At Expo 2010 Shanghai, China thinks big
By Andrew Higgins
Washington Post Foreign Service
Friday, April 30, 2010
A global showcase of architecture, science and technology opens May 1 in China's financial capital. Tens of millions of people are expected to visit the international exposition in Shanghai, which runs through Oct. 31.
» LAUNCH PHOTO GALLERY
SHANGHAI -- Take the crowd that attended Woodstock in 1969, multiply it by 175 and dump the result in the middle of the world's most populous city. That is, in effect, what China plans to do at Expo 2010 Shanghai, an elephantine world's fair that opens Friday evening on the banks of the Huangpu River.
Everything about the Shanghai jamboree is super-size, most prominently the China Pavilion, a red upside-down pyramid with floor space equivalent to 35 football fields. That makes it about 30 times the size of the Canadian-designed U.S. showcase, which is tucked away in a corner of the main Expo site.
"The obvious conscious message is that China has arrived," said Jose Villarreal, a San Antonio lawyer recruited by the Obama administration in July to salvage floundering U.S. plans for the Shanghai Expo. "We are basically celebrating China's emergence as a world power."
Villarreal, who was named U.S. commissioner general to the event, joined Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in raising $61 million from U.S. companies to finance the American pavilion, which -- to China's dismay -- was nearly abandoned at one point for lack of funds. "We were going through one of the worst financial crises in history, and it was hard to get the attention of corporate leaders," Villarreal said.
On Thursday, China signaled its delight that the United States had finally gotten its act together: President Hu Jintao visited the U.S. exhibit, met with Mandarin-speaking American students who are serving as guides and "congratulated us on completing our pavilion," Villarreal said.
For China, money has been no object. Unlike the United States, which has begged for private money to fund expos since 1991, when Congress made government funding difficult, China dipped into the deep pockets of the state. It is spending $4.2 billion on the six-month Expo -- and 10 times that if new roads, rail lines and other infrastructure projects are included in the bill. (The last world's fair on U.S. soil, held in New Orleans in 1984, went bankrupt.)
One thing that has been scaled back in Shanghai, though, is Friday's opening ceremony. It still features an elaborate fireworks display, but an even grander spectacle was pared down to make sure China's second city didn't eclipse Beijing's opening of the 2008 Olympics.
A dozen boxes of silk
When London hosted the first world's fair in 1851, showcasing Britain as the dominant industrial and imperial power, China's sole contribution was 12 boxes of silk sent by a Shanghai merchant. Karl Marx, who was in London at the time working on theories that would inspire Mao Zedong and which nominally still guide China's ruling Communist Party, deplored the whole affair, known as the Great Exhibition, as an exercise in capitalist excess.
About the only nod in Marx's direction in Shanghai is a second opening ceremony Saturday -- International Workers' Day -- to open the Expo's vast riverside sites to the general public.
U.S. reliance on corporate sponsors has presented "unique difficulties," Villarreal said, noting that all other major countries have full-time government-funded teams that turn up at each world's fair. "We invent the wheel every time," he said.
While throngs of Chinese with advance tickets waited for hours earlier this week to get a sneak preview of China's already operating national exhibit, American contractors were still connecting wires and unpacking boxes inside a hall dominated by the corporate logos of sponsors.
'Rising to the Challenge'
The U.S. pavilion -- motto: "Rising to the Challenge" -- features a movie house, a big room filled with stands promoting the companies that are footing the bill and a fast-food joint run by Kentucky Fried Chicken and Pizza Hut. The United States has also signed some big-name acts, including musician Herbie Hancock, who will perform next month.
Early reviews of U.S. efforts from ordinary Chinese have been mostly lukewarm. "There are too many corporate logos," said Sam Feng, a 30-year-old Shanghai resident. "I thought the USA would have some brilliant and exciting stuff. . . . Except for buying some souvenirs, I can't think of anything special about it."
China's pavilion has also stirred some grumbling. There have been complaints that its design was cribbed from a Japanese exhibit in Spain in 1992. The Chinese designer denies this.
Zhou Hanmin, deputy director of the Expo's organizing committee, said China is not trying to show off by building a gigantic national pavilion. It needs the space to house exhibits from 31 provinces and cities, which each have bigger populations than many countries. Moreover, big as it is, the China Pavilion will only be able to accommodate about 8 percent of the expected 70 million visitors, he said.
Friday, April 30, 2010
414) Shanghai Expo - Le Monde
L'Exposition universelle 2010 inaugurée ce vendredi à Shanghaï
Le Monde avec AFP, 30.04.2010
Shanghaï s'apprête à donner le coup d'envoi de l'Exposition universelle la plus grande de tous les temps vendredi soir, en embrasant le ciel sur les rives du fleuve Huangpu avec feux d'artifice et jeux d'eau, en présence d'une vingtaine de dirigeants étrangers. La cérémonie d'ouverture de la première Exposition organisée par un pays émergent débutera vers 20 heures, heure locale (14 heures, heure française), pour environ une heure et demie de chorégraphies, chansons interprétées par des stars internationales et un spectacle de jeux d'eau et de feux d'artifice.
Les journalistes accrédités ne pouvaient en dévoiler davantage après avoir dû signer un accord de confidentialité afin de ne pas gâcher la surprise de la fête, qui marquera l'aboutissement d'années de préparation pour la métropole de 20 millions d'habitants. Le spectacle de vendredi soir sera suivi de l'ouverture officielle samedi matin par le président chinois, Hu Jintao, puis celle au public d'une exposition universelle appelée à battre de nombreux records : taille du site (plus de 5 km2), nombre de pays participant (189) et nombre de visiteurs (jusqu'à 100 millions attendus).
UN DÉFI DE TAILLE
Une vingtaine de chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement doivent assister à la cérémonie de vendredi soir : le président français, Nicolas Sarkozy, qui achève à Shanghaï, avec son épouse, Carla, une visite d'Etat en Chine, le président de la Commission européenne, José Manuel Barroso, plusieurs chefs d'Etat africains, dont le Congolais Denis Sassou Nguesso, le Gabonais Ali Bongo Ondimba. Le président de l'autorité palestinienne, Mahmoud Abbas, le premier ministre des Pays-Bas, Jan Peter Balkenende, ainsi que le numéro deux du régime nord-coréen, Kim Yong-nam, sont également à Shanghaï.
La Chine, qui a retrouvé sa superbe, compte faire de l'événement la vitrine de sa nouvelle puissance, moins de deux ans après avoir organisé avec brio les jeux Olympiques de Pékin. Mais le défi est de taille, notamment pour assurer la sécurité sur six mois d'affilée et pour jusqu'à 100 millions de visiteurs, à 95 % chinois. Un public qui semble acquis d'avance après avoir été matraqué par une intense propagande par les médias chinois depuis des mois.
Au total 189 pays de tous les continents seront présents, avec des pavillons pour lesquels les architectes se sont lâchés et dont certains battent des records d'audace, tel celui de la Grande-Bretagne avec ses tiges d'acrylique qui s'agitent avec le vent et captent la lumière. Dans l'après-midi, M. Sarkozy aura inauguré le pavillon français, consacré à la "ville sensuelle", où la France, en pleine embellie de sa relation avec Pékin, se présente comme le pays de la culture et du romantisme.
En savoir plus :
Consulter le site officiel de l'Exposition universelle 2010, le site officiel du pavillon français, le portail de l'ambassade de France en Chine, et toutes les informations pratiques sur l'exposition.
Le Monde avec AFP, 30.04.2010
Shanghaï s'apprête à donner le coup d'envoi de l'Exposition universelle la plus grande de tous les temps vendredi soir, en embrasant le ciel sur les rives du fleuve Huangpu avec feux d'artifice et jeux d'eau, en présence d'une vingtaine de dirigeants étrangers. La cérémonie d'ouverture de la première Exposition organisée par un pays émergent débutera vers 20 heures, heure locale (14 heures, heure française), pour environ une heure et demie de chorégraphies, chansons interprétées par des stars internationales et un spectacle de jeux d'eau et de feux d'artifice.
Les journalistes accrédités ne pouvaient en dévoiler davantage après avoir dû signer un accord de confidentialité afin de ne pas gâcher la surprise de la fête, qui marquera l'aboutissement d'années de préparation pour la métropole de 20 millions d'habitants. Le spectacle de vendredi soir sera suivi de l'ouverture officielle samedi matin par le président chinois, Hu Jintao, puis celle au public d'une exposition universelle appelée à battre de nombreux records : taille du site (plus de 5 km2), nombre de pays participant (189) et nombre de visiteurs (jusqu'à 100 millions attendus).
UN DÉFI DE TAILLE
Une vingtaine de chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement doivent assister à la cérémonie de vendredi soir : le président français, Nicolas Sarkozy, qui achève à Shanghaï, avec son épouse, Carla, une visite d'Etat en Chine, le président de la Commission européenne, José Manuel Barroso, plusieurs chefs d'Etat africains, dont le Congolais Denis Sassou Nguesso, le Gabonais Ali Bongo Ondimba. Le président de l'autorité palestinienne, Mahmoud Abbas, le premier ministre des Pays-Bas, Jan Peter Balkenende, ainsi que le numéro deux du régime nord-coréen, Kim Yong-nam, sont également à Shanghaï.
La Chine, qui a retrouvé sa superbe, compte faire de l'événement la vitrine de sa nouvelle puissance, moins de deux ans après avoir organisé avec brio les jeux Olympiques de Pékin. Mais le défi est de taille, notamment pour assurer la sécurité sur six mois d'affilée et pour jusqu'à 100 millions de visiteurs, à 95 % chinois. Un public qui semble acquis d'avance après avoir été matraqué par une intense propagande par les médias chinois depuis des mois.
Au total 189 pays de tous les continents seront présents, avec des pavillons pour lesquels les architectes se sont lâchés et dont certains battent des records d'audace, tel celui de la Grande-Bretagne avec ses tiges d'acrylique qui s'agitent avec le vent et captent la lumière. Dans l'après-midi, M. Sarkozy aura inauguré le pavillon français, consacré à la "ville sensuelle", où la France, en pleine embellie de sa relation avec Pékin, se présente comme le pays de la culture et du romantisme.
En savoir plus :
Consulter le site officiel de l'Exposition universelle 2010, le site officiel du pavillon français, le portail de l'ambassade de France en Chine, et toutes les informations pratiques sur l'exposition.
413) Shanghai Expo - Claudia Trevisan, Blog Estadao
China celebra sua emergência global com a Expo Xangai
por Cláudia Trevisan
Blog O Tao da China, 30.abril.2010 12:04:08
Maior aglomerado urbano da China, Xangai vai se transformar a partir do próximo sábado em um enorme centro global de reflexão e troca de experiências sobre as cidades, seus problemas e os caminhos para enfrentá-los. No dia 1º de maio será aberta a edição 2010 da Exposição Mundial, que será a maior já realizada na história, com a participação de 190 países e 50 organizações internacionais e empresas.
Durante seis meses de duração, a Expo 2010 deverá atrair 70 milhões de visitantes _quase 400 mil por dia_ e abrigar 20 mil atividades, entre seminários, debates e performances culturais.
O grande tema que vai nortear o evento é “Cidade Melhor, Vida Melhor”. Neste século, pela primeira vez na história da humanidade, há mais pessoas vivendo em áreas urbanas do que rurais. Segundo o Bureau International des Expositions, que desde 1928 é responsável pela regulamentação do evento, a principal pergunta que a Expo 2010 deverá responder é: “Como nós podemos explorar o enorme potencial das cidades para o desenvolvimento e, ao mesmo tempo, enfrentar os desafios colocados por elas?”.
A questão será discutida nos pavilhões, em seminários e no fórum que encerrará o evento, em outubro, no qual será aprovada a “Declaração de Xangai”, com os resultados das trocas de experiências dos seis meses anteriores. O fórum será realizado no pavilhão da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) e deverá apresentar uma visão global para o desenvolvimento urbano e a cidade do futuro.
Xangai foi a primeiro centro de um país em desenvolvimento a ser escolhido para sediar uma Exposição Mundial. Desde 2001, quando a decisão foi anunciada, o governo chinês trabalha para que a Expo 2010 seja a maior de todos os tempos, tanto em número de participantes quanto de visitantes.
O parque da exposição foi construído em uma área de 5,28 quilômetros quadrados, onde há 46 pavilhões individuais de países, entre os quais o Brasil, e pavilhões coletivos de regiões que não tinham dinheiro para bancar sua participação, como a África. Além disso, há pavilhões temáticos, de empresas e os que são destinados a atividades específicas, como seminários e apresentações culturais.
A discussão das questões urbanas será concentrada em sete pavilhões dedicados às Melhores Práticas Urbanas, nos quais serão apresentadas experiências bem-sucedidas de todo o mundo.
O tópico também será o centro do gigantesco Pavilhão Temático, que apresentará a relação entre seres humanos e as cidades em todo o planeta em cinco subseções: Cidadãos Urbanos, Seres Urbanos, Planetas Urbanos, Pegadas Urbanas e Sonhos Urbanos.
Nesse mar de construções, será acirrada a concorrência para atrair visitantes, a maioria dos quais será de chineses _a expectativa é que “apenas” quatro milhões dos 70 milhões aguardados sejam estrangeiros.
O Brasil vai lançar mão do futebol, o elemento que os chineses associam imediatamente ao país. Na fachada do pavilhão haverá uma enorme tela interativa na qual os visitantes poderão “jogar” futebol com seus celulares. O local também servirá para exibição de jogos do Brasil na Copa do Mundo, que coincidirá com um período da Expo 2010.
Com o tema “Cidades Pulsantes”, o pavilhão utiliza filmes e painéis digitais interativos para dar um panorama da cultura, da economia, das cidades e dos destinos turísticos brasileiros. “Essa vai ser uma das mais completas participações do Brasil em eventos internacionais de grande porte”, afirma o diretor do pavilhão, Pedro Wendler.
Na sala de entrada, serão projetados vídeos sobre regiões e cidades brasileiras, em uma parede curva que forma uma espécie de semitúnel.
O destino seguinte é a Sala da Alegria Brasileira, onde há uma parede curva de 180 graus, na qual serão mostrados filmes sobre as festas regionais brasileiras, o Carnaval e o futebol, nos estádios que irão sediar a Copa de 2014.
O coração do pavilhão é a Sala das Cidades Pulsantes, na qual os visitantes assistirão simultaneamente a quatro filmes de oito minutos sobre o quotidiano de brasileiros, projetados nas paredes internas de um quadrado suspenso que ocupa o centro da sala.
Os personagens são um engenheiro da Embraer, um trabalhador em plataforma da Petrobras, uma música e um fazendeiro. No piso, são projetadas imagens aéreas de grandes cidades brasileiras.
A participação na Expo 2010 custou ao país R$ 50 milhões, entre recursos públicos e privados. O pavilhão tem 2.000 metros quadrados e uma localização privilegiada: ele está em frente aos dos Estados Unidos, o que mais desperta a curiosidade dos chineses de acordo com pesquisa realizada pelo governo local.
Mas o pavilhão que promete provocar o maior impacto é o da Inglaterra, no centro do qual está a “Catedral de Sementes”, um objeto que tem o formato de um cubo com as bordas arredondadas. Em sua superfície, foram “espetados” 60 mil estreitos tubos transparentes com 7,5 metros de comprimento, dentro dos quais há sementes de milhares de plantas encontradas no planeta. Durante o dia, esses tubos funcionarão como fibras óticas que iluminarão o interior do local. À noite, eles transmitirão luz de dentro para fora do edifício, iluminando o seu exterior.
Desenhado por Thomas Heatherwick, o pavilhão britânico é aberto e se espalha no espaço ao redor da Catedral de Sementes. O formato da área parece um papel de presente aberto e simboliza o fato de que o local é um presente da Inglaterra para a China.
por Cláudia Trevisan
Blog O Tao da China, 30.abril.2010 12:04:08
Maior aglomerado urbano da China, Xangai vai se transformar a partir do próximo sábado em um enorme centro global de reflexão e troca de experiências sobre as cidades, seus problemas e os caminhos para enfrentá-los. No dia 1º de maio será aberta a edição 2010 da Exposição Mundial, que será a maior já realizada na história, com a participação de 190 países e 50 organizações internacionais e empresas.
Durante seis meses de duração, a Expo 2010 deverá atrair 70 milhões de visitantes _quase 400 mil por dia_ e abrigar 20 mil atividades, entre seminários, debates e performances culturais.
O grande tema que vai nortear o evento é “Cidade Melhor, Vida Melhor”. Neste século, pela primeira vez na história da humanidade, há mais pessoas vivendo em áreas urbanas do que rurais. Segundo o Bureau International des Expositions, que desde 1928 é responsável pela regulamentação do evento, a principal pergunta que a Expo 2010 deverá responder é: “Como nós podemos explorar o enorme potencial das cidades para o desenvolvimento e, ao mesmo tempo, enfrentar os desafios colocados por elas?”.
A questão será discutida nos pavilhões, em seminários e no fórum que encerrará o evento, em outubro, no qual será aprovada a “Declaração de Xangai”, com os resultados das trocas de experiências dos seis meses anteriores. O fórum será realizado no pavilhão da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) e deverá apresentar uma visão global para o desenvolvimento urbano e a cidade do futuro.
Xangai foi a primeiro centro de um país em desenvolvimento a ser escolhido para sediar uma Exposição Mundial. Desde 2001, quando a decisão foi anunciada, o governo chinês trabalha para que a Expo 2010 seja a maior de todos os tempos, tanto em número de participantes quanto de visitantes.
O parque da exposição foi construído em uma área de 5,28 quilômetros quadrados, onde há 46 pavilhões individuais de países, entre os quais o Brasil, e pavilhões coletivos de regiões que não tinham dinheiro para bancar sua participação, como a África. Além disso, há pavilhões temáticos, de empresas e os que são destinados a atividades específicas, como seminários e apresentações culturais.
A discussão das questões urbanas será concentrada em sete pavilhões dedicados às Melhores Práticas Urbanas, nos quais serão apresentadas experiências bem-sucedidas de todo o mundo.
O tópico também será o centro do gigantesco Pavilhão Temático, que apresentará a relação entre seres humanos e as cidades em todo o planeta em cinco subseções: Cidadãos Urbanos, Seres Urbanos, Planetas Urbanos, Pegadas Urbanas e Sonhos Urbanos.
Nesse mar de construções, será acirrada a concorrência para atrair visitantes, a maioria dos quais será de chineses _a expectativa é que “apenas” quatro milhões dos 70 milhões aguardados sejam estrangeiros.
O Brasil vai lançar mão do futebol, o elemento que os chineses associam imediatamente ao país. Na fachada do pavilhão haverá uma enorme tela interativa na qual os visitantes poderão “jogar” futebol com seus celulares. O local também servirá para exibição de jogos do Brasil na Copa do Mundo, que coincidirá com um período da Expo 2010.
Com o tema “Cidades Pulsantes”, o pavilhão utiliza filmes e painéis digitais interativos para dar um panorama da cultura, da economia, das cidades e dos destinos turísticos brasileiros. “Essa vai ser uma das mais completas participações do Brasil em eventos internacionais de grande porte”, afirma o diretor do pavilhão, Pedro Wendler.
Na sala de entrada, serão projetados vídeos sobre regiões e cidades brasileiras, em uma parede curva que forma uma espécie de semitúnel.
O destino seguinte é a Sala da Alegria Brasileira, onde há uma parede curva de 180 graus, na qual serão mostrados filmes sobre as festas regionais brasileiras, o Carnaval e o futebol, nos estádios que irão sediar a Copa de 2014.
O coração do pavilhão é a Sala das Cidades Pulsantes, na qual os visitantes assistirão simultaneamente a quatro filmes de oito minutos sobre o quotidiano de brasileiros, projetados nas paredes internas de um quadrado suspenso que ocupa o centro da sala.
Os personagens são um engenheiro da Embraer, um trabalhador em plataforma da Petrobras, uma música e um fazendeiro. No piso, são projetadas imagens aéreas de grandes cidades brasileiras.
A participação na Expo 2010 custou ao país R$ 50 milhões, entre recursos públicos e privados. O pavilhão tem 2.000 metros quadrados e uma localização privilegiada: ele está em frente aos dos Estados Unidos, o que mais desperta a curiosidade dos chineses de acordo com pesquisa realizada pelo governo local.
Mas o pavilhão que promete provocar o maior impacto é o da Inglaterra, no centro do qual está a “Catedral de Sementes”, um objeto que tem o formato de um cubo com as bordas arredondadas. Em sua superfície, foram “espetados” 60 mil estreitos tubos transparentes com 7,5 metros de comprimento, dentro dos quais há sementes de milhares de plantas encontradas no planeta. Durante o dia, esses tubos funcionarão como fibras óticas que iluminarão o interior do local. À noite, eles transmitirão luz de dentro para fora do edifício, iluminando o seu exterior.
Desenhado por Thomas Heatherwick, o pavilhão britânico é aberto e se espalha no espaço ao redor da Catedral de Sementes. O formato da área parece um papel de presente aberto e simboliza o fato de que o local é um presente da Inglaterra para a China.
Thursday, April 29, 2010
412) Korea: a vibrant economy
South Korea: Finding its place on the world stage
McKinsey Quarterly, April 2010
During the four decades following the Korean War, South Korea evolved from one of the most abject states in the region to one of the most vibrant. But despite the country’s remarkable successes, it remains largely unknown to outsiders. The country is now poised at a critical juncture, and this package of five essays explores both its present and its future.
The resilient economy
Stephen Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley; Sharon Lam, vice president of research, Morgan Stanley Asia
Designing a distinctive national brand
Christopher Graves, global CEO of Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide
Beyond manufacturing
Richard Dobbs, director of the McKinsey Global Institute; Roland Villinger, managing director for McKinsey’s Seoul office
Four steps to prosperity
Shen Dingli, professor at Japan’s Fudan University
Korea’s geographic advantage
Bill Emmott, former editor-in-chief of the Economist
McKinsey Quarterly, April 2010
During the four decades following the Korean War, South Korea evolved from one of the most abject states in the region to one of the most vibrant. But despite the country’s remarkable successes, it remains largely unknown to outsiders. The country is now poised at a critical juncture, and this package of five essays explores both its present and its future.
The resilient economy
Stephen Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley; Sharon Lam, vice president of research, Morgan Stanley Asia
Designing a distinctive national brand
Christopher Graves, global CEO of Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide
Beyond manufacturing
Richard Dobbs, director of the McKinsey Global Institute; Roland Villinger, managing director for McKinsey’s Seoul office
Four steps to prosperity
Shen Dingli, professor at Japan’s Fudan University
Korea’s geographic advantage
Bill Emmott, former editor-in-chief of the Economist
411) Shanghai Expo: amazing photos
Shanghai's Expo nearly ready
Boston.Com - The Big Picture, April 28, 2010
Organizers of Shanghai's World Expo have been holding trial runs this week, before the official opening this Saturday, May 1st. About 70 percent of the nearly 200 participants participated in the trials, and visitors were already encountering long lines. Officials now estimate the 6-month event, themed "Better City, Better Life", will attract up to 100 million visitors, 95 percent of them Chinese. Shanghai has spent 400 billion yuan (58.6 billion US dollars) preparing for the Expo, according to state media - more than was spent on the Beijing Olympics. Collected here are photographs of last-minute preparations in Shanghai as they prepare to welcome the world this weekend.
(37 photos total)
See them all!!!
Boston.Com - The Big Picture, April 28, 2010
Organizers of Shanghai's World Expo have been holding trial runs this week, before the official opening this Saturday, May 1st. About 70 percent of the nearly 200 participants participated in the trials, and visitors were already encountering long lines. Officials now estimate the 6-month event, themed "Better City, Better Life", will attract up to 100 million visitors, 95 percent of them Chinese. Shanghai has spent 400 billion yuan (58.6 billion US dollars) preparing for the Expo, according to state media - more than was spent on the Beijing Olympics. Collected here are photographs of last-minute preparations in Shanghai as they prepare to welcome the world this weekend.
(37 photos total)
See them all!!!
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
410) China: Exchange and Trade Policies
China's Exchange Rate Policy and Trade Imbalances
Nicholas R. Lardy
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 28, 2010
Testimony before the Hearing of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Economic Policy
April 22, 2010
China and the United States each contributed massively to the large global economic imbalances that emerged in the middle of the last decade. China was far and away the largest global surplus country by the middle of the decade. Its current account surplus reached an astonishing 11.0 percent of GDP in 2007 and for the four years from 2005 through 2008 China accounted for about a fifth of the total global surplus. China's emergence as a large surplus country reflects the rise of domestic savings relative to investment over this period.
The United States was far and away the world's largest deficit country in recent years, hitting a peak of 6 percent of GDP in 2006. For the same four-year period the United States accounted for almost 60 percent of the total global deficit. These very large US deficits reflected our low national savings relative to our national investment.
The imbalances in both countries contributed to the global financial crisis, though lax financial regulation in the United States was undoubtedly a more important underlying cause.
But this situation has changed significantly over the past two to three years. The external imbalances of both the United States and China have declined dramatically. From its 2007 peak China's current account fell by almost half to 6.1 percent of GDP in 2009 and in the first quarter of this year was running at an annual rate of only 1 percent of GDP. Similarly, the pace of official intervention, which prevents the value of the renminbi from appreciating, fell by three-fifths in the first quarter of this year compared to last year. The US current account imbalance also has fallen sharply; the deficit fell to only 2.9 percent of GDP last year, about half the level of 2006.
Given these developments it may appear that the renewed focus by the US Congress on China's currency and its external imbalance is misplaced. In China the Ministry of Commerce now argues that the collapse of China's trade surplus shows that its currency is no longer undervalued and thus appreciation is not warranted. However, I believe that this conclusion is not well founded since the decline in China's external surplus in large part was caused by three factors that are likely to be transitory or already have been reversed.
First, China was the first globally significant economy to begin to recover from the global recession. China's growth bottomed out in the fourth quarter of 2008 and then accelerated very strongly starting in the first quarter of 2009. Thus China's recovery predates that of the United States, its largest trading partner, by half a year and predates European recovery by an even longer period. China's early growth resurgence compared to the rest of the world boosted its imports relative to its exports, cutting the external surplus. But this factor will wane if the US recovery gains traction and Europe begins to recover.
Second, China's terms of trade have deteriorated dramatically over the past year, reflecting a sharp rise in commodity prices. Since China is the world's largest importer of a number of key commodities, sharply rising prices for these goods have added substantially to China's import bill, thus reducing its external surplus. This is unlikely to continue to be such a major factor going forward.
Third, the renminbi appreciated 15 to 20 percent in real effective terms from late 2007 through the first quarter of 2009. This was a major factor contributing to the sharp reduction in China's surplus in 2008 and 2009. But since the first quarter of 2009 the renminbi has depreciated in real effective terms by about 5 percent. This factor is likely to contribute to a rise in China's surplus, probably beginning in the second half of 2010.
Thus I disagree with those who argue that China's currency is no longer undervalued. It seems more likely that China's external surplus will turn upward and that China's contribution to global economic imbalances should continue to be a focus of US policy.
However, the extraordinarily sharp and unexpected reduction in China's current account surplus over the past year surely suggests that there is substantial uncertainty surrounding most estimates of the degree of renminbi undervaluation. Moreover, we should recognize that the virtual disappearance of China's trade surplus, even if only temporary, means that within China it will be politically difficult for the government to quickly resume a policy of appreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar. It also means that if this policy is adopted we are likely to see a slow pace of appreciation, at least until the global recovery strengthens and China's external surplus widens significantly.
Furthermore, even if the degree of undervaluation of the renminbi is very large, a rapid appreciation of the renminbi is not optimal from the Chinese perspective and probably not from the US perspective either. With about 50 million people employed in China's export-oriented manufacturing, the Chinese government will eschew rapid appreciation since that would result in a sharp fall in the output of these industries and eliminate many of these jobs. Their optimal strategy will be a gradual appreciation that would eliminate the growth of China's trade surplus and thus tend to stabilize the output and employment of these industries. In 2008, when my colleague Morris Goldstein and I believed the renminbi was very substantially undervalued, we argued the optimal time frame for eliminating currency undervaluation would be four to six years.1 Our colleague, Michael Mussa, points out that a very rapid elimination of China's currency undervaluation would not be desirable from the perspective of the United States since it would likely "disrupt China's economic growth in ways and to an extent that could not plausibly be offset by other policy adjustments."2 A rapid deceleration in the growth of the world's second largest economy is not likely to enhance global economic recovery, nor would it likely contribute to the recovery of employment in the United States. Indeed, the opposite is more likely.
Ultimately reducing imbalances, whether in the United States or China, requires structural reforms that reduce the gap between national rates of saving and investment. The exchange rate is an important factor that can contribute to this process. But without supporting reform policies in both countries, the results of exchange rate adjustment alone are likely to be disappointing.
In China some progress has been made over the last couple of years to advance this broader rebalancing agenda. This progress is spelled out in greater detail in my policy brief The Sustainability of China's Recovery from the Global Recession, which was distributed by the Peterson Institute in March. The government has taken steps to reduce some of the factor market distortions that have artificially subsidized the production of export goods and goods that compete with imports and at the same time have inhibited the output of services, which are largely consumed at home. In 2009 the government raised the prices of some important inputs, notably fuels, which are predominantly consumed in the industrial sector. This reduced the bias of investment toward manufacturing, contributing to a larger increase in investment in services than in industry in 2009. This is a reversal from the pattern that had dominated Chinese investment for many years. Similarly the government continued to accelerate its build out of the social safety net by massively increasing expenditures on health, education, and pensions. This should contribute to a reduction in households' precautionary demand for savings and thus a reduction in China's large savings surplus. Finally, bank lending to consumers grew dramatically last year, facilitating a remarkable increase in household consumption expenditures.
In addition to allowing its currency to appreciate, the Chinese government should adopt a number of other policy reforms to insure a sustained reduction in its global current account surplus and a successful transition to more consumption-driven growth. Low interest rates on bank loans continue to favor manufacturing (tradable goods) over services and thus contribute to China's external surplus. To address this problem China's central bank should end its policy of imposing a broad range of deposit and lending rates in favor of allowing supply and demand in the market to determine interest rates. Further price reforms would also contribute to sustaining the reduction in China's global current account surplus. For example, while the government last year raised the prices of gasoline and diesel fuel, electric power remains underpriced, continuing to provide an advantage to China's exports. And, after years of discussion, the government should introduce realistic environmental taxes and fees, which would help to level the playing field between industrial growth and exports versus services and consumption.
Notes
1. Goldstein, Morris, and Nicholas R Lardy. 2008. China's Exchange Rate Policy: An Overview of Some Key Issues [pdf]. In Debating China's Exchange Rate Policy, eds.Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Pages 54–55.
2. Mussa, Michael. 2010. Global Economic Prospects for 2010 and 2011: Global Recovery Continues [pdf]. Paper presented at the 17th semiannual meeting on Global Economic Prospects (April 8).
RELATED LINKS
Testimony: Correcting the Chinese Exchange Rate: An Action Plan March 24, 2010
Policy Brief 10-7: The Sustainability of China's Recovery from the Global Recession March 2010
Paper: Submission to the USTR in Support of a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement January 25, 2010
Peterson Perspective: A Growing US-China Rift January 6, 2010
Book: China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (hardcover) September 2008
Book: Future of China's Exchange Rate Policy, The July 2009
Book: Debating China's Exchange Rate Policy April 2008
Testimony: China's Role in the Origins of and Response to the Global Recession February 17, 2009
Op-ed: China's Currency Needs to Rise Further July 22, 2008
Testimony: The Dollar and the Renminbi May 23, 2007
Speech: Is China a Currency “Manipulator”? January 28, 2009
Paper: China Energy: A Guide for the Perplexed May 2007
Paper: China and Economic Integration in East Asia May 2007
Paper: China: Rebalancing Economic Growth May 2007
Book: US-China Trade Disputes: Rising Tide, Rising Stakes August 2006
Op-ed: The Yen Beckons China’s Dollars March 12, 2007
Nicholas R. Lardy
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 28, 2010
Testimony before the Hearing of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Economic Policy
April 22, 2010
China and the United States each contributed massively to the large global economic imbalances that emerged in the middle of the last decade. China was far and away the largest global surplus country by the middle of the decade. Its current account surplus reached an astonishing 11.0 percent of GDP in 2007 and for the four years from 2005 through 2008 China accounted for about a fifth of the total global surplus. China's emergence as a large surplus country reflects the rise of domestic savings relative to investment over this period.
The United States was far and away the world's largest deficit country in recent years, hitting a peak of 6 percent of GDP in 2006. For the same four-year period the United States accounted for almost 60 percent of the total global deficit. These very large US deficits reflected our low national savings relative to our national investment.
The imbalances in both countries contributed to the global financial crisis, though lax financial regulation in the United States was undoubtedly a more important underlying cause.
But this situation has changed significantly over the past two to three years. The external imbalances of both the United States and China have declined dramatically. From its 2007 peak China's current account fell by almost half to 6.1 percent of GDP in 2009 and in the first quarter of this year was running at an annual rate of only 1 percent of GDP. Similarly, the pace of official intervention, which prevents the value of the renminbi from appreciating, fell by three-fifths in the first quarter of this year compared to last year. The US current account imbalance also has fallen sharply; the deficit fell to only 2.9 percent of GDP last year, about half the level of 2006.
Given these developments it may appear that the renewed focus by the US Congress on China's currency and its external imbalance is misplaced. In China the Ministry of Commerce now argues that the collapse of China's trade surplus shows that its currency is no longer undervalued and thus appreciation is not warranted. However, I believe that this conclusion is not well founded since the decline in China's external surplus in large part was caused by three factors that are likely to be transitory or already have been reversed.
First, China was the first globally significant economy to begin to recover from the global recession. China's growth bottomed out in the fourth quarter of 2008 and then accelerated very strongly starting in the first quarter of 2009. Thus China's recovery predates that of the United States, its largest trading partner, by half a year and predates European recovery by an even longer period. China's early growth resurgence compared to the rest of the world boosted its imports relative to its exports, cutting the external surplus. But this factor will wane if the US recovery gains traction and Europe begins to recover.
Second, China's terms of trade have deteriorated dramatically over the past year, reflecting a sharp rise in commodity prices. Since China is the world's largest importer of a number of key commodities, sharply rising prices for these goods have added substantially to China's import bill, thus reducing its external surplus. This is unlikely to continue to be such a major factor going forward.
Third, the renminbi appreciated 15 to 20 percent in real effective terms from late 2007 through the first quarter of 2009. This was a major factor contributing to the sharp reduction in China's surplus in 2008 and 2009. But since the first quarter of 2009 the renminbi has depreciated in real effective terms by about 5 percent. This factor is likely to contribute to a rise in China's surplus, probably beginning in the second half of 2010.
Thus I disagree with those who argue that China's currency is no longer undervalued. It seems more likely that China's external surplus will turn upward and that China's contribution to global economic imbalances should continue to be a focus of US policy.
However, the extraordinarily sharp and unexpected reduction in China's current account surplus over the past year surely suggests that there is substantial uncertainty surrounding most estimates of the degree of renminbi undervaluation. Moreover, we should recognize that the virtual disappearance of China's trade surplus, even if only temporary, means that within China it will be politically difficult for the government to quickly resume a policy of appreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar. It also means that if this policy is adopted we are likely to see a slow pace of appreciation, at least until the global recovery strengthens and China's external surplus widens significantly.
Furthermore, even if the degree of undervaluation of the renminbi is very large, a rapid appreciation of the renminbi is not optimal from the Chinese perspective and probably not from the US perspective either. With about 50 million people employed in China's export-oriented manufacturing, the Chinese government will eschew rapid appreciation since that would result in a sharp fall in the output of these industries and eliminate many of these jobs. Their optimal strategy will be a gradual appreciation that would eliminate the growth of China's trade surplus and thus tend to stabilize the output and employment of these industries. In 2008, when my colleague Morris Goldstein and I believed the renminbi was very substantially undervalued, we argued the optimal time frame for eliminating currency undervaluation would be four to six years.1 Our colleague, Michael Mussa, points out that a very rapid elimination of China's currency undervaluation would not be desirable from the perspective of the United States since it would likely "disrupt China's economic growth in ways and to an extent that could not plausibly be offset by other policy adjustments."2 A rapid deceleration in the growth of the world's second largest economy is not likely to enhance global economic recovery, nor would it likely contribute to the recovery of employment in the United States. Indeed, the opposite is more likely.
Ultimately reducing imbalances, whether in the United States or China, requires structural reforms that reduce the gap between national rates of saving and investment. The exchange rate is an important factor that can contribute to this process. But without supporting reform policies in both countries, the results of exchange rate adjustment alone are likely to be disappointing.
In China some progress has been made over the last couple of years to advance this broader rebalancing agenda. This progress is spelled out in greater detail in my policy brief The Sustainability of China's Recovery from the Global Recession, which was distributed by the Peterson Institute in March. The government has taken steps to reduce some of the factor market distortions that have artificially subsidized the production of export goods and goods that compete with imports and at the same time have inhibited the output of services, which are largely consumed at home. In 2009 the government raised the prices of some important inputs, notably fuels, which are predominantly consumed in the industrial sector. This reduced the bias of investment toward manufacturing, contributing to a larger increase in investment in services than in industry in 2009. This is a reversal from the pattern that had dominated Chinese investment for many years. Similarly the government continued to accelerate its build out of the social safety net by massively increasing expenditures on health, education, and pensions. This should contribute to a reduction in households' precautionary demand for savings and thus a reduction in China's large savings surplus. Finally, bank lending to consumers grew dramatically last year, facilitating a remarkable increase in household consumption expenditures.
In addition to allowing its currency to appreciate, the Chinese government should adopt a number of other policy reforms to insure a sustained reduction in its global current account surplus and a successful transition to more consumption-driven growth. Low interest rates on bank loans continue to favor manufacturing (tradable goods) over services and thus contribute to China's external surplus. To address this problem China's central bank should end its policy of imposing a broad range of deposit and lending rates in favor of allowing supply and demand in the market to determine interest rates. Further price reforms would also contribute to sustaining the reduction in China's global current account surplus. For example, while the government last year raised the prices of gasoline and diesel fuel, electric power remains underpriced, continuing to provide an advantage to China's exports. And, after years of discussion, the government should introduce realistic environmental taxes and fees, which would help to level the playing field between industrial growth and exports versus services and consumption.
Notes
1. Goldstein, Morris, and Nicholas R Lardy. 2008. China's Exchange Rate Policy: An Overview of Some Key Issues [pdf]. In Debating China's Exchange Rate Policy, eds.Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Pages 54–55.
2. Mussa, Michael. 2010. Global Economic Prospects for 2010 and 2011: Global Recovery Continues [pdf]. Paper presented at the 17th semiannual meeting on Global Economic Prospects (April 8).
RELATED LINKS
Testimony: Correcting the Chinese Exchange Rate: An Action Plan March 24, 2010
Policy Brief 10-7: The Sustainability of China's Recovery from the Global Recession March 2010
Paper: Submission to the USTR in Support of a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement January 25, 2010
Peterson Perspective: A Growing US-China Rift January 6, 2010
Book: China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (hardcover) September 2008
Book: Future of China's Exchange Rate Policy, The July 2009
Book: Debating China's Exchange Rate Policy April 2008
Testimony: China's Role in the Origins of and Response to the Global Recession February 17, 2009
Op-ed: China's Currency Needs to Rise Further July 22, 2008
Testimony: The Dollar and the Renminbi May 23, 2007
Speech: Is China a Currency “Manipulator”? January 28, 2009
Paper: China Energy: A Guide for the Perplexed May 2007
Paper: China and Economic Integration in East Asia May 2007
Paper: China: Rebalancing Economic Growth May 2007
Book: US-China Trade Disputes: Rising Tide, Rising Stakes August 2006
Op-ed: The Yen Beckons China’s Dollars March 12, 2007
409) US-China Maritime Security relations - FPRI
Conference on US-China Maritime Security Relations
Conference Sponsors
Foreign Policy Research Institute www.fpri.org
Reserve Officers Association www.roa.org
Sea Change?
Conflicting Claims, Disparate Agendas and U.S.-China
Maritime Security Relations
Thursday, May 13, 2010
2:00 - 4:45 PM EDT
Reserve Officers Association
One Constitution Avenue NE, Washington, DC
Reservations Required
Free for FPRI and ROA Members, $25 for non-Members
To register contact:
Alan Luxenberg
Tel: (215) 732-3774 x105
Email: lux@fpri.org
Please provide full contact information.
This conference will also be available via Audio Webcast and
by Teleconference
Participation by audio webcast or teleconference is free.
For instructions on how to participate via webcast or
teleconference contact:
Alan Luxenberg
Tel: (215) 732-3774 x105
Email: lux@fpri.org
Please provide full contact information.
FPRI and ROA will convene a symposium to address issues in
U.S.-China and Northeast Asian regional security relations
that arise from China’s growing maritime power , conflicting
claims of maritime and territorial sovereignty in the ocean
areas adjacent to China and the rights of foreign military
craft to operate in the region, including China's claimed
exclusive economic zone. The session will address the
prospects for conflict and accommodation, the merits of the
principal parties' claims, and the significance of these
issues for broader U.S.-China relations. Implications for
Japan's role and Sino-Japanese relations will be addressed
as well.
Agenda
Thursday, May 13, 2010
2:00 - 4:45 PM EDT
Sea Change?
Conflicting Claims, Disparate Agendas and U.S.-China
Maritime Security Relations
Panel I: 2:00 - 3:15 p.m.
Implications of China's Rising Maritime Power and U.S. and
Japanese Responses
Panelists:
Avery Goldstein, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics
and International Relations and Associate Director of the
Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics,
University of Pennsylvania; Senior Fellow, FPRI
Lt. Col. James R. Kendall, Foreign Area Officer, USMC
Felix Chang, Senior Fellow, FPRI
Moderator: Jacques deLisle, Director, FPRI Asia Program, and
Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law and Director of the Center
for East Asian Studies, University of Pennsylvania
Panel II: 3:30 - 4:45 p.m.
Contested Claims: Territorial Sovereignty and Rights of
Operation / Rules of the Road for Military Craft
Panelists:
Jacques deLisle, Director, FPRI Asia Program, and Stephen A.
Cozen Professor of Law and Director of the Center for East
Asian Studies, University of Pennsylvania
Peter Dutton, Associate Professor, U.S. Naval War College
and a founding member of the China Maritime Studies
Institute, US Naval War College
Xinjun Zhang, Associate Professor of Public International
Law at Tsinghua University, Beijing, and Fulbright Scholar
(2009-10), University of Pennsylvania Law School
Moderator: Harvey Sicherman, President, FPRI
----------------------------
About the Panelists
Felix K. Chang, an FPRI Senior Fellow, is a partner at CVP
Ventures, a venture capital firm. He was previously a
consultant in Booz Allen Hamilton’s Organization and
Strategy practice; among his clients were the U.S.
Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
and other agencies. Earlier, he served as a senior planner
and an intelligence officer in the U.S. Department of
Defense and a business advisor at Mobil Oil Corporation,
where he dealt with strategic planning for upstream and
midstream investments throughout Asia and Africa. His
publications and ongoing research concentrate on military,
economic, and energy security issues in Asia as well as
financial industry trends around the world. He received his
M.B.A. from Duke University and M.A. and B.A. from the
University of Pennsylvania. His FPRI essays can be found
here:
http://www.fpri.org/byauthor.html#chang
Jacques deLisle is Director of FPRI’s Asia Program, the
Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law and the Director of the
Center for East Asian Studies at the University of
Pennsylvania. His research focuses on Chinese politics and
legal reform, China's approach to international law and
institutions, U.S.-China relations, and the international
status of Taiwan. His articles also have appeared in Orbis
and other foreign affairs journals, law reviews and edited
volumes. He received a J.D. and graduate education in
political science at Harvard and an A.B. from Princeton. His
FPRI essays can be found here:
http://www.fpri.org/byauthor.html#delisle
Peter Dutton, a retired Navy commander and judge advocate,
is associate professor of joint military operations at the
Naval War College and an adjunct professor at Roger Williams
University School of Law. Professor Dutton earned his juris
doctorate from the College of William and Mary and a master
of arts from the Naval War College (with honors). While on
active duty, he served as a naval flight officer, taught at
the Naval Justice School and the Defense Institute of
International Legal Studies, and served as operational law
adviser to Commander, USS John F. Kennedy Battle Group,
during Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. In 2004, Professor Dutton
became the Naval War College’s Howard S. Levie Chair of
Operational Law. He is a founding member of the College’s
China Maritime Studies Institute and writes on issues
related to U.S. and Chinese perspectives on maritime
international law as they relate to security.
Avery Goldstein, an FPRI Senior Fellow, is the David M.
Knott Professor of Global Politics and International
Relations and Associate Director of the Christopher H.
Browne Center for International Politics at the University
of Pennsylvania. He specializes in international relations,
security studies, and Chinese politics. He is currently
conducting research on China’s grand strategy. He is the
Associate Director of Penn’s Christopher H. Browne Center
for International Politics. He received his Ph.D. from the
University of California, Berkeley. His books include Rising
to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International
Security (Stanford University Press, 2005), Deterrence and
Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and
the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford
University Press, 2000), and From Bandwagon to Balance-of-
Power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in
China, 1949–1978 (Stanford University Press, 1991). His FPRI
essays can be found here:
http://www.fpri.org/byauthor.html#goldstein
LtCol James R. Kendall is an East Asia Foreign Area Officer
currently preparing to attend the Japanese National
Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS) in Tokyo this summer.
From 2006 until last January, he was a Strategic Analyst
with the Marine Corps’ Strategic Initiatives Group (SIG) at
the Pentagon, conducting service-level analysis of the US
Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility and
Afghanistan. Fluent in Japanese, LtCol Kendall also served
at the Japanese Defense Agency in Tokyo in 2003, aiding the
historic Japanese deployment to Iraq. An artillery officer,
he has undertaken numerous overseas deployments and
assignments since being commissioned in 1991, including two
in Japan, and participated in such operations as RESTORE
HOPE in Somalia in 1994 and IRAQI FREEDOM in Al Anbar
province, Iraq, in 2004 and 2006. LtCol Kendall graduated
from the Virginia Military Institute in1991, and in 2002
received his MA in National Security Affairs from the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he was a
Distinguished Graduate. His personal awards include the
Meritorious Service Medal, Navy and Marine Corps
Commendation Medal and the Combat Action Ribbon.
Dr. Xinjun Zhang is Associate Professor of Public
International Law at Tsinghua University, Beijing. He
received his doctoral degree from Kyoto University. His
research interests include the Law of the Sea, Non-
proliferation Law and the Law of Treaties. He is a member of
International Law Association (ILA), and active participant
in the `Committee on The Legal Principles relating to
Climate Change|. He is currently a Fulbright Research
Scholar at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. His
FPRI essay on China-Japan maritime sovereignty disputes can
be found here:
http://www.fpri.org/byauthor.html#zhang
Conference Sponsors
Foreign Policy Research Institute www.fpri.org
Reserve Officers Association www.roa.org
Sea Change?
Conflicting Claims, Disparate Agendas and U.S.-China
Maritime Security Relations
Thursday, May 13, 2010
2:00 - 4:45 PM EDT
Reserve Officers Association
One Constitution Avenue NE, Washington, DC
Reservations Required
Free for FPRI and ROA Members, $25 for non-Members
To register contact:
Alan Luxenberg
Tel: (215) 732-3774 x105
Email: lux@fpri.org
Please provide full contact information.
This conference will also be available via Audio Webcast and
by Teleconference
Participation by audio webcast or teleconference is free.
For instructions on how to participate via webcast or
teleconference contact:
Alan Luxenberg
Tel: (215) 732-3774 x105
Email: lux@fpri.org
Please provide full contact information.
FPRI and ROA will convene a symposium to address issues in
U.S.-China and Northeast Asian regional security relations
that arise from China’s growing maritime power , conflicting
claims of maritime and territorial sovereignty in the ocean
areas adjacent to China and the rights of foreign military
craft to operate in the region, including China's claimed
exclusive economic zone. The session will address the
prospects for conflict and accommodation, the merits of the
principal parties' claims, and the significance of these
issues for broader U.S.-China relations. Implications for
Japan's role and Sino-Japanese relations will be addressed
as well.
Agenda
Thursday, May 13, 2010
2:00 - 4:45 PM EDT
Sea Change?
Conflicting Claims, Disparate Agendas and U.S.-China
Maritime Security Relations
Panel I: 2:00 - 3:15 p.m.
Implications of China's Rising Maritime Power and U.S. and
Japanese Responses
Panelists:
Avery Goldstein, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics
and International Relations and Associate Director of the
Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics,
University of Pennsylvania; Senior Fellow, FPRI
Lt. Col. James R. Kendall, Foreign Area Officer, USMC
Felix Chang, Senior Fellow, FPRI
Moderator: Jacques deLisle, Director, FPRI Asia Program, and
Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law and Director of the Center
for East Asian Studies, University of Pennsylvania
Panel II: 3:30 - 4:45 p.m.
Contested Claims: Territorial Sovereignty and Rights of
Operation / Rules of the Road for Military Craft
Panelists:
Jacques deLisle, Director, FPRI Asia Program, and Stephen A.
Cozen Professor of Law and Director of the Center for East
Asian Studies, University of Pennsylvania
Peter Dutton, Associate Professor, U.S. Naval War College
and a founding member of the China Maritime Studies
Institute, US Naval War College
Xinjun Zhang, Associate Professor of Public International
Law at Tsinghua University, Beijing, and Fulbright Scholar
(2009-10), University of Pennsylvania Law School
Moderator: Harvey Sicherman, President, FPRI
----------------------------
About the Panelists
Felix K. Chang, an FPRI Senior Fellow, is a partner at CVP
Ventures, a venture capital firm. He was previously a
consultant in Booz Allen Hamilton’s Organization and
Strategy practice; among his clients were the U.S.
Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
and other agencies. Earlier, he served as a senior planner
and an intelligence officer in the U.S. Department of
Defense and a business advisor at Mobil Oil Corporation,
where he dealt with strategic planning for upstream and
midstream investments throughout Asia and Africa. His
publications and ongoing research concentrate on military,
economic, and energy security issues in Asia as well as
financial industry trends around the world. He received his
M.B.A. from Duke University and M.A. and B.A. from the
University of Pennsylvania. His FPRI essays can be found
here:
http://www.fpri.org/byauthor.html#chang
Jacques deLisle is Director of FPRI’s Asia Program, the
Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law and the Director of the
Center for East Asian Studies at the University of
Pennsylvania. His research focuses on Chinese politics and
legal reform, China's approach to international law and
institutions, U.S.-China relations, and the international
status of Taiwan. His articles also have appeared in Orbis
and other foreign affairs journals, law reviews and edited
volumes. He received a J.D. and graduate education in
political science at Harvard and an A.B. from Princeton. His
FPRI essays can be found here:
http://www.fpri.org/byauthor.html#delisle
Peter Dutton, a retired Navy commander and judge advocate,
is associate professor of joint military operations at the
Naval War College and an adjunct professor at Roger Williams
University School of Law. Professor Dutton earned his juris
doctorate from the College of William and Mary and a master
of arts from the Naval War College (with honors). While on
active duty, he served as a naval flight officer, taught at
the Naval Justice School and the Defense Institute of
International Legal Studies, and served as operational law
adviser to Commander, USS John F. Kennedy Battle Group,
during Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. In 2004, Professor Dutton
became the Naval War College’s Howard S. Levie Chair of
Operational Law. He is a founding member of the College’s
China Maritime Studies Institute and writes on issues
related to U.S. and Chinese perspectives on maritime
international law as they relate to security.
Avery Goldstein, an FPRI Senior Fellow, is the David M.
Knott Professor of Global Politics and International
Relations and Associate Director of the Christopher H.
Browne Center for International Politics at the University
of Pennsylvania. He specializes in international relations,
security studies, and Chinese politics. He is currently
conducting research on China’s grand strategy. He is the
Associate Director of Penn’s Christopher H. Browne Center
for International Politics. He received his Ph.D. from the
University of California, Berkeley. His books include Rising
to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International
Security (Stanford University Press, 2005), Deterrence and
Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and
the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford
University Press, 2000), and From Bandwagon to Balance-of-
Power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in
China, 1949–1978 (Stanford University Press, 1991). His FPRI
essays can be found here:
http://www.fpri.org/byauthor.html#goldstein
LtCol James R. Kendall is an East Asia Foreign Area Officer
currently preparing to attend the Japanese National
Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS) in Tokyo this summer.
From 2006 until last January, he was a Strategic Analyst
with the Marine Corps’ Strategic Initiatives Group (SIG) at
the Pentagon, conducting service-level analysis of the US
Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility and
Afghanistan. Fluent in Japanese, LtCol Kendall also served
at the Japanese Defense Agency in Tokyo in 2003, aiding the
historic Japanese deployment to Iraq. An artillery officer,
he has undertaken numerous overseas deployments and
assignments since being commissioned in 1991, including two
in Japan, and participated in such operations as RESTORE
HOPE in Somalia in 1994 and IRAQI FREEDOM in Al Anbar
province, Iraq, in 2004 and 2006. LtCol Kendall graduated
from the Virginia Military Institute in1991, and in 2002
received his MA in National Security Affairs from the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he was a
Distinguished Graduate. His personal awards include the
Meritorious Service Medal, Navy and Marine Corps
Commendation Medal and the Combat Action Ribbon.
Dr. Xinjun Zhang is Associate Professor of Public
International Law at Tsinghua University, Beijing. He
received his doctoral degree from Kyoto University. His
research interests include the Law of the Sea, Non-
proliferation Law and the Law of Treaties. He is a member of
International Law Association (ILA), and active participant
in the `Committee on The Legal Principles relating to
Climate Change|. He is currently a Fulbright Research
Scholar at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. His
FPRI essay on China-Japan maritime sovereignty disputes can
be found here:
http://www.fpri.org/byauthor.html#zhang
Sunday, April 25, 2010
408) Naval Power of China - New York Times
Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power
By EDWARD WONG
The New York Times, April 23, 2010
YALONG BAY, China — The Chinese military is seeking to project naval power well beyond the Chinese coast, from the oil ports of the Middle East to the shipping lanes of the Pacific, where the United States Navy has long reigned as the dominant force, military officials and analysts say.
China calls the new strategy “far sea defense,” and the speed with which it is building long-range capabilities has surprised foreign military officials.
The strategy is a sharp break from the traditional, narrower doctrine of preparing for war over the self-governing island of Taiwan or defending the Chinese coast. Now, Chinese admirals say they want warships to escort commercial vessels that are crucial to the country’s economy, from as far as the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca, in Southeast Asia, and to help secure Chinese interests in the resource-rich South and East China Seas.
In late March, two Chinese warships docked in Abu Dhabi, the first time the modern Chinese Navy made a port visit in the Middle East.
The overall plan reflects China’s growing sense of self-confidence and increasing willingness to assert its interests abroad. China’s naval ambitions are being felt, too, in recent muscle flexing with the United States: in March, Chinese officials told senior American officials privately that China would brook no foreign interference in its territorial issues in the South China Sea, said a senior American official involved in China policy.
The naval expansion will not make China a serious rival to American naval hegemony in the near future, and there are few indications that China has aggressive intentions toward the United States or other countries.
But China, now the world’s leading exporter and a giant buyer of oil and other natural resources, is also no longer content to trust the security of sea lanes to the Americans, and its definition of its own core interests has expanded along with its economic clout.
In late March, Adm. Robert F. Willard, the leader of the United States Pacific Command, said in Congressional testimony that recent Chinese military developments were “pretty dramatic.” China has tested long-range ballistic missiles that could be used against aircraft carriers, he said. After years of denials, Chinese officials have confirmed that they intend to deploy an aircraft carrier group within a few years.
China is also developing a sophisticated submarine fleet that could try to prevent foreign naval vessels from entering its strategic waters if a conflict erupted in the region, said Admiral Willard and military analysts.
“Of particular concern is that elements of China’s military modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region,” the admiral said.
Yalong Bay, on the southern coast of Hainan island in the South China Sea, is the site of five-star beach resorts just west of a new underground submarine base. The base allows submarines to reach deep water within 20 minutes and roam the South China Sea, which has some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and areas rich in oil and natural gas that are the focus of territorial disputes between China and other Asian nations.
That has caused concern not only among American commanders, but also among officials in Southeast Asian nations, which have been quietly acquiring more submarines, missiles and other weapons. “Regional officials have been surprised,” said Huang Jing, a scholar of the Chinese military at the National University of Singapore. “We were in a blinded situation. We thought the Chinese military was 20 years behind us, but we suddenly realized China is catching up.”
China is also pressing the United States to heed its claims in the region. In March, Chinese officials told two visiting senior Obama administration officials, Jeffrey A. Bader and James B. Steinberg, that China would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea, now part of China’s “core interest” of sovereignty, said an American official involved in China policy. It was the first time the Chinese labeled the South China Sea a core interest, on par with Taiwan and Tibet, the official said.
Another element of the Chinese Navy’s new strategy is to extend its operational reach beyond the South China Sea and the Philippines to what is known as the “second island chain” — rocks and atolls out in the Pacific, the official said. That zone significantly overlaps the United States Navy’s area of supremacy.
Japan is anxious, too. Its defense minister, Toshimi Kitazawa, said in mid-April that two Chinese submarines and eight destroyers were spotted on April 10 heading between two Japanese islands en route to the Pacific, the first time such a large Chinese flotilla had been seen so close to Japan. When two Japanese destroyers began following the Chinese ships, a Chinese helicopter flew within 300 feet of one of the destroyers, the Japanese Defense Ministry said.
Since December 2008, China has maintained three ships in the Gulf of Aden to contribute to international antipiracy patrols, the first deployment of the Chinese Navy beyond the Pacific. The mission allows China to improve its navy’s long-range capabilities, analysts say.
A 2009 Pentagon report estimated Chinese naval forces at 260 vessels, including 75 “principal combatants” — major warships — and more than 60 submarines. The report noted the building of an aircraft carrier, and said China “continues to show interest” in acquiring carrier-borne jet fighters from Russia. The United States Navy has 286 battle-force ships and 3,700 naval aircraft, though ship for ship the American Navy is considered qualitatively superior to the Chinese Navy.
The Pentagon does not classify China as an enemy force. But partly in reaction to China’s growth, the United States has recently transferred submarines from the Atlantic to the Pacific so that most of its nuclear-powered attack submarines are now in the Pacific, said Bernard D. Cole, a former American naval officer and a professor at the National War College in Washington.
The United States has also begun rotating three to four submarines on deployments out of Guam, reviving a practice that had ended with the cold war, Mr. Cole said.
American vessels now frequently survey the submarine base at Hainan island, and that activity leads to occasional friction with Chinese ships. A survey mission last year by an American naval ship, the Impeccable, resulted in what Pentagon officials said was harassment by Chinese fishing vessels; the Chinese government said it had the right to block surveillance in those waters because they are an “exclusive economic zone” of China.
The United States and China have clashing definitions of such zones, defined by a United Nations convention as waters within 200 nautical miles of a coast. The United States says international law allows a coastal country to retain only special commercial rights in the zones, while China contends the country can control virtually any activity within them.
Military leaders here maintain that the Chinese Navy is purely a self-defense force. But the definition of self-defense has expanded to encompass broad maritime and economic interests, two Chinese admirals contended in March.
“With our naval strategy changing now, we are going from coastal defense to far sea defense,” Rear Adm. Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, said in an interview with Xinhua, the state news agency.
“With the expansion of the country’s economic interests, the navy wants to better protect the country’s transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes,” he added. “In order to achieve this, the Chinese Navy needs to develop along the lines of bigger vessels and with more comprehensive capabilities.”
The navy gets more than one-third of the overall Chinese military budget, “reflecting the priority Beijing currently places on the navy as an instrument of national security,” Mr. Cole said. China’s official military budget for 2010 is $78 billion, but the Pentagon says China spends much more than that amount. Last year, the Pentagon estimated total Chinese military spending at $105 billion to $150 billion, still much less than what the United States spends on defense. For comparison, the Obama administration proposed $548.9 billion as the Pentagon’s base operating budget for next year.
The Chinese Navy’s most impressive growth has been in its submarine fleet, said Mr. Huang, the scholar in Singapore. It recently built at least two Jin-class submarines, the first regularly active ones in the fleet with ballistic missile capabilities, and two more are under construction. Two Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarines recently entered service.
Countries in the region have responded with their own acquisitions, said Carlyle A. Thayer, a professor at the Australian Defense Force Academy. In December, Vietnam signed an arms deal with Russia that included six Kilo-class submarines, which would give Vietnam the most formidable submarine fleet in Southeast Asia. Last year, Malaysia took delivery of its first submarine, one of two ordered from France, and Singapore began operating one of two Archer-class submarines bought from Sweden.
Last fall, during a speech in Washington, Lee Kuan Yew, the former Singaporean leader, reflected widespread anxieties when he noted China’s naval rise and urged the United States to maintain its regional presence. “U.S. core interest requires that it remains the superior power on the Pacific,” he said. “To give up this position would diminish America’s role throughout the world.”
Thom Shanker contributed reporting from Washington.
By EDWARD WONG
The New York Times, April 23, 2010
YALONG BAY, China — The Chinese military is seeking to project naval power well beyond the Chinese coast, from the oil ports of the Middle East to the shipping lanes of the Pacific, where the United States Navy has long reigned as the dominant force, military officials and analysts say.
China calls the new strategy “far sea defense,” and the speed with which it is building long-range capabilities has surprised foreign military officials.
The strategy is a sharp break from the traditional, narrower doctrine of preparing for war over the self-governing island of Taiwan or defending the Chinese coast. Now, Chinese admirals say they want warships to escort commercial vessels that are crucial to the country’s economy, from as far as the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca, in Southeast Asia, and to help secure Chinese interests in the resource-rich South and East China Seas.
In late March, two Chinese warships docked in Abu Dhabi, the first time the modern Chinese Navy made a port visit in the Middle East.
The overall plan reflects China’s growing sense of self-confidence and increasing willingness to assert its interests abroad. China’s naval ambitions are being felt, too, in recent muscle flexing with the United States: in March, Chinese officials told senior American officials privately that China would brook no foreign interference in its territorial issues in the South China Sea, said a senior American official involved in China policy.
The naval expansion will not make China a serious rival to American naval hegemony in the near future, and there are few indications that China has aggressive intentions toward the United States or other countries.
But China, now the world’s leading exporter and a giant buyer of oil and other natural resources, is also no longer content to trust the security of sea lanes to the Americans, and its definition of its own core interests has expanded along with its economic clout.
In late March, Adm. Robert F. Willard, the leader of the United States Pacific Command, said in Congressional testimony that recent Chinese military developments were “pretty dramatic.” China has tested long-range ballistic missiles that could be used against aircraft carriers, he said. After years of denials, Chinese officials have confirmed that they intend to deploy an aircraft carrier group within a few years.
China is also developing a sophisticated submarine fleet that could try to prevent foreign naval vessels from entering its strategic waters if a conflict erupted in the region, said Admiral Willard and military analysts.
“Of particular concern is that elements of China’s military modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region,” the admiral said.
Yalong Bay, on the southern coast of Hainan island in the South China Sea, is the site of five-star beach resorts just west of a new underground submarine base. The base allows submarines to reach deep water within 20 minutes and roam the South China Sea, which has some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and areas rich in oil and natural gas that are the focus of territorial disputes between China and other Asian nations.
That has caused concern not only among American commanders, but also among officials in Southeast Asian nations, which have been quietly acquiring more submarines, missiles and other weapons. “Regional officials have been surprised,” said Huang Jing, a scholar of the Chinese military at the National University of Singapore. “We were in a blinded situation. We thought the Chinese military was 20 years behind us, but we suddenly realized China is catching up.”
China is also pressing the United States to heed its claims in the region. In March, Chinese officials told two visiting senior Obama administration officials, Jeffrey A. Bader and James B. Steinberg, that China would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea, now part of China’s “core interest” of sovereignty, said an American official involved in China policy. It was the first time the Chinese labeled the South China Sea a core interest, on par with Taiwan and Tibet, the official said.
Another element of the Chinese Navy’s new strategy is to extend its operational reach beyond the South China Sea and the Philippines to what is known as the “second island chain” — rocks and atolls out in the Pacific, the official said. That zone significantly overlaps the United States Navy’s area of supremacy.
Japan is anxious, too. Its defense minister, Toshimi Kitazawa, said in mid-April that two Chinese submarines and eight destroyers were spotted on April 10 heading between two Japanese islands en route to the Pacific, the first time such a large Chinese flotilla had been seen so close to Japan. When two Japanese destroyers began following the Chinese ships, a Chinese helicopter flew within 300 feet of one of the destroyers, the Japanese Defense Ministry said.
Since December 2008, China has maintained three ships in the Gulf of Aden to contribute to international antipiracy patrols, the first deployment of the Chinese Navy beyond the Pacific. The mission allows China to improve its navy’s long-range capabilities, analysts say.
A 2009 Pentagon report estimated Chinese naval forces at 260 vessels, including 75 “principal combatants” — major warships — and more than 60 submarines. The report noted the building of an aircraft carrier, and said China “continues to show interest” in acquiring carrier-borne jet fighters from Russia. The United States Navy has 286 battle-force ships and 3,700 naval aircraft, though ship for ship the American Navy is considered qualitatively superior to the Chinese Navy.
The Pentagon does not classify China as an enemy force. But partly in reaction to China’s growth, the United States has recently transferred submarines from the Atlantic to the Pacific so that most of its nuclear-powered attack submarines are now in the Pacific, said Bernard D. Cole, a former American naval officer and a professor at the National War College in Washington.
The United States has also begun rotating three to four submarines on deployments out of Guam, reviving a practice that had ended with the cold war, Mr. Cole said.
American vessels now frequently survey the submarine base at Hainan island, and that activity leads to occasional friction with Chinese ships. A survey mission last year by an American naval ship, the Impeccable, resulted in what Pentagon officials said was harassment by Chinese fishing vessels; the Chinese government said it had the right to block surveillance in those waters because they are an “exclusive economic zone” of China.
The United States and China have clashing definitions of such zones, defined by a United Nations convention as waters within 200 nautical miles of a coast. The United States says international law allows a coastal country to retain only special commercial rights in the zones, while China contends the country can control virtually any activity within them.
Military leaders here maintain that the Chinese Navy is purely a self-defense force. But the definition of self-defense has expanded to encompass broad maritime and economic interests, two Chinese admirals contended in March.
“With our naval strategy changing now, we are going from coastal defense to far sea defense,” Rear Adm. Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, said in an interview with Xinhua, the state news agency.
“With the expansion of the country’s economic interests, the navy wants to better protect the country’s transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes,” he added. “In order to achieve this, the Chinese Navy needs to develop along the lines of bigger vessels and with more comprehensive capabilities.”
The navy gets more than one-third of the overall Chinese military budget, “reflecting the priority Beijing currently places on the navy as an instrument of national security,” Mr. Cole said. China’s official military budget for 2010 is $78 billion, but the Pentagon says China spends much more than that amount. Last year, the Pentagon estimated total Chinese military spending at $105 billion to $150 billion, still much less than what the United States spends on defense. For comparison, the Obama administration proposed $548.9 billion as the Pentagon’s base operating budget for next year.
The Chinese Navy’s most impressive growth has been in its submarine fleet, said Mr. Huang, the scholar in Singapore. It recently built at least two Jin-class submarines, the first regularly active ones in the fleet with ballistic missile capabilities, and two more are under construction. Two Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarines recently entered service.
Countries in the region have responded with their own acquisitions, said Carlyle A. Thayer, a professor at the Australian Defense Force Academy. In December, Vietnam signed an arms deal with Russia that included six Kilo-class submarines, which would give Vietnam the most formidable submarine fleet in Southeast Asia. Last year, Malaysia took delivery of its first submarine, one of two ordered from France, and Singapore began operating one of two Archer-class submarines bought from Sweden.
Last fall, during a speech in Washington, Lee Kuan Yew, the former Singaporean leader, reflected widespread anxieties when he noted China’s naval rise and urged the United States to maintain its regional presence. “U.S. core interest requires that it remains the superior power on the Pacific,” he said. “To give up this position would diminish America’s role throughout the world.”
Thom Shanker contributed reporting from Washington.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
397) Cambio na berlinda: pressoes sobre yuan da India e do Brasil
Brasil e Índia se unem em crítica ao yuan
Da Redação
Folha de S. Paulo, Quinta-feira, 22 de abril de 2010
A China está enfrentando uma pressão cada vez maior dos países emergentes para deixar a sua moeda (o yuan) se valorizar, uma ação que está criando aliados inesperados para os Estados Unidos na disputa diplomática contra a política cambial de Pequim.
Falando às vésperas do encontro de ministros das Finanças e de presidentes de bancos centrais do G20, que começa hoje em Washington, os comandantes dos BCs brasileiro e indiano fizeram as declarações mais fortes de seus países pela apreciação do yuan.
Ainda que a maior parte da pressão pública contra a China venha dos EUA, a declaração deles ressalta que uma série de países em desenvolvimento sente que o atrelamento do yuan ao dólar, que ocorreu em meados de 2008, tem imposto custos para suas economias.
O presidente do Banco Central, Henrique Meirelles, disse que uma moeda chinesa mais forte é absolutamente crítica para o equilíbrio da economia mundial. Ele afirmou que existem algumas distorções nos mercados globais, uma delas é a falta de crescimento, a outra é a China.
Já o presidente do BC indiano, Duvvuri Subbarao, afirmou que um yuan desvalorizado cria problemas para os países, inclusive para a Índia.
Se a China reavaliar o yuan, isso terá um impacto positivo no nosso setor externo, disse. Se alguns países administram sua taxa cambial e a deixam artificialmente baixa, o peso do ajuste recai em alguns países que não administram a sua taxa cambial tão ativamente.
Algumas pessoas na China têm se protegido das críticas dos EUA contra o yuan forte ao dizer que isso é um modo de tirar a atenção das verdadeiras razões da crise financeira global. No entanto, não é tão fácil rebater as críticas de países em desenvolvimento. Se as economias ricas e emergentes estiverem unidas no pedido pela revalorização cambial, vai ficar mais difícil para desqualificar a manifestação, chamando-a de exemplo da arrogância de uma superpotência, afirmou Sebastian Mallaby, do Council on Foreign Relations.
O yuan desvalorizado prejudica as exportações de alguns emergentes, porém também ajudou na recuperação da China, que aumentou seu consumo de itens vindos de fora.
================
O Bric já rachou
Clóvis Rossi
Folha de S. Paulo, Quinta-feira, 22 de abril de 2010
Não passou nem uma semana desde que o presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva proclamou, em Brasília, a unidade de ação do Bric (Brasil, Rússia, Índia e China) e eis que dois de seus integrantes (Brasil e Índia) disparam sobre um terceiro (China).
Henrique de Campos Meirelles, presidente do Banco Central do Brasil, diz que a valorização da moeda chinesa é absolutamente crítica para o equilíbrio da economia mundial.
Duvvuri Subbarao, o colega de Meirelles no Banco Central indiano, reforça: Se a China revalorizasse o yuan, teria um impacto positivo no nosso setor externo. (...) Se alguns países administram sua taxa de câmbio e a mantêm artificialmente baixa, o peso do ajuste cai em certos países que não administram sua taxa de câmbio tão ativamente.
Detalhe nada secundário: a manifestação de Subbarao é rigorosamente idêntica à de Timothy Geithner, o secretário norte-americano do Tesouro, mas não tem parentesco algum com o que se ouviu na cúpula do Bric.
Não se trata de minimizar o Bric. Países grandes, territorial e populacionalmente, são por definição candidatos a potências. Nem precisava a Goldman Sachs dizê-lo.
Trata-se apenas de não cair na fanfarra vazia que cerca o grupo, por enquanto apenas uma mesa de debates.
Prova-o a divergência em torno do câmbio. Meirelles aponta o yuan valorizado como uma das duas grandes distorções da economia global (a outra é o deficit de crescimento nos países ricos).
A moeda chinesa desvalorizada facilita exportações e dificulta importações, o que cria os problemas apontados pelo presidente do BC indiano e a distorção global citada por Meirelles.
É esse o ponto que tende a dominar a discussão econômica doravante, além da guerra entre a Casa Branca e Wall Street.
Da Redação
Folha de S. Paulo, Quinta-feira, 22 de abril de 2010
A China está enfrentando uma pressão cada vez maior dos países emergentes para deixar a sua moeda (o yuan) se valorizar, uma ação que está criando aliados inesperados para os Estados Unidos na disputa diplomática contra a política cambial de Pequim.
Falando às vésperas do encontro de ministros das Finanças e de presidentes de bancos centrais do G20, que começa hoje em Washington, os comandantes dos BCs brasileiro e indiano fizeram as declarações mais fortes de seus países pela apreciação do yuan.
Ainda que a maior parte da pressão pública contra a China venha dos EUA, a declaração deles ressalta que uma série de países em desenvolvimento sente que o atrelamento do yuan ao dólar, que ocorreu em meados de 2008, tem imposto custos para suas economias.
O presidente do Banco Central, Henrique Meirelles, disse que uma moeda chinesa mais forte é absolutamente crítica para o equilíbrio da economia mundial. Ele afirmou que existem algumas distorções nos mercados globais, uma delas é a falta de crescimento, a outra é a China.
Já o presidente do BC indiano, Duvvuri Subbarao, afirmou que um yuan desvalorizado cria problemas para os países, inclusive para a Índia.
Se a China reavaliar o yuan, isso terá um impacto positivo no nosso setor externo, disse. Se alguns países administram sua taxa cambial e a deixam artificialmente baixa, o peso do ajuste recai em alguns países que não administram a sua taxa cambial tão ativamente.
Algumas pessoas na China têm se protegido das críticas dos EUA contra o yuan forte ao dizer que isso é um modo de tirar a atenção das verdadeiras razões da crise financeira global. No entanto, não é tão fácil rebater as críticas de países em desenvolvimento. Se as economias ricas e emergentes estiverem unidas no pedido pela revalorização cambial, vai ficar mais difícil para desqualificar a manifestação, chamando-a de exemplo da arrogância de uma superpotência, afirmou Sebastian Mallaby, do Council on Foreign Relations.
O yuan desvalorizado prejudica as exportações de alguns emergentes, porém também ajudou na recuperação da China, que aumentou seu consumo de itens vindos de fora.
================
O Bric já rachou
Clóvis Rossi
Folha de S. Paulo, Quinta-feira, 22 de abril de 2010
Não passou nem uma semana desde que o presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva proclamou, em Brasília, a unidade de ação do Bric (Brasil, Rússia, Índia e China) e eis que dois de seus integrantes (Brasil e Índia) disparam sobre um terceiro (China).
Henrique de Campos Meirelles, presidente do Banco Central do Brasil, diz que a valorização da moeda chinesa é absolutamente crítica para o equilíbrio da economia mundial.
Duvvuri Subbarao, o colega de Meirelles no Banco Central indiano, reforça: Se a China revalorizasse o yuan, teria um impacto positivo no nosso setor externo. (...) Se alguns países administram sua taxa de câmbio e a mantêm artificialmente baixa, o peso do ajuste cai em certos países que não administram sua taxa de câmbio tão ativamente.
Detalhe nada secundário: a manifestação de Subbarao é rigorosamente idêntica à de Timothy Geithner, o secretário norte-americano do Tesouro, mas não tem parentesco algum com o que se ouviu na cúpula do Bric.
Não se trata de minimizar o Bric. Países grandes, territorial e populacionalmente, são por definição candidatos a potências. Nem precisava a Goldman Sachs dizê-lo.
Trata-se apenas de não cair na fanfarra vazia que cerca o grupo, por enquanto apenas uma mesa de debates.
Prova-o a divergência em torno do câmbio. Meirelles aponta o yuan valorizado como uma das duas grandes distorções da economia global (a outra é o deficit de crescimento nos países ricos).
A moeda chinesa desvalorizada facilita exportações e dificulta importações, o que cria os problemas apontados pelo presidente do BC indiano e a distorção global citada por Meirelles.
É esse o ponto que tende a dominar a discussão econômica doravante, além da guerra entre a Casa Branca e Wall Street.
Monday, April 19, 2010
396) Shanghai Expo costs - Washington Post
Shanghai prepares world's fair while wondering about costs
By Keith B. Richburg
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, April 19, 2010; A08
SHANGHAI -- As China's largest city prepares to open the most expensive world's fair in history, the 2008 Beijing Olympics provides both a model and a cautionary tale.
As with the extravagant Olympics, Chinese officials see the World Expo, which begins next month and runs through October, as another chance to showcase China's rising clout and prosperity to a global audience. Shanghai has been constructing lavishly for the event, including new subway lines and an additional airport terminal.
But more than a year and a half after the Beijing Games awed the world, some of the most iconic venues have fallen into disuse.
The "Bird's Nest" stadium, site of the lavish opening ceremonies, hosted just three concerts and two B-list sporting events last year, and nothing in recent months. The "Water Cube," an engineering marvel where American swimmer Michael Phelps made Olympic history, has not been used for a competition since, and has been closed for renovations since October as officials try to transform it into an entertainment complex.
So far, the huge maintenance costs of those venues is being sustained by Chinese tourists, who pay for tickets to visit them and relive a bit of China's glory. But officials said interest is beginning to wane.
Perhaps mindful of that history, authorities in Shanghai decided that almost all the World Expo pavilions will be dismantled immediately after the fair. The site, an old industrial area that once housed a steel plant and scrap yard, will be used for exhibitions and conferences, a business sector this city is still trying to develop.
Also, officials and Shanghai residents say, the costly infrastructure improvements will continue to benefit locals long after the fair has closed down.
There have been contradictory official statements about the cost of the expo. Officially, the budget is 28.6 billion yuan, or just over $4 billion. But the China Economic Daily reported that the real cost could reach more than 400 billion yuan -- or more than $58 billion -- once all the costs for construction, the rail lines and the airport terminal are factored in. In addition, some 17,000 people were relocated, adding to the costs.
"Shanghai will be more beautiful, cleaner and have better infrastructure," said Hong Hao, the director general of the expo. "All the citizens will benefit from this."
He added, "We never stopped learning from the Beijing Olympics."
Most Shanghainese seem to like the idea of their city being the center of attention. One of the few vocal critics was Han Han, a popular writer, blogger and rally car driver. Invited to an expo forum for celebrities in November, Han Han began by saying the rapid urbanization of Shanghai would "make life worse," and the live video feed of his remarks abruptly stopped. His speech ended up being passed around on Web sites.
With the expo a new point of patriotic pride, such criticism has been rare and largely limited to anonymous postings on Internet sites. On one popular Shanghai discussion forum, some recent posters questioned whether the prestige of the world's fair was worth the high cost. "I am just wondering why they are putting so many resources into Expo," one poster said last week, using the online name Cfxianggang. "What benefits will this bring to the country?"
Another poster, using the name Yi Tao, replied: "All this is for face. No other country would do this like China, and put so many resources into it. But the way China is doing it, it will still end up being regarded as a developing country."
Another area where Shanghai is taking a page from Beijing is security. Metal detectors have been set up at Shanghai's subways and in the lobbies of hotels. A special paper, first used at the Olympics, is being swabbed on baggage and can detect explosives and other prohibited items. Kites and balloons are banned in the expo's vicinity. And volunteers are being enlisted to be on the lookout for troublemakers.
Organizers also say this expo will be the "greenest" world's fair ever. A solar energy system will produce up to 5 megawatts of power -- making it the largest solar plant in China -- and large rooftop canopies will collect rainwater to be purified for drinking. Heating will be provided through underground systems.
Richard Brubaker, an American business consultant who teaches a sustainability course at the China Europe International Business School here, said the green results will be known only after the event has closed. Brubaker said that the design of all the buildings uses energy-efficient technology -- but that afterward it would be better to reuse the pavilions than to disassemble all the glass, wood and steel used to make them.
Also, simply moving 70 million people to Shanghai on planes, trains and automobiles will increase China's energy footprint, even if the expo is self-sustaining.
Hong, the expo official, said it will bring "intangible benefits" to Shanghai -- among other things, teaching residents to be "more civilized." Residents have been ordered not to jaywalk, not to spit on the sidewalks, not to hang their laundry in public, and to be polite to foreigners.
The biggest change is that they are being told not to wear their pajamas in public, a longtime Shanghainese tradition.
Wu Weikang, 67, was standing in his thick green-and-blue plaid pajamas outside his house on a chilly afternoon. Before the coming of the expo, he said, if he needed something at the nearby grocery store, he would just walk there in his pajamas. But no longer.
"Now everybody knows," Wu said. "If I forget and wear my pajamas out on the street, my neighbor will stop me."
Photo Gallery
By Keith B. Richburg
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, April 19, 2010; A08
SHANGHAI -- As China's largest city prepares to open the most expensive world's fair in history, the 2008 Beijing Olympics provides both a model and a cautionary tale.
As with the extravagant Olympics, Chinese officials see the World Expo, which begins next month and runs through October, as another chance to showcase China's rising clout and prosperity to a global audience. Shanghai has been constructing lavishly for the event, including new subway lines and an additional airport terminal.
But more than a year and a half after the Beijing Games awed the world, some of the most iconic venues have fallen into disuse.
The "Bird's Nest" stadium, site of the lavish opening ceremonies, hosted just three concerts and two B-list sporting events last year, and nothing in recent months. The "Water Cube," an engineering marvel where American swimmer Michael Phelps made Olympic history, has not been used for a competition since, and has been closed for renovations since October as officials try to transform it into an entertainment complex.
So far, the huge maintenance costs of those venues is being sustained by Chinese tourists, who pay for tickets to visit them and relive a bit of China's glory. But officials said interest is beginning to wane.
Perhaps mindful of that history, authorities in Shanghai decided that almost all the World Expo pavilions will be dismantled immediately after the fair. The site, an old industrial area that once housed a steel plant and scrap yard, will be used for exhibitions and conferences, a business sector this city is still trying to develop.
Also, officials and Shanghai residents say, the costly infrastructure improvements will continue to benefit locals long after the fair has closed down.
There have been contradictory official statements about the cost of the expo. Officially, the budget is 28.6 billion yuan, or just over $4 billion. But the China Economic Daily reported that the real cost could reach more than 400 billion yuan -- or more than $58 billion -- once all the costs for construction, the rail lines and the airport terminal are factored in. In addition, some 17,000 people were relocated, adding to the costs.
"Shanghai will be more beautiful, cleaner and have better infrastructure," said Hong Hao, the director general of the expo. "All the citizens will benefit from this."
He added, "We never stopped learning from the Beijing Olympics."
Most Shanghainese seem to like the idea of their city being the center of attention. One of the few vocal critics was Han Han, a popular writer, blogger and rally car driver. Invited to an expo forum for celebrities in November, Han Han began by saying the rapid urbanization of Shanghai would "make life worse," and the live video feed of his remarks abruptly stopped. His speech ended up being passed around on Web sites.
With the expo a new point of patriotic pride, such criticism has been rare and largely limited to anonymous postings on Internet sites. On one popular Shanghai discussion forum, some recent posters questioned whether the prestige of the world's fair was worth the high cost. "I am just wondering why they are putting so many resources into Expo," one poster said last week, using the online name Cfxianggang. "What benefits will this bring to the country?"
Another poster, using the name Yi Tao, replied: "All this is for face. No other country would do this like China, and put so many resources into it. But the way China is doing it, it will still end up being regarded as a developing country."
Another area where Shanghai is taking a page from Beijing is security. Metal detectors have been set up at Shanghai's subways and in the lobbies of hotels. A special paper, first used at the Olympics, is being swabbed on baggage and can detect explosives and other prohibited items. Kites and balloons are banned in the expo's vicinity. And volunteers are being enlisted to be on the lookout for troublemakers.
Organizers also say this expo will be the "greenest" world's fair ever. A solar energy system will produce up to 5 megawatts of power -- making it the largest solar plant in China -- and large rooftop canopies will collect rainwater to be purified for drinking. Heating will be provided through underground systems.
Richard Brubaker, an American business consultant who teaches a sustainability course at the China Europe International Business School here, said the green results will be known only after the event has closed. Brubaker said that the design of all the buildings uses energy-efficient technology -- but that afterward it would be better to reuse the pavilions than to disassemble all the glass, wood and steel used to make them.
Also, simply moving 70 million people to Shanghai on planes, trains and automobiles will increase China's energy footprint, even if the expo is self-sustaining.
Hong, the expo official, said it will bring "intangible benefits" to Shanghai -- among other things, teaching residents to be "more civilized." Residents have been ordered not to jaywalk, not to spit on the sidewalks, not to hang their laundry in public, and to be polite to foreigners.
The biggest change is that they are being told not to wear their pajamas in public, a longtime Shanghainese tradition.
Wu Weikang, 67, was standing in his thick green-and-blue plaid pajamas outside his house on a chilly afternoon. Before the coming of the expo, he said, if he needed something at the nearby grocery store, he would just walk there in his pajamas. But no longer.
"Now everybody knows," Wu said. "If I forget and wear my pajamas out on the street, my neighbor will stop me."
Photo Gallery
Sunday, April 18, 2010
395) China's maritime ambitions
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Over 50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation
www.fpri.org
CHINA'S "PEACEFUL RISE," "HARMONIOUS" FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND LEGAL CONFRONTATION-AND LESSONS FROM THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE OVER THE EAST CHINA SEA
by Xinjun Zhang
April 16, 2010
Xinjun Zhang is Associate Professor, School of Law, Tsinghua
University and, for 2009-10, is a Fulbright Scholar in
residence at the School of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
This essay is based on his November 5, 2009 presentation to
FPRI's Asia Study Group, chaired by Jacques deLisle.
China's rise naturally raises concern among its neighbors
about Beijing's agenda. China has emphasized that its "rise"
will be "peaceful," but China also will seek to remove
impediments to its rise, in part by invoking existing
international rules, and shaping new international rules, to
serve its interests. As a result, there will be more "legal
confrontations" between China and other states. Such legal
disputes are contentious but peaceful, compatible with
China's ideal of a "harmonious world" and agenda of peaceful
rise, and preferable to less law-governed alternatives.
China's approach to territorial disputes during the last
twenty years and recent developments in the Sino-Japanese
dispute over the East China Sea, including a "principled
consensus" between the parties in 2008, illustrate the
virtues and potential-as well as the limits-of China's
reliance on international law to address a chronic source of
friction and instability in China's foreign relations.
China's Numerous, Long-Running Territorial Disputes
China's long land borders, numerous neighbors and long,
complicated and sometimes crisis-ridden history of relations
with adjacent states have generated border disputes. These
have sometimes brought crisis and violence, including
several armed conflicts from the 1960s to the 1980s.
Especially since the 1990s, China and its continental
neighbors have worked hard to reach boundary agreements,
successfully settling most of the long-standing disputes
with formal treaties. For example, China and Vietnam reached
a comprehensive land boundary agreement in December 1999.
China and Russia reached an agreement concerning the western
part of the border in September 1994. With respect to the
more contentious eastern part of their border, the two
powers reached an initial agreement in May 1991, a
supplementary agreement in October 2004, and a supplementary
protocol in July 2008, which is said to be a final
settlement of the 4300 kilometer frontier. China and India
are engaged in ongoing talks to address China's last
unsettled land boundary.
Maritime boundary issues, in contrast, have only recently
emerged on China's foreign relations agenda, and there has
been little progress in settling most of them. China has
overlapping maritime territorial claims with three countries
in the East China Sea and five countries in the South China
Sea. The only formal delimitation agreement so far has been
reached with Vietnam (the Beibu Gulf Delimitation Agreement,
December 12, 2000, and entered into force on June 30, 2004)
and addresses only part of the two states' maritime
boundary. In 2002, China and ASEAN agreed on a Code of
Conduct for the South China Sea-a relatively informal
declaration that did not resolve territorial claims or
rights to exploit resources. In 2005, China and North Korea
concluded a Joint Development Agreement -- China's first
joint development agreement, but the text of the agreement
has not yet been made available to public. On June 18, 2008,
China and Japan reached a "Principled Consensus on the East
China Sea Issue," but the accord was followed immediately by
sharp discrepancies in the parties' interpretations of the
document, and an apparent stalling of the process for
negotiating the further measures required to implement the
Consensus.
China's Policy Goals and the Relevance of International Law
What lessons can be drawn from Chinese practice in the past
twenty years in dealing with boundary issues? First, China
sees boundary stability as vital for creating a harmonious
international (and, specifically, regional) environment that
is essential for China's agenda of a peaceful rise (and
peaceful development). In Chinese diplomatic and foreign
policymaking circles, references to weiwen-maintaining
stability-are common. This policy goal is evident in Chinese
efforts during the past 20 years to address disputed land
boundaries. In handling those issues, China discarded the
"naturalist" position which holds that territory is divine
and sovereign issues (including boundary issues) is non-
negotiable[1]. Most strikingly, China moved beyond two
centuries of intermittent bloodshed over competing claims to
territorial sovereignty on the Sino-Russian border to a
conventional international legal agreement delimiting the
two states' territories.
Second, the policy of peaceful rise requires China to
develop a more comprehensive and global perspective in
defining its national interests. Here, the focus is not on
weiwen (maintaining stability) but on weiquan (upholding
rights). China's territorial interests increasingly include
traditionally slighted ones, such as hydrocarbon resources
in the continental shelf and national security interests in
a more extended offshore maritime area. Although such newly
emphasized concerns can reduce China's focus on nettlesome
maritime boundary issues, they also can pose challenges
because China is rather new to these questions and has not
fully assessed and articulated its interests. Still, it does
seem clear that the rights China seeks to uphold are those
generally accepted in the existing international order,
particularly those defined by the law of the sea.
It is therefore unsurprising that China increasingly turns
to international law as a policy instrument in these areas.
China repeatedly highlights the importance of international
law in addressing maritime issues. This is not mere lip-
service; it has a foundation in serious policy
considerations and Chinese approaches to foreign policy.
International legal rules and institutions, including the
WTO, have been beneficial to China's national interests
throughout the period of reform and opening to the outside
world that began three decades ago. Even amid significant
uncertainty about the future trajectory of world order,
international law still promises to provide means to protect
and advance China's national interests, especially as China
assumes a greater role in making international law (as has
been occurring, for example, in international negotiations
to address climate change).
Using international law to address disputed boundaries
serves China's high priority goal of maintaining domestic
stability. China's modern history-including the May Fourth
Movement that reacted against the Versailles Treaty's
acceptance of Japanese colonial encroachment on China and
that gave birth to modern Chinese nationalism and, in turn,
the Chinese Revolution-teaches the danger of domestic
turmoil and threats to the regime that can come from failed
diplomatic efforts to address highly sensitive territorial
issues in China. Although understandable in light of the
historical context, the political and diplomatic compromises
that characterized the U.S.-China Joint Communiques
similarly failed to resolve fully crucial international
legal issues and thus sowed seeds of future conflicts.
Giving territorial settlements a clear basis in
international law makes them easier to accept for Chinese
public opinion (which is expressed today in newly strident
nationalist tones via the Internet), and therefore helps
prevent such agreements from triggering political crisis. A
firm international legal basis also facilitates other
parties' acceptance and implementation of territorial
accords with China, smoothing ratification by their
legislatures and other steps required by other states'
constitutional structures. This in turn promotes regional
stability, which is in China's interest.
China has grown more confident in relying on international
law. This new confidence reflects China's growing power.
China's previously suspicious attitude toward international
law was based on the belief not that international law was
unreasonable but that it was unreliable because China lacked
national power. As one Chinese international law scholar has
characterized this view, "if there is right without might,
the right will not prevail."[2] In addition to acquiring
more of the requisite "might," elites in China have gained
international experience and perspectives and are thus more
likely to perceive international law in more than a narrowly
instrumentalist way. They increasingly understand the
normativity of international law and thus feel less
alienated from the initially Western partly law-based
approach to foreign policy.
Nevertheless, even under current conditions and against the
backdrop of a broader Chinese tradition of pragmatism in
foreign affairs, there are still some significant obstacles
to China's employing international law in foreign
policymaking. For example, China's lack of a strong legal
culture and tradition domestically can make it less likely
that foreign policy makers will give full consideration to
international law in pursuing international dispute
settlement. Traditionally in Chinese society, people were
discouraged from going to court and invoking law to solve
their problems because the "win or lose" result of a
judicial proceeding could be devastating to a party's
reputation. Instead, norms and practices favored informal
conciliation outside courts, with "saving face" and ending
overt conflict being primary concerns, sometimes at the cost
of setting aside or papering over the issues in dispute.
When aspects of this tradition carry into foreign policy, it
can encourage the view that it is not important to have a
basis in international law for China's positions. In
maritime and territorial issues, the well-known Chinese
policy of "setting aside disputes and undertaking joint-
development" may illustrate this problem although the policy
also can be defended as reflecting strategic thinking and
calculations about what serves China's national interests.
Another factor impeding China's effective use of
international law in foreign policy is China's still-
insufficient study of international law. Although China's
leaders have called for enhanced study of international law
since the late 1970s,[3] Reform-era China started from a
comparatively low baseline. It trails other big powers that
have strong traditions in the study of international law and
ample well-trained international lawyers. While it is
uncertain how large a role international law will play in
various aspects of China's foreign policy, there are signs
of significant growth. One example is the recent
establishment of the Department of Boundary and Ocean
Affairs, which is located in the Chinese Foreign Ministry,
staffed from the Ministry's Department of Treaties and Law,
and reflects enhancement of international law as a
consideration in managing maritime boundary and territorial
issues.
On balance, international law has come to be seen as a more
important and necessary means for China to achieve its
foreign policy ends, even though obstacles and uncertainty
persist. Moreover, China's turn to international law has
been uneven, and unsurprisingly so. International law is
more likely to be an appealing instrument for China where
the other party to a dispute is a near-peer in political,
economic and military power (as is the case, for example,
with Japan), or where the other parties are significantly
less powerful than China (as is the case, for example, with
the ASEAN countries). In the first type of case,
international law is useful because there is comparatively
little room for one party to prevail through simple pressure
or manipulation. In the second context, using international
law can help to reassure weaker parties worried about
China's rise. Beijing's recent approach to the East China
Sea dispute with Japan illustrates the first pattern.
International Law and the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the
East China Sea
China and Japan assert overlapping claims to the East China
Sea (ECS). The territorial dispute involves two questions,
neither one easy. The first is sovereignty over the Diaoyu
Islands (the Senkaku Islands in Japanese). The second is
title to the continental shelf and maritime delimitation in
an area where the maximum distance between the east (Japan)
and west (China) coasts is less than the 400 nautical miles
needed to give each country the full 200 nautical mile zone
in which coastal states ordinarily enjoy exclusive rights
over economic resources and activities.
On the issue of sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands,
each side has made arguments grounding its positions in
international law. The strengths and defects of those
arguments have been examined extensively elsewhere and will
not be revisited here. In addition, China has long proposed
"setting aside the [sovereignty] dispute and pursuing joint-
development" of the resources adjacent to the islands. In
contrast, Japan simply denies that there is a credible
dispute over the islands and refuses to discuss the issue in
diplomatic talks.
On the question of legal claims to the continental shelf,
the relevant history begins with an international agreement
to which China was not a party: the 1974 Japan-ROK Joint
Development Agreement (provisional agreement) concerning the
northern part of the ECS. China protested the agreement
because it threatened to infringe China's rights and
interest in the ECS continental shelf. Notwithstanding the
Chinese protest, Japan and South Korea explored three shelf
sites for energy resources between 1980 and 1986. Those
explorations failed to find any economically viable fields.
China began feasibility studies in the 1980s, and in the
1990s explored and developed four groups of oil and gas
fields to the Chinese side of the geometrical median line of
the ECS (which was the line Japan asserted for
delimitation). China's moves drew no diplomatic protest from
Japan. Indeed, in the late 1990s, a project to construct
pipelines to Shanghai from some of the fields received
financial aid from Japan, directly through its Export-Import
Bank and indirectly through Japan's contributions to the
Asian Development Bank. The Sino-Japanese dispute did not
emerge until a May 2004 Japanese news report on China's
development of the Chunxiao oil and gas fields publicized
the field's production and its location only several miles
west of the median line and Japan's claimed zone.
In addressing this dispute, both sides have relied
extensively on international law, and specifically on the
law of the sea and its rules on the continental shelf. Both
have invoked especially Article 76(1) of the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention, to which the two countries are parties,
which provides:
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-
bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond
its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of
its land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does
not extend up to that distance.
China has argued for application of the "natural
prolongation" principle in the treaty and under the
preexisting customary international legal rule articulated
by the International Court of Justice in the famous 1969
North Sea Continental Shelf Case. On this view, China's
portion of the ECS continental shelf includes its natural
prolongation to the Okinawa Trough, where the 2000-meter-
deep trough marks the geologic end of the shelf and, thus,
the area under Chinese title.
Japan's legal arguments have been more complex and in some
respects inconsistent. Japan has invoked the "200 nautical
miles" portion of Article 76(1), rejecting the possibility
of a claim based on natural prolongation beyond 200 nautical
miles. On this view, the continental shelf in this area
(which is narrower than 400 nautical miles) legally must be
divided at the median (equidistance) line between the two
states' coasts. At the same time, Japan also has argued that
the "baseline" from which the 200 nautical mile zone should
be measured is not Japan's main coast but, rather, the
coast of the Ryukyu Islands (Liuqiu in Chinese), which would
trump China's claim based on natural prolongation for a
significant portion of the ECS continental shelf. Finally,
Japan also has argued that the Okinawa Trough is a mere dent
in the continental shelf, not its endpoint. This
position-which invokes a factually flawed application of the
natural prolongation argument and thereby rejects the 200
mile zone and equidistance principles-was Japan's central
argument when negotiating with the Republic of Korea for
their 1974 provisional joint-development agreement.
Against the backdrop of this largely legal confrontation,
China and Japan engaged in eleven rounds of consultations
from October 2004 to November 2007. Finally, after the
exchange of visits of leaders resumed in the post-Koizumi
era, the two countries issued Joint Communiques calling for
cooperation in making the ECS a "sea of peace, cooperation
and friendship." With this top-level political commitment to
maintaining stability in bilateral relations, the foreign
ministries of the two countries concurrently released a
"Principled Consensus on the East China Sea Issue" on June
18, 2008.
The "Principled Consensus" is the product of the two sides'
disputing in strikingly international legal terms, but it
did not augur a legal resolution of their dispute. The
Consensus is by nature an interim arrangement "in the
transitional period prior to delimitation" as stipulated in
the Law of the Sea Convention, Article 83, paragraph 3.
According to that same article, this kind of arrangement is
not to prejudice the legal positions of the parties (as the
first part of the Consensus also states). The substantive
provisions in the Consensus are: first, a small block,
sitting astride the median line, is marked for joint
development; second, the Chunxiao field, already initially
developed by China, is to be open to "cooperative
exploitation" pursuant to a clause stating, "Chinese
enterprises welcome the participation of Japanese legal
persons in the development of the existing oil and gas field
in Chunxiao in accordance with the relevant laws of China."
Almost immediately, the "Principled Consensus" ran into
trouble that seemed to cast doubt on the utility of an
international legal approach to the dispute. Formally, the
document had an uncertain status, having appeared as a pair
of concurrent press releases, lacking signatures and a date,
and thus inviting much doubt and speculation about its
stature.
Soon after the Consensus was released, the two countries
fell to quarrelling about its meaning, adopting sharply
contradictory interpretations of its two substantive
provisions. On the Chinese side, the Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs (within a week after the Consensus was
announced) and the Minister himself (a few days later)
explained: that China never recognized the so-called "median
line" that defined the joint development zone; that there
was no issue of drawing any "median line"; and that the
agreement on cooperative exploitation of the Chunxiao field
meant that Japan accepted Chinese jurisdiction and
recognized China's sovereign rights over the field. Japan's
Chief Cabinet Secretary and Foreign Minister publicly
rejected the Chinese interpretations.
The Utility of Legal Confrontation
Thus, it may seem that the fate of the Principled Consensus
casts doubt on the usefulness of framing a political (and
economic) dispute as a legal confrontation. But such a
pessimistic conclusion is too simple or, at least,
premature. The Consensus and the broader turn to
international law can contribute to stability in China-Japan
relations and regional stability more generally, provided
that two further, interrelated conditions are satisfied.
First, the Consensus (and other measures) must reflect the
legitimate-and legal-national interests of the both parties.
Second, in implementing and moving beyond the initial
Consensus, China and Japan must adhere to two overarching
international legal principles: good faith and reciprocity.
Good faith is especially important because the Consensus
includes merely interim measures "in the transitional period
prior to delimitation" and thus contemplates further
negotiations in which each side will seek to advance its
interests within an ongoing legal confrontation. During this
process, reciprocity is also vital to maintain stability and
to sustain negotiations toward a final settlement that takes
adequate account of both sides' good faith legal claims and
legitimate interests.
On these issues, the evidence so far is mixed. China's
claim, based on the principle of natural prolongation, has
sufficient legal foundation that it clears the threshold of
a good faith claim. Under the doctrine of "inter-temporal
law" (which holds that the applicable international law is
the law as it stood at the time when the claimant purports
to have acquired a right, in this case to ownership of
portions of the ECS shelf), the relevant legal principle
arguably is the "old" customary rule of natural
prolongation, not the more "mixed" principles of Article
76(1) of the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty. Alternatively,
China's claim to the ECS is a plausible reading of Article
76(1) of the Treaty. Moreover, China's position is further
reinforced by principles of estoppel, which could bar
elements of Japan's competing claims on the ground that
Japan has accepted the so-called median line (which stops
short of 200 nautical miles from Japan's coast) and that
Japan has accepted and indeed supported China's development
of the Chunxiao field, which China has claimed is in its
portion of the ECS.
On the other hand, Japan's invocation of the 200 nautical
mile principle also has sufficient legal plausibility to
meet a "good faith" standard. Post-Law of the Sea Treaty
state practice and judicial decisions offer some support for
the view that the natural prolongation principle is subject
to interpretation and limitation under Article 76(1).
If each party accepts that other's position reflects a good
faith legal argument, this can increase the likelihood that
the two sides can lower the temperature of their conflict
while also setting aside the fine points of their contending
legal claims and moving forward with provisional
arrangements for joint development. To some extent, the
"joint development block" provision in the Consensus offers
a concrete example of what can be achieved consistent with
the principles of good faith amid unresolved, but legally
framed and cabined, conflicts. The joint development
arrangement does not accept the median line as the legal
boundary and thus sets aside the core legal issue. At the
same time, the joint development zone remains within the
geographic area each side claims as its own under legal
analyses consistent with good faith principles.
The Consensus fares less well in satisfying the norm of
reciprocity, especially Japanese reciprocity toward China.
The Consensus's interim arrangement, if made permanent,
would be fully consistent with Japan's preferred principles
of a 200 nautical mile limit, with equidistance in the
context of seas less than 400 nautical miles wide. Yet, the
Consensus is heedless of China's, as well as Japan's, claim
to the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands and the rights to the
adjacent ECS and continental shelf that sovereignty over the
islands could bring. The Consensus also gives no place to
China's natural prolongation-based claim to a wider swath of
the ECS shelf or its claim to the Chunxiao field, where
China had already begun to explore and invest. It would be a
significant step for reciprocity and, in turn, stability in
bilateral relations if Japan were to go beyond the language
of the Consensus and acknowledge China's sovereign rights
over Chunxiao-even if the operative regime remained the
"cooperative exploitation" envisaged in the Consensus.
Unfortunately, Japan's post-Consensus interpretations of the
Consensus indicate that this is highly unlikely.
Overall, the China-Japan Principled Consensus on the East
China Sea Issue is an example of how legal rules and
arguments, when animated by political prudence, can help to
contain and manage conflict, and foster more harmonious
relations between China and a similarly powerful neighbor.
To be sure, the Consensus remains limited and flawed. It is
only a "first step," after which the two sides "will
continue to conduct consultations in the future." It helped
contain and define, but also left open, legal questions that
quickly became the focus of new, if more bounded, disputes.
The Consensus's potential is undermined by its failure to
provide greater reciprocity.
Nonetheless, the common ground that the Consensus defined,
the good faith legal arguments to which the parties mostly
limited themselves, and the commitments the Consensus
embodied to continuing to address a significant dispute in
largely legal and cooperative terms are hopeful signs. The
Consensus, and the broader effort it represents to embed or
frame bilateral disputes as legal confrontations, promises
to help the two parties to find firmer footholds in climbing
out of the troubled waters of the East China Sea. Beyond
that, it strengthens international law's potential to help
an increasingly competent and confident China and its
expanding international partners to stabilize their
relations while they grapple with complex disputes.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Jacques deLisle, "Sovereignty Resumed: China's
Conception of Law for Hong Kong, and Its Implications for
SAR and US-PRC Relations", Harvard Asia Quarterly, Summer
1998, p.23.
[2] Li Zhaojie, "Legacy of Modern Chinese History: Its
Relevance to the Chinese Perspective of the Contemporary
International Legal Order", Singapore Journal of
International and Comparative Law (2001), p.317.
[3] The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1979 issued a simple
but important instruction "we should also strengthen our
study of international law." As a result, Chinese Society of
International Law was founded in February 1980.
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Over 50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation
www.fpri.org
CHINA'S "PEACEFUL RISE," "HARMONIOUS" FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND LEGAL CONFRONTATION-AND LESSONS FROM THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE OVER THE EAST CHINA SEA
by Xinjun Zhang
April 16, 2010
Xinjun Zhang is Associate Professor, School of Law, Tsinghua
University and, for 2009-10, is a Fulbright Scholar in
residence at the School of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
This essay is based on his November 5, 2009 presentation to
FPRI's Asia Study Group, chaired by Jacques deLisle.
China's rise naturally raises concern among its neighbors
about Beijing's agenda. China has emphasized that its "rise"
will be "peaceful," but China also will seek to remove
impediments to its rise, in part by invoking existing
international rules, and shaping new international rules, to
serve its interests. As a result, there will be more "legal
confrontations" between China and other states. Such legal
disputes are contentious but peaceful, compatible with
China's ideal of a "harmonious world" and agenda of peaceful
rise, and preferable to less law-governed alternatives.
China's approach to territorial disputes during the last
twenty years and recent developments in the Sino-Japanese
dispute over the East China Sea, including a "principled
consensus" between the parties in 2008, illustrate the
virtues and potential-as well as the limits-of China's
reliance on international law to address a chronic source of
friction and instability in China's foreign relations.
China's Numerous, Long-Running Territorial Disputes
China's long land borders, numerous neighbors and long,
complicated and sometimes crisis-ridden history of relations
with adjacent states have generated border disputes. These
have sometimes brought crisis and violence, including
several armed conflicts from the 1960s to the 1980s.
Especially since the 1990s, China and its continental
neighbors have worked hard to reach boundary agreements,
successfully settling most of the long-standing disputes
with formal treaties. For example, China and Vietnam reached
a comprehensive land boundary agreement in December 1999.
China and Russia reached an agreement concerning the western
part of the border in September 1994. With respect to the
more contentious eastern part of their border, the two
powers reached an initial agreement in May 1991, a
supplementary agreement in October 2004, and a supplementary
protocol in July 2008, which is said to be a final
settlement of the 4300 kilometer frontier. China and India
are engaged in ongoing talks to address China's last
unsettled land boundary.
Maritime boundary issues, in contrast, have only recently
emerged on China's foreign relations agenda, and there has
been little progress in settling most of them. China has
overlapping maritime territorial claims with three countries
in the East China Sea and five countries in the South China
Sea. The only formal delimitation agreement so far has been
reached with Vietnam (the Beibu Gulf Delimitation Agreement,
December 12, 2000, and entered into force on June 30, 2004)
and addresses only part of the two states' maritime
boundary. In 2002, China and ASEAN agreed on a Code of
Conduct for the South China Sea-a relatively informal
declaration that did not resolve territorial claims or
rights to exploit resources. In 2005, China and North Korea
concluded a Joint Development Agreement -- China's first
joint development agreement, but the text of the agreement
has not yet been made available to public. On June 18, 2008,
China and Japan reached a "Principled Consensus on the East
China Sea Issue," but the accord was followed immediately by
sharp discrepancies in the parties' interpretations of the
document, and an apparent stalling of the process for
negotiating the further measures required to implement the
Consensus.
China's Policy Goals and the Relevance of International Law
What lessons can be drawn from Chinese practice in the past
twenty years in dealing with boundary issues? First, China
sees boundary stability as vital for creating a harmonious
international (and, specifically, regional) environment that
is essential for China's agenda of a peaceful rise (and
peaceful development). In Chinese diplomatic and foreign
policymaking circles, references to weiwen-maintaining
stability-are common. This policy goal is evident in Chinese
efforts during the past 20 years to address disputed land
boundaries. In handling those issues, China discarded the
"naturalist" position which holds that territory is divine
and sovereign issues (including boundary issues) is non-
negotiable[1]. Most strikingly, China moved beyond two
centuries of intermittent bloodshed over competing claims to
territorial sovereignty on the Sino-Russian border to a
conventional international legal agreement delimiting the
two states' territories.
Second, the policy of peaceful rise requires China to
develop a more comprehensive and global perspective in
defining its national interests. Here, the focus is not on
weiwen (maintaining stability) but on weiquan (upholding
rights). China's territorial interests increasingly include
traditionally slighted ones, such as hydrocarbon resources
in the continental shelf and national security interests in
a more extended offshore maritime area. Although such newly
emphasized concerns can reduce China's focus on nettlesome
maritime boundary issues, they also can pose challenges
because China is rather new to these questions and has not
fully assessed and articulated its interests. Still, it does
seem clear that the rights China seeks to uphold are those
generally accepted in the existing international order,
particularly those defined by the law of the sea.
It is therefore unsurprising that China increasingly turns
to international law as a policy instrument in these areas.
China repeatedly highlights the importance of international
law in addressing maritime issues. This is not mere lip-
service; it has a foundation in serious policy
considerations and Chinese approaches to foreign policy.
International legal rules and institutions, including the
WTO, have been beneficial to China's national interests
throughout the period of reform and opening to the outside
world that began three decades ago. Even amid significant
uncertainty about the future trajectory of world order,
international law still promises to provide means to protect
and advance China's national interests, especially as China
assumes a greater role in making international law (as has
been occurring, for example, in international negotiations
to address climate change).
Using international law to address disputed boundaries
serves China's high priority goal of maintaining domestic
stability. China's modern history-including the May Fourth
Movement that reacted against the Versailles Treaty's
acceptance of Japanese colonial encroachment on China and
that gave birth to modern Chinese nationalism and, in turn,
the Chinese Revolution-teaches the danger of domestic
turmoil and threats to the regime that can come from failed
diplomatic efforts to address highly sensitive territorial
issues in China. Although understandable in light of the
historical context, the political and diplomatic compromises
that characterized the U.S.-China Joint Communiques
similarly failed to resolve fully crucial international
legal issues and thus sowed seeds of future conflicts.
Giving territorial settlements a clear basis in
international law makes them easier to accept for Chinese
public opinion (which is expressed today in newly strident
nationalist tones via the Internet), and therefore helps
prevent such agreements from triggering political crisis. A
firm international legal basis also facilitates other
parties' acceptance and implementation of territorial
accords with China, smoothing ratification by their
legislatures and other steps required by other states'
constitutional structures. This in turn promotes regional
stability, which is in China's interest.
China has grown more confident in relying on international
law. This new confidence reflects China's growing power.
China's previously suspicious attitude toward international
law was based on the belief not that international law was
unreasonable but that it was unreliable because China lacked
national power. As one Chinese international law scholar has
characterized this view, "if there is right without might,
the right will not prevail."[2] In addition to acquiring
more of the requisite "might," elites in China have gained
international experience and perspectives and are thus more
likely to perceive international law in more than a narrowly
instrumentalist way. They increasingly understand the
normativity of international law and thus feel less
alienated from the initially Western partly law-based
approach to foreign policy.
Nevertheless, even under current conditions and against the
backdrop of a broader Chinese tradition of pragmatism in
foreign affairs, there are still some significant obstacles
to China's employing international law in foreign
policymaking. For example, China's lack of a strong legal
culture and tradition domestically can make it less likely
that foreign policy makers will give full consideration to
international law in pursuing international dispute
settlement. Traditionally in Chinese society, people were
discouraged from going to court and invoking law to solve
their problems because the "win or lose" result of a
judicial proceeding could be devastating to a party's
reputation. Instead, norms and practices favored informal
conciliation outside courts, with "saving face" and ending
overt conflict being primary concerns, sometimes at the cost
of setting aside or papering over the issues in dispute.
When aspects of this tradition carry into foreign policy, it
can encourage the view that it is not important to have a
basis in international law for China's positions. In
maritime and territorial issues, the well-known Chinese
policy of "setting aside disputes and undertaking joint-
development" may illustrate this problem although the policy
also can be defended as reflecting strategic thinking and
calculations about what serves China's national interests.
Another factor impeding China's effective use of
international law in foreign policy is China's still-
insufficient study of international law. Although China's
leaders have called for enhanced study of international law
since the late 1970s,[3] Reform-era China started from a
comparatively low baseline. It trails other big powers that
have strong traditions in the study of international law and
ample well-trained international lawyers. While it is
uncertain how large a role international law will play in
various aspects of China's foreign policy, there are signs
of significant growth. One example is the recent
establishment of the Department of Boundary and Ocean
Affairs, which is located in the Chinese Foreign Ministry,
staffed from the Ministry's Department of Treaties and Law,
and reflects enhancement of international law as a
consideration in managing maritime boundary and territorial
issues.
On balance, international law has come to be seen as a more
important and necessary means for China to achieve its
foreign policy ends, even though obstacles and uncertainty
persist. Moreover, China's turn to international law has
been uneven, and unsurprisingly so. International law is
more likely to be an appealing instrument for China where
the other party to a dispute is a near-peer in political,
economic and military power (as is the case, for example,
with Japan), or where the other parties are significantly
less powerful than China (as is the case, for example, with
the ASEAN countries). In the first type of case,
international law is useful because there is comparatively
little room for one party to prevail through simple pressure
or manipulation. In the second context, using international
law can help to reassure weaker parties worried about
China's rise. Beijing's recent approach to the East China
Sea dispute with Japan illustrates the first pattern.
International Law and the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the
East China Sea
China and Japan assert overlapping claims to the East China
Sea (ECS). The territorial dispute involves two questions,
neither one easy. The first is sovereignty over the Diaoyu
Islands (the Senkaku Islands in Japanese). The second is
title to the continental shelf and maritime delimitation in
an area where the maximum distance between the east (Japan)
and west (China) coasts is less than the 400 nautical miles
needed to give each country the full 200 nautical mile zone
in which coastal states ordinarily enjoy exclusive rights
over economic resources and activities.
On the issue of sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands,
each side has made arguments grounding its positions in
international law. The strengths and defects of those
arguments have been examined extensively elsewhere and will
not be revisited here. In addition, China has long proposed
"setting aside the [sovereignty] dispute and pursuing joint-
development" of the resources adjacent to the islands. In
contrast, Japan simply denies that there is a credible
dispute over the islands and refuses to discuss the issue in
diplomatic talks.
On the question of legal claims to the continental shelf,
the relevant history begins with an international agreement
to which China was not a party: the 1974 Japan-ROK Joint
Development Agreement (provisional agreement) concerning the
northern part of the ECS. China protested the agreement
because it threatened to infringe China's rights and
interest in the ECS continental shelf. Notwithstanding the
Chinese protest, Japan and South Korea explored three shelf
sites for energy resources between 1980 and 1986. Those
explorations failed to find any economically viable fields.
China began feasibility studies in the 1980s, and in the
1990s explored and developed four groups of oil and gas
fields to the Chinese side of the geometrical median line of
the ECS (which was the line Japan asserted for
delimitation). China's moves drew no diplomatic protest from
Japan. Indeed, in the late 1990s, a project to construct
pipelines to Shanghai from some of the fields received
financial aid from Japan, directly through its Export-Import
Bank and indirectly through Japan's contributions to the
Asian Development Bank. The Sino-Japanese dispute did not
emerge until a May 2004 Japanese news report on China's
development of the Chunxiao oil and gas fields publicized
the field's production and its location only several miles
west of the median line and Japan's claimed zone.
In addressing this dispute, both sides have relied
extensively on international law, and specifically on the
law of the sea and its rules on the continental shelf. Both
have invoked especially Article 76(1) of the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention, to which the two countries are parties,
which provides:
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-
bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond
its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of
its land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does
not extend up to that distance.
China has argued for application of the "natural
prolongation" principle in the treaty and under the
preexisting customary international legal rule articulated
by the International Court of Justice in the famous 1969
North Sea Continental Shelf Case. On this view, China's
portion of the ECS continental shelf includes its natural
prolongation to the Okinawa Trough, where the 2000-meter-
deep trough marks the geologic end of the shelf and, thus,
the area under Chinese title.
Japan's legal arguments have been more complex and in some
respects inconsistent. Japan has invoked the "200 nautical
miles" portion of Article 76(1), rejecting the possibility
of a claim based on natural prolongation beyond 200 nautical
miles. On this view, the continental shelf in this area
(which is narrower than 400 nautical miles) legally must be
divided at the median (equidistance) line between the two
states' coasts. At the same time, Japan also has argued that
the "baseline" from which the 200 nautical mile zone should
be measured is not Japan's main coast but, rather, the
coast of the Ryukyu Islands (Liuqiu in Chinese), which would
trump China's claim based on natural prolongation for a
significant portion of the ECS continental shelf. Finally,
Japan also has argued that the Okinawa Trough is a mere dent
in the continental shelf, not its endpoint. This
position-which invokes a factually flawed application of the
natural prolongation argument and thereby rejects the 200
mile zone and equidistance principles-was Japan's central
argument when negotiating with the Republic of Korea for
their 1974 provisional joint-development agreement.
Against the backdrop of this largely legal confrontation,
China and Japan engaged in eleven rounds of consultations
from October 2004 to November 2007. Finally, after the
exchange of visits of leaders resumed in the post-Koizumi
era, the two countries issued Joint Communiques calling for
cooperation in making the ECS a "sea of peace, cooperation
and friendship." With this top-level political commitment to
maintaining stability in bilateral relations, the foreign
ministries of the two countries concurrently released a
"Principled Consensus on the East China Sea Issue" on June
18, 2008.
The "Principled Consensus" is the product of the two sides'
disputing in strikingly international legal terms, but it
did not augur a legal resolution of their dispute. The
Consensus is by nature an interim arrangement "in the
transitional period prior to delimitation" as stipulated in
the Law of the Sea Convention, Article 83, paragraph 3.
According to that same article, this kind of arrangement is
not to prejudice the legal positions of the parties (as the
first part of the Consensus also states). The substantive
provisions in the Consensus are: first, a small block,
sitting astride the median line, is marked for joint
development; second, the Chunxiao field, already initially
developed by China, is to be open to "cooperative
exploitation" pursuant to a clause stating, "Chinese
enterprises welcome the participation of Japanese legal
persons in the development of the existing oil and gas field
in Chunxiao in accordance with the relevant laws of China."
Almost immediately, the "Principled Consensus" ran into
trouble that seemed to cast doubt on the utility of an
international legal approach to the dispute. Formally, the
document had an uncertain status, having appeared as a pair
of concurrent press releases, lacking signatures and a date,
and thus inviting much doubt and speculation about its
stature.
Soon after the Consensus was released, the two countries
fell to quarrelling about its meaning, adopting sharply
contradictory interpretations of its two substantive
provisions. On the Chinese side, the Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs (within a week after the Consensus was
announced) and the Minister himself (a few days later)
explained: that China never recognized the so-called "median
line" that defined the joint development zone; that there
was no issue of drawing any "median line"; and that the
agreement on cooperative exploitation of the Chunxiao field
meant that Japan accepted Chinese jurisdiction and
recognized China's sovereign rights over the field. Japan's
Chief Cabinet Secretary and Foreign Minister publicly
rejected the Chinese interpretations.
The Utility of Legal Confrontation
Thus, it may seem that the fate of the Principled Consensus
casts doubt on the usefulness of framing a political (and
economic) dispute as a legal confrontation. But such a
pessimistic conclusion is too simple or, at least,
premature. The Consensus and the broader turn to
international law can contribute to stability in China-Japan
relations and regional stability more generally, provided
that two further, interrelated conditions are satisfied.
First, the Consensus (and other measures) must reflect the
legitimate-and legal-national interests of the both parties.
Second, in implementing and moving beyond the initial
Consensus, China and Japan must adhere to two overarching
international legal principles: good faith and reciprocity.
Good faith is especially important because the Consensus
includes merely interim measures "in the transitional period
prior to delimitation" and thus contemplates further
negotiations in which each side will seek to advance its
interests within an ongoing legal confrontation. During this
process, reciprocity is also vital to maintain stability and
to sustain negotiations toward a final settlement that takes
adequate account of both sides' good faith legal claims and
legitimate interests.
On these issues, the evidence so far is mixed. China's
claim, based on the principle of natural prolongation, has
sufficient legal foundation that it clears the threshold of
a good faith claim. Under the doctrine of "inter-temporal
law" (which holds that the applicable international law is
the law as it stood at the time when the claimant purports
to have acquired a right, in this case to ownership of
portions of the ECS shelf), the relevant legal principle
arguably is the "old" customary rule of natural
prolongation, not the more "mixed" principles of Article
76(1) of the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty. Alternatively,
China's claim to the ECS is a plausible reading of Article
76(1) of the Treaty. Moreover, China's position is further
reinforced by principles of estoppel, which could bar
elements of Japan's competing claims on the ground that
Japan has accepted the so-called median line (which stops
short of 200 nautical miles from Japan's coast) and that
Japan has accepted and indeed supported China's development
of the Chunxiao field, which China has claimed is in its
portion of the ECS.
On the other hand, Japan's invocation of the 200 nautical
mile principle also has sufficient legal plausibility to
meet a "good faith" standard. Post-Law of the Sea Treaty
state practice and judicial decisions offer some support for
the view that the natural prolongation principle is subject
to interpretation and limitation under Article 76(1).
If each party accepts that other's position reflects a good
faith legal argument, this can increase the likelihood that
the two sides can lower the temperature of their conflict
while also setting aside the fine points of their contending
legal claims and moving forward with provisional
arrangements for joint development. To some extent, the
"joint development block" provision in the Consensus offers
a concrete example of what can be achieved consistent with
the principles of good faith amid unresolved, but legally
framed and cabined, conflicts. The joint development
arrangement does not accept the median line as the legal
boundary and thus sets aside the core legal issue. At the
same time, the joint development zone remains within the
geographic area each side claims as its own under legal
analyses consistent with good faith principles.
The Consensus fares less well in satisfying the norm of
reciprocity, especially Japanese reciprocity toward China.
The Consensus's interim arrangement, if made permanent,
would be fully consistent with Japan's preferred principles
of a 200 nautical mile limit, with equidistance in the
context of seas less than 400 nautical miles wide. Yet, the
Consensus is heedless of China's, as well as Japan's, claim
to the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands and the rights to the
adjacent ECS and continental shelf that sovereignty over the
islands could bring. The Consensus also gives no place to
China's natural prolongation-based claim to a wider swath of
the ECS shelf or its claim to the Chunxiao field, where
China had already begun to explore and invest. It would be a
significant step for reciprocity and, in turn, stability in
bilateral relations if Japan were to go beyond the language
of the Consensus and acknowledge China's sovereign rights
over Chunxiao-even if the operative regime remained the
"cooperative exploitation" envisaged in the Consensus.
Unfortunately, Japan's post-Consensus interpretations of the
Consensus indicate that this is highly unlikely.
Overall, the China-Japan Principled Consensus on the East
China Sea Issue is an example of how legal rules and
arguments, when animated by political prudence, can help to
contain and manage conflict, and foster more harmonious
relations between China and a similarly powerful neighbor.
To be sure, the Consensus remains limited and flawed. It is
only a "first step," after which the two sides "will
continue to conduct consultations in the future." It helped
contain and define, but also left open, legal questions that
quickly became the focus of new, if more bounded, disputes.
The Consensus's potential is undermined by its failure to
provide greater reciprocity.
Nonetheless, the common ground that the Consensus defined,
the good faith legal arguments to which the parties mostly
limited themselves, and the commitments the Consensus
embodied to continuing to address a significant dispute in
largely legal and cooperative terms are hopeful signs. The
Consensus, and the broader effort it represents to embed or
frame bilateral disputes as legal confrontations, promises
to help the two parties to find firmer footholds in climbing
out of the troubled waters of the East China Sea. Beyond
that, it strengthens international law's potential to help
an increasingly competent and confident China and its
expanding international partners to stabilize their
relations while they grapple with complex disputes.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Jacques deLisle, "Sovereignty Resumed: China's
Conception of Law for Hong Kong, and Its Implications for
SAR and US-PRC Relations", Harvard Asia Quarterly, Summer
1998, p.23.
[2] Li Zhaojie, "Legacy of Modern Chinese History: Its
Relevance to the Chinese Perspective of the Contemporary
International Legal Order", Singapore Journal of
International and Comparative Law (2001), p.317.
[3] The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1979 issued a simple
but important instruction "we should also strengthen our
study of international law." As a result, Chinese Society of
International Law was founded in February 1980.
----------------------------------------------------------
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394) US worried by Chinese dominance over minerals - CNN
China mineral dominance concerns U.S.
By Laurie Ure
CNN, April 16, 2010
STORY HIGHLIGHTS
* China has secured 97 percent of the production of rare earth minerals, GAO says
* GAO report describes China as a a "rapidly rising military and economic power"
* United States has a rare earth mineral mine in southern California
* GAO estimates rebuilding the U.S. rare earth industry could take up to 15 years
Washington (CNN) -- China's dominant position in the production of rare earth minerals has long-reaching implications for the U.S. Department of Defense, according to a recent government report.
The report from the Government Accountability Office was commissioned by Congress amid growing concerns that China's potential reduction on the supply of much-needed rare earth minerals could impact critical military uses.
China has secured 97 percent of the production of these minerals, which are used in nearly every electronic device, cell phones, computer hard drives and guided missiles.
"The longer we neglect this, the longer we don't take steps to counter this, the more it becomes a pressing problem," said Dean Chang, Research fellow at the Heritage Foundation's Center for Asian Studies.
The minerals include ores, oxides, metals, alloys and semi-finished rare earth products and cannot be reproduced artificially. "It's not like the DOD can just say, 'OK, we won't use them,'" said Chang.
There is widespread use of rare earth materials in defense systems, including precision-guided munitions, lasers, communication systems, radar systems, avionics, night vision equipment, satellites and more, according to the GAO.
China has decreased output and increased export taxes on all its rare earth materials to a range of 15 to 25 percent, according to the report.
It's not like the DOD can just say, 'OK, we won't use them'
--Dean Chang, research fellow, Heritage Foundation's Center for Asian Studies
The defense industry's heavy reliance on these minerals has prompted Congress and Pentagon and to examine ways to mitigate should China continue to reduce its exports.
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton, a Missouri Democrat, said he's planning a hearing to discuss the GAO report.
Defense Department spokesman Dave Lapan said the Pentagon has been monitoring this issue for years, and is "looking at options to increase domestic availability of rare earth elements though developing new domestic sources, re-energizing previous domestic sources and transforming the national stockpile to include rare earth materials."
The United States has a rare earth mineral mine in southern California, which is the largest non-Chinese mine in the world, but the GAO says the mine currently lacks the facilities to process the rare earth ore into finished components such as permanent magnets.
Andrew Lubin spent 30 years importing and exporting Chinese metals and taught economics and export-import operations at the online American Military University. He said Chinese in-country demand has increased greatly in the last ten years.
"They have a huge middle class that didn't exist 20 years ago," said Lubin. "It's not that they're trying to screw us. They need it for themselves."
But Chang said, "The big step back for this is that the Chinese are taking a very broad-minded view of their national security and national influence. It's not just the number of their submarines or missiles, or even broad economic power. In this case China is using all of these things as tools to influence everybody, including us."
But Chang said the GAO report is not all doom and gloom.
"The GAO is not saying all is lost," he said. "You could re-establish a domestic industry, from mining through processing, but that's expensive and also that takes time."
Rebuilding the U.S. rare earth industry could take up to 15 years, according to GAO estimates.
RELATED TOPICS
* China
* Science and Technology
* Earth Science
By Laurie Ure
CNN, April 16, 2010
STORY HIGHLIGHTS
* China has secured 97 percent of the production of rare earth minerals, GAO says
* GAO report describes China as a a "rapidly rising military and economic power"
* United States has a rare earth mineral mine in southern California
* GAO estimates rebuilding the U.S. rare earth industry could take up to 15 years
Washington (CNN) -- China's dominant position in the production of rare earth minerals has long-reaching implications for the U.S. Department of Defense, according to a recent government report.
The report from the Government Accountability Office was commissioned by Congress amid growing concerns that China's potential reduction on the supply of much-needed rare earth minerals could impact critical military uses.
China has secured 97 percent of the production of these minerals, which are used in nearly every electronic device, cell phones, computer hard drives and guided missiles.
"The longer we neglect this, the longer we don't take steps to counter this, the more it becomes a pressing problem," said Dean Chang, Research fellow at the Heritage Foundation's Center for Asian Studies.
The minerals include ores, oxides, metals, alloys and semi-finished rare earth products and cannot be reproduced artificially. "It's not like the DOD can just say, 'OK, we won't use them,'" said Chang.
There is widespread use of rare earth materials in defense systems, including precision-guided munitions, lasers, communication systems, radar systems, avionics, night vision equipment, satellites and more, according to the GAO.
China has decreased output and increased export taxes on all its rare earth materials to a range of 15 to 25 percent, according to the report.
It's not like the DOD can just say, 'OK, we won't use them'
--Dean Chang, research fellow, Heritage Foundation's Center for Asian Studies
The defense industry's heavy reliance on these minerals has prompted Congress and Pentagon and to examine ways to mitigate should China continue to reduce its exports.
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton, a Missouri Democrat, said he's planning a hearing to discuss the GAO report.
Defense Department spokesman Dave Lapan said the Pentagon has been monitoring this issue for years, and is "looking at options to increase domestic availability of rare earth elements though developing new domestic sources, re-energizing previous domestic sources and transforming the national stockpile to include rare earth materials."
The United States has a rare earth mineral mine in southern California, which is the largest non-Chinese mine in the world, but the GAO says the mine currently lacks the facilities to process the rare earth ore into finished components such as permanent magnets.
Andrew Lubin spent 30 years importing and exporting Chinese metals and taught economics and export-import operations at the online American Military University. He said Chinese in-country demand has increased greatly in the last ten years.
"They have a huge middle class that didn't exist 20 years ago," said Lubin. "It's not that they're trying to screw us. They need it for themselves."
But Chang said, "The big step back for this is that the Chinese are taking a very broad-minded view of their national security and national influence. It's not just the number of their submarines or missiles, or even broad economic power. In this case China is using all of these things as tools to influence everybody, including us."
But Chang said the GAO report is not all doom and gloom.
"The GAO is not saying all is lost," he said. "You could re-establish a domestic industry, from mining through processing, but that's expensive and also that takes time."
Rebuilding the U.S. rare earth industry could take up to 15 years, according to GAO estimates.
RELATED TOPICS
* China
* Science and Technology
* Earth Science
Saturday, April 17, 2010
393) Entrevista Celso Amorim a jornal chines - Guangzhou Ribao
Segue abaixo tradução elaborada pela Embaixada em Pequim de entrevista do Ministro Celso Amorim publicada na edição de 14 de abril do Diário de Cantão ("Guangzhou Ribao"). O texto em mandarim se encontra disponível na internet, no sítio .
"`O BRIC se tornou o motor da economia mundial`
Entrevista com o Ministro das Relações Exteriores do Brasil,
Celso Amorim - por Wang Xiyi, Chen Hailing e Xiao Xian.
Desde a chegada ao poder do Presidente Lula, a posição e a influência do Brasil no cenário internacional têm tido uma expansão sem precedentes. Para entender a razão disso, não se pode desconhecer o mérito do "arquiteto chefe" da política externa brasileira, o Chanceler Celso Amorim.
Na esfera diplomática, Celso Amorim acumula várias realizações notáveis: em 2003, na Conferência de Cancún da OMC, ele negociou com os representantes dos países
desenvolvidos, em favor do ponto de vista e dos interesses dos países em desenvolvimento; utilizou as vantagens dos biocombustíveis para promover o diálogo e a cooperação com outros países e expandir a influência do Brasil; e, por fim, acolheu favoravelmente o conceito de BRIC, contribuindo para torná-lo um influente mecanismo de cooperação geopolítica. No cenário político internacional, Amorim é ativo e se move com
desenvoltura, fazendo com que mais países escutem a voz do Brasil.
Em 9 de abril de 2010, às vésperas da realização da Cúpula do BRIC, o Chanceler Amorim concedeu, no "Palácio de Cristal" [shuijing gong - como às vezes é chamado o Palácio Itamaraty em mandarim] uma entrevista exclusiva aos repórteres deste jornal, discutindo com franqueza a II Cúpula do BRIC e sua visão sobre as perspectivas para o relacionamento e a cooperação sino-brasileiro.
- A preparação da agenda do BRIC
Diário de Cantão: Como estão os trabalhos preparatórios para a II Cúpula do BRIC?
Amorim: Estão bem. Trata-se de um encontro muito importante, com uma série de reuniões prévias, envolvendo bancos centrais, a comunidade empresarial, acadêmicos. Houve, ainda, uma reunião de Ministros de Agricultura, já realizada.
Vocês talvez já tenham notado que, no Brasil, a Cúpula do BRIC é um tema que desperta muito interesse, e, na capital, por toda parte se pode perceber a atmosfera da Cúpula.
Eu acredito que a Cúpula vai expandir o poder de imaginação das pessoas. O BRIC se tornou o motor da economia mundial.
Segundo projeções do Fundo Monetário Internacional, nos próximos seis anos o crescimento do BRIC responderá por 62% do crescimento global. O G-7 responderá por apenas 12%.
Diário de Cantão: Como Chanceler anfitrião, o que espera desta Cúpula?
Amorim: Este é a segunda vez em que se realiza uma Cúpula do BRIC, é um processo de consolidação da cooperação. Acredito que o encontro dos líderes dos países do BRIC tem um significado muito importante, porque eles podem definir a agenda futura.
Na área econômica, o BRIC se tornou um grupo de grande influência. Para dar um exemplo do grau de importância do grupo, os quatro países, reunidos, tem poder de veto no FMI. Em outras áreas, como mudança climática, o BRIC terá um poder de voz cada vez mais elevado.
Mas, a meu ver, há um outro assunto que aguarda discussão: o da segurança comercial. Acho que cada país ainda não considerou a fundo a situação de fato, talvez por se tratar
de uma questão sensível. Também espero que os líderes do BRIC possam discutir uma série de problemas do mundo atual.
Diário de Cantão: Haverá uma terceira Cúpula do BRIC no ano que vem? Se houver, qual país a sediará, e em que data?
Amorim: Espero que sim, mas, neste momento, não sei quando, exatamente. Caberá aos líderes do BRIC decidir. Uma vez que a primeira e a segunda cúpulas ocorreram na Rússia e no Brasil, é notável que a óbvio que a terceira deve ser num país asiático. Estamos esperando o convite (risos).
Diário de Cantão: Qual será o papel do BRIC na recuperação da economia mundial?
Amorim: No ano passado, as economias da China e da Índia preservaram seu crescimento. A economia brasileira, embora não tenha crescido, pelo menos não se retraiu. A previsão é de que o PIB brasileiro tenha crescimento de 5% ou 6% neste ano. Isso sem dúvida terá impacto relevante na economia mundial. Em certa medida, enquanto os países desenvolvidos se recuperam com dificuldade, o BRIC ajuda a economia mundial e sustenta o comércio global. Sem o BRIC, estaríamos em pior situação.
Tome o Brasil como exemplo. Nos últimos 8 anos, o valor total do intercâmbio comercial entre o Brasil e a China, a Índia e a Rússia se elevou de US$ 10 bilhões para US$ 50 bilhões, isto é, quintuplicou. No ano passado, a China se tornou o principal parceiro comercial do Brasil. 6 ou 7 anos atrás, as exportações do Brasil para os EUA e a União Européia respondiam por 28% ou 30% do total. No momento presente, as exportações para os EUA tiveram uma redução relativa, atingindo 10% do nosso total, enquanto as exportações para a China, a Índia e outros países se elevaram, em termos relativos. Acredito que se trata de uma tendência que continuará avançando, assim como o BRIC.
Diário de Cantão: Tornou-se mais elevada, no cenário internacional, a voz dos países com mercados emergentes?
Amorim: É certo. Os países com mercados emergentes têm elevado sua voz, gradualmente. O G-20 já suplantou o G-7 ou o G-8 como plataforma para a condução do diálogo em matéria de assuntos econômicos internacionais.
Além do BRIC, México, Argentina e África do Sul e outros também participam das discussões com os países desenvolvidos, o que nos permite obter um bom equilíbrio. Isso é muito importante. Mas não podemos esquecer que esses países não representam o mundo inteiro.
Como quer que seja, decisões importantes devem ser tomadas em plataformas mais amplas, como a Assembléia Geral das Nações Unidas. Quero dizer, o BRIC é importante, mas no processo de intercâmbio e de comunicação ainda temos de manter um atitude
calma e modesta, sem levar em consideração unicamente os interesses de nosso próprio país.
`O mercado interno do Brasil é seu "escudo" de defesa contra a crise`
Diário de Cantão: Como foi a recuperação do Brasil em meio à crise financeira e econômica? Quais as políticas domésticas de maior sucesso?
Amorim: Acredito que três fatores foram de grande valia para o Brasil. Em primeiro lugar, há a decisão do Governo de promover políticas públicas que assegurem melhor distribuição de renda e redução das disparidades sociais. Essas políticas têm o condão de consolidar o mercado interno, que é o principal "escudo" de defesa do Brasil contra os efeitos da crise. Antes, muitas pessoas não dispunham de poder aquisitivo, mas, hoje, podem comprar aparelhos de televisão e outros bens, e isso mantém a economia do país.
O segundo fator foi que, antes da crise, o Brasil já havia diversificado suas relações comerciais, com a China, a Argentina, outros países da América do Sul. As exportações do Brasil se tornam crescentemente importantes até mesmo para países árabes e africanos. O comércio com os EUA e a União Européia se tornou menos importante, em termos relativos.
Claro, nossas exportações continuam, como antes, a ser direcionadas para todos esses países, mas a participação dos países em desenvolvimento atingiu mais ou menos 53%, 54%. Há 8 anos apenas, essa porcentagem era menor. Recentemente, as exportações vêm se expandindo com velocidade, sobretudo as exportações para os países em desenvolvimento. Esse é outro elemento importante no enfrentamento da crise.
O terceiro fator é a grande estabilidade do nosso sistema financeiro. A reforma do nosso sistema financeiro foi concluída anos atrás. Temos bancos estatais muito fortes, que
podem prover apoio fundamental aos pequenos bancos nos momentos em que o sistema bancário atravessa uma crise. Essas instituições estão em condições de apoiar de maneira consistente os pequenos bancos e conceder empréstimos à indústria, à agricultura e aos consumidores mais humildes.
Diário de Cantão: Há problemas por resolver?
Amorim: Claro que sim. O Rio de Janeiro sediará a Olimpíada de 2016. Temos muito a aprender com a Olimpíada de Pequim. Um dos nossos problemas é a necessidade de melhorar a infra-estrutura, especialmente no que se refere a energia, transporte e portos.
Além disso, o Brasil também enfrenta importantes desafios para o desenvolvimento dos biocombustíveis e a redução da pobreza.
Diário de Cantão: Como o Senhor avalia a situação econômica da China?
Amorim: É incrível o desenvolvimento econômico da China. Estou seguro de que a China continuará a ser um dos motores do crescimento econômico mundial, e o principal deles, dentro de alguns anos.
- Comentário dos jornalistas: conheça o "melhor Chanceler do mundo"
Devido a uma visita do Presidente do Chile, nossa entrevista exclusiva com o Ministro Celso Amorim sofreu um adiamento de última hora, o que nos deixou muito preocupados, achando que não teríamos sucesso...
Quando chegamos ao Ministério das Relações Exteriores, os Presidentes do Brasil e do Chile davam uma coletiva de imprensa. Em meio a vários altos funcionários, reconhecemos de longe o Ministro Amorim. Antes de encontrar o Ministro brasileiro pessoalmente, as fotos nos haviam transmitido a impressão de um senhor cordial e simples, que não mantém as pessoas a uma distância cerimoniosa.
Perguntamos a uma das assessoras de imprensa do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Lilian, se seria necessário reduzir o tempo da entrevista, já que o Ministro estava muito
ocupado. A resposta de Lilian foi a seguinte: "De jeito nenhum. Podem conversar com o Chanceler livremente". No final, a entrevista, que seria de uma hora, durou uma hora e
meia. Durante o encontro, o Chanceler escutou atentamente as perguntas, respondendo-as com energia. Os verbos que mais empregou na entrevista foram "talk", "discuss" e "meet" [em inglês no texto] - todas com um mesmo sentido comum:
"comunicar".
"Comunicar" é a idéia-chave da forma como Amorim conduz a política externa brasileira. Ele a põe em prática todos os dias, pessoalmente. Comunica-se com líderes de vários países, comunica-se com brasileiros comuns, e comunica-se com jornalistas que, como nós, viemos da remota China. Ele se esforça para escutar o maior número possível de vozes, e também se esforça para fazer com o que o maior número possível de pessoas escutem a voz do Governo brasileiro.
Sobre a honra de receber da revista americana "Foreign Policy" o título de "melhor Chanceler do mundo", Amorim comentou com tranqüilidade: "Não sou um político, mas um diplomata profissional". De fato, "melhor Chanceler do mundo" talvez seja apenas uma opinião particular. Mas as características nele percebidas pelos jornalistas - franqueza, entusiasmo, sabedoria e lucidez - são a melhor demonstração do conceito de "diplomata profissional".
"`O BRIC se tornou o motor da economia mundial`
Entrevista com o Ministro das Relações Exteriores do Brasil,
Celso Amorim - por Wang Xiyi, Chen Hailing e Xiao Xian.
Desde a chegada ao poder do Presidente Lula, a posição e a influência do Brasil no cenário internacional têm tido uma expansão sem precedentes. Para entender a razão disso, não se pode desconhecer o mérito do "arquiteto chefe" da política externa brasileira, o Chanceler Celso Amorim.
Na esfera diplomática, Celso Amorim acumula várias realizações notáveis: em 2003, na Conferência de Cancún da OMC, ele negociou com os representantes dos países
desenvolvidos, em favor do ponto de vista e dos interesses dos países em desenvolvimento; utilizou as vantagens dos biocombustíveis para promover o diálogo e a cooperação com outros países e expandir a influência do Brasil; e, por fim, acolheu favoravelmente o conceito de BRIC, contribuindo para torná-lo um influente mecanismo de cooperação geopolítica. No cenário político internacional, Amorim é ativo e se move com
desenvoltura, fazendo com que mais países escutem a voz do Brasil.
Em 9 de abril de 2010, às vésperas da realização da Cúpula do BRIC, o Chanceler Amorim concedeu, no "Palácio de Cristal" [shuijing gong - como às vezes é chamado o Palácio Itamaraty em mandarim] uma entrevista exclusiva aos repórteres deste jornal, discutindo com franqueza a II Cúpula do BRIC e sua visão sobre as perspectivas para o relacionamento e a cooperação sino-brasileiro.
- A preparação da agenda do BRIC
Diário de Cantão: Como estão os trabalhos preparatórios para a II Cúpula do BRIC?
Amorim: Estão bem. Trata-se de um encontro muito importante, com uma série de reuniões prévias, envolvendo bancos centrais, a comunidade empresarial, acadêmicos. Houve, ainda, uma reunião de Ministros de Agricultura, já realizada.
Vocês talvez já tenham notado que, no Brasil, a Cúpula do BRIC é um tema que desperta muito interesse, e, na capital, por toda parte se pode perceber a atmosfera da Cúpula.
Eu acredito que a Cúpula vai expandir o poder de imaginação das pessoas. O BRIC se tornou o motor da economia mundial.
Segundo projeções do Fundo Monetário Internacional, nos próximos seis anos o crescimento do BRIC responderá por 62% do crescimento global. O G-7 responderá por apenas 12%.
Diário de Cantão: Como Chanceler anfitrião, o que espera desta Cúpula?
Amorim: Este é a segunda vez em que se realiza uma Cúpula do BRIC, é um processo de consolidação da cooperação. Acredito que o encontro dos líderes dos países do BRIC tem um significado muito importante, porque eles podem definir a agenda futura.
Na área econômica, o BRIC se tornou um grupo de grande influência. Para dar um exemplo do grau de importância do grupo, os quatro países, reunidos, tem poder de veto no FMI. Em outras áreas, como mudança climática, o BRIC terá um poder de voz cada vez mais elevado.
Mas, a meu ver, há um outro assunto que aguarda discussão: o da segurança comercial. Acho que cada país ainda não considerou a fundo a situação de fato, talvez por se tratar
de uma questão sensível. Também espero que os líderes do BRIC possam discutir uma série de problemas do mundo atual.
Diário de Cantão: Haverá uma terceira Cúpula do BRIC no ano que vem? Se houver, qual país a sediará, e em que data?
Amorim: Espero que sim, mas, neste momento, não sei quando, exatamente. Caberá aos líderes do BRIC decidir. Uma vez que a primeira e a segunda cúpulas ocorreram na Rússia e no Brasil, é notável que a óbvio que a terceira deve ser num país asiático. Estamos esperando o convite (risos).
Diário de Cantão: Qual será o papel do BRIC na recuperação da economia mundial?
Amorim: No ano passado, as economias da China e da Índia preservaram seu crescimento. A economia brasileira, embora não tenha crescido, pelo menos não se retraiu. A previsão é de que o PIB brasileiro tenha crescimento de 5% ou 6% neste ano. Isso sem dúvida terá impacto relevante na economia mundial. Em certa medida, enquanto os países desenvolvidos se recuperam com dificuldade, o BRIC ajuda a economia mundial e sustenta o comércio global. Sem o BRIC, estaríamos em pior situação.
Tome o Brasil como exemplo. Nos últimos 8 anos, o valor total do intercâmbio comercial entre o Brasil e a China, a Índia e a Rússia se elevou de US$ 10 bilhões para US$ 50 bilhões, isto é, quintuplicou. No ano passado, a China se tornou o principal parceiro comercial do Brasil. 6 ou 7 anos atrás, as exportações do Brasil para os EUA e a União Européia respondiam por 28% ou 30% do total. No momento presente, as exportações para os EUA tiveram uma redução relativa, atingindo 10% do nosso total, enquanto as exportações para a China, a Índia e outros países se elevaram, em termos relativos. Acredito que se trata de uma tendência que continuará avançando, assim como o BRIC.
Diário de Cantão: Tornou-se mais elevada, no cenário internacional, a voz dos países com mercados emergentes?
Amorim: É certo. Os países com mercados emergentes têm elevado sua voz, gradualmente. O G-20 já suplantou o G-7 ou o G-8 como plataforma para a condução do diálogo em matéria de assuntos econômicos internacionais.
Além do BRIC, México, Argentina e África do Sul e outros também participam das discussões com os países desenvolvidos, o que nos permite obter um bom equilíbrio. Isso é muito importante. Mas não podemos esquecer que esses países não representam o mundo inteiro.
Como quer que seja, decisões importantes devem ser tomadas em plataformas mais amplas, como a Assembléia Geral das Nações Unidas. Quero dizer, o BRIC é importante, mas no processo de intercâmbio e de comunicação ainda temos de manter um atitude
calma e modesta, sem levar em consideração unicamente os interesses de nosso próprio país.
`O mercado interno do Brasil é seu "escudo" de defesa contra a crise`
Diário de Cantão: Como foi a recuperação do Brasil em meio à crise financeira e econômica? Quais as políticas domésticas de maior sucesso?
Amorim: Acredito que três fatores foram de grande valia para o Brasil. Em primeiro lugar, há a decisão do Governo de promover políticas públicas que assegurem melhor distribuição de renda e redução das disparidades sociais. Essas políticas têm o condão de consolidar o mercado interno, que é o principal "escudo" de defesa do Brasil contra os efeitos da crise. Antes, muitas pessoas não dispunham de poder aquisitivo, mas, hoje, podem comprar aparelhos de televisão e outros bens, e isso mantém a economia do país.
O segundo fator foi que, antes da crise, o Brasil já havia diversificado suas relações comerciais, com a China, a Argentina, outros países da América do Sul. As exportações do Brasil se tornam crescentemente importantes até mesmo para países árabes e africanos. O comércio com os EUA e a União Européia se tornou menos importante, em termos relativos.
Claro, nossas exportações continuam, como antes, a ser direcionadas para todos esses países, mas a participação dos países em desenvolvimento atingiu mais ou menos 53%, 54%. Há 8 anos apenas, essa porcentagem era menor. Recentemente, as exportações vêm se expandindo com velocidade, sobretudo as exportações para os países em desenvolvimento. Esse é outro elemento importante no enfrentamento da crise.
O terceiro fator é a grande estabilidade do nosso sistema financeiro. A reforma do nosso sistema financeiro foi concluída anos atrás. Temos bancos estatais muito fortes, que
podem prover apoio fundamental aos pequenos bancos nos momentos em que o sistema bancário atravessa uma crise. Essas instituições estão em condições de apoiar de maneira consistente os pequenos bancos e conceder empréstimos à indústria, à agricultura e aos consumidores mais humildes.
Diário de Cantão: Há problemas por resolver?
Amorim: Claro que sim. O Rio de Janeiro sediará a Olimpíada de 2016. Temos muito a aprender com a Olimpíada de Pequim. Um dos nossos problemas é a necessidade de melhorar a infra-estrutura, especialmente no que se refere a energia, transporte e portos.
Além disso, o Brasil também enfrenta importantes desafios para o desenvolvimento dos biocombustíveis e a redução da pobreza.
Diário de Cantão: Como o Senhor avalia a situação econômica da China?
Amorim: É incrível o desenvolvimento econômico da China. Estou seguro de que a China continuará a ser um dos motores do crescimento econômico mundial, e o principal deles, dentro de alguns anos.
- Comentário dos jornalistas: conheça o "melhor Chanceler do mundo"
Devido a uma visita do Presidente do Chile, nossa entrevista exclusiva com o Ministro Celso Amorim sofreu um adiamento de última hora, o que nos deixou muito preocupados, achando que não teríamos sucesso...
Quando chegamos ao Ministério das Relações Exteriores, os Presidentes do Brasil e do Chile davam uma coletiva de imprensa. Em meio a vários altos funcionários, reconhecemos de longe o Ministro Amorim. Antes de encontrar o Ministro brasileiro pessoalmente, as fotos nos haviam transmitido a impressão de um senhor cordial e simples, que não mantém as pessoas a uma distância cerimoniosa.
Perguntamos a uma das assessoras de imprensa do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Lilian, se seria necessário reduzir o tempo da entrevista, já que o Ministro estava muito
ocupado. A resposta de Lilian foi a seguinte: "De jeito nenhum. Podem conversar com o Chanceler livremente". No final, a entrevista, que seria de uma hora, durou uma hora e
meia. Durante o encontro, o Chanceler escutou atentamente as perguntas, respondendo-as com energia. Os verbos que mais empregou na entrevista foram "talk", "discuss" e "meet" [em inglês no texto] - todas com um mesmo sentido comum:
"comunicar".
"Comunicar" é a idéia-chave da forma como Amorim conduz a política externa brasileira. Ele a põe em prática todos os dias, pessoalmente. Comunica-se com líderes de vários países, comunica-se com brasileiros comuns, e comunica-se com jornalistas que, como nós, viemos da remota China. Ele se esforça para escutar o maior número possível de vozes, e também se esforça para fazer com o que o maior número possível de pessoas escutem a voz do Governo brasileiro.
Sobre a honra de receber da revista americana "Foreign Policy" o título de "melhor Chanceler do mundo", Amorim comentou com tranqüilidade: "Não sou um político, mas um diplomata profissional". De fato, "melhor Chanceler do mundo" talvez seja apenas uma opinião particular. Mas as características nele percebidas pelos jornalistas - franqueza, entusiasmo, sabedoria e lucidez - são a melhor demonstração do conceito de "diplomata profissional".