwan are, from China’s perspective, the two core sovereignty issues, and they rank above all others in Chinese diplomacy,” said David Shambaugh, a visiting scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Disputed territory is also the biggest obstacle in relations between China and its largest neighbor, India. On Tuesday, Mr. Qin denounced the Dalai Lama for his visit this week to the Tibetan Buddhist enclave of Tawang in the Indian Himalayan state of Arunachal Pradesh.
Tawang is one of the most potent symbols of China’s unresolved sovereignty issues. China says it was once part of Tibet, which the Chinese military seized in 1951, and so belongs to Beijing. India says that Tibetan leaders ceded it to British-ruled India in a 1914 treaty. Tawang figured centrally in a border war between China and India in 1962.
Part of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party lies in the notion, rightly or wrongly held, that it ousted foreign influence from the country and has tried to reunite fragments of China to return the boundaries of the modern nation to roughly those of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) at its height. That includes Taiwan, Tibet, the western region of Xinjiang and, by China’s calculation, Tawang.
“In most respects, the People’s Republic of China, of course, inherits the fixed boundaries of its predecessor nation-state, the Republic of China, which declared as its territorial boundaries what had been mostly the messy frontiers of the Qing empire,” Alice Miller, a political scientist and research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, wrote in a China discussion forum posting that she agreed to make public.
“Messy” is the operative word here. In the age of empires, there were no hard and fast borders, whether the imperial rulers were the Ottoman Turks or the Manchus or the Moghuls. The seat of empire had its sphere of influence, radiating outward, with tributary states occupying the borderlands but rarely being governed in the same way as regions within a modern nation today.
Trying to define national borders along the contours of an old empire is a daunting task. If, for example, Tibet paid tribute to the Qing emperor at certain points in history, should Tibet be part of modern China? If Tawang did the same with Tibetan rulers in Lhasa, should Tawang be part of modern Tibet?
Along with India and Indonesia, China is one of a handful of vast, multiethnic nations that follow the contours of fallen empires. Because of their size and history, all three nations grapple with the same issues: border disputes, ethno-nationalism, occasionally violent movements by disaffected ethnic or religious minorities.
China is often criticized as handling uprisings harshly in Tibet and Xinjiang, which the country’s ethnic Han leaders consider internal issues of sovereignty. But in dealing with its neighbors on territorial issues, China has in the recent past generally sought to settle conflicts through negotiation, scholars say.
Since 1949, it has resolved 17 of 23 border disputes, offering concessions in 15 of those instances and, over all, receiving less than half of the contested territory, said M. Taylor Fravel, an associate professor of political science at M.I.T. The compromises have generally come at times of regime instability, when the Communist Party has felt threatened by external or internal forces, he added.
The big question, then, is whether Chinese leaders will continue to show flexibility on border issues as China becomes a greater world power, and as it stamps out internal threats.
China’s maritime disputes have proven harder to settle than those on land. In the resource-rich seas to its east and south, China is trying to assert control of various islands — most notably the Spratly, Paracel and Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands — that are also claimed in whole or in part by other Asian countries. In March, official Chinese news organizations reported that the government intended to send six more patrol vessels to the South China Sea in the next three to five years.
Even the United States has run directly afoul of China’s maritime border claims: On March 8, five Chinese vessels harassed an American surveillance ship in what Pentagon officials said are international waters. The Chinese insisted that the American ship, the Impeccable, was conducting illegal surveillance in waters under their jurisdiction.
Dennis C. Blair, the national intelligence director, told Congress that China’s general behavior in the South China Sea was “more military, aggressive, forward-pushing than we saw a couple of years before.”
This all speaks to how a bolder, brasher China might handle issues of sovereignty and territory, comparisons to Abraham Lincoln notwithstanding.
“The biggest unknown is how a stronger China will behave in its outstanding disputes,” Mr. Fravel said. “When it has compromised in the past, mostly in disputes on its land border, it was a relatively weak state. The question now becomes: how will a stronger China behave in its remaining territorial disputes over maritime sovereignty and with India?”
87) North Koreans refugee drama in China
Korea's Berlin Wall
Obama, China and the stranded refugees
The Wall Street Journal, Editorial, November 14, 2009
One trigger for the collapse of the Berlin Wall 20 years ago was the flow of East Germans across their country's newly opened border to Hungary, then on through Austria to West Germany. One day a similar flow of refugees from North Korea to China and on to South Korea could help bring down Kim Jong Il's barbarous regime and help re-unify Korea.
We hope the subject of North Korean refugees in China is on President Obama's agenda when he visits Beijing next week. There are at least tens of thousands of refugees hiding in China and perhaps as many as 300,000, according to human rights groups. Beijing's policy—contrary to international law—is to track them down and send them back to the North, where they face severe punishment for the "crime" of leaving their country without permission. Anyone who helps the refugees is subject to fines, arrest and jail time. Under Chinese law, even giving food to a refugee is a crime.
Specifically, Mr. Obama could ask Beijing to release five North Korean refugees who were caught recently trying to sneak across China's border to Vietnam. That's a popular escape route for refugees, who then usually go on to safety in South Korea, whose constitution requires that it accept all North Koreans who request asylum. The five arrested refugees were trying to reach the South. Nine other refugees recently received asylum at the Danish embassy in Hanoi.
The five refugees are awaiting repatriation in a Chinese detention center near the North Korean border, according to the International Network of North Korean Human Rights Activists in Seoul. They include one man, three women and a six-year-old boy, the Network says. Two of the women had been sold to Chinese men. The going price for a North Korean "bride" ranges from "$700 for a plain-looking woman to over $1,000 for a more attractive" woman, says Tim Peters, a Seoul-based American pastor who helps refugees. The boy is half-Chinese.
If sent back to the North, the refugees are likely to end up in Chongori prison camp, an experience they are unlikely to survive. The Chosun Ilbo newspaper in Seoul recently broke the news of the camp, which is dedicated to repatriated refugees and whose harsh conditions are intended to stop the flow of refugees to China by scaring citizens into staying put. At Chongori, the paper reports, "inmates are doomed to die of malnutrition." They are forced to work 14 hours a day and their daily diet consists of two potatoes and a handful of cornmeal, refugees told the paper. The U.S.-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea commissioned satellite images of Chongori. They are posted at www.freekorea.us.
Mr. Obama's nominee for Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues is Robert King, whose confirmation hearing was held earlier this month in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. King said he would press China to uphold its obligation under the international Refugee Convention not to forcibly return North Koreans.
In Beijing next week, Mr. Obama could pledge U.S. assistance should China be overrun by refugees fleeing the North. This is one of Beijing's big worries in the event of a destabilized North Korea. But a humanitarian crisis is taking place now. The President could demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the human rights of the refugees already in China by demanding the release of the five we know about.
Obama, China and the stranded refugees
The Wall Street Journal, Editorial, November 14, 2009
One trigger for the collapse of the Berlin Wall 20 years ago was the flow of East Germans across their country's newly opened border to Hungary, then on through Austria to West Germany. One day a similar flow of refugees from North Korea to China and on to South Korea could help bring down Kim Jong Il's barbarous regime and help re-unify Korea.
We hope the subject of North Korean refugees in China is on President Obama's agenda when he visits Beijing next week. There are at least tens of thousands of refugees hiding in China and perhaps as many as 300,000, according to human rights groups. Beijing's policy—contrary to international law—is to track them down and send them back to the North, where they face severe punishment for the "crime" of leaving their country without permission. Anyone who helps the refugees is subject to fines, arrest and jail time. Under Chinese law, even giving food to a refugee is a crime.
Specifically, Mr. Obama could ask Beijing to release five North Korean refugees who were caught recently trying to sneak across China's border to Vietnam. That's a popular escape route for refugees, who then usually go on to safety in South Korea, whose constitution requires that it accept all North Koreans who request asylum. The five arrested refugees were trying to reach the South. Nine other refugees recently received asylum at the Danish embassy in Hanoi.
The five refugees are awaiting repatriation in a Chinese detention center near the North Korean border, according to the International Network of North Korean Human Rights Activists in Seoul. They include one man, three women and a six-year-old boy, the Network says. Two of the women had been sold to Chinese men. The going price for a North Korean "bride" ranges from "$700 for a plain-looking woman to over $1,000 for a more attractive" woman, says Tim Peters, a Seoul-based American pastor who helps refugees. The boy is half-Chinese.
If sent back to the North, the refugees are likely to end up in Chongori prison camp, an experience they are unlikely to survive. The Chosun Ilbo newspaper in Seoul recently broke the news of the camp, which is dedicated to repatriated refugees and whose harsh conditions are intended to stop the flow of refugees to China by scaring citizens into staying put. At Chongori, the paper reports, "inmates are doomed to die of malnutrition." They are forced to work 14 hours a day and their daily diet consists of two potatoes and a handful of cornmeal, refugees told the paper. The U.S.-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea commissioned satellite images of Chongori. They are posted at www.freekorea.us.
Mr. Obama's nominee for Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues is Robert King, whose confirmation hearing was held earlier this month in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. King said he would press China to uphold its obligation under the international Refugee Convention not to forcibly return North Koreans.
In Beijing next week, Mr. Obama could pledge U.S. assistance should China be overrun by refugees fleeing the North. This is one of Beijing's big worries in the event of a destabilized North Korea. But a humanitarian crisis is taking place now. The President could demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the human rights of the refugees already in China by demanding the release of the five we know about.
Friday, November 13, 2009
86) Obama Trip to Asia
As U.S. Power Wanes, China Considers Its New Place
by Anthony Kuhn
National Public Radio, November 13, 2009
The West in recent years has been busy discussing how to handle China's rise. But in an odd symmetry, China has been debating how to respond to America's decline. That debate will influence how China responds when President Obama calls on China next week to play a more active role in global affairs.
Related NPR Stories
On Asia Tour, Obama Faces A Stronger China Nov. 12, 2009
Since the end of the Cold War, China has predicted a trend toward a world with "one superpower and many great powers." Very few mainstream commentators in China believe that their country is about to replace the U.S. as the world's sole superpower anytime soon.
But many observe a decline in U.S. power relative to China and other developing nations.
Wu Xinbo, deputy director of the American Studies Institute at Shanghai's Fudan University, argues that the U.S.'s waning power has led it to support a greater role for China in organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the G-20 group of industrialized nations.
"America is emphasizing that it seeks partnerships with other nations to resolve shared challenges," Wu says. "It is relinquishing some of its demands to dominate world affairs. This is to some extent an admission that it has no choice."
Wu sees the U.S. decline as temporary and reversible. He says the Obama administration's multilateral approach will help the U.S. bounce back and recoup some international support.
China Conflicted Over Its New Role
President Obama arrives Sunday for his first visit to China. He is expected to encourage China to play a larger role in a full spectrum of issues, from Afghanistan to global finance to climate change. The two sides are said to be hammering out a joint statement emphasizing U.S.-China economic interdependence and the importance of a "positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship."
China expert David Shambaugh, of George Washington University, says China may not be able to help out as much as Washington might like.
"I think it's absolutely right for the Americans to be pushing them," he says. "But we have to be careful not to expect too much, because China is conflicted over its desire to be a responsible major power, and it certainly lacks the capability in many areas to be one."
Xu Jin, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the nation's top think tank, says the fate of the former Soviet Union convinced China not to aspire to global leadership or even Third World leadership. He says Beijing learned to avoid confrontation and arms races, while concentrating on economic development. He says that today, ordinary Chinese think their country has taken on enough international responsibility already.
"That's how my parents see it," Xu says. "They think we should mind our own business, and that foreign affairs have nothing to do with us. It reminds me very much of post-World War I American isolationism."
Xu adds that to many foreigners, China's view of itself as a developing nation seems thoroughly outdated. He points to a China-Africa summit held in Beijing in 2006.
"When our leaders said that China is a developing nation, some people in the audience laughed and said 'Beijing and Shanghai don't look like part of a developing nation to us,' " Xu recalls. "Those African leaders may have never been to China's poorer regions."
Ultimately, Self-Interest Will Require Action
Shambaugh of George Washington University adds that mistrust has lingered since the Cold War, when the U.S. tried to contain, encircle and subvert China. And Chinese, he says, have never forgotten this.
"Therefore, it makes them very wary to engage with the Americans, when the Americans say, 'Come be our partner on the world stage today.' They think, first of all, 'trap.' 'What are they trying to lure us into this time?' " he says.
But Fudan University's Wu says that what is behind China's growing participation in world affairs is not debates or attitudes, but its ever-expanding global interests, which for now are mostly economic.
"There are some things which China must do regardless of whether it wants to or not," Wu says. "For example, China's recent dispatching of naval ships to the Indian Ocean — China may not have wished to do such things in the past, but it has to now because there are more pirates and more Chinese ships that are threatened by them."
Wu says that if Washington wants to enlist China's help in global affairs, it should avoid treating China's rise as a threat.
Wu's advice to his own government is to try not to make the U.S. feel that China is aiming to replace it as a superpower. Instead, it should make the U.S. feel that China is willing to help defray the costs and shoulder the burdens of leadership.
85) Rob Gifford: China Road
Estou lendo este livro de Gifford, na edição italiana:
Cina: Viaggio nell'Impero del futuro
traduzione di Monica Morzenti
(Vicenza: Neri Pozza Editore,2008)
Edição original:
China Road
(New York: Random House, 2007)
O livro nasceu de uma série de programas feitos para a National Public Radio (EUA), objeto do post anterior, e que podem ser ouvidos neste link.
A viagem ocorreu em 2004 e um ano depois, em 2005, ele percorreu novamente a estrada, durante dois meses, seguida de duas visitas a Shanghai e Nanquim.
A bibliografia e as sugestões de leitura são comentadas, de onde recolho estas sugestões para leitura posterior.
De início, dois sites de informação:
Keith Pomeranz and Bin Wong: China and the West: http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/chinawh
John Flower: a village in Sechuan province: http://xiakou.uncc.edu
Pearl Buck, The Good Earth (1931)
Mildred Cable and Francesca French, The Gobi Desert (Macmillan, 1944); Through Jade Gate and Central Asia: An Account of Journeys in Kansu, Turkestan and the Gobi Desert (Constable, 1927)
Peter Fleming, News from Tartary: A Journey from Peking to Kashmir (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936)
Peter Hopkirk, Foreign Devils on the Silk Road: The Search for the Lost Cities and Treasures of Chinese Central Asia (University of Massachusetts Press, 1984): inside the book in Amazon
(description: The Silk Road, the great trans-Asian highway linking Imperial Rome to China, reached the height of its importance during the T'ang Dynasty. Along it travelled precious cargoes as well as new ideas, art and knowledge. Its oasis towns blossomed into thriving centres of trade. However, as the Chinese lost control of the region, it began to decline to the point where the towns disappeared beneath desert sands. Local legends grew of buried treasure guarded by demons. This is the story of the intrepid adventurers who, at great personal risk, led long-range archaeological raids to the region in the early years of the 20th century. Profiles of such archaeologists as Sir Aurel Stein, who carried off large quantities of priceless wall paintings, sculptures, silks and early manuscripts, augment a narrative which also traces the fate of the works of art that were removed.)
W.J.F. Jeanner, The Tiranny of History: The Roots of China's Crisis (Penguin, 1992)
From Library Journal: Modern Chinese history is a series of crises: the Opium War, the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the Communist takeover, the Cultural Revolution, and the Tiananmen Massacre. The most enduring civilization has been in a turbulent stage for over 100 years. What are the problems? In his "impressionistic" book, Jenner tries to link China's present situation to its past and claims that the fundamental problem is a flaw in Chinese tradition. Confucianism is blamed for economic stagnation, and the traditional family structure is seen as an obstacle to democracy. Jenner even finds the Chinese language an inferior medium of expression. The author, who admits that he "has not tried to present a balanced argument," offers such a bleak depiction of Chinese tradition that he feels the need to remind the reader repeatedly that he is not "anti-Chinese." Jenner's book is also marred by the lack of footnotes or any kinds of bibliographic references to materials used. - Mark Meng , St. John's Univ. Lib., New York.
Product Description: Based on a series of lectures given by Professor Jenner in New Zealand shortly after Tianenmen Square in 1989, this book examines the peculiarities of Chinese history, and of the unique burden that history places on present-day China, which the author sees in a state of serious crisis, possibly even of potential collapse.
James Kynge, China Shakes the World: A Titan's Rise and Troubled Future - And the Challenge for America (Houghton Mifflin, 2006)
Amazon: From Publishers Weekly - Since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, binding its billion-plus population more tightly to the global economic system, the Asian giant's prodigious appetite for food, technology and natural resources has dramatically accelerated profound changes already well underway across the planet. Kynge, the Financial Times's former Beijing bureau chief, makes the voracious "appetites" of the new China his constant concern, as he uncovers the sources of and limitations on the giant country's epochal growth. Beginning with a scene in Germany's postindustrial Ruhr—where a steel mill is sold, deconstructed and shipped more than 5,000 miles for reassembly near the banks of the Yangtze River—Kynge assesses the socioeconomic transformations of China's low "Industrial Revolution–era" labor costs and modern production technology at home and abroad. But for all its world-shaking potential, notes Kynge, "China's endowments are deeply lopsided." Key weaknesses—such as a shortage of arable land, serious environmental devastation and pollution, systemic corruption and a dearth of resources—are conversely helping to ensure that China will have to manage its growing hegemony in a symbiotic manner with partners on the economic and geopolitical playing fields. Despite the subtitle, and a chapter devoted to China's acquisition of U.S. technologies, Kynge focuses at least as much on China's significance for Western Europe. Overall, Kynge's crisp assessment of the dynamics involved is both authoritative and eye-opening. (Sept. 27)
Diligent and Compelling View on China and the World., October 28, 2006
By Peter Senese - James Kynge's 'China Shakes the World: A Titan's Rise and Troubled Future and the Challenge for America' is a completely authoritative and comprehensive study based upon extensive and reliable research of what has become industrialist China. Author Kynge does an outstanding job in presenting internal and external global issues China faces today, and how its needs combined with its resources, or lack of them, will direct China in the future. Kynge reviews how China's problems with its environmental resources, a severe pollution that is beginning to cripple its core, government corruption that actually has become part of the norm, a legal system that makes sacrifice to human rights and rights of freedom for its citizens, a Gestapo-like police force, and a media that bows to censorship all together are crutches that will force China to rely on global trade, and so, global cooperation. The author is also diligent in showing the mass resources and capability of China's manufacturing facilities, and why there is no end in sight to there economic boom. Clearly there is a prosperous balance that has developed between China and the United States, and China and Western Europe. Kynge presents the dynamic issues of this complex web in a way that is most educational, backed with unquestionable foundational data, reader friendly, and compelling . . .
Minxin Pei, China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Harvard University press, 2006) Amazon
Product Description: The rise of China as a great power is one of the most important developments in the twenty-first century. But despite dramatic economic progress, China’s prospects remain uncertain. In a book sure to provoke debate, Minxin Pei examines the sustainability of the Chinese Communist Party’s reform strategy—pursuing pro-market economic policies under one-party rule.
Pei casts doubt on three central explanations for why China’s strategy works: sustained economic development will lead to political liberalization and democratization; gradualist economic transition is a strategy superior to the “shock therapy” prescribed for the former Soviet Union; and a neo-authoritarian developmental state is essential to economic take-off. Pei argues that because the Communist Party must retain significant economic control to ensure its political survival, gradualism will ultimately fail.
The lack of democratic reforms in China has led to pervasive corruption and a breakdown in political accountability. What has emerged is a decentralized predatory state in which local party bosses have effectively privatized the state’s authority. Collusive corruption is widespread and governance is deteriorating. Instead of evolving toward a full market economy, China is trapped in partial economic and political reforms.
Combining powerful insights with empirical research, China’s Trapped Transition offers a provocative assessment of China’s future as a great power.
Daniel H. Geng - A book for those who actually know the ABCs of China, May 2, 2006
For those who's never been to China or lived there, this book might be a little out of their scope. Afterall, the only things you hear in the news are how if Walmart were a country, it'd be China's 7th biggest trading partner, or how Intel is building their fabs in China (away from Shanghai towards inland to further reduce cost). For those people, go read on how China will take over the world economically by the middle of this century and believe what you want.
For those who Does have any clue about China's political system is keenly aware that the entire Chinese economy is still tied into the political system, and that is just a time bomb waiting to explode. If the CCP were to collapse, half of the country's wealth will be exported and rest will go down with the defunct banking system. This book digs into the depth of the current geo-political situation, and is so accurate that the People's Congress is taking note and implementing changes (albeit slowly) previously pointed out by the author. If you want to know the REAL story behind the Chinese economic system and where it'll truely head in the next several decades, this is THE book to read. Not some "economic model that projects blah, blah, blah and threaten's US's position in the world," where the author is totally cluelss of all fundamentals of the Chinese economy other than published economic numbers.
An anonimous reviewer: I am not a political scientist, economist or expert on China, and I found this book quite clear and understandable. It is a highly intelligent, in-depth and convincing analysis of China as a dysfunctional, 'predatory' state. It is highly unlikely it will evolve in positive directions of increasing democracy. While it may collapse, the future may instead be that of a corrupt, stagnating failed state which exports its problems to the rest of the world - failure to control drugs, arms sales to dangerous regimes, aids, illegal immigration, etc etc. An important antidote to all the self-serving business propaganda on China's economic miracle.
John Pomfret, Chinese Lessons: Five Classmates and the Story of New China (Henry Holt, 2006)
From Publishers Weekly: Pomfret's first sojourn in China came as an American exchange student at Nanjing University in 1981, near the outset of China's limited reopening to the West and its halting, chaotic and momentous conversion from Maoist totalitarianism to police state capitalism and status as world economic giant. Over the next two decades, he returned twice as a professional journalist and was an eyewitness to the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Pomfret's enthusiasm and personal access make this an engaging examination of three tumultuous decades, rooted in the stories of classmates whose remarkable grit and harrowing experiences neatly epitomize the sexual and cultural transformations, and the economic ups and downs, of China since the 1960s. At the same time, Pomfret draws on intimate conversations and personal diaries to paint idiosyncratic portraits with a vivid, literary flair. Viewing China's version of capitalism as an anomoly, and focused overwhelmingly within its national borders, the book's lack of a greater critical context will be limiting for some. But Pomfret's palpable and pithy first-hand depiction of the New China offers a swift, elucidating introduction to its awesome energies and troubling contradictions. (Aug.)
From The Washington Post: Those of us reporting on China a few years ago believed the big story of the early 21st century would be its transformation from impoverished pariah to economic juggernaut and global superpower. Instead, 9/11 shifted the attention of U.S. media to the Muslim world, and China became, as it had been for most of the previous 500 years, an intricate sideshow. That's a shame, because the massive societal shifts in China -- which form the most fascinating, relevant and important development of the new millennium -- have been steadily pushed off the front pages and opening segments by a flood of stories on the war on terror.
Washington Post reporter John Pomfret's compulsively readable new book on today's China deserves far more attention than that. Chinese Lessons is a rich, first-hand account of modern Chinese history as it was lived and experienced by five of the author's 1981 classmates at Nanjing University. Pomfret was among the first generation of American college students to enroll in exchange programs with Chinese universities in the early 1980s; the New York native grew up to become The Post's Beijing bureau chief and one of the very best reporters covering China throughout the dynamic 1990s, with his writings emerging as the standard by which many of his peers judged their own work. In his hands, the journey of his classmates becomes not just an entertaining and precisely rendered account of a changing China in which consumers' aspirations ratcheted up from bicycles and wrist watches to Audis and flip-phones; it also becomes a splendid human narrative of how fragile souls weather barbaric cruelty, social shifts and the rewiring of a nation.
When Pomfret arrived in China shortly after Deng Xiaoping had launched China's free-market-oriented economic reforms, he met his college roommates -- seven perpetually hungry, reed-thin, cotton-jacketed survivors of various denouncements, rustications and "struggle sessions" inflicted on supposed traitors. They generously gave him the bunk next to the window, a prime location in a dank, first-floor dormitory room that was a maze of wet clothes hanging to dry amid a haze of garlic stench. The students whom Pomfret came to know were only just emerging from a long Maoist nightmare: "My classmates snooped on each other, read each other's diaries, feared and suspected one another -- an expression of the deep mistrust they perfected during the Cultural Revolution when they were pitted against their parents, siblings, and friends."
Every Chinese over the age of, say, 45, has a vivid recollection of life under Mao Zedong -- often of the national psychotic episode known as the Cultural Revolution, in which Mao unleashed his Red Guards as he reestablished control in the mid-1960s. Pomfret vividly recounts such stories from his classmates and their families. There is Old Wu (called "old" because he is a year older than Pomfret), the son of a prominent academic, who found out about the murder of his parents from two fellow Red Guards as they giddily recounted it. Or there's Zhou Lianchun, who, as a 15-year-old Red Guard, fanatically denounced his mother in public for three days as a "capitalist" and screamed at her to renounce her "bourgeois sensibility."
The journey of these college roommates through university and into middle age is an easy-to-follow road map through post-Mao China. Chinese Lessons explains so many of the contradictions that one encounters in the country today: A nation that prides itself on family bonds and ancestor worship can also exploit relatives and tear down monuments. Pomfret shows how the cutthroat immorality that pervades so many segments of Chinese society today is rooted in the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. ("Why," he wonders, "did so many stories in China always seem to end with the bad guys getting away, literally, with murder?") Yet once Deng lifted the economic strictures of communism, as immoral as they were, they were never replaced by another ethical code save the "man-eat-man" (the common Chinese translation of "dog-eat-dog") capitalism of modern China.
As a result, China has gone from being one of the most egalitarian societies in the world to among the least. It is a rapidly aging country stricken by widespread and devastating environmental degradation, and the government's first response to epidemics, poisoned water supplies and natural disasters is usually to try to cover up the debacle. Pomfret's sketches of self-serving Chinese officials, bureaucrats and businesspeople will be depressingly familiar to anyone who has worked in China. (Though this was the first time I had read of some Chinese executives' penchant for spending weekends smoking methamphetamine, popping Viagra and bedding prostitutes.) And Pomfret's portraits of contemporary Chinese who enter adulthood with a naive optimism that is soon replaced by heartbreaking cynicism will be maddening to readers who are rooting for China to become a responsible world power. Yet to his great credit, Pomfret's affection for the people he is writing about almost always shows through, which keeps Chinese Lessons from feeling like a polemic; the book's accumulation of acutely observed detail is compelling.
Pomfret ends by positing a notion that will be increasingly discussed in years to come as China's great opportunity for economic growth begins to look more and more like a wasted chance to improve the lives of so many of its people: "The social contract hashed out by Deng -- you can get rich if you keep your mouth shut -- is fraying because too few people have won their share of the bargain." If Pomfret is correct (and I think he is), China will still be the great story of the 21st century -- not because of what has gone right but because of what has gone wrong.
Reviewed by Karl Taro Greenfeld (Copyright 2006, The Washington Post)
Extraordinary , August 6, 2006
By Seth Faison (Princeton, NJ) - An outstanding book. There really is no better way to tell the story of China's incredible transformation over the past 25 years than through the lives of a few well-chosen characters. Pomfret delivers, beautifully. In a winning narrative, he skillfully braids the intricate tales of several classmates from Nanjing University, where Pomfret went in 1981, bunking with seven roommates in a tiny dorm room. Together, taking a variety of tracks over the next 20 years, those classmates end up capturing the striking horrors and unpredictable aspirations of the Chinese nation. By keeping in touch with them, as he matures into a first-rate journalist, Pomfret is able to gain a level of intimacy and knowledge about their lives that is unmatched in any narrative about Modern China. His writing is sharp and convivial. His story-telling ability matches the stories themselves, which are unbelievable.
Book-Idiot Zhou confides to Pomfret that he was a tormentor, not a victim, during the Cultural Revoluiton. Later, he alternates teaching Marxist history with deal-making in the urine industry. Song, a born Romeo, falls for an Italian woman and has sneak-away trysts. My own favorite was Little Guan, persecuted at age 11 for wiping herself with a piece of paper that said 'Long live Chairman Mao. She is a cheerful fighter, and bucks the odds over and over to succeed.
Pomfret is masterful. Armed with a fluent Chinese and a deft pen, he becomes an outstanding journalist, leading the coverage of Tiananmen, being formally expelled from China, and coming back again as Beijing Bureau chief for the Washington Post to establish himself as the dean of foreign correspondents. His newspaper stories were the gold standard of China coverage for several years. In this book, more than anything, it is his extraordinary ability to learn, ruminate and convey the stories of his Chinese classmates that stands out. Highly recommended.
Jonathan Spence, The Chan's Great Continent: China in Western Minds (NY: W.W. Norton, 1999)
Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (NY: W.W. Norton, 1999)
From Publishers Weekly: Spence argues that China's modernization strategies can't work unless the people are allowed to participate in political decision-making. A splendid achievement, this sweeping 1088-page epic chronicle compresses four centuries of political and social change into a sharply observant narrative. Spence offers contemporary perspectives on the British 19th-century drive to get the Chinese masses addicted to opium, Chiang Kai-Shek's secret police apparatus and proto-fascist supporters, Japan's ruthless occupation during WW II, the Mao bloodbath known as the "Cultural Revolution" and the legacy of China's bureaucratic, authoritarian Ming and Qing dynasties.
From School Library Journal: The difficulty of finding a complete, one-volume history of China is no longer a problem with publication of this work, which covers Chinese history from the 16th-century Ming Dynasty to the 1989 "China Spring" demonstrations. The 200+ photographs and illustrations, many in color and previously unpublished, include historical notes that add understanding to the art and the stories illustrated. The text is written in an informative manner that will appeal to students; their lack of knowledge of Chinese history is forstalled by the comprehensive glossary that explains phrases, people, and events. High-school teachers will bless you for buying this well-researched volume. -Dolores Steinhauer, Jefferson Sci-Tech, Alexandria, VA.
Ross Terril, The New Chinese Empire: And What It Means for the United States (NY: Basic Books, 2004)
From Publishers Weekly: Experienced China-watcher Terrill (Mao: A Biography) has viewed with a skeptical eye China's emergence as a major player in the international community. In this rather one-sided view of China's future, he implores the West not to pursue a policy of na‹ve engagement with the People's Republic, citing what he considers to be the dangerous state-centered legacy of the nation's dynastic past. Of principal concern to Terrill is China's continued territorial control over the culturally alien border regions of Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. This imperial expansionism is driven in part by what Terrill identifies as an arrogant sense of entitlement in the minds of China's leaders, coupled with a military capability that he overstates to buttress his provocative conclusion: that China is a "misfit" in the international system and is what Terrill calls a "semiterrorist outfit." The author also argues that if malcontented minorities on China's periphery don't tear apart the Communist regime, then a faltering Chinese economy will. Communist repression limits what Terrill crudely describes as the "Chinese genius for business" and the people's "industriousness," and, he expects, will bring about a powerful backlash against the state. One symptom of the coming collapse identified by Terrill relates to a yawning gap in income among workers and the fact that 1% of Chinese owns 40% of the country's wealth. This is alarming, but hardly foreshadows the country's collapse when one considers the size of the economic gap in the U.S. Maps.
From Booklist: Is the People's Republic of China willing to become a modern nation, asks Terrill, or does it insist on remaining an empire? What will the China of the future look like and how might political change occur? Emphasizing present-day, post-Mao China's essential continuities with its 2,500-year-old imperial roots, the author describes the emerging tension between old and new as rooted in long and familiar historical tensions: the needs of the individual versus those of the state, Confucianism versus legalism, and an "us-versus-them" approach to foreign policy. The Chinese state has seen many political changes--indeed, revolutions--but these states have often wielded power similarly, especially regarding the rights of the individual, the treatment of territories like Taiwan and Hong Kong, and an insistence on centralized power. These deeply held imperial values, argues Terrill, are what keeps China from becoming a modern nation at the head of the global community, and what must bend if the current state is to keep from cracking. Insightful predictions and critical yet astute observations. Brendan Driscoll.
Biased, but useful and convincing, July 17, 2003
By H. Huggins (New York, NY) - This review is from: The New Chinese Empire: Bejing's Political Dilemma And What It Means For The United States (Hardcover)
By the middle of the first chapter of this book, you know exactly where Ross Terrill stands. He is not a fan of the CCP. That being said, I found his view refreshing. There are many China apologists writing out there, and this book tries to balance the field.
Some complaints:
- Terrill is vague in parts. Take this sentence for example: "Historically, the centralization-devolution swings were sometimes a prelude to dynastic decline and fragmentation, but not always"(pg. 180). There are many wishy-washy sentences like that in "New Chinese Empire." Also, I am in the dark as to what 'synergy' really means in the context of international relations. A more detailed explanation would have been welcomed.
- China scholars would disagree with Terrill that because China does not hold national, free elections, Chinese citizens have no say in their government (see Shi Tianjian's "Political Participation in Beijing"). Elections are not the only, and not even the most effective, mode of participation. Chinese participate in a variety of ways...refusal to attend meetings, local elections, protests against local cadres, letter writing (which Terrill dismisses offhand as 'petitioning the court'), etc.
- Some of what Terrill writes contradicts what I have learned (not to say I am right; conflicting sources automatically make me wary). For example: Terrill claims the protests following the accidental American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia were coordinated by the government. I was under the impression that the government tried its best to get Chinese to stop protesting for the sake of Sino-American harmony.
- Terrill can be overly harsh on China. In his disussion of Sino-Japanese relations, he criticizes China for not letting World War II issues go. To be fair, Japan never has apologized for atrocoties committed in that war, and its nations textbooks do not address the question honestly. The fact that China also censors its textbooks / history does not lessen Japan's blame . Also, there were a few times I felt Terrill was a micrometer away from calling China "Chicom," and he did call it a 'semi-terrorist outfit.' This seems a bit much.
- Terrill's argument seems to rely too much on emotion. He taps into American frustrations at China's grandstanding, and finds a historical basis for it.
- Some of the accusations Terrill waves at China could be said just as equally about America, or any country for that matter. He states China doesn't have allies, and therefore they are inconsistent and dishonest in foreign policy. No country has allies, they have interests, and these interests change over time. Terrill's accusation singles China out, but can be applied to every country in every time.
All those complaints aside, overall I liked this book. I particularaly liked his explanation of China's claims on territory that is simply not theirs (Tibet, Xinjiang, Manchuria, etc.). His view on Taiwan was especially appreciated. He notes that talk about the "Taiwan problem" masks that there is no problem. Taiwan is a healthy, prosperous democracy. The problem is that China claims to own it. Having lived in Taiwan, I can attest to the fact that the Mainland's propoganda claiming that the Taiwan issue is exacerbated by American policy is absolutely false. I have yet to meet a Taiwanese person who thinks "re"unification is anywhere close to a good idea. But I digress...
Okay, so in summary, this book was a good read, but read with a critical eye.
This book makes my head spin, April 30, 2003
By Bibliophile - The coincidence is remarkable: Niall Ferguson's book on the British Empire, Dominic Lieven's on the Russian Empire, and now Ross Terrill's on the Chinese Empire - all appear at the same time. All are histories with a message - the subject is more like political science than strictly history.
While Ferguson's final message on the British Empire is that America is in fact an empire and should be a larger one still in the future, Terrill argues similarly that China today is also an empire - but one that should cease to exist if possible.
This book is somewhat confusing, a jumble of anecdotes, historical analysis, and political theorizing. It is so full of complaints about the present Chinese government that I doubt this is unintentional: Ross Terrill is making a statement, being deliberately provocative (no doubt improving sales here in America), and leaving behind a personal manifesto for posterity, so to speak. This book is unlikely to make the bestsellers lists in China, to put it mildly.
If I'm not mistaken, Terrill believes China will democratize - and break up into a federation of semi-independent states. He offers a number of scenarios, but the point is the same: China cannot, must not, and will not remain what it is today. He means politically. Of economics he has little to say.
While I agree with him that China will change, Terrill is a bit vague on his specific timeframe.
My personal observation is as follows. China has undergone more changes politically and economically in the last two hundred years than it had ever had since 400-200 B.C., when China was in political, military, cultural, economic and social turmoil before finally achieving the prosperity and stability of the two Han Dynasties. Today China is still in transition, and one cannot expect China not to change. Terrill's point is valid, if somewhat overstated. Every country follows its own course, which is marked out by its history and shaped by international events. Certainly China will eventually liberalize and be part of the international community in every sense. Why be so impatient? China today is authoritarian and totalitarian. What Terrill doesn't ask is: Is China more authoritarian and totalitarian today than a quarter century ago, or is it less so? The answer is of course LESS SO. Moreover, all signs point to the same thing: China is still moving in the democratic direction, and however slow this process may be, it seems irreversible. Terrill chooses not to point this out. (If China were NOT moving in the right direction, I doubt very much the 2008 Olympics would have been awarded to Beijing. The reason why comparing the Beijing Games to the "Hitler Olympics" in 1936 doesn't make sense is that Germany in the 1930's was moving in the wrong direction, while China today is clearly changing in the right direction, politically as well economically.)
I have a slight problem with authors who make their points with highly selective facts. It makes me suspicious of their integrity (or worse, their competence). I have no doubt Terrill is a China-lover. After all his biography of Mao is one of my favorite books. But this book is a little different. One detail illustrates my point. On p. 281: "In fact, after two decades of MFN status for China, US trade with the PRC was very far from being 'ten times' its trade with Taiwan. In 1999, US exports to the PRC were LESS than its exports to Taiwan."
First of all, considering this book just came out of the printers, I find it odd that he has chosen 1999 to make his point. US exports to China in Feb 2003 was $4 billion, compared to $2.5 billion to Taiwan - not LESS, but 1.6 times. US total trade with China for the month of Feb, 2003 was $11.69 billion, compared with the puny $3.38 billion with Taiwan. For the whole year of 2002, US total trade in both exports and imports with China amounted to $147.3 billion, compared with the much smaller $50.6 billion with Taiwan. (All figures from the US Dept of Commerce.) Now, of course none of these figures invalidate Terrill's point that US trade with China is still less than ten times that with Taiwan, but what he suggests is misleading (and in his suggestion that US exports to China is less than to Taiwan, wrong). The truth is, China is doing much more trade, both ways, with America than Taiwan is. It may not be ten times as much - YET - but considering the fact that America has been seriously trading with China for only a decade, while it has been doing so with Taiwan since 1949, the ten times conjecture is very possible in the future. China is already America's 4th largest trade partner - coming fast on the heels of Japan - while Taiwan is only 9th. Terrill neglects to mention that the trade growth between China and the US is extremely fast, while America's trade with Taiwan is stalled. He also fails to note that two-way trade betwen China and Taiwan is also growing healthily (despite SARS). Terrill is suggesting that when Deng Xiaoping made this forecast to Carter, he was lying. But he wasn't, because he never said when this target would be achieved. In time, it will be.
Terrill makes this observation to illustrate the difference between what the Chinese govenment says and the reality. This book has countless such examples. No doubt the point itself is well-made and correct. (Show me a government - any government - that tells the truth, the whole truth and nothing but! Where are the WMD and al-Qaeda links in Iraq?) But since the reality he himself presents is often so misleading and sometimes wrong, he makes a fool of himself. He must first find out the truth himself before accusing others of not telling the truth.
While I'm on this subject of trade, Terrill doesn't ask himself why trade with the West will not be the key to political changes in China. It WILL be. Indeed he has little to say about economics in general, even though foreign trade leads to economic prosperity, which in turn will drive social and political liberalization, not to mention further economic reform. Trade is China's political and economic engine. Instead he focuses on the one thing he loves to talk about: political ideology. That puts the cart before the horse. Also, he doesn't discuss why China even with an authoritarian system can still be a responsible and constructive partner with the US over foreign problems, such as North Korea, as it is indeed proving to be so. India is a democracy - how is India helping America? France too is a democracy for that matter.
I find this book full of rage. No doubt it stems from his personal love of China and his hatred of the regime, and I empathize. Or maybe it's just a deliberate posture (what they call "grand standing")? But it is foolish to be impatient and fail to take the long view. (This is doubly odd since Terrill's familiarity with China's history is evident in this book.) It is also unwise to neglect the economic factors in the equation, and dishonest to be highly selective in presenting facts and figures to prove his points.
International Relations, China-Style, May 12, 2003
By Jeffery Steele (Taipei, Taiwan) - Ross Terrill sees continuity between the past and the present in China's domestic politics and international relations. The imperial system, he believes, is still the fundamental structure in which China's leaders make decisions, even in the twenty-first century, and even after more than fifty years of Communist rule.
That leaders like Mao and Deng (and even Jiang) were emperors in all but name is something of a cliché, but Terrill gives a fresh perspective to this commonly-held notion. He is well-read in China's history, and shows it here to good effect without weighing himself down with excessive scholarship. His style is light and well-suited to his approach: prove a point to the general reader's satisfaction and then move on.
By far the most interesting sections of Terrill's book are those having to do with China's world view. China has traditionally looked upon not just the rest of East Asia, but even the rest of the world as an extension of China itself. This was not so much a ruling concept as it was a pervasive ruling assumption, and it formed the basis for imperial China. When China was strong, this assumption allowed it to swallow up other areas from Tibet to Vietnam without elaborate conceptual justifications; when China was weak, the assumption was still in force through tributary relations or complex diplomatic relations that allowed Beijing to appear to have the upper hand even when it did not. Circumstances may change, but the assumption is never questioned.
Terrill draws numerous parallels between imperial China and today's new China. Beijing still seeks to punch above its weight by formalizing relationships with other countries in ways China prefers even when it cannot immediately achieve its aims (this explains why China puts such stress on its "One-China" policy with the United States). What is remarkable, he argues, is not so much that China would use this strategy as how successful it is in doing so. Other nations - whether out of excessive respect for China's culture or fear of losing access to China's market - bow down and accede to many of China's demands.
In the area of international relations, this book should be viewed as the counterpoint to "The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security." Whereas the authors of that book, Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, view China as fundamentally conservative in its international outlook, Terrill sees it as potentially destabilizing.
Cina: Viaggio nell'Impero del futuro
traduzione di Monica Morzenti
(Vicenza: Neri Pozza Editore,2008)
Edição original:
China Road
(New York: Random House, 2007)
O livro nasceu de uma série de programas feitos para a National Public Radio (EUA), objeto do post anterior, e que podem ser ouvidos neste link.
A viagem ocorreu em 2004 e um ano depois, em 2005, ele percorreu novamente a estrada, durante dois meses, seguida de duas visitas a Shanghai e Nanquim.
A bibliografia e as sugestões de leitura são comentadas, de onde recolho estas sugestões para leitura posterior.
De início, dois sites de informação:
Keith Pomeranz and Bin Wong: China and the West: http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/chinawh
John Flower: a village in Sechuan province: http://xiakou.uncc.edu
Pearl Buck, The Good Earth (1931)
Mildred Cable and Francesca French, The Gobi Desert (Macmillan, 1944); Through Jade Gate and Central Asia: An Account of Journeys in Kansu, Turkestan and the Gobi Desert (Constable, 1927)
Peter Fleming, News from Tartary: A Journey from Peking to Kashmir (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936)
Peter Hopkirk, Foreign Devils on the Silk Road: The Search for the Lost Cities and Treasures of Chinese Central Asia (University of Massachusetts Press, 1984): inside the book in Amazon
(description: The Silk Road, the great trans-Asian highway linking Imperial Rome to China, reached the height of its importance during the T'ang Dynasty. Along it travelled precious cargoes as well as new ideas, art and knowledge. Its oasis towns blossomed into thriving centres of trade. However, as the Chinese lost control of the region, it began to decline to the point where the towns disappeared beneath desert sands. Local legends grew of buried treasure guarded by demons. This is the story of the intrepid adventurers who, at great personal risk, led long-range archaeological raids to the region in the early years of the 20th century. Profiles of such archaeologists as Sir Aurel Stein, who carried off large quantities of priceless wall paintings, sculptures, silks and early manuscripts, augment a narrative which also traces the fate of the works of art that were removed.)
W.J.F. Jeanner, The Tiranny of History: The Roots of China's Crisis (Penguin, 1992)
From Library Journal: Modern Chinese history is a series of crises: the Opium War, the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the Communist takeover, the Cultural Revolution, and the Tiananmen Massacre. The most enduring civilization has been in a turbulent stage for over 100 years. What are the problems? In his "impressionistic" book, Jenner tries to link China's present situation to its past and claims that the fundamental problem is a flaw in Chinese tradition. Confucianism is blamed for economic stagnation, and the traditional family structure is seen as an obstacle to democracy. Jenner even finds the Chinese language an inferior medium of expression. The author, who admits that he "has not tried to present a balanced argument," offers such a bleak depiction of Chinese tradition that he feels the need to remind the reader repeatedly that he is not "anti-Chinese." Jenner's book is also marred by the lack of footnotes or any kinds of bibliographic references to materials used. - Mark Meng , St. John's Univ. Lib., New York.
Product Description: Based on a series of lectures given by Professor Jenner in New Zealand shortly after Tianenmen Square in 1989, this book examines the peculiarities of Chinese history, and of the unique burden that history places on present-day China, which the author sees in a state of serious crisis, possibly even of potential collapse.
James Kynge, China Shakes the World: A Titan's Rise and Troubled Future - And the Challenge for America (Houghton Mifflin, 2006)
Amazon: From Publishers Weekly - Since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, binding its billion-plus population more tightly to the global economic system, the Asian giant's prodigious appetite for food, technology and natural resources has dramatically accelerated profound changes already well underway across the planet. Kynge, the Financial Times's former Beijing bureau chief, makes the voracious "appetites" of the new China his constant concern, as he uncovers the sources of and limitations on the giant country's epochal growth. Beginning with a scene in Germany's postindustrial Ruhr—where a steel mill is sold, deconstructed and shipped more than 5,000 miles for reassembly near the banks of the Yangtze River—Kynge assesses the socioeconomic transformations of China's low "Industrial Revolution–era" labor costs and modern production technology at home and abroad. But for all its world-shaking potential, notes Kynge, "China's endowments are deeply lopsided." Key weaknesses—such as a shortage of arable land, serious environmental devastation and pollution, systemic corruption and a dearth of resources—are conversely helping to ensure that China will have to manage its growing hegemony in a symbiotic manner with partners on the economic and geopolitical playing fields. Despite the subtitle, and a chapter devoted to China's acquisition of U.S. technologies, Kynge focuses at least as much on China's significance for Western Europe. Overall, Kynge's crisp assessment of the dynamics involved is both authoritative and eye-opening. (Sept. 27)
Diligent and Compelling View on China and the World., October 28, 2006
By Peter Senese - James Kynge's 'China Shakes the World: A Titan's Rise and Troubled Future and the Challenge for America' is a completely authoritative and comprehensive study based upon extensive and reliable research of what has become industrialist China. Author Kynge does an outstanding job in presenting internal and external global issues China faces today, and how its needs combined with its resources, or lack of them, will direct China in the future. Kynge reviews how China's problems with its environmental resources, a severe pollution that is beginning to cripple its core, government corruption that actually has become part of the norm, a legal system that makes sacrifice to human rights and rights of freedom for its citizens, a Gestapo-like police force, and a media that bows to censorship all together are crutches that will force China to rely on global trade, and so, global cooperation. The author is also diligent in showing the mass resources and capability of China's manufacturing facilities, and why there is no end in sight to there economic boom. Clearly there is a prosperous balance that has developed between China and the United States, and China and Western Europe. Kynge presents the dynamic issues of this complex web in a way that is most educational, backed with unquestionable foundational data, reader friendly, and compelling . . .
Minxin Pei, China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Harvard University press, 2006) Amazon
Product Description: The rise of China as a great power is one of the most important developments in the twenty-first century. But despite dramatic economic progress, China’s prospects remain uncertain. In a book sure to provoke debate, Minxin Pei examines the sustainability of the Chinese Communist Party’s reform strategy—pursuing pro-market economic policies under one-party rule.
Pei casts doubt on three central explanations for why China’s strategy works: sustained economic development will lead to political liberalization and democratization; gradualist economic transition is a strategy superior to the “shock therapy” prescribed for the former Soviet Union; and a neo-authoritarian developmental state is essential to economic take-off. Pei argues that because the Communist Party must retain significant economic control to ensure its political survival, gradualism will ultimately fail.
The lack of democratic reforms in China has led to pervasive corruption and a breakdown in political accountability. What has emerged is a decentralized predatory state in which local party bosses have effectively privatized the state’s authority. Collusive corruption is widespread and governance is deteriorating. Instead of evolving toward a full market economy, China is trapped in partial economic and political reforms.
Combining powerful insights with empirical research, China’s Trapped Transition offers a provocative assessment of China’s future as a great power.
Daniel H. Geng - A book for those who actually know the ABCs of China, May 2, 2006
For those who's never been to China or lived there, this book might be a little out of their scope. Afterall, the only things you hear in the news are how if Walmart were a country, it'd be China's 7th biggest trading partner, or how Intel is building their fabs in China (away from Shanghai towards inland to further reduce cost). For those people, go read on how China will take over the world economically by the middle of this century and believe what you want.
For those who Does have any clue about China's political system is keenly aware that the entire Chinese economy is still tied into the political system, and that is just a time bomb waiting to explode. If the CCP were to collapse, half of the country's wealth will be exported and rest will go down with the defunct banking system. This book digs into the depth of the current geo-political situation, and is so accurate that the People's Congress is taking note and implementing changes (albeit slowly) previously pointed out by the author. If you want to know the REAL story behind the Chinese economic system and where it'll truely head in the next several decades, this is THE book to read. Not some "economic model that projects blah, blah, blah and threaten's US's position in the world," where the author is totally cluelss of all fundamentals of the Chinese economy other than published economic numbers.
An anonimous reviewer: I am not a political scientist, economist or expert on China, and I found this book quite clear and understandable. It is a highly intelligent, in-depth and convincing analysis of China as a dysfunctional, 'predatory' state. It is highly unlikely it will evolve in positive directions of increasing democracy. While it may collapse, the future may instead be that of a corrupt, stagnating failed state which exports its problems to the rest of the world - failure to control drugs, arms sales to dangerous regimes, aids, illegal immigration, etc etc. An important antidote to all the self-serving business propaganda on China's economic miracle.
John Pomfret, Chinese Lessons: Five Classmates and the Story of New China (Henry Holt, 2006)
From Publishers Weekly: Pomfret's first sojourn in China came as an American exchange student at Nanjing University in 1981, near the outset of China's limited reopening to the West and its halting, chaotic and momentous conversion from Maoist totalitarianism to police state capitalism and status as world economic giant. Over the next two decades, he returned twice as a professional journalist and was an eyewitness to the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Pomfret's enthusiasm and personal access make this an engaging examination of three tumultuous decades, rooted in the stories of classmates whose remarkable grit and harrowing experiences neatly epitomize the sexual and cultural transformations, and the economic ups and downs, of China since the 1960s. At the same time, Pomfret draws on intimate conversations and personal diaries to paint idiosyncratic portraits with a vivid, literary flair. Viewing China's version of capitalism as an anomoly, and focused overwhelmingly within its national borders, the book's lack of a greater critical context will be limiting for some. But Pomfret's palpable and pithy first-hand depiction of the New China offers a swift, elucidating introduction to its awesome energies and troubling contradictions. (Aug.)
From The Washington Post: Those of us reporting on China a few years ago believed the big story of the early 21st century would be its transformation from impoverished pariah to economic juggernaut and global superpower. Instead, 9/11 shifted the attention of U.S. media to the Muslim world, and China became, as it had been for most of the previous 500 years, an intricate sideshow. That's a shame, because the massive societal shifts in China -- which form the most fascinating, relevant and important development of the new millennium -- have been steadily pushed off the front pages and opening segments by a flood of stories on the war on terror.
Washington Post reporter John Pomfret's compulsively readable new book on today's China deserves far more attention than that. Chinese Lessons is a rich, first-hand account of modern Chinese history as it was lived and experienced by five of the author's 1981 classmates at Nanjing University. Pomfret was among the first generation of American college students to enroll in exchange programs with Chinese universities in the early 1980s; the New York native grew up to become The Post's Beijing bureau chief and one of the very best reporters covering China throughout the dynamic 1990s, with his writings emerging as the standard by which many of his peers judged their own work. In his hands, the journey of his classmates becomes not just an entertaining and precisely rendered account of a changing China in which consumers' aspirations ratcheted up from bicycles and wrist watches to Audis and flip-phones; it also becomes a splendid human narrative of how fragile souls weather barbaric cruelty, social shifts and the rewiring of a nation.
When Pomfret arrived in China shortly after Deng Xiaoping had launched China's free-market-oriented economic reforms, he met his college roommates -- seven perpetually hungry, reed-thin, cotton-jacketed survivors of various denouncements, rustications and "struggle sessions" inflicted on supposed traitors. They generously gave him the bunk next to the window, a prime location in a dank, first-floor dormitory room that was a maze of wet clothes hanging to dry amid a haze of garlic stench. The students whom Pomfret came to know were only just emerging from a long Maoist nightmare: "My classmates snooped on each other, read each other's diaries, feared and suspected one another -- an expression of the deep mistrust they perfected during the Cultural Revolution when they were pitted against their parents, siblings, and friends."
Every Chinese over the age of, say, 45, has a vivid recollection of life under Mao Zedong -- often of the national psychotic episode known as the Cultural Revolution, in which Mao unleashed his Red Guards as he reestablished control in the mid-1960s. Pomfret vividly recounts such stories from his classmates and their families. There is Old Wu (called "old" because he is a year older than Pomfret), the son of a prominent academic, who found out about the murder of his parents from two fellow Red Guards as they giddily recounted it. Or there's Zhou Lianchun, who, as a 15-year-old Red Guard, fanatically denounced his mother in public for three days as a "capitalist" and screamed at her to renounce her "bourgeois sensibility."
The journey of these college roommates through university and into middle age is an easy-to-follow road map through post-Mao China. Chinese Lessons explains so many of the contradictions that one encounters in the country today: A nation that prides itself on family bonds and ancestor worship can also exploit relatives and tear down monuments. Pomfret shows how the cutthroat immorality that pervades so many segments of Chinese society today is rooted in the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. ("Why," he wonders, "did so many stories in China always seem to end with the bad guys getting away, literally, with murder?") Yet once Deng lifted the economic strictures of communism, as immoral as they were, they were never replaced by another ethical code save the "man-eat-man" (the common Chinese translation of "dog-eat-dog") capitalism of modern China.
As a result, China has gone from being one of the most egalitarian societies in the world to among the least. It is a rapidly aging country stricken by widespread and devastating environmental degradation, and the government's first response to epidemics, poisoned water supplies and natural disasters is usually to try to cover up the debacle. Pomfret's sketches of self-serving Chinese officials, bureaucrats and businesspeople will be depressingly familiar to anyone who has worked in China. (Though this was the first time I had read of some Chinese executives' penchant for spending weekends smoking methamphetamine, popping Viagra and bedding prostitutes.) And Pomfret's portraits of contemporary Chinese who enter adulthood with a naive optimism that is soon replaced by heartbreaking cynicism will be maddening to readers who are rooting for China to become a responsible world power. Yet to his great credit, Pomfret's affection for the people he is writing about almost always shows through, which keeps Chinese Lessons from feeling like a polemic; the book's accumulation of acutely observed detail is compelling.
Pomfret ends by positing a notion that will be increasingly discussed in years to come as China's great opportunity for economic growth begins to look more and more like a wasted chance to improve the lives of so many of its people: "The social contract hashed out by Deng -- you can get rich if you keep your mouth shut -- is fraying because too few people have won their share of the bargain." If Pomfret is correct (and I think he is), China will still be the great story of the 21st century -- not because of what has gone right but because of what has gone wrong.
Reviewed by Karl Taro Greenfeld (Copyright 2006, The Washington Post)
Extraordinary , August 6, 2006
By Seth Faison (Princeton, NJ) - An outstanding book. There really is no better way to tell the story of China's incredible transformation over the past 25 years than through the lives of a few well-chosen characters. Pomfret delivers, beautifully. In a winning narrative, he skillfully braids the intricate tales of several classmates from Nanjing University, where Pomfret went in 1981, bunking with seven roommates in a tiny dorm room. Together, taking a variety of tracks over the next 20 years, those classmates end up capturing the striking horrors and unpredictable aspirations of the Chinese nation. By keeping in touch with them, as he matures into a first-rate journalist, Pomfret is able to gain a level of intimacy and knowledge about their lives that is unmatched in any narrative about Modern China. His writing is sharp and convivial. His story-telling ability matches the stories themselves, which are unbelievable.
Book-Idiot Zhou confides to Pomfret that he was a tormentor, not a victim, during the Cultural Revoluiton. Later, he alternates teaching Marxist history with deal-making in the urine industry. Song, a born Romeo, falls for an Italian woman and has sneak-away trysts. My own favorite was Little Guan, persecuted at age 11 for wiping herself with a piece of paper that said 'Long live Chairman Mao. She is a cheerful fighter, and bucks the odds over and over to succeed.
Pomfret is masterful. Armed with a fluent Chinese and a deft pen, he becomes an outstanding journalist, leading the coverage of Tiananmen, being formally expelled from China, and coming back again as Beijing Bureau chief for the Washington Post to establish himself as the dean of foreign correspondents. His newspaper stories were the gold standard of China coverage for several years. In this book, more than anything, it is his extraordinary ability to learn, ruminate and convey the stories of his Chinese classmates that stands out. Highly recommended.
Jonathan Spence, The Chan's Great Continent: China in Western Minds (NY: W.W. Norton, 1999)
Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (NY: W.W. Norton, 1999)
From Publishers Weekly: Spence argues that China's modernization strategies can't work unless the people are allowed to participate in political decision-making. A splendid achievement, this sweeping 1088-page epic chronicle compresses four centuries of political and social change into a sharply observant narrative. Spence offers contemporary perspectives on the British 19th-century drive to get the Chinese masses addicted to opium, Chiang Kai-Shek's secret police apparatus and proto-fascist supporters, Japan's ruthless occupation during WW II, the Mao bloodbath known as the "Cultural Revolution" and the legacy of China's bureaucratic, authoritarian Ming and Qing dynasties.
From School Library Journal: The difficulty of finding a complete, one-volume history of China is no longer a problem with publication of this work, which covers Chinese history from the 16th-century Ming Dynasty to the 1989 "China Spring" demonstrations. The 200+ photographs and illustrations, many in color and previously unpublished, include historical notes that add understanding to the art and the stories illustrated. The text is written in an informative manner that will appeal to students; their lack of knowledge of Chinese history is forstalled by the comprehensive glossary that explains phrases, people, and events. High-school teachers will bless you for buying this well-researched volume. -Dolores Steinhauer, Jefferson Sci-Tech, Alexandria, VA.
Ross Terril, The New Chinese Empire: And What It Means for the United States (NY: Basic Books, 2004)
From Publishers Weekly: Experienced China-watcher Terrill (Mao: A Biography) has viewed with a skeptical eye China's emergence as a major player in the international community. In this rather one-sided view of China's future, he implores the West not to pursue a policy of na‹ve engagement with the People's Republic, citing what he considers to be the dangerous state-centered legacy of the nation's dynastic past. Of principal concern to Terrill is China's continued territorial control over the culturally alien border regions of Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. This imperial expansionism is driven in part by what Terrill identifies as an arrogant sense of entitlement in the minds of China's leaders, coupled with a military capability that he overstates to buttress his provocative conclusion: that China is a "misfit" in the international system and is what Terrill calls a "semiterrorist outfit." The author also argues that if malcontented minorities on China's periphery don't tear apart the Communist regime, then a faltering Chinese economy will. Communist repression limits what Terrill crudely describes as the "Chinese genius for business" and the people's "industriousness," and, he expects, will bring about a powerful backlash against the state. One symptom of the coming collapse identified by Terrill relates to a yawning gap in income among workers and the fact that 1% of Chinese owns 40% of the country's wealth. This is alarming, but hardly foreshadows the country's collapse when one considers the size of the economic gap in the U.S. Maps.
From Booklist: Is the People's Republic of China willing to become a modern nation, asks Terrill, or does it insist on remaining an empire? What will the China of the future look like and how might political change occur? Emphasizing present-day, post-Mao China's essential continuities with its 2,500-year-old imperial roots, the author describes the emerging tension between old and new as rooted in long and familiar historical tensions: the needs of the individual versus those of the state, Confucianism versus legalism, and an "us-versus-them" approach to foreign policy. The Chinese state has seen many political changes--indeed, revolutions--but these states have often wielded power similarly, especially regarding the rights of the individual, the treatment of territories like Taiwan and Hong Kong, and an insistence on centralized power. These deeply held imperial values, argues Terrill, are what keeps China from becoming a modern nation at the head of the global community, and what must bend if the current state is to keep from cracking. Insightful predictions and critical yet astute observations. Brendan Driscoll.
Biased, but useful and convincing, July 17, 2003
By H. Huggins (New York, NY) - This review is from: The New Chinese Empire: Bejing's Political Dilemma And What It Means For The United States (Hardcover)
By the middle of the first chapter of this book, you know exactly where Ross Terrill stands. He is not a fan of the CCP. That being said, I found his view refreshing. There are many China apologists writing out there, and this book tries to balance the field.
Some complaints:
- Terrill is vague in parts. Take this sentence for example: "Historically, the centralization-devolution swings were sometimes a prelude to dynastic decline and fragmentation, but not always"(pg. 180). There are many wishy-washy sentences like that in "New Chinese Empire." Also, I am in the dark as to what 'synergy' really means in the context of international relations. A more detailed explanation would have been welcomed.
- China scholars would disagree with Terrill that because China does not hold national, free elections, Chinese citizens have no say in their government (see Shi Tianjian's "Political Participation in Beijing"). Elections are not the only, and not even the most effective, mode of participation. Chinese participate in a variety of ways...refusal to attend meetings, local elections, protests against local cadres, letter writing (which Terrill dismisses offhand as 'petitioning the court'), etc.
- Some of what Terrill writes contradicts what I have learned (not to say I am right; conflicting sources automatically make me wary). For example: Terrill claims the protests following the accidental American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia were coordinated by the government. I was under the impression that the government tried its best to get Chinese to stop protesting for the sake of Sino-American harmony.
- Terrill can be overly harsh on China. In his disussion of Sino-Japanese relations, he criticizes China for not letting World War II issues go. To be fair, Japan never has apologized for atrocoties committed in that war, and its nations textbooks do not address the question honestly. The fact that China also censors its textbooks / history does not lessen Japan's blame . Also, there were a few times I felt Terrill was a micrometer away from calling China "Chicom," and he did call it a 'semi-terrorist outfit.' This seems a bit much.
- Terrill's argument seems to rely too much on emotion. He taps into American frustrations at China's grandstanding, and finds a historical basis for it.
- Some of the accusations Terrill waves at China could be said just as equally about America, or any country for that matter. He states China doesn't have allies, and therefore they are inconsistent and dishonest in foreign policy. No country has allies, they have interests, and these interests change over time. Terrill's accusation singles China out, but can be applied to every country in every time.
All those complaints aside, overall I liked this book. I particularaly liked his explanation of China's claims on territory that is simply not theirs (Tibet, Xinjiang, Manchuria, etc.). His view on Taiwan was especially appreciated. He notes that talk about the "Taiwan problem" masks that there is no problem. Taiwan is a healthy, prosperous democracy. The problem is that China claims to own it. Having lived in Taiwan, I can attest to the fact that the Mainland's propoganda claiming that the Taiwan issue is exacerbated by American policy is absolutely false. I have yet to meet a Taiwanese person who thinks "re"unification is anywhere close to a good idea. But I digress...
Okay, so in summary, this book was a good read, but read with a critical eye.
This book makes my head spin, April 30, 2003
By Bibliophile - The coincidence is remarkable: Niall Ferguson's book on the British Empire, Dominic Lieven's on the Russian Empire, and now Ross Terrill's on the Chinese Empire - all appear at the same time. All are histories with a message - the subject is more like political science than strictly history.
While Ferguson's final message on the British Empire is that America is in fact an empire and should be a larger one still in the future, Terrill argues similarly that China today is also an empire - but one that should cease to exist if possible.
This book is somewhat confusing, a jumble of anecdotes, historical analysis, and political theorizing. It is so full of complaints about the present Chinese government that I doubt this is unintentional: Ross Terrill is making a statement, being deliberately provocative (no doubt improving sales here in America), and leaving behind a personal manifesto for posterity, so to speak. This book is unlikely to make the bestsellers lists in China, to put it mildly.
If I'm not mistaken, Terrill believes China will democratize - and break up into a federation of semi-independent states. He offers a number of scenarios, but the point is the same: China cannot, must not, and will not remain what it is today. He means politically. Of economics he has little to say.
While I agree with him that China will change, Terrill is a bit vague on his specific timeframe.
My personal observation is as follows. China has undergone more changes politically and economically in the last two hundred years than it had ever had since 400-200 B.C., when China was in political, military, cultural, economic and social turmoil before finally achieving the prosperity and stability of the two Han Dynasties. Today China is still in transition, and one cannot expect China not to change. Terrill's point is valid, if somewhat overstated. Every country follows its own course, which is marked out by its history and shaped by international events. Certainly China will eventually liberalize and be part of the international community in every sense. Why be so impatient? China today is authoritarian and totalitarian. What Terrill doesn't ask is: Is China more authoritarian and totalitarian today than a quarter century ago, or is it less so? The answer is of course LESS SO. Moreover, all signs point to the same thing: China is still moving in the democratic direction, and however slow this process may be, it seems irreversible. Terrill chooses not to point this out. (If China were NOT moving in the right direction, I doubt very much the 2008 Olympics would have been awarded to Beijing. The reason why comparing the Beijing Games to the "Hitler Olympics" in 1936 doesn't make sense is that Germany in the 1930's was moving in the wrong direction, while China today is clearly changing in the right direction, politically as well economically.)
I have a slight problem with authors who make their points with highly selective facts. It makes me suspicious of their integrity (or worse, their competence). I have no doubt Terrill is a China-lover. After all his biography of Mao is one of my favorite books. But this book is a little different. One detail illustrates my point. On p. 281: "In fact, after two decades of MFN status for China, US trade with the PRC was very far from being 'ten times' its trade with Taiwan. In 1999, US exports to the PRC were LESS than its exports to Taiwan."
First of all, considering this book just came out of the printers, I find it odd that he has chosen 1999 to make his point. US exports to China in Feb 2003 was $4 billion, compared to $2.5 billion to Taiwan - not LESS, but 1.6 times. US total trade with China for the month of Feb, 2003 was $11.69 billion, compared with the puny $3.38 billion with Taiwan. For the whole year of 2002, US total trade in both exports and imports with China amounted to $147.3 billion, compared with the much smaller $50.6 billion with Taiwan. (All figures from the US Dept of Commerce.) Now, of course none of these figures invalidate Terrill's point that US trade with China is still less than ten times that with Taiwan, but what he suggests is misleading (and in his suggestion that US exports to China is less than to Taiwan, wrong). The truth is, China is doing much more trade, both ways, with America than Taiwan is. It may not be ten times as much - YET - but considering the fact that America has been seriously trading with China for only a decade, while it has been doing so with Taiwan since 1949, the ten times conjecture is very possible in the future. China is already America's 4th largest trade partner - coming fast on the heels of Japan - while Taiwan is only 9th. Terrill neglects to mention that the trade growth between China and the US is extremely fast, while America's trade with Taiwan is stalled. He also fails to note that two-way trade betwen China and Taiwan is also growing healthily (despite SARS). Terrill is suggesting that when Deng Xiaoping made this forecast to Carter, he was lying. But he wasn't, because he never said when this target would be achieved. In time, it will be.
Terrill makes this observation to illustrate the difference between what the Chinese govenment says and the reality. This book has countless such examples. No doubt the point itself is well-made and correct. (Show me a government - any government - that tells the truth, the whole truth and nothing but! Where are the WMD and al-Qaeda links in Iraq?) But since the reality he himself presents is often so misleading and sometimes wrong, he makes a fool of himself. He must first find out the truth himself before accusing others of not telling the truth.
While I'm on this subject of trade, Terrill doesn't ask himself why trade with the West will not be the key to political changes in China. It WILL be. Indeed he has little to say about economics in general, even though foreign trade leads to economic prosperity, which in turn will drive social and political liberalization, not to mention further economic reform. Trade is China's political and economic engine. Instead he focuses on the one thing he loves to talk about: political ideology. That puts the cart before the horse. Also, he doesn't discuss why China even with an authoritarian system can still be a responsible and constructive partner with the US over foreign problems, such as North Korea, as it is indeed proving to be so. India is a democracy - how is India helping America? France too is a democracy for that matter.
I find this book full of rage. No doubt it stems from his personal love of China and his hatred of the regime, and I empathize. Or maybe it's just a deliberate posture (what they call "grand standing")? But it is foolish to be impatient and fail to take the long view. (This is doubly odd since Terrill's familiarity with China's history is evident in this book.) It is also unwise to neglect the economic factors in the equation, and dishonest to be highly selective in presenting facts and figures to prove his points.
International Relations, China-Style, May 12, 2003
By Jeffery Steele (Taipei, Taiwan) - Ross Terrill sees continuity between the past and the present in China's domestic politics and international relations. The imperial system, he believes, is still the fundamental structure in which China's leaders make decisions, even in the twenty-first century, and even after more than fifty years of Communist rule.
That leaders like Mao and Deng (and even Jiang) were emperors in all but name is something of a cliché, but Terrill gives a fresh perspective to this commonly-held notion. He is well-read in China's history, and shows it here to good effect without weighing himself down with excessive scholarship. His style is light and well-suited to his approach: prove a point to the general reader's satisfaction and then move on.
By far the most interesting sections of Terrill's book are those having to do with China's world view. China has traditionally looked upon not just the rest of East Asia, but even the rest of the world as an extension of China itself. This was not so much a ruling concept as it was a pervasive ruling assumption, and it formed the basis for imperial China. When China was strong, this assumption allowed it to swallow up other areas from Tibet to Vietnam without elaborate conceptual justifications; when China was weak, the assumption was still in force through tributary relations or complex diplomatic relations that allowed Beijing to appear to have the upper hand even when it did not. Circumstances may change, but the assumption is never questioned.
Terrill draws numerous parallels between imperial China and today's new China. Beijing still seeks to punch above its weight by formalizing relationships with other countries in ways China prefers even when it cannot immediately achieve its aims (this explains why China puts such stress on its "One-China" policy with the United States). What is remarkable, he argues, is not so much that China would use this strategy as how successful it is in doing so. Other nations - whether out of excessive respect for China's culture or fear of losing access to China's market - bow down and accede to many of China's demands.
In the area of international relations, this book should be viewed as the counterpoint to "The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security." Whereas the authors of that book, Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, view China as fundamentally conservative in its international outlook, Terrill sees it as potentially destabilizing.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
